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Abstract 
The Owl of Minerva: governing technology in the quest for sustainability  
Companion to the goddess of wisdom, the owl flies at dusk; understanding emerges only at 
the end of an era. Inspired by insights from both sides of the science and humanities divide, 
this dissertation surveys the terrain of sustainability before swooping upon our relationship 
with technology as key to its realisation. It assesses each element of the classic I=PAT equation 
and determines that humanity’s current trajectory is not sustainable. Because effective 
population (P) policy acts slowly, and because reducing affluence (A) is incompatible with 
human aspiration, only technology (T) might moderate human impact (I) to sustainable 
proportions. Building on a comparative analysis of three case studies on chemical herbicides, 
nuclear power, and robotics and artificial intelligence that identify significant problems with 
present governance approaches, this study outlines an alternative. Rejecting the attitude that 
technological ‘innovation’ and ‘disruption’ are unquestionably good and inevitable, it argues 
that if sustainability is to be realised, humanity must wrest back control over the technologies 
we create. Supported by integrity and other measures, this implies going beyond existing 
approaches to a form of network governance that promises the agility to deal with complex 
change, while avoiding regulatory capture by commercial and military interests. At the end of 
this industrial era, there is need for wisdom. Providing that sustainability has priority, that its 
governance is inclusive, transparent and polycentric, through technology humanity may yet 
have a long-term future on Earth. 
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Notes 
On style 
As recommended by The Economist style guide, a tendency to over-capitalisation is resisted. 
Acronyms are used sparingly to help make the text more readable. 
As Fowler suggests, ‘ise’ and its variants are preferred to ‘ize’, if only for the sake of 
consistency.  
‘Program’ is preferred to the archaic and francophone ‘programme’, as ‘telegram’ would have 
been preferred to ‘telegramme’ if the opportunity had arisen. 
On knowledge 
As to what may be known, I am attracted to the view of the entomologist E.O. Wilson (1999, 
p. 291) that: “all tangible phenomena, from the birth of stars to the workings of social
institutions, are based on material processes that are ultimately reducible, however long and
tortuous the sequences, to the laws of physics”. Deconstructionists and post-modernists, in
this view, are mere gadflies, who are nonetheless useful to keep the ‘real’ scientists honest
(Costanza 1999).
On the other hand, I am not convinced that “the workings of social institutions” in particular 
are tangible phenomena reducible to physics as Wilson asserts. Rather, I think that Bismarck 
came close to a truth when he said that the making of laws is like the making of sausages: it is 
better not to observe the process too closely. Although in this he was less invoking a 
Heisenberg indeterminacy, more its unpleasantness.  
And lastly, science is central. But it does not mean that particular scientists are infallible, that 
methods and results are not influenced by social processes, or that human perceptions of 
what is important are pure and objective rather than the result of historical and political 
forces. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
For generations, we have assumed that the efforts of mankind would leave the fundamental 
equilibrium of the world's systems and atmosphere stable. But it is possible that with all these 
enormous changes (population, agricultural, use of fossil fuels) concentrated into such a short 
period of time, we have unwittingly begun a massive experiment with the system of this planet 
itself                                                                   - Margaret Thatcher, speech to the Royal Society, 1988. 
Riding tigers 
Mrs Thatcher and the industrialist Aurelio Peccei, co-founder of the Club of Rome, were once 
in accord. While Thatcher spoke of “a massive experiment” with the entire planet, Peccei had 
earlier dictated a message from his deathbed. He said that humanity “must learn how to ride 
the technological tigers” we have unleashed; if we do not the Earth will become incapable of 
supporting our species; there will be no future for humankind (Peccei 1984, pp. 41-42). Two 
centuries of industrialisation, exploding population growth and economic frenzy based on 
unchecked technologies gave us smog, polluted waterways, toxic waste, soil erosion, 
deforestation, the extinction of many species, global warming and rising oceans (Westacott 
2016). Yet those technologies have also given us the means to check disease and extend life, 
to connect with each other and to access and apply knowledge in ways beyond the wildest 
imaginings of the Enlightenment. Our present system of extracting, making, consuming and 
discarding may be unsustainable, but is not inevitable. This dissertation assesses the factors of 
sustainability and how we might become more adept at riding Peccei’s tigers.   
Is humanity sustainable? 
There can be no greater significance than the issue of sustainability for humanity. While ever-
narrowing inquiries typify research within all disciplines, this study attempts a breadth 
commensurate with the importance of the question. If the answer to the question above is in 
fact an unqualified ‘no’, then ultimately there is no point to any other field of human 
endeavour. Quantum physics, history, philosophy, engineering, the fine arts, love, capital 
accumulation − in the longer term, all is for nought and for nothing.  
This sustainability issue is just as important for the many life forms fast dwindling at our hand, 
and more so now than at any earlier time. Yet besides the possible finding of ‘no’ to the 
question, there are also many variations of an affirmative. Perhaps humanity is sustainable if 
we adopt a particular policy, if we effect different technologies, if we accept a diminished 
energy or if global capitalism is better controlled. Perhaps humanity is, in the longer term, 
already on a sustainable trajectory and this current crisis is just a blip, a speed bump on our 
digital highway to the future.  
The words ‘sustainable’ and ‘sustainability’ in the second decade of the twenty-first century are 
ubiquitous throughout the Anglosphere, having leapt to prominence around 1980.1 Businesses 
aspire to be sustainable. Public strategies require sustainability. No-one supports endeavours that 
are said to be unsustainable. While the notion of sustainability is both central and contested in 
several disciplines, as Eriksson & Andersson put it (2010, pp. 59-60), “to understand the true 
meaning of sustainability, the concept of entropy is necessary”. Entropy is the universal tendency 
to disorder, in which energy, although conserved in accordance with the first law of 
thermodynamics,2 becomes dispersed and thus less useable over time as it performs work and 
transitions from higher states to its lowest state: heat. This means that in the long run humanity 
1 According to Google’s N-gram viewer, 2017. 
2 The first law of thermodynamics is a version of the general law of conservation of energy. 
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must again adapt to using inexhaustible energy resources as we once did, because in a closed 
system, the non-renewable stock will run out, just as energy (or states of order) will tend to even 
out over time in thermodynamics. All energy on Earth ultimately derives from the sun.3  
And while ultimately all matter is stardust, and theoretically anything can be constructed from its 
basic elements, it requires a great deal of energy to change complex material forms. As a result, 
the extraction of complex forms of matter from the Earth such as metals, chemicals and organic 
materials will continue as long as humanity foreseeably exists as a civilisation. But minimisation, 
conservation and re-use of those materials becomes imperative. Otherwise continued 
consumption and disposal leads only to a material entropy where grains of nickel, calcium 
carbonate and humus are dispersed beyond recovery over a featureless desert of grey. 
In this way, T. S. Eliot’s famous phrase from The Hollow Men (1925) “this is the way the world 
ends, not with a bang, but a whimper” has a parallel in the second law of thermodynamics, which 
states that “any closed system4 evolves towards a state of thermodynamic equilibrium”  the 
state of maximum entropy. If we consider the Earth as a closed system, then the whimper 
towards the end of its Anthropocene epoch will be an entropy in which any remaining human life 
will possess minimal degraded capabilities.  
However, C. P. Snow’s The Two Cultures (1959) lecture on the two mutually uncomprehending 
worlds of science and literature supposes that familiarity with Eliot for a scientist is the equivalent 
of knowledge of the second law of thermodynamics by a literary intellectual. Both are unlikely. 
Snow deplores this gulf of understanding between the two fields,5 and especially the lack of 
appreciation of the importance of applied science in addressing the major concerns of his time: 
“Industrialisation is the only hope of the poor” (Snow 1959, p. 13). Writing during the Cold War, 
Snow urges a scientific effort of the West to transform the poor societies of “India, Africa, South-
East Asia, Latin America and the Middle East” to ameliorate the three menaces that confront 
humanity: nuclear war, over-population and the gap between rich and poor. While less due to a 
conscious scientific effort of the West, some of those poor societies have since undergone 
industrialisation and the threat of nuclear war has arguably diminished. Yet the menaces of over-
population and inequality remain. An underlying theme of this dissertation is bridging 
understandings between cultures and disciplines. The quest for sustainability demands that the 
sciences and the humanities acknowledge their need for each other. 
Consistent with an awareness of the Earth as a linked, closed system rather than a limitless 
resource (Boulding 1966, Buckminster Fuller 1969, Commoner 1972, Holdren & Erlich 1974, 
Lovelock 1979) that has developed since Snow’s identification of these threats, overpopulation 
and inequality still imperil not only humanity, but all species that form life on Earth. The classic 
I=PAT equation, meaning human environmental impact is a product of population, affluence and 
technology, has been used to identify the key relationships that govern sustainability for most of 
the ensuing six decades. Population alone is not the only basic determinant of our effect on the 
planet. Unlike other species, our impact is greatly amplified by the factors of affluence and 
technology. This dissertation uses the equation to structure its analysis of sustainability. However, 
3 This includes fossil fuels that are due to photosynthesis, radioactive materials that came from solar 
matter, wind that is caused by solar radiation differentials and the tides that result from the orbits of 
the Earth and the moon about the sun.  
4 There is an important difference between a ‘closed’ and an ‘isolated’ system in thermodynamic 
theory, which is discussed later in this dissertation. 
5 Although DiMaggio (2015, para. 2) asserts “that the era of the “two cultures” (Snow, 1959) is over” 
based on his experience as a social scientist working with computer scientists, finding instead of 
chasms, only “modest differences in orientation” due to their respective intellectual traditions. 
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the relationship, between these factors, originally formulated by Erlich (1968), is not entirely 
straightforward. Neither is the meaning of each element. 
The IPAT relationship remains the most coherent summation of factors that relate to 
sustainability. However, the meanings of the latter two factors especially – A (affluence) and T 
(technology) — have changed considerably since its original conception (Chertow 2000). Also, 
there is no direct empirical relationship between affluence or technology and environmental 
impact. Rather, in line with Kuznets (1955), there is evidence that the environmental impact of at 
least some pollutants first rises with increasing affluence, then falls as wealth further increases 
(World Bank 1992). Some technologies benefit the environment. Some cause outright harm. 
Moreover, the measurement of affluence itself is problematic. It is usually assumed to be 
measurable by gross domestic product (GDP), given that production equates to consumption, 
which is determined by affluence. However, GDP and similar measures do not quantify all aspects 
of production and consumption. What is consumed can affect the environment as much as how 
much is consumed, and consumption of intangibles is increasing.  
The interaction of technology with the environment may be positive as well as negative. In the 
original I=PAT equation, Erlich (1968) postulated carbon dioxide emission as a cipher for 
technology use, as then technological density and industrialisation emitted more carbon dioxide. 
Certainly this is still essentially true of recently industrialised economies such as China and 
increasingly India, where coal-fired power stations and secondary industries continue to be built 
at an astonishing rate and where air pollution is legendary. However newer technologies such as 
solar cells emit no carbon dioxide in use. Digital technologies facilitate analysis and the acquisition 
of knowledge, and also emit little. Sensors and meteorological computer models help mitigate 
the effects of weather through accurate prediction. And contraception technologies negatively 
effect population and thus contribute to a reduced environmental impact.  
This dissertation initially explores the nature of human sustainability and its dimensions 
through the IPAT lens. It examines how perceptions of the variables that compose it have 
changed, their interrelationships and how the concept might guide policies that lead to a 
more sustainable world. Because each of its variables relate to different fields, including the 
social, physical and life sciences as well as the humanities, an interdisciplinary approach is 
used to investigate this concept and its related public policy. 
Now, however, we have the advantage of being able to look backwards in time to the 
beginnings of the modern environmental awakening, as well as forwards to where our fate 
may lead. That awakening was directly related to the accelerating impact of new technologies 
after the Second World War (Carson 1962, Commoner 1972, Steffen et al 2011), as well as to 
the accumulation of technologies that began with the Industrial Revolution. Half a century 
since that environmental awakening, innovation and still newer technologies are exploding 
into diverse realms, based on digital computing, new means of data capture and analysis 
capabilities on a scale unimaginable only a generation earlier. The relationship between 
humanity and technology is symbiotic. Our technologies affect us as much as we affect them 
and the relationship is intensifying. It is to this bond that this dissertation turns as the only 
practicable policy area whereby sustainability might be effected in the medium term. 
Research question 
The research question is in two parts: (1) Having regard to the key factors affecting the impact of 
humanity on the Earth, is our current trajectory sustainable? (2) Of those factors, how important 
is technology to sustainability, and how might its governance best be approached?  The former 
4 
part attempts to assess how close we are to disaster and the main factors driving it. The second 
part, focuses on technology in particular and describes both weaknesses in, and implied reforms 
to its governance that promise a long-term future for our species, and for the remaining 
creatures with which our world is shared.  
Thesis 
That while the evolving discourse surrounding sustainability involves patterns of paradox and 
contradiction, these are overridden by our dependence on technologies that greatly amplify 
human impact such that it is not sustainable. Because neither rapid population reduction nor 
declining affluence are practical policy goals, the quest for sustainability demands a conscious re-
fashioning of our relationship with technology that centers on energy intensity, its impact on 
other life forms, and its capacity to dematerialise the effects of our existence. This implies 
measures that focus on technology governance with sustainability as a predominant principle.  
Approach 
Taking Snow (1959) as an inspiration, the approach is interdisciplinary. It consists of a broad 
review of the concept of sustainability spanning relevant literatures, including analysis of 
elements of the IPAT relationship, with particular reference to technology. Technological regimes 
at the state and global level are then assessed against the criteria of good governance. The 
dissertation then analyses three representative case studies of major technologies – the herbicide 
glyphosate, nuclear electricity, and robotics and artificial intelligence. The case studies are aimed 
at detecting strengths and weaknesses in their governance, with a view to the identification of 
policies that show promise in the pursuit of sustainability. As well as the literature review and 
comparative case studies, its methods involve discussions with leading scholars and practitioners 
as well as analysis of insights from disciplines including anthropology, astrobiology, biology, 
ecology, economics, geography, history, paleontology, philosophy and physics, together with 
politics and public policy theory.   
Structure 
Consistent with the research question, the structure is in two parts. Part One is an analysis of 
human sustainability tied to each element of the IPAT equation as separate chapters, based on an 
extensive literature review. Part Two singles out our relationship with technology as an issue of 
governance. Three case studies of major technologies are assessed as separate chapters, and 
their governance strengths and weaknesses identified and alternatives explored. The conclusion 
reflects on the global measures involving technology that may advance sustainability, affecting its 
governance, both structural and institutional (see figure 1 below). 
Figure 1. Dissertation structure 
Part One
Extensive theoretical discussion of sustainability and its elements
Part Two
Comparative critical engagement with three technology case studies in relation to governance for 
sustainability 
Conclusion
Reflection on measures to advance sustainability through technology governance
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Part One. Sustainability and its elements 
  6 
Chapter 2. The concept of sustainability 
 
This is the dead land 
This is cactus land 
Here the stone images 
Are raised, here they receive 
The supplication of a dead man's hand 
Under the twinkle of a fading star       
− TS Eliot, The Hollow Men 
 
Eliot’s image of a lifeless Earth looms as one reflects on what has happened to our planet 
home in recent times. By contrast with this representation, a more hopeful world is alive, 
vibrant, interconnected: a sustainable one. The concept of sustainability is recent, yet concerns 
about it have been with us for millennia. It encompasses all resource extraction, production and 
consumption of goods and services. It includes how waste is treated and our impact on other 
life forms on which we depend, or which are part of the one biosphere that we share. It 
encompasses and is yet distracted by ‘climate change’ as it was once distracted by ‘the 
population explosion’. Sustainability is simply human activity that might continue indefinitely. 
 
This Part One of the dissertation is a broad appraisal of the concept of sustainability and its 
components, with a view to what may be practically feasible. It is structured according to the 
classic I=PAT relationship: human impact (I) is a product of population (P), affluence (A) and 
technology (T). Each of these elements form the following chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. Based on this 
investigation, chapter 7 assesses the directions that show most promise in realising a more 
sustainable humanity. 
 
This chapter 2 sets out key aspects of the sustainability concept, especially historically, 
scientifically and politically. It is argued that the notion is important within all such spheres 
and that its pursuit, ultimately through politics, depends on the development of a compelling 
narrative to support its realisation. 
 
The notion of long-term global sustainability has yet to fully enter widespread consciousness; 
many still operate with a nineteenth century mindset of a nature without limit and frontiers of 
civilisation to be ‘opened up’ and exploited. By contrast, reality is that nature clearly has limits 
and there are no more frontiers that can be exploited without consequence. 
 
The early Christian, Tertullian (1951 [c. 200 AD]), observed that humans were “burdensome to 
the world” nearly two thousand years ago, and instances of unsustainable practices have 
increased throughout history. Lead pollution was evident in ancient times (Hong et al 1994). 
The burning of ‘sea coal’ in London became increasingly obnoxious during the Middle Ages 
(Chew & Kellaway 1973, no. 617). Timber harvesting in England and much of Europe became 
unsustainable during Elizabethan times (Van der Zee 2013). The volume of sewage in Victorian 
cities led to epidemics before the imperative of reform (Snow 2008). The Romantics were 
dismayed at the price nature paid for the Industrial Revolution. In the United States (US), the 
Sierra Club and national parks were established in the late nineteenth century in reaction to a 
fast diminishing natural world. The 1930s ‘dustbowl’ tragedy showed the importance of 
sustainable agricultural practices. In the 1940s and 1950s, the many deaths from air pollution 
in Donora, Pennsylvania and in London helped spur more sustainable industrial practice, at 
least in the US and UK. Fatalities and deformities from heavy metal accumulation in Japan in 
the 1960s finally led to better controls over following decades. Asbestos and lead poisoning 
has been curtailed in rich countries since the late twentieth century and emissions of ozone 
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depleting substances have lately been limited by near universal international law, because 
their use was unsustainable. Sustainability implies minimal harm to both humans and the 
biosphere. It is a self-evident imperative where they intersect. 
 
Although human awareness that demanding no more than the environment can supply is 
historically and geographically age-old (Matson, Clark & Andersson p. 2), contemporary 
anxieties about sustainability date from the 1960s when Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) 
and the Erlichs’ The Population Bomb (1968)6 were published. Carson highlighted the perils of 
synthetic pesticides while the Erlichs made public the threat of runaway population growth. In 
1969 a new mandate for the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
referred to management of ‘air, water, soils, minerals and living species including man, so as 
to achieve the highest sustainable quality of life’ (Adams 2006, p. 2).  
 
However, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) report for the newly formed Club 
of Rome, The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al 1972), first showed the profound effects of 
continued exponential consumption on a finite planet, using computer modelling. Graham 
Turner’s 2014 article Is Global Collapse Imminent?, which compares the report’s predictions to 
reality, suggests that the original Limits was remarkably accurate in forecasting patterns of 
population, economic growth and resource use in the four decades since it was written.7 
Pointedly, he concludes that if the unsustainable ‘business as usual’ trajectory continues, then 
global collapse within the next decade or two is imminent (Turner 2014, p. 3). 
 
Prompted by the Limits projections, the new concept of “sustainability”8 was first articulated 
at a World Council of Churches (WCC) meeting involving scientists, theologians and 
economists in Bucharest in 1974, at which the “intolerable strain on the Earth's resources” 
was discussed in the context of science, technology and human development. According to 
David Hallman’s later WCC report: 
 
What emerged out of the [1974] Bucharest discussion on the role of science and 
technology in the development of human societies was the articulation of a concept 
called "sustainability" - the idea that the world's future requires a vision of 
development that can be sustained in the long run, both environmentally and 
economically. The awareness of the need to link socio-economic justice and ecological 
sustainability has been a recurring theme within the ecumenical community and has 
been a gift to the broader global community (Hallman 2002, para. 8). 
 
These early prophecies of peril resulted in measures aimed at curbing excesses, especially in 
the industrialised West, as well as the creation of global mechanisms relating to the 
environment and sustainability. During the 1980s these measures included the World 
Conservation Strategy: Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development (1980), the 
World Commission on Environment and Development (1983), the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Brundtland report Our Common Future, both 
1987. Since that flurry of activity, measures relating to sustainability noticeably faltered and 
narrowed. There was the Kyoto protocol of 1997, the stalemate of Copenhagen in 2009 and 
the diluted extension of Doha in 2012, all of which attempt to forestall climate change by 
                                                 
6 Both Anne and Paul Erlich were the original authors, although the publisher decided to list only Paul. 
7 Specifically, Turner refers to “population, industrial capital, pollution, agricultural systems, and non-
renewable resources” (Turner 2014, p. 5).  
8 Although the notion of ‘sustainable yield’ emerged with scientific forestry in Germany during the 
eighteenth century (Worster 1993, p. 145). 
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limiting greenhouse gas emissions. The Paris emissions agreement of 2015 yet stood out as an 
important step forward, at least as far as global warming is concerned.  
 
There have also been the Rio (1992) and follow-up Earth Summits (Rio+5, +10 and +20) that 
concerned conservation, poverty reduction and empowerment. There were the eight 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 2000-2015 that included an eleventh hour goal seven, 
to ensure environmental sustainability.9 This goal included targets for biodiversity loss, 
deforestation, fish stocks and water quality as well as emissions. However, the focus of the 
MDGs was more on other goals, especially poverty reduction, health and gender equality. 
More importantly, the MDGs were targeted at developing countries − there was no goal seven 
that applied to the industrialised world, nor in practice to China. At least the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) that replaced the MDGs from 2016 do involve targets for rich 
countries; thus for the first time wider sustainability is recognised as a global problem for 
global action.  
 
Empathy and entropy 
Beyond these historical aspects of the concept, there is the anthropological and the planetary. 
While it has been observed that no social animal is guided by the welfare of the entire species 
to which it belongs, humans are a potential exception. Originally tribal and territorial, our 
species first conceived of ‘universal orders’,10 when the entire human race could be imagined 
as a single unit about three thousand years ago. This meant that everyone was potentially ‘us’. 
There was no longer ‘them’ (Harari 2014, pp. 171-172). Since then, despite many setbacks, the 
overall historical trend has been towards greater global unity. Around the end of the last ice 
age there were thousands of autonomous human worlds on the planet. Five hundred years 
ago most people lived in the single Afro-Asian landmass with limited cultural and economic 
interconnections. Now there is only one world. Harari (2014, pp. 167-168) observes that 
Tasmania, with the arrival of British settlers from Sydney in 1803, was the last autonomous 
human world to be brought under the dominant Afro-Asian, (in this case, European) sphere of 
influence.11 
 
This impinges on the notion of moral progress, which means “including ever more people (or 
beings) in the group of those whose interests are to be respected”, illustrated by Hierocles, 
the second century Stoic philosopher, who described our relationships as a series of 
concentric circles radiating from the self, then the immediate family, the neighbourhood, the 
state and so on (Klein & Cave 2015). It further links with the notion of the ‘land ethic’ by which 
we are bound to respect our biotic community: water, animals, plants and the soil (Leopold 
1977 [1949]).  
 
In The Empathic Civilisation, the US social theorist Jeremy Rifkin takes this idea further and 
conceives “a grand paradox”. He suggests that the whole of history is a struggle between the 
polar forces of empathy and entropy. Just as we have extended empathy to all of humankind, 
the industrialised infrastructure needed to accomplish that interconnectivity "is running up 
against a rapidly accelerating entropic juggernaut” in “climate change and the proliferation of 
                                                 
9 According to its lead author, Mark Malloch Brown of the UNDP, goal seven was a last-minute inclusion 
due to a chance meeting in the corridor he had with “the beaming head of the UNEP”, even as an 
earlier version had already been sent to print. Brown says “a terrible swearword crossed my mind when 
I realised we'd forgotten an environmental goal … we raced back to put in the sustainable development 
goal” (Malloch-Brown in Tran 2012). 
10 Harari proposes three such universal orders: monetary, imperial and religious. 
11 While New Zealand was settled by Europeans a little later  in 1814  the Maori ended its autonomy 
at the end of the Polynesian expansion several hundred years earlier. 
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weapons of mass destruction". This self-destruction can only be averted by developing what 
Rivkin terms a "biosphere consciousness", a collective sense of affiliation with the entire 
biosphere and its systems (Rivkin 2009, p. 21).  
 
Indeed, it has been observed that humanity is now involved in a “world-wide conversation 
about the issues of human longevity on Earth”, but as yet a satisfactory vision of sustainability 
has not been framed. Sustainability is still often regarded as just one of many issues - rather 
than the “linchpin that connects all the other issues” (Orr 2006, p. 266). In this vein, one pithy 
statement about sustainability is from the former British ambassador to the UN, Sir Crispin 
Tickell, who speaking of sustainable development, described it as “treating the Earth as if we 
intended to stay” (Tickell 2013). 
 
Alternatively, the issue of sustainability can be seen from the viewpoint of the Earth itself, 
rather than from the position of humanity. James Lovelock is associated with this idea that 
goes beyond the Anthropocene and dynamic Earth systems approaches.12 Gaia – the Greek 
goddess of the Earth – envisages a planet that is itself “alive, in the same way that a gene is 
selfish”. The Earth is “a self-regulating entity” and able to dispense with those that threaten 
life – including humans (Lovelock 2000 [1979], p. ix). The atmosphere is a biological 
construction, not living, but like a bird’s feathers or a wasp’s nest, an extension of a living 
system designed to maintain a chosen environment (Ibid, p. 9).  
 
The term ‘Gaia’ was suggested to Lovelock by his neighbour, William Golding, the 1983 Nobel 
laureate for literature (Lovelock 2000 [1979], vii). The concept reputedly enraged scientists 
such as the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, because the strong form of the hypothesis 
presupposes a singular member (the Earth) of a separate species that has evolved without 
natural selection. However, it became popular with the wider public and those scientists of 
less rigid disposition who saw it as more of a metaphor. Lovelock developed the idea while 
working for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California, when pondering the quest to discover 
life on other planets. He reasoned that all life is anti-entropic. Therefore, evidence for life 
would be found in signs of anti-entropic processes.  
 
Thus sustainability on Earth is linked to a maintenance or increase of life, a conservation or 
lessening of entropy. This notion has profound consequences. For example, a loss of 
biodiversity points to a reduction in sustainability. A loss of populations within species points 
to less sustainability. Any factor on which diverse life forms depend, such as forests or seas or 
entire ecosystems, if degraded, means that sustainability has been lost. This general concept 
of sustainability is used throughout the rest of this dissertation. Its relationship to the term 
‘sustainable development’ is discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Industrialisation 
Predominating these considerations is the notion that human impact on the planet, now 
clearly a matter of dire concern, is largely the result of the industrialisation that began only 
within the past 200-odd years. This industrialisation was and still is based on the extraction 
and burning of coal, oil and gas. Even the icons of modernity  mass production, grid 
electricity, the telephone, the car, chemicals, plastics  derive from these fossil substances. 
The problem is not only that the amounts of these materials are limited, but more 
immediately that their extraction and use is harmful to the biosphere on which all life 
depends.   
                                                 
12 Although Lovelock acknowledges that the idea of a living Earth system originated with the ‘father of 
geology’, James Hutton, in a 1785 lecture (cited in Young 1991, p.122). 
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Coal, oil and gas are all forms of stored energy from the sun, the result of ancient plants and 
forests that grew in the oxygen-rich atmosphere of the carboniferous period, 300-350 million 
years ago. Since the Industrial Revolution we have been raiding that stored sunlight and now 
face the consequences. Either the storehouse will be emptied or the environment will be 
permanently altered, or both.  
 
Over the past thousand years, global average temperatures have varied less than one degree 
Celsius (Wilson & Piper 2010) but show a sharp rise after the 1960s. But while the current 
widespread concern about ‘climate change’, or ‘global warming’ and the earlier term 
‘greenhouse effect’ has become part of global consciousness only within the past twenty years 
or so, one of its more obvious effects, that of melting ice, was known to popular science much 
earlier. Rachel Carson’s lesser known 1952 classic The Sea Around Us describes in some detail 
the opening up of the Arctic Sea due to reduced in ice cover from the early twentieth century: 
 
We are witnessing a startling alteration of climate…a definite change in the arctic 
climate set in about 1900, that it became astonishingly marked about 1930, and that it 
is now spreading into sub-arctic and temperate regions…in 1932, for example, the 
Knipowitsch sailed around Franz Joseph Land for the first time in the history of arctic 
voyaging…the season when pack ice lies about Iceland became shorter by about two 
months than it was a century ago…drift ice in the Russian sector of the Arctic Sea 
decreased by a million square kilometres between 1924 and 1944 (Carson 1952, pp. 
183-184). 
 
Carson also shows that awareness of global glacier melt, too, was evident quite some time 
ago. She lists a “catastrophic” decline in glaciers of the Alps as well as those of Norway, the 
North Atlantic coast and Alaska “during the last decades”.13 Further: 
 
Northern glaciers are not the only ones that are receding…the glaciers of several East 
African high volcanoes have been diminishing since they were first studied in the 
1800s − very rapidly since 1920 − and there is glacial shrinkage in the Andes and also 
in the high mountains of central Asia (Carson 1952, p. 186). 
 
Yet while the effects of global warming are clear and “the long trend is toward a warmer 
Earth” (Ibid, p. 187), Carson is wary of pointing to a definitive cause. Changes in ocean 
currents, tidal movements, natural post-Pleistocene warming, and an increase in solar activity 
are all countenanced. Anthropogenic causes are not.  
 
Today that main cause is, according to scientific consensus, clear. It is anthropogenic and due 
to industrialisation. Palutikof et al (2013 p. 4) propose a three dimensional relationship 
between the costs of climate change impact, mitigation and adaptation. Greater resources put 
into either or both mitigation and adaptation result in lower impact costs whereas fewer 
resources put into either or both result in higher impact costs. These impacts include not only 
short term disasters such as stronger hurricanes, but also long term increases in salinity, loss 
of water table, droughts, crop failures, sea level rise and biodiversity decline  all of which 
imply loss of sustainability.  
 
Even the venerable author of The Population Bomb, Paul Erlich, is more than concerned about 
the climate: “Climate change may be the most serious issue there is, another may be the 
                                                 
13 The 1920s. 
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toxification of the planet” (Erlich 2009). US President Barack Obama is curt about what this 
means for fossil fuel extraction: “We’re not going to be able to burn it all” (cited in Rusbridger 
2015). 
 
Industrialisation affects sustainability well beyond the dimension of climate change, however. 
Its effluents may directly destroy life forms and its resource extraction may destroy whole 
ecosystems. And there are many views on its remedy. John Dryzek in The Politics of the Earth 
(1997) identifies eight different discourses that counter the long-dominant Promethean 
paradigm of industrialism, by which unlimited growth is both assumed and approved. These 
eight alternative discourses he classifies as either ‘radical’ or ‘prosaic’ and either ‘reformist’ or 
‘imaginative’, as outlined in figure 2 below: 
 
Figure 2. Alternative environmental discourses 
 Radical  Reformist 
Prosaic Survivalism 
 Survivalist  
(challenges limitless growth 
but not societal structure, 
e.g. ‘Limits to Growth’) 
Environmental problem solving by: 
 Experts (administrative rationalism) 
 ‘the people’ (democratic pragmatism) 
 the market (economic rationalism) 
 
Imaginative Green radical 
 Green romanticism  
 Green rationalism  
(includes social ecology, 
deep ecology, ecofeminism 
and environmental justice 
movements) 
Sustainability  
 Sustainable development 
 Ecological modernisation or 
‘ecomodernism’ (seeks to resolve 
environmental and economic conflict 
and ignore limits)  
Source: based on Dryzek 1997 
 
The survivalist discourse is radical because it challenges the notion of limitless growth, yet it is 
prosaic because its solutions, such as more rational control, are within the constraints of 
industrialism. The three environmental problem-solving discourses are both reformist and 
prosaic because they all accept industrialism and their solutions are adjustments to the status 
quo. They differ according to agency for control of environmental policies – experts, ‘the 
people’ or the market. The two green radical discourses − green romanticism and green 
rationalism − are both radical and imaginative. These discourses reject the structure of 
industrial society and imagine radically different societies and environmental relationships. 
They include strands of the social ecology, deep ecology, ecofeminist and environmental 
justice movements. Lastly, the two sustainability discourses are both reformist and 
imaginative. They seek to dissolve the conflict between environmental and economic values 
and seek to minimise the notion of limits.  
 
When considering the politics of sustainability, it can be an advantage to understand what sort 
of discourse is acceptable. In part, this depends on how the concepts are ‘framed’. For 
example, people relate more to identity and values rather than facts and self-interest (Lakoff, 
2004); the tendency of sustainability to be couched as a bio-physical systems issue rather than 
a social issue makes it less likely to be addressed with the policy urgency it deserves (Hackman 
et al 2014, p. 655).  
 
In this vein, Alex Steffen (2009) makes the framing rather simpler. He divides environmental 
sustainability into three shades of green. Light greens see the issue as one of personal 
responsibility and individual lifestyle, dark greens see a radical change in economics and 
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consumption as the only answer to continuing destruction, while his preferred bright greens 
favour technological innovation and regulation as the best way to lighten human impact on 
the planet, as shown in figure 3 below.  
 
Figure 3. Three shades of green 
 
Source: Steffen 2009. 
 
A fourth category are the greys  those who deny that there is a problem and promote 
business as usual. For practical reasons, this dissertation concludes that a form of bright green 
framing is most apt. 
 
The IPAT relationship 
This sort of framing emerged from earlier intense debates within the environmental 
movement. The classic Impact = Population × Affluence × Technology (I=PAT, or IPAT) 
relationship is directly related to sustainability as it conceives the dimensions of human 
impact on the biosphere. Where that impact exceeds the capacity of the biosphere, it is not 
sustainable. However, the formulation has been interpreted quite differently depending on 
who has referred to it over its half-century of existence.  
 
The IPAT equation was developed during the late 1960s as a result of debates between the 
biologist and ecologist Barry Commoner (1917-2012), biologist and demographer Paul Ehrlich 
(b. 1932) and physicist John Holdren (b. 1944), who was President Obama’s White House 
advisor on Science. Ehrlich and Holdren argued that of each of these three factors, the 
population factor is most important. Erlich and his wife Anne, who co-authored the 1968 best 
seller, The Population Bomb, had visited India as students and had been shocked at the 
apparent overpopulation and widespread poverty. It is likely that this experience led them to 
believe that overpopulation was the main cause of poverty and of environmental impact. 
Commoner, however, argued in The Closing Circle (1971) that environmental impacts 
(especially pollution) were caused primarily by changes in production technology following 
World War II, because these impacts far outweighed any population increase, especially in the 
US. Erlich and Holdren opposed this and focussed their argument increasingly on the 
population explosion and its consequences. Erlich has continued to hold this view since:  
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While the basis of climate change was known towards the end of the nineteenth 
century everybody who didn’t need to take off their shoes to count to twenty, knew 
that population is part of the problem fifty years ago (Erlich 2009).  
 
However, it was Erlich and Holdren who first wrote:  
 
Pollution can be said to be the result of multiplying three factors; population size, per 
capita consumption, and an ‘environmental impact’ index that measures, in part, how 
wisely we apply the technology that goes with consumption (cited in Commoner et al 
1971, p. 3).  
 
Commoner attempted to re-interpret this more precisely in 1972 as: 
 
pollution = (population) × (production per capita) × (pollution emission per production).  
 
This version is at least logically valid, since the above and below the line ‘populations’ (or ‘per 
capita’) and ‘productions’ cancel each other out, leaving pollution = pollution emission. This 
was then re-written by Erlich as the now familiar I=PAT equation (Chertow 2000, p. 19). 
However, in 1974 Erlich and Holdren (1974, p. 288) again re-interpreted this as:  
 
environmental disruption = population × consumption per person × damage per unit of 
consumption.  
 
Erlich and Holdren saw the variables as interdependent, whereas Commoner viewed them as 
independent of each other (Chertow 2000, p. 19). The significance of this difference is that the 
former pair wanted population as the central culprit, thus population affected both affluence 
and technology in producing a final impact. Whereas, Commoner believed the new post-war 
technologies to be the culprit, irrespective of population and affluence. In this respect, he 
advanced considerable evidence that new technologies had environmental impacts orders of 
magnitude beyond the other two factors (Commoner 1972 and 1990). 
 
The ‘I’ in the equation (or environmental impact) is at first regarded as simply pollution, 
whereas later it became environmental disruption, a much wider concept that, for example, 
may include land clearing, loss of habitat and species extinction as well as pollution alone. 
Further, technology (T) is equated with “pollution”, or “pollution per unit of production”, or 
else “damage per unit of consumption”, which tends to assume the damaging and heavily 
polluting industrial technologies of the mid-twentieth century. The possibility that some 
technologies might reduce environmental impact is not countenanced. Lastly, affluence is 
equated with either consumption or production depending on the formulation, but its impact 
depends on how it is measured.  
 
While the IPAT formula was originally developed by life-scientists14 as distinct from other 
groups, investigating issues surrounding it have also been conducted by social scientists, in 
parallel, but separately and “often antagonistically” (Dietz & Rosa 1994, p. 277). For example, 
in The Wealth of Nature, US historian Donald Worster (1991, pp. 7-8) outlines examples of 
unsustainability based on material “revolutionary forces” such as demography, technology 
and energy embodied in the “effortless industrialism” that supplies almost limitless goods to 
the affluent. These ‘forces’ are close to the IPAT concept but describe a more detailed modern 
                                                 
14 Although John Holdren studied aeronautics and physics, he was Professor of Environmental Policy at 
the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. 
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world. Still, Worster suggests the real cause of environmental destruction in modern America 
is culture – driven by an attitude of human innocence in an Eden where all is fruit for the 
picking.  
 
In 2000, the Australian engineer, Sharon Beder (2000, p. 2), advanced the IPAT formula as: 
 
I: environmental impact = P: number of people × A: resource use per person × T: 
environmental impact per unit of resource used.  
 
This is again slightly different and focuses on resource use rather than pollution emission as 
the key factor. 
 
The Kaya identity is closely related to the I=PAT equation. But while the I=PAT equation is 
more general and can describe a more abstract 'impact', the Kaya identity describes the 
impact of human activity specifically on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. It was developed by 
Japanese energy economist Yoichi Kaya in his book Environment, Energy, and Economy: 
strategies for sustainability arising from the 1993 Tokyo Conference on Global Environment, 
Energy, and Economic Development. The Kaya identity differs from IPAT, having four rather 
than three variables:      
 
global CO2 emissions = global population × gross world product per global population × 
gross energy consumption per gross world product × global CO2 emissions per gross 
energy consumption.  
 
Like the I=PAT equation, whereby (in some versions) pollution ultimately equals pollution, 
variables above and below the divisor lines cancel each other out, so that its mathematical 
validity is demonstrable. One limitation of this equation is that it does not account for the 
direct release of carbon dioxide by deforestation through burning, nor the loss of the carbon 
sink also due to forest destruction, because it assumes carbon dioxide is directly linked to 
energy consumption. While carbon dioxide output rose noticeably with the Industrial 
Revolution and its increasing consumption of fossil fuels, this was inter-related with 
temperate deforestation across Europe, North America and Australasia during the same 
period, which also saw considerable growth in world population and production. The Kaya 
equation therefore does not encompass the full impact of carbon emissions. 
 
In his 2010 article, Energy, Economic Growth and Environmental Sustainability, Steven Sorrell 
discusses the IPAT identity in relation to energy and resource efficiency. Again the terms are 
subtly twisted. In particular, technology (T) becomes ‘performance’ or ‘efficiency’: 
 
Over the long term, continued economic growth can only be reconciled with 
environmental sustainability if implausibly large improvements in energy and resource 
efficiency can be achieved. This point is easy to demonstrate with the I = P*A*T 
equation, which represents total environmental impact (I) as the product of 
population (P), affluence or income level (A) and technological performance or 
efficiency (T)...The decoupling strategy seeks reductions in T that will more than offset 
the increases in P and A, thereby lowering I (Sorrell 2010, p. 1795). 
 
Elizabeth Kolbert (2011) and (Will) Steffen et al (2011, p. 6) use the I=PAT equation to visualise 
the current state of human impact on the planet over time, relative to both 1900 and 1950. If 
conceptually valid, the acceleration of the impact since 1950 is staggering. However, while still 
considerable, the impact is arguably much less than portrayed in the illustration that 
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accompanies both articles because ‘population’ is double-counted in both ‘affluence’ and 
‘technology’.  
 
 A more recent article (Brondizio et al 2016, p. 2) discussing the ‘Anthropocene’ concept 
suggests that because it represents a “state change” in the “interdependent social-ecological” 
Earth system, the concept is different “from earlier ideas of human pressures” due to “a 
combination of population growth and economic and technical change, having an impact on 
natural systems, whether local or global”.  Yet, whether the concept does in fact differ much 
from what is still clearly a reformulation of IPAT, may be less important than the authors’ call 
for more collaboration across disciplines to help reach sustainability. 
 
The feminist critic, Patricia Hynes, believes that the IPAT identity is so entrenched that it is 
“like a mental boxing ring”, that both its advocates and its critics debate within it, rather than 
from a critical outside position (Hynes 1993, p. 3). Its combination of simplicity and 
universality makes the relationship particularly hard to escape from. In Hynes’ view, the 
relationship lacks any dimension of environmental or social justice, especially for the lowest 
quintile of humanity whose only goal is daily survival (Ibid, pp. 7-8). She goes on to suggest 
that environmental justice means that women’s health should be an end in itself, rather than 
a means to reach population goals, and that the general education of women and girls, as well 
as the education of men and boys in peace studies, non-violence to women and 
environmental management are some of its public policy implications (Ibid, pp. 51-52). 
 
Jeffrey Sachs (2008 p. 6) does begin to look at justice issues, while at the same time factoring 
in only some of the elements of the IPAT relationship. He outlines four main causes of the 
‘unsustainability crisis’ – human pressure on ecosystems and climate, rapidly rising population 
especially in areas least able to cope, the poverty of one sixth of humanity unrelieved by 
global economic growth, and paralysis of global problem-solving due to cynical, defeatist 
attitudes and inadequate institutions. Sachs is politically connected, at least within the US and 
UN, and was influential in the creation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
However, it is intriguing that he does not mention technology in relation to sustainability. It is 
as if he is concerned with the ‘I’ (impact), the ‘P’ (population) and the ‘A’ (poverty in this case), 
but not at all with the potential of the ‘T’ (technology) as either a positive or negative factor. 
 
Yet the original concept lingers still at high levels. The ghost of the IPAT relationship lurks 
within the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC):  
 
Without additional efforts to reduce GHG emissions beyond those in place today, 
global emission growth is expected to persist driven by growth in global population 
and economic activities (high confidence) (IPCC 2014d, p. 81)). 
 
The IPAT relationship remains central to issues of sustainability. As an overarching concept it 
can constrain debates but it also disciplines them and it has inherent flexibility. It tells us, for 
example, that to reduce human impact we need to moderate population, reconsider the 
nature of affluence and develop technologies that enhance rather than degrade life systems. 
It is at least a well-trodden start line, a place to begin. For these reasons the structure of part 
one of this dissertation follows its formulation. 
 
Images  
Formulae can be uninspiring, however. The potency of a concept can rather depend on its 
imagery. It is often asserted that the first photographs of the entire planet by the Apollo moon 
missions in the late 1960s led to a change of consciousness, a new awareness of the limited 
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and fragile nature of the biosphere that we all occupy. Certainly the new ‘blue marble’ image 
of the entire planet was used to support environmental causes and a new environmental 
awareness became widespread at around the same time.15 However, such an effect was 
predicted nearly two decades before. In 1950 the Cambridge astronomer, Fred Hoyle, 
predicted that:  
 
Once a photograph of the Earth, taken from outside, is available, we shall, in an 
emotional sense, acquire an additional dimension...once let the sheer isolation of the 
Earth become plain to every man whatever his nationality or creed, and a new idea as 
powerful as any in history will be let loose…it must increasingly have the effect of 
exposing the futility of nationalistic strife (Hoyle 1950, p. 8). 
 
While perhaps over-optimistic about the demise of “nationalistic strife”, Hoyle’s view has 
validity still. Nonetheless, the 2013-2014 President of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, Phillip Sharp, believes that the power of the blue marble is less than 
Hoyle had hoped:  
 
our awareness of the global nature of major problems facing our planet is relatively new 
and demands global responses for which neither the scientific community nor the 
general public is well-prepared (Sharp 2014, p. 1468). 
 
The issue now is more how to act on that awareness, rather than contesting the degree of 
impact our species is having on the biosphere. In that vein, Sharp is more positive. A 
microbiologist, he thinks that “ecosystem engineering” will reduce damage and restore 
ecosystem functions through analysis of micro-organisms using DNA sequencing. This is a 
prominent example of techno-optimism, the view that technology can be used to save rather 
than destroy our environment, which is discussed later in the technology chapter. More 
broadly, he suggests that we need to converge across disciplines (life, physical, social and 
engineering sciences) as well as between research and its implementation through 
entrepreneurship (Ibid, p. 1471).  
 
This echoes the economist Kenneth Boulding, who in anticipation of CP Snow, in 1956 drew 
attention to the increasing development of ‘knowledge silos’, whereby physicists only talk to 
physicists and economists to economists. He feared that this “assemblage of walled-in hermits” 
who are mutually unintelligible would slow the growth of knowledge. However, he is encouraged 
that as a result there were then an increasing number of ‘hybrid disciplines’ such as social 
psychology and astrophysics. Interestingly, he also draws attention to the possible re-birth of 
political economy, which he said had died prematurely in the mid nineteenth century (Boulding 
1956, p. 129).  
 
The polymath inventor Buckminster Fuller was of a similar frame of mind when writing his 
Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth: 
 
Of course, our failures are a consequence of many factors, but possibly one of the most 
important is the fact that society operates on the theory that specialisation is the key to 
success, not realising that specialisation precludes comprehensive thinking. This means 
that the potentially-integratable-techno-economic advantages accruing to society from 
the myriad specialisations are not comprehended integratively and therefore are not 
                                                 
15 For example, the counter-cultural First Whole Earth Catalogue was published in 1968, with its front 
cover showing an image of the Earth taken from space, which reputedly its editor had campaigned for 
NASA to release. 
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realised, or they are realised only in negative ways, in new weaponry or the industrial 
support only of warfaring (Buckminster Fuller 1969, p. 3). 
 
While Sharp and his predecessors appear to presume that capitalism is a friend of the 
environment and sustainability through its emphasis on technological innovation, Boulding 
and Snow have reservations in that the overspecialisation it engenders means sustainability 
will be far more difficult to achieve. On the other hand, however, Marshall McLuhan and 
Robert Logan (1976, p. 26) assert that Snow had “naïve hang ups” about increasing 
specialisation, because, “in the electric age there can be no more monopolies of knowledge”. 
Professor Logan confirms the passage means that barriers between different disciplines are 
reduced by the electric technologies of the ‘global village’.16  This is discussed later in chapter 
5 on affluence. 
 
Before Buckminster Fuller’s Operating Manual, Kenneth Boulding was also one of the first to 
identify the Earth as a “spaceship” (Boulding 1966), meaning a self-contained economy with 
physical limits as opposed to an endless frontier that could be exploited indefinitely without 
ecological consequence. In this way, it is relevant to consider the defining characteristics of 
artificial spaceships that are designed to transport people through the cosmos. Even the early 
orbital and lunar spaceships had to provide resources and environments that supported 
human life, including air, water, food and means of waste disposal. Longer voyages such as the 
Mars mission, possibly around the year 2030, will require intricate systems for recycling of 
fluids and waste.  
 
In science fiction, starships are commonplace, whether of alien or human construction. The 
most sophisticated iteration of the Startrek concept − the exploration of an intelligence-
populated universe by a technologically advanced and idealistic humanity − was achieved in 
the 1990s Startrek Voyager television series. The starship crew are seeking to return to Earth 
from a distant quadrant of the galaxy, through a space littered with minefields diplomatic, 
military and epistemological. There are four relevant observations here: (i) although inclusive, 
the culture of the vessel is American as would be expected from its origins, which as well as 
extraversion and individualism implies technological specialisation (ii) the starship Voyager of 
the title possesses technologies that not only enable it to travel at multiples of light speed and 
to create instantly any (relatively small) material item,17 but allow it to cruise indefinitely − or 
sustainably − throughout the cosmos, (iii) its on-board artificial intelligence (AI) is not only 
immortal,18 but develops as a character and is in many ways more human than those he 
supports, and (iv) this advanced ship and its mission are a product of a government federation 
(albeit of a military nature), rather than a means of exploration provided through capitalist 
enterprise.19  
 
It is intriguing that such a successful series, made by the most triumphant of entrepreneurial 
societies, views our exploration of deep space in this way, the same way that our relationship 
with space began in both the former Soviet Union (USSR) and the US. The motivation, 
resources, discipline and conscious focus required to conceive, construct and maintain such a 
complex set of technologies may be beyond capitalism, as it is now for extra-terrestrial 
                                                 
16 Personal email of 30 August 2015. 
17 Such as a slice of New York cheesecake. 
18 His immortality results from his photonic, rather than carbonic, essence. 
19 The name Enterprise – the starship of the original 1960s Startrek series – is the only instance of its 
occurrence throughout the entire franchise. Voyager echoes the names of the two ex-solar spacecraft 
of the 1970s that carry human images and symbols into deep space. 
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missions20 – just as it may be beyond capitalism to construct and maintain a renewed and 
sustainable spaceship Earth. 
 
Anthropocene 
The blue marble ‘spaceship’ tends to be static image. Yet the Earth comprises more dynamic 
processes and systems. The notion of an ‘Anthropocene’ geological epoch is attributed to the 
Nobel atmosphere chemist Paul Crutzen and the biologist Eugene Stoermer, who reflected on 
the inadequacy of the post-glacial term ‘Holocene’ in signifying the increasing impact of 
humanity on the planet. Both thought of the term ‘Anthropocene’ independently and 
published a joint paper with that title in 2000. In that brief essay they acknowledge the work 
of Lyall and others in establishing the very concept of geological epochs, but saw a need for a 
better name for the current era, which they propose began at the time of the Industrial 
Revolution:  
 
It seems to us more than appropriate to emphasise the central role of mankind in 
geology and ecology by proposing to use the term “anthropocene” for the current 
geological epoch. The impacts of current human activities will continue over long 
periods...because of the anthropogenic emissions of CO2, climate may depart 
significantly from natural behaviour over the next 50,000 years (Crutzen & Stoermer 
2000, p. 17). 
 
The newsletter in which the article was first published also contains several articles on ‘Earth 
systems’21 as it was around this time that ecological concerns were developing into larger and 
more dynamic concepts. ‘Earth systems’, which encompass the dynamics of the entire planet, 
as well as its energy and matter relationships with astronomical phenomena, was pioneered 
by the early computer modelling of Meadows et al (1972). 
 
The philosopher Clive Hamilton has recently become quite heated on the difference between 
the static, restricted notion of ‘ecology’ and the dynamic, vast notion of ‘Earth systems’ 
approaches. His blog is provocatively titled ecologists-butt-out-you-are-not-entitled-to-
redefine-the-anthropocene: 
 
changes in landscapes, forest clearing, extinction of megafauna, “ecosystem 
engineering” and so on...[are] entirely irrelevant to the Anthropocene, unless it can be 
demonstrated that they changed the functioning of the whole Earth system in a 
detectable way. And they have not been able to do so. 
 
…the difference between ecological thinking versus Earth system thinking lies in 
divergent understandings of the object to which their thinking is applied. Ecological 
thinking focuses on ecosystems delimited by their spatial boundaries…this traditional 
(and in the right context useful) idea has been transcended by Earth system science 
with a deeper conception of the Earth as a total entity, stretching from the core of the 
planet to the moon and in an unceasing state of flux driven by natural cycles great and 
small, a flux in which humans in the Anthropocene have recently become the 
dominant process (Hamilton 2014, paras 7 and 12). 
                                                 
20 Elon Musk’s private Space-X project is acknowledged, but it has yet to put a person into space, which 
was achieved by the USSR in 1961, more than half a century ago. Space-X also depends on NASA 
contracts that support its operations. 
21 Such as Earth System Models of Intermediate Complexity (Clausen et al, 2000, pp. 4-6) and Full-Form 
Earth System Models: Coupled Carbon-Climate Interaction Experiment (the “Flying Leap”), Fung et al 
2000, pp. 7-8), for example. 
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Crutzen and Stoermer’s original landmark paper does not emphasise these conceptual 
differences. Nevertheless, Hamilton has a point: ‘Earth systems’ appear to encompass and 
vastly extend the notion of ‘ecology’. As such, the approach offers hope for a better 
understanding of sustainability. 
 
Brundtland  
More immediate than systems dynamics and conceptions of the Earth, human desires for 
equity over both time and place are politically serious. The UN World Commission on the 
Environment and Development was set up in 1983 to address wide concerns about the impact 
of development on the environment. The resulting landmark 1987 Brundtland report, Our 
Common Future, is about ‘sustainable development’ rather than the more general 
‘sustainability’, but the two topics overlap. Named for the woman former Labour prime 
minister of Norway who chaired the enquiry, this report famously defined ‘sustainable 
development’ as development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland 1987, p. 15). This 
definition is often popularly confused with ‘sustainability’, whereas it is equally concerned 
with the politics of development, in particular Third World development and the alleviation of 
poverty. The issue of how to facilitate economic growth to reduce poverty without 
environmental damage remains important, but was regarded as a major conundrum during 
the era. 
 
The same part of the report, however, goes on to link technology, economic growth, equity 
and political will to the environmental limits on human impact: 
 
The concept of sustainable development does imply limits - not absolute limits but 
limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social organisation on 
environmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of 
human activities. But technology and social organisation can be both managed and 
improved to make way for a new era of economic growth...A world in which poverty is 
endemic will always be prone to ecological and other catastrophes...Yet in the end, 
sustainable development is not a fixed state of harmony, but rather a process of 
change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the 
orientation of technological development, and institutional change are made 
consistent with future as well as present needs…Painful choices have to be made. 
Thus, in the final analysis, sustainable development must rest on political will (Ibid, pp. 
15-16)  
 
In his book, Principles of Sustainability, Simon Dresner observes that Brundtland’s famous 
definition of sustainable development is both simple and vague, qualities that are both its 
strength and weakness (Dresner 2008, p. 34). Adams’ paper for the IUCN however, is rather 
more affirmative:  
 
it cleverly captured two fundamental issues, the problem of the environmental 
degradation that so commonly accompanies economic growth, and yet the need for 
such growth to alleviate poverty (Adams 2006, p. 2). 
 
According to Seabrook (2002), however, the term ‘sustainable development’ is an oxymoron.22 
                                                 
22 Seabrook’s observation is consistent with Michael Redclift’s (2002 [1987], p. 7) argument that the 
term sustainable development is “founded on contradiction”. Others, notably Herman Daly, have been 
attributed with similar observations (Redclift 2006, p. 66). 
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Yet it was believed that the solution to the great clash between ecology and economy 
had been discovered in the 1980s: this was the idea of "sustainable development", 
triumphantly enshrined in the Rio declaration. Intra-generational equity would be 
balanced with inter-generational justice to ensure that we do not take more from the 
Earth than we give back to it. The excitement generated by this formula concealed the 
possibility that it might be a contradiction in terms: when unlimited desire is 
unleashed in a world of limited resources, something has to yield. The "fruits" of 
industrialism turn out to be strange hybrids - perhaps, ultimately, inedible. 
 
Lélé (1991, p. 607) says the term is too fuzzy and needs to be made more precise. John Dryzek 
believes that the term has meaning, but that Brundtland more asserted “with great force” 
rather than argued that the environment and social justice did not have to confront normal 
material growth, and since then the term ‘sustainable development’ has become increasingly 
resigned to conventional concepts of economic growth (Dryzek 2014, p. 13).  
 
Ultimately, Brundtland is a political document that necessarily reflects the undercurrents of 
the time. It manages to appear both balanced and progressive and it remains an icon in 
sustainability research, although nearly three decades later it still attracts differing 
interpretations. According to one respondent to a recent debate on the meaning of 
sustainability in Australia, the essential aim of the Brundtland report was to stabilise global 
population: 
 
It was believed that the only politically acceptable way to stabilise population was to 
elevate the living standards of the then four billion poorest people on Earth, where 
population was expanding dramatically, to the level of the then one billion people living in 
the developed world, where population was stable…it was obvious that living standards 
could not rise unless economic growth, especially in poor countries, accelerated and was 
sustained for a number of years…So the plan became for "policy makers" to somehow 
direct most of this five per cent annual global economic growth to the developing world, 
for decades (Lewis 2015). 
 
However, the report’s own statement of its goals is much wider. Brundtland looked at eight 
key issues, of which population was a part, but a relatively small one. Energy, industry, food 
security, human settlement and international economic relations were also examples of areas 
included for analysis (Brundtland 1987, p. 243).   
 
Adams, however, points out that there is a measurement issue, because “there is no agreed 
way of defining the extent to which sustainability is being achieved in any policy programme” 
(Adams 2006, p. 4).  
 
Brundtland’s compatriots, Asheim & Kjell, look at intergenerational sustainability using 
mathematical formulations that importantly attempt to operationalise the concept:  
 
If a notion of sustainability is to be of practical importance in the real management of 
natural and environmental resources, it is essential that the notion is operational. The 
notion becomes operational if the following question can be answered: What kind of 
rules must our generation follow in order to manage the resource base in such a way 
that it constitutes a first part of a sustainable development? The problem of finding 
such rules can only — if at all — be resolved through an analysis of the long-term 
global production possibilities (Asheim & Kjell 1993, p. 3). 
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They also introduce the notion of risk: “The crucial question is whether the risk of decreasing 
future quality of life is acceptable” (Ibid). 
 
As far as the discourse about sustainability is concerned, the Brundtland report indicates an 
awareness of contemporary connotations of key words, especially ‘environment’ and 
‘development’.  
 
The environment does not exist as a sphere separate from human actions, ambitions, 
and needs, and attempts to defend it in isolation from human concerns have given the 
very word "environment" a connotation of naivety in some political circles. The word 
"development" has also been narrowed by some into a very limited focus, along the 
lines of "what poor nations should do to become richer", and thus again is automatically 
dismissed by many in the international arena as being a concern of specialists" 
(Brundtland 1987, p. 7). 
 
In the thirty years since the report, there have been changes in terminologies and different 
emphases on different words, possibly in attempts to escape the sort of connotations 
Brundtland identifies. For example, an emphasis on ‘the greenhouse effect’ became ‘global 
warming’ then more recently, ‘climate change’, which underlines its negative effects. The 
‘environment’, something separate from humanity, has tended to be replaced by the 
‘biosphere’, which emphasises its global relationship to life, or ‘ecosystem’, which underlines 
its characteristic as an inter-related system.  
 
From a critical neo-Marxist perspective, Arturo Escobar argues that the discourse of 
‘sustainable development’ only reshuffles the elements of neo-liberal development theories: 
basic needs, population, resources, technology, etc. (Escobar, 1995, p. 195). And overarching 
the development discourse is that modernity can only be achieved through the development 
expert – “the wise white man from the West” (Röwert 2011, p. 2). Whether sustainable or 
not, it is argued that the very concept of development reinforces racial and cultural 
stereotyping. As Hilary Hove (2004, p. 49) puts it, “sustainable development simply embodies 
a new form of the old discourse; it fails to emerge from its ethnocentric vices”. She argues 
that due to “its emphasis on sustainable growth” the policy does not account for how the 
West “contributes to the inferiority and subordination of poorer parts of the world”. Escobar 
also points out that the bond with sustainability essentially just means that the ‘wise white 
man from the West’ is as likely to be an environmental scientist as an economist: 
 
The Western scientist continues to speak for the Earth. God forbid that the Peruvian 
peasant, an African nomad, or a rubber tapper of the Amazon would have something 
to say in this regard (Escobar 1995, p. 194).  
 
Critics from the political left emphasise that the sustainable development concept does not 
address the issue of unsustainable consumption of the West, which for sustainability must be 
a central concern. Rather, it both assumes and reinforces a globalised homogeneity, in which 
social diversity is “disciplined” according to the dictates of the interests of capital. Fernando 
(2003, p. 6), for example, asserts that achieving the goals of sustainable development  
addressing both socio-economic inequality and environmental degradation  means that it 
“must be liberated from the ideology and institutional parameters of capitalism”. But while 
much of this sort of criticism is compelling, it tends to lead towards unlikely social and political 
outcomes. As there appears to be little coherence in leftist political movements towards a 
sustainable development that is separate from global capitalism, it is doubtful that there will 
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be major revolutionary political and economic change in that direction, despite some localised 
efforts in South America. This study therefore attempts a more pragmatic approach in which it 
is assumed that a form (or forms) of capitalism will continue, but also that it may be 
channelled more responsibly. 
 
Earth summits  
After Brundtland, the UN 1992 Rio Earth Summit encouraged ways of merging development 
with environmental protection, producing the 300-page Agenda 21, and the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, as well as opening conventions for signature on 
biodiversity, climate change and desertification. The title ‘Agenda 21’ refers to priorities for 
the twenty-first century. It contains four sections concerning poverty reduction, 
environmental conservation, empowering marginalised groups and means of implementation 
respectively. Three follow-up Earth Summits were held in 1997 (Rio+5), 2002 (+10) and 2012 
(+20) to revisit the commitments made under Agenda 21. 
 
Lack of progress on implementing the principles of the Earth summits is often ascribed to 
North-South attitudes to economic development and environmental impact. Agenda 21’s 
introduction, however, wastes no time in launching into an enthusiasm for trade liberalisation, 
a policy area still scarred from battles between the environment and the (neoliberal) 
economy: 
 
An open, equitable, secure, non-discriminatory and predictable multilateral trading 
system that is consistent with the goals of sustainable development and leads to the 
optimal distribution of global production in accordance with comparative advantage is 
of benefit to all trading partners (UNCED 1992, s.2.5). 
 
This may help explain slow progress. The WTO and regional trade agreements that have 
evolved since the late 1980s have tended to reduce rather than extend environmental 
protections in the name of economic efficiency. 
 
Trade  
One example of these battles is the World Trade Organisation (WTO) tuna-dolphin cases of 
1990 and 2008. The outcome of these disputes was that US import restrictions on tuna caught 
with fishing methods that incidentally killed dolphin were not upheld (Oxley 2001, p. 5, Miles 
2012). In effect, the WTO asserted that its purpose was purely the pursuit of trade 
liberalisation. Environmental matters were separate, for other forums. Since the stalling of 
progress with trade liberalisation at the Doha round, however, emphasis on multi-lateral 
instruments has slowed in favour of increasing numbers of bi-lateral and more limited multi-
lateral free trade agreements. 
 
But trade can be antipathetic to sustainability more generally, and further, trade volumes are 
affected by technology. The classic Smith-Ricardo theory of comparative advantage shows 
that it is mutually beneficial for countries to trade goods that they can produce relatively 
efficiently compared with other goods in the same country, with countries that have different 
relativities.  
 
But transportation costs can reduce or eliminate the economic benefits from trade, including 
comparative advantage. Paul Krugman, who once asserted that “almost nobody understands 
such abstruse concepts as comparative advantage” (Krugman 1995, p. 329), later used the 
same example as Ricardo to show that if transport and related costs exceed the production 
advantage, there is no advantage in trade (Krugman 2010, para. 4).  
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Krugman speculates that changes in the cost of trade relative to production costs affect trade 
volumes. If trade costs fall, as they did in the late nineteenth century due to steam-powered 
shipping and the inter-ocean canals, trade increases. Conversely, if trade (especially transport) 
costs rise or if production costs fall faster than transport costs (as with the electrification of 
factories between the wars), then trade decreases. Containerisation, larger ships, jumbo 
aircraft and progressive tariff removal in the late twentieth century meant that trade 
increased because transport was effectively cheaper (Ibid, paras 6-8). Thus the relationship 
between dominant transport and production technologies affects trade volumes. 
 
The significance of these observations for sustainability is that more trade implies more 
emissions associated with the transport of goods and services. Therefore, reduced trade is 
beneficial to sustainability. Krugman’s insight is especially significant in the present era of 
complex international supply chains that draw heavily on long distance transport to assemble 
and bring the final product to market. The impact of trade is substantial. If it were a country, 
international shipping would be the ninth largest emitter of carbon dioxide. Aviation would be 
sixteenth, as shown in figure 4 below.   
 
Figure 4. CO2 emissions EU, other countries, international shipping and aviation.  
 
Source: EU emissions database: Emissions database for global atmospheric research (EDGAR) 2014 
 
Components 
Trade can be detrimental to sustainability due to its emissions, but sustainability is often 
conceived of as other than just environmental impact. The IUCN’s Adams (2006, p. 2) has one 
of three diagrams describing the concept of sustainability as the centre of a triple intersection 
of economic, social and environmental concerns. A related image is at figure 5 below, which 
suggests that sustainability is at the centre of the socially and environmentally bearable, the 
socially and economically equitable and the environmentally and economically viable. 
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Figure 5. Sustainability: bearable, equitable and viable.  
 
Source: Choi 2015, p.14789 
 
These three areas are routinely used in business to describe what is termed the ‘triple bottom 
line’, whereby an organisation aims to be economically and socially, as well as 
environmentally, sustainable. While arguably it is the environment that is the most important 
since the other two both depend on it, these differing perspectives are based on different 
values making an interdisciplinary approach to sustainability more challenging (Ostrom 2009, 
p. 419; Gale et al 2015, p. 253).  
 
Environmental sustainability can itself be split into three parts, all of which relate to natural 
capital.23 In 1990 the pioneer ecological economist, Herman Daly (1990, pp. 1-4) proposed that 
(i) for renewable resources, the rate of harvest should not exceed the rate of regeneration 
(sustainable yield); (ii) for non-renewable resources, depletion should not exceed the creation 
of renewable substitutes (sustainable depletion); and (iii) for pollution, the rate of waste 
generation should not exceed the capacity of the environment to assimilate it (sustainable 
assimilation). Thus, environmental sustainability is the rate of renewable yield, non-renewable 
depletion and waste assimilation that can be continued indefinitely. If they cannot be 
continued indefinitely then they are not sustainable.  
 
While the issue of renewable substitutes for non-renewable resources is potentially the most 
challenging – including substitutes for rare earths used in electrical storage as well as 
substitutes for fossil fuels – there is the issue of quality as against quantity in all three of Daly’s 
dimensions. For example, a sustainable harvest might still occur in volume, but the quality of 
the harvest may decline. This is arguably true of meat production in some countries where 
animals destined for slaughter are fed chemicals to speed production volume, but the quality 
suffers as a result. Where fewer crops replace more diverse plantings, production may be 
sustainable, but variation, choice and biodiversity suffer. Also in many cases substitutes are 
not as suitable as the original resource – plastics instead of metal for example in many 
applications. Further, the determination of when waste assimilation is complete and 
successful is problematic. 
 
Governance 
Before implementation, furthering such aims implies goal-setting and regulation. There has 
been at best mixed success with global regulation in favour of sustainability. While the Rio 
1992 Earth Summit proclaimed lofty principles, many of them still await means of 
                                                 
23 Although Daly uses the term in the article cited, it must be noted that the term ‘natural capital’ 
remains controversial due to its perceived diminution of nature as simply a resource for humanity. 
  25 
implementation and enforcement. More recently there has been the 2004 Rotterdam 
Convention on informed consent for trade in toxic substances, and the Stockholm Convention 
of 2004 limiting persistent organic pollutants. In 2012, the UN Secretary-General’s High level 
panel on global sustainability (UNHPGS) made several recommendations on governance, 
including ensuring a stronger interface between policy-making and science (R.44) and the 
creation of the SDGs at R.48. But many aspects such as the protection of biodiversity, 
measures to prevent desertification and to control climate change have so far made 
“regrettably few” advances (Pope Francis 2015, s. 168-169). What is needed, he says are ways 
to effect systems of governance for the whole range of the “global commons” (Ibid, s.174). 
 
John Dryzek in discussing institutions for Anthropocene governance remarks that what counts 
is convergence of expectations rather than rules and regulation: 
 
Institutions are in large measure discursive constructions: they work because of a 
convergence of expectations and understandings, not just formal rules. So, for 
example, market liberal globalisation is so powerful in large measure because it 
permeates the understandings of actors in the political economy. Policy deviations 
from its orthodoxy are punished not just by impersonal market forces, but because 
people in key positions in financial and economic institutions believe those deviations 
will have negative economic consequences, and so may disinvest in the deviant state 
(Dryzek 2014, p. 12).  
 
Iconic imagery is also important in the force of ideas. The idea of an ‘ozone hole’ in the 
negotiations leading up to the Montreal Protocol contributed to its adoption and apparent 
success (Ibid pp. 13-14). However, the metrics of sustainability regulation often present 
greater difficulty. Adams (2006, p. 4) says that often at the practical program level 
sustainability is less measured than ‘genuflected’, less achievable than aspirational, “a victim 
of the desire to set targets and measure progress”. 
 
More positively, however, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2016 – 2030 
combine indicators of progress with some of the major elements of sustainability. For 
example, target 6.3, as well as minimising water pollution, involves “halving the proportion of 
untreated wastewater and substantially increasing recycling and safe reuse globally” by 2030. 
The proportion of untreated wastewater will therefore be measured and progress monitored. 
This promises to be more than an empty gesture and should inform program measurement at 
the national level. 
 
Paradox and pessimism 
Simon Dresner’s influential treatise on sustainability, re-written at the time of the GFC and the 
subsequent global recession,24 makes the case for “an attempt to make our civilisation more 
sustainable than it presently is” despite the impossibility of drawing up “a detailed blueprint 
of a sustainable society or even a route to get to it”. Dresner’s historical analysis draws heavily 
on discussions of economic growth and the displacement of traditional religion by triumphant 
Western consumerism. He compares the failure of communism, due to the impossibility of 
central planning of a complex modern economy (Hayek) and due to transformative 
communication technologies destroying tradition and stability (Giddens) with socialism, which 
although “discredited” entails valuable concerns with equality and fairness. These concerns he 
says, now need to be associated with concerns for “nature, risk, growth and technology” 
(Dresner 2008, p. 179). 
                                                 
24 Second edition. The original edition was written in 2002. 
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Dresner’s take on neoliberal economics with its emphasis on growth is that it is a reflection of 
Smithian rationalist influence over the past 200 years, which has been predominant over the 
alternative ‘respect for nature’ Enlightenment tradition of Rousseau. He points out that the 
neoliberal “seductive message” that markets alone will make government planning 
unnecessary (Ibid, p. 175) and the problem of “accumulation without end” assumed by 
Fukuyama (1991) and criticised by Giddens (1994), is clearly absurd (Dresner 2008, p. 160, 
Higgs 2015). 
 
While he uses the terms ‘liberal democratic capitalism’ and ‘liberal democracy’ 
interchangeably, Dresner (pp. 144-153) believes that the market is central to them both. The 
essence of his view is at page 144: “we can try to be sustainable or we can pursue the free 
market, but we can’t do both.” This is rather different in Gore (2013, p. 33), who prefers a 
system of “sustainable capitalism”, whereby the market is still paramount, but it must factor 
in environmental impact (Ibid, p. 35). 
 
The notion of paradox is sprinkled throughout Dresner’s book. One paradox of sustainability is 
that its pursuit depends on a global community linked through the Internet and other 
technologies, yet these technologies at the same time tend to prevent needed prediction due 
to the rapid social change they engender (Ibid, p. 179). Post-modernists believe in a diversity 
of moral values and are therefore unable to argue against fundamentalist values that would 
deny moral diversity, including those that might be needed to save the planet (Ibid, p. 170). 
And the paradox of utilitarianism is that people are expected to accept less for the sake of 
those who are already more fortunate (Ibid, p. 131). Elsewhere in this dissertation is found the 
Jevons paradox (1.6) whereby more fuel efficient machines result in more fuel used. There is 
also the paradox of biodiversity -- that the more species we render extinct, the more ‘new’ 
species we discover.  
 
While these apparent contradictions are important, Dresner also points out an irony  that 
sustainability arose on the political agenda during the 1980s just as the ideologies that might 
support it were being abandoned for neoliberalism. In a similar vein, Garnaut (2014) points 
out that it took half a century for neoliberal economics to shrug off the taint of the Great 
Depression and achieve the sort of global dominance it enjoyed until the GFC in 2008. Wesley 
Widmaier (2015, paras 7-12) argues that since the 1987 crash all neoliberal economics has 
given us is a series of “bubbles and bailouts” based on demand created by asset price 
increases rather than the wage increases of the Keynesian era. In this current economic period 
where growth is listless25 and volatility rules, sustainability struggles for the attention it 
demands. 
 
Dresner identifies a contemporary mood of pessimism about the future, which is in contrast to 
the attitude of the Victorians. The very slogan ‘sustainable development’ is but an attempt to 
sound optimistic about a doubtful future, he says (Dresner 2008, p. 19). This fits with Arthur 
Clarke’s earlier observation that “this is the first age that has paid much attention to the 
future, which is ironic since we may not have one”. And if the results of a recent four-nation26 
survey are indicative beyond the Anglosphere, pessimism is the mood of our era. More than 
half the 2000 people surveyed rate the risk of our civilisation ending within 100 years as at 
                                                 
25 For example, “longer-term potential growth rates remain subdued across the globe 
compared with past decades, especially in advanced economies” (IMF 2017b, p. xii). 
26 Australia, Canada, the UK and the US. 
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least 50 per cent; almost a quarter believe there is the same risk of actual human extinction 
within the same timeframe (Randle & Eckersley 2015). 
 
Principles  
Dresner also collaborated with Ekins et al (2008 pp. 68-9), who outline four principles that 
affect what method is best for evaluating sustainable development policies, both at point of 
contemplation and after implementation. The principles are sustainability, precautionary, 
appropriateness and justice. 
 
The environmental sustainability principle concerns the need to maintain critical 
environmental functions for future generations. These functions include climate stability, 
maintaining the ozone layer and preserving biodiversity, ensuring environmental quality and 
avoiding pollution. Clearly we are not doing well against this one; at least the last three are 
worsening. 
 
The precautionary principle is about avoiding irreversibility. The loss of particular 
environmental functions may cost dearly to remedy, or may not be recoverable at all once 
lost. Therefore because of risk uncertainty, actions that could result in very large costs should 
not be embarked on, even if there is little chance of their occurrence and high chance of 
beneﬁts. This principle tends to dampen the zeal of geo-engineering enthusiasts. Exactly 
where the principle is invoked, however, is a political matter to be decided − or ignored – in 
each case. 
 
The appropriateness principle relates to situations where assessing ﬁnancial trade-offs is 
morally inappropriate. ‘Willingness to pay’ needs to be consistent with ‘ability to pay’ – what 
poor people are willing to pay for environmental benefits is unlikely to be what they think 
something is actually worth, because they cannot afford to pay much at all. Therefore 
‘willingness to pay’ approaches to environmental resource allocation are often inappropriate 
because the priorities they indicate will automatically favour the better off. 
 
The principle of justice also applies. While the point above demonstrates marginal valuations 
may be in conﬂict with justice, the example of social costs and beneﬁts in the IPCC’s Second 
Assessment Report was of a different order to mere moral inconsistency. Ekins et al (2008, 
p.69) suggest that the report was “met with outrage” because lives in rich countries were 
valued 15 times greater than lives in poor countries. Further, “no distinction was made 
between those responsible for anthropogenic climate change and those likely to suffer its 
consequences”.  
 
However, while these principles apply to sustainable development policies, those policies are 
applied in a world driven by considerations of the ‘dismal science’: economics. 
 
Ecological economics 
As Paul Erlich (2009) has observed, the words ‘economy’ and ‘ecology’ are from the same 
root. While in English one derives from sixteenth century usage, the other was a German 
invention of the nineteenth century (Kurtz 2006). Ecology was about management of the 
household’s physical resources while economy was about management of the household’s 
financial resources (Ellerbrook 1998). The origin of the two terms is now apposite as we have 
reached the limiting household size – the extent of the planet Earth.  
 
Eriksson & Anderson (2010, p. 2) in outlining the elements of ecological economics, articulate 
the ‘trilemma’ of global social justice, prosperity and ecological sustainability. While the 
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difficulty of resolving any two is high, resolving all three is much harder. They point to several 
recent reports (World Bank, ILO) that attempt to address two of the three, with little or no 
mention of the third. Ecological economics arose from the need to address all three of these 
meta-issues that we now face on this planet. 
 
Building a bridge between ecological and the still dominant neoclassical27 economics, 
however, is difficult. Ecological and neoclassical economists do not necessarily share the same 
concepts, if one large study is typical. In an international workshop on economic sustainability 
held in Berlin in 2003, participants became involved in a heated discussion about whether 
economic growth is desirable for sustainable development. Ecological economists were 
concerned about the physical aspects of economic growth  material resources, emissions and 
waste. Neoclassical economists rather had a monetary concept of growth measurable by GDP 
and which would not necessarily increase environmental harm. While both groups ultimately 
agreed that decoupling economic activity from harmful environmental effects is a desirable 
goal, opinions differed on how to achieve it (Illge & Schwarze 2006, p. 3).  
 
Nevertheless, the 196 questionnaires returned by participants showed there is some common 
ground between disciplines. For example, there was agreement that sustainability means 
preserving development opportunities for future generations. It was also agreed that 
economic growth is not the only way to solve the conflict between efficiency and equitable 
distribution, that sustainability is an important field of economic research and that 
sustainability research must rise above the boundaries between disciplines. 
 
Ecological economists, however, were alone in believing that an integrated understanding of 
economic, ecological and social welfare is essential to sustainability. Only they believe that 
human-made capital rarely substitutes for natural capital, that the economy depends on nature, 
and that the value of an intact environment cannot be measured in money.  They alone believe 
that changing societal values is important to achieving sustainability rather than through a self-
interested view of human nature. Sustainability economics must deal with the question of how to 
make decisions in an intergenerational context. Economic science should not be value-free.  
 
Neoclassical environmental economists, on the other hand, do not believe that inter-generational 
justice presupposes intra-generational justice. They are alone in believing that sustainability does 
not require restrictions on material consumption, that it may be achievable within the present 
economic system by setting the ‘right’ prices. They uniquely believe that international 
specialisation leads to more long-lasting wealth worldwide, and that economic science should be 
objective.  
 
Another schism is the concept of science: economics has to be objective and ‘value-free’ 
according to the neo-classicists, whereas ecological economists tend to have a post-modern 
view of science as necessarily value-laden (Ibid, p. 20).   
 
The former World Bank chief economist and Nobel laureate, Joseph Stiglitz, manages to steer a 
course between the two camps in terms of practical policy. While at present there are 
considerable subsidies involved in the production and consumption of polluting substances such 
as fossil fuels in many countries, Stiglitz says that it is “better to tax bad things than good things, 
because that way you get a double benefit” – revenue from the tax as well as less harmful 
activity. Hence the most critical thing for sustainability is to put a price on pollutants such as 
                                                 
27 ‘Neoclassical’ economics is a school of economics that assumes rational actors within markets that 
balance supply and demand. Much of its approach is used in the political ideology of neoliberalism. 
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carbon – a carbon tax. Removal of subsidies on carbon production would also improve 
government revenue while at the same time reduce environmental harm and increase efficiency 
(Stiglitz 2014). 
 
Others, notably Costanza et al (2014), have grasped the nettle of putting a monetary value on 
nature. While they emphasise that doing so is not privatising or commodifying ecosystem 
services, and that the value estimates are more use (or non-use) rather than exchange values 
(Ibid, pp. 153-154), it is obvious from their paper that there has been marked criticism of the 
concept. Original estimates in an earlier article in Nature (Costanza et al 1997) showed that the 
value of ecosystem services exceeded global GDP at the time. On the other hand, Jesse Ausubel 
(2014) argues that “we must make nature worthless” so that it can be owned by those wishing to 
conserve it and rendered unnecessary in the pursuit of an economy based on common, rather 
than rare, substances such as silicon. Humanity would thrive in dense communities that did not 
rely on chlorophyll, leaving larger areas to return to nature, as has happened already in the US 
North East for example. 
 
Decoupling  
Decoupling refers to the possibility of achieving economic growth without environmental 
harm. The concept is similar to the idea of ‘dematerialisation’, by which economic growth is 
increasingly based on non-material outputs such as services, entertainment and software 
forms rather than on physical goods. 
 
There is a distinction between absolute and relative decoupling. In relative decoupling the 
growth rate of the environmental parameter is less than the economic parameter, but is still 
positive. Whereas absolute decoupling involves a zero or negative growth rate of the 
environmental parameter as the economy grows (UNEP 2010 p. 18).  
 
At least in respect of carbon pollution of the atmosphere, decoupling has not yet been achieved:  
 
Globally, economic and population growth continue to be the most important drivers of 
increases in CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion… Between 2000 and 2010, both 
drivers outpaced emission reductions from improvements in energy intensity...Increased 
use of coal relative to other energy sources has reversed the long-standing trend of 
gradual decarbonisation of the world’s energy supply (IPCC 2014d, p. 9) 
 
Dietz & O’Neill (2013, p. 117) propose that our “obsession with GDP” can promote economic 
growth that is harmful. They say that our ecological overshoot is at least partly due to our narrow 
group of economic indicators, especially GDP. Ward et al (2016) agree:  
 
We have shown that there is little evidence that GDP growth can be decoupled in the 
long-term (i.e. it is not sustainable) …it is ultimately necessary for nations and the world 
to transition to a steady or declining GDP scenario. 
 
Capitalism 
Dennis Meadows of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), one of the original 
authors of The Limits to Growth (1972), now believes that sustainability cannot be achieved 
within the present financial system: 
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A fish will never create fire while immersed in water.28 We will never create 
sustainability while immersed in the present financial system. There is no tax, or 
interest rate, or disclosure requirement that can overcome the many ways the current 
money system blocks sustainability...I now understand, as proven clearly in this text, 
that the prevailing financial system is incompatible with sustainability in five ways: 
• it causes boom and bust cycles in the economy 
• it produces short-term thinking 
• it requires unending growth 
• it concentrates wealth 
• it destroys social capital (Meadows in Lietaer et al 2012, p. 6). 
 
Seabrook (2002) is in accord. For him, ‘sustainability’ has been distorted to mean the 
economic rather than the environmental kind:  
 
‘Sustainable’ now means what the market, not the Earth, can bear; what originally 
meant adjusting the industrial technosphere so that it should not destroy the planet 
has now come to indicate the regenerative power of the economy, no matter how it 
may degrade the "environment". Sustainable is what the rich and powerful can get 
away with. 
 
Much earlier, Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944], p. 136) had written of the natural world that the 
“market economy, if left to evolve according to its own laws would create great and 
permanent evils”. These would result because “food supplies…the climate…the denudation of 
forests…erosions, and dustbowls” do not respond to the supply-and-demand mechanism of 
the market (Ibid, p. 193). 
 
And yet, reflecting on Meadows’ five incompatibilities, none of them is necessarily 
irreconcilable with a sustainable world. Certainly they are all discordant social issues, but they 
do not directly conflict with sustainability. Boom and bust economic cycles are undesirable 
socially and politically, but they do not in themselves necessarily have adverse environmental 
effects. Short-term thought is less revered than long-term thinking, but grand masterplans are 
no guarantee of success, as Napoleon and Hitler exemplify. Whereas the art of ‘muddling 
through’ has serious underpinning in public policy (Lindblom 1959 and 1979; Forester 1984). A 
series of short-term incremental policy steps are often the only practical way to proceed.  
 
Unending growth, or as Higgs (2015) puts it “endless growth on a finite planet”, seems the 
most cogent of these incompatibilities. Yet, ultimately the growth involved is – as our Berlin 
neoclassical economists assert – ephemeral. It is economic. It is money. It is a concept of 
exchange value. It is a number on a screen, not necessarily the consumption of materials or 
energy. A Rembrandt has an exchange value millions of times its physical content. A software 
program may be extremely valuable but is immaterial. And increasingly economies depend on 
growth in services rather than goods. At least in the developed world, most people have more 
than enough ‘stuff’ and economic growth is decoupling from physical possessions. It seems 
possible that not only can growth be de-materialised, but the innovation that it enables can 
lead to sustainability rather than to degradation. According to Nicholas Stern in The Economics 
of Climate Change (2006), for example: “growth is part of the solution to climate change. Most 
growth is the result of innovation – the development of new products, new techniques and 
new ways of doing things that are an improvement on what went before. The next wave looks 
like it will be dominated by digital technology, robotics, biotech, lighter materials and 
                                                 
28 This is an odd metaphor: fish do not create fire, whether immersed in water or not. 
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renewable energy...To say that we have to stop growing – that we have to go backwards – I 
think is factually wrong, and also politically unlikely to be successful...We absolutely can have 
growth and protection of the climate at the same time, and in doing so we will construct a 
much better form of economic activity and growth in terms of clean air, less-congested cities 
and so on”. 
 
Concentration of wealth is not only inequitable and socially undesirable; it can also have 
indirect adverse environmental effects – through both excessive consumption and the 
insulation of the wealthy from the consequences of unsustainable practices. Yet this is not 
necessarily disastrous. Governments can still make laws that assuage inequities while keeping 
reasonable incentives. Information is increasingly available to anyone. New platforms can 
democratise the media and political activism is a counterweight to the power of wealth. 
 
Lastly, the destruction of ‘social capital’, or the promotion of selfish and non-collaborative 
behaviours, is documented.  Certainly it would reduce societal cohesion. And it would weigh 
against environmental well-being, which would be ignored in pursuit of individual gain. But to 
say that the financial system destroys social capital is absurd. The central study on the issue 
ascribed the decline of US social capital to television, not the financial system (Putnam 1995). 
Also, while the financial system has been around for hundreds of years, social capital has 
apparently yet to be destroyed. Lastly, social capital can be constructed in pursuit of financial 
ends. Finance is not intrinsically evil − although money may well be at its root. 
 
As to Seabrook’s view that the economically powerful distort ‘the environment’ to mean ‘the 
economy’, there are means to counter such forces – the glare of social media on 
environmental issues for one. Polanyi’s warning of unrestrained markets implies that markets 
must be restrained for the good of both natural and human sustainability.  
 
Still others have more aggressive views, but along similar lines to Meadows. Joel Kovel, 
ecosocialist academic and former US Green party presidential candidate for example, believes 
that “capital is the efficient cause of the [ecological] crisis”. He is concerned about “the 
general acceptance of capitalism as having a kind of divine right to organise society, and the 
coordinated refusal to face up to its essential ecodestructivity” (Kovel 2007, p. 164). This is an 
observation that resonates, especially since Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ neoliberal capitalist 
triumphalism at the end of the Cold War, although traditional socialist economic models have 
been less than exemplary in this regard as well.  
 
Two visions  
The US biologist John Vucetich observes ruefully that in the modern world we can have human 
prosperity in the absence of once-abundant life. “There are so few black-footed ferrets on the 
planet that we’ve already proved we don’t need them,” he says. “You can list hundreds of 
species we can get along fine without”. Vucetich sees the fight over green modernism as a 
clash between two visions of sustainability: one that exploits nature as much as we like 
without infringing on future exploitation, and one that exploits nature as little as necessary to 
lead a meaningful life. “It’s hard to imagine those two world views would lead to the same 
place,” he says. “I think they would lead to wildly different worlds” (quoted in Keim 2014, 
paras. 48-49).  
 
However, human prosperity does not necessarily mean the elimination of other forms of life. 
The return of some areas to the wild (‘rewilding’) is happening in parts of the US and Europe, 
for example (Monbiot 2014b). And when such habitats are physically linked and their scale 
increased, nature becomes more resilient, more sustainable.  
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Further, Dame Ellen MacArthur (2015), who has real-life experience of sustainability at sea, 
believes that it is not economic growth or capitalism that is the problem, rather it is the linear 
nature of the economy that extracts, uses and degrades in the pursuit of material wealth. She 
believes that a circular economy like a life system would enable sustainability – one in which 
people buy transport services, not cars and buy lighting services, not lights. This is a world where 
we ‘use things’ rather than ‘using them up’ and where organic wastes are recycled as fertiliser. 
Some of this may have been informed by Hawkens, Lovins & Lovins (2015, p. 8) who argue that 
the abundant natural capital and scarce labour of the industrial revolution is giving way to the 
converse – scarce natural capital and abundant labour. Nature can no longer be regarded as free 
to exploit. Hence economic and production systems must be redesigned to be vastly more 
efficient and to produce no waste at all. 
 
If it can’t be reduced, reused, repaired, rebuilt, refurbished, refinished, resold, recycled or 
composted, then it should be restricted, redesigned, or removed  
– Pete Seeger, cited in Svedrup & Ragnarsdóttir 2015, p. 277. 
 
Nightfall 
Isaac Asimov’s Nightfall (1941) imagines a world that orbits several suns, that produces 
continuous daylight throughout the planet, except for a period of nightfall that occurs but 
once every thousand years. The people of the planet do not expect this new phenomenon and 
are driven insane by darkness and the vista of the heavens that opens infinitely above them. 
The civilisation they build collapses, as fires are widespread in desperate attempts to produce 
light. Ultimately, a new civilisation emerges from the ashes of the old, until the darkness again 
returns after a further millennium. The plot tension centres on archaeological discoveries of 
several previous civilisations separated by layers of ash. Can this evidence be interpreted 
correctly, or will the next imminent round of darkness overwhelm the discovery of the truth 
and the means to deal with it? Arguably this scenario is not far from the current predicament 
of humanity on Earth. We already have strong evidence that our civilisation is unsustainable 
and we do know largely how to deal with it. The issue is rather how to deal with the political 
and economic consequences of such actions. 
 
Roadmap 
The underlying theme of Al Gore’s book The Future (2013) is finding a way out of the fossil-
fuel climate crisis, which has still wider application for sustainability. In charting a route, Gore 
outlines six ‘drivers’ of global change, the major forces that offer hope for a sustainable 
future. In Dryzek’s discourse framework (figure 2), this is a sustainability that is both 
imaginative and reformist.   
 
Gore’s sounding the alarm about global warming,29 as well as his efforts to secure the 1997 
Kyoto protocols when US Vice-President, entitle him to some regard in matters of 
sustainability. Not everyone endorses his views, however. From the left, Joel Kovel (2007, p. 
166) believes that “history will be kind to Gore”, but says it is wrong to set the logic of change 
within the dominant (capitalist) system. Nevertheless, Gore’s drivers form a plausible 
roadmap: 
 
The first driver is the integrated global web of corporations, finance and markets that now 
dominates liberal democracies. The second is the emerging “global mind” − humanity linked 
through the Internet and other digital communications that enables alternative political 
                                                 
29 As portrayed in the film An Inconvenient Truth (2006). 
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movements, new business forms that dispense with the middleman, and linked sensors, 
databases and intelligent machines. Gore’s third factor is the shift in political and economic 
power from the global North to the global South.30 His fourth driver is “outgrowth”, whereby 
the global population increase is more in the South, especially Africa. While this population 
increase puts added burdens on resources, it should also lead to the benefits of urbanisation 
and to population restraint through the education of girls, the empowerment of women, the 
availability of contraception and the reduction of death rates. 
 
His fifth driver is genetic and biological research, especially advances in neuroscience. 
Combined with progress in cloud computing and artificial intelligence, such technologies have 
yet to impact on public understanding of their potential. In this respect, the World Bank-IMF 
spring meeting in 2015 included focus on how cloud data can be exploited in ways yet 
unimagined. As a result of interconnected sensors and other data gathering facilities, the 
cloud now contains vast and increasing amounts of data that are available for ‘mining’ – to 
create new models and ways of approaching intricate problems. Gore’s final driver is the 
technological breakthroughs in renewable energy, materials and resource re-use. He sees (US) 
euphoria over shale oil and gas as short-lived due to its minimal net energy output, its huge 
demand for water and its toxic methods. The main obstructions are the corruption of 
democracies through money from established industries and ‘science deniers’ who may fight 
the disruptive technologies of the future.  
 
Consistent with Gore’s view of cloud computing and AI, the originators of the term 
‘anthropocene’ believe that sustainability must be based on information technologies: 
 
To develop a world-wide accepted strategy leading to sustainability of ecosystems 
against human induced stresses will be one of the great future tasks of mankind, 
requiring intensive research efforts and wise application of the knowledge thus 
acquired in the noösphere, better known as the knowledge or information society 
(Crutzen & Stoermer 2000, p. 18). 
 
However, Adams (2006, p. 14) speaks of imagination imprisoned and the importance of 
political heart:  
The existing language of sustainability has become a prison for the imagination. It 
limits the capacity of partners to respond to the challenge of planetary future (e.g. 
language of choices, trade-offs). The elements needed for the future are easily stated, 
although very challenging to work through. They include imagination, vision, passion 
and emotion. The issue of emotion is probably central to success. Existing approaches 
to sustainability have depended heavily on natural science (from which the concept 
came), and economics. ‘Dismal science’ in all forms remains essential to charting a 
course to the future, but it is not enough to drive changes needed. The world is not 
run by technocrats (even economists), but politicians and the citizens they represent 
or govern. In the past sustainability has engaged the mind, but the future demands an 
engagement with the hearts as well. 
 
Others, such as the historian Lynn White writing in 1967, see the origins of our sustainability 
crisis in the overly-successful and destructive combination of Western science, Christianity and 
technology, whereby not only do we see ourselves as rightly dominant over nature but have 
the means to assert it. His solution is based on the values of St Francis, who saw all creatures 
as equal (White 1967, p. 1207), since echoed in Pope Francis’ Laudato si’: on care for our 
                                                 
30 Including Asia, Latin America and Africa. 
  34 
common home (2015). There is little doubt that the road to sustainability must require a 
change of values. However, the half century since White has not been encouraging. For 
example, former Google engineer, Anthony Levandowski’s announced mission to develop a 
“Godhead based on artificial intelligence” to worship and help develop society (Sacasas 2017) 
is bizarre in its combination of religion and technology; values are diminished in an idolatry of 
power over nature. Humanity will best focus where there is the most leverage. And in this 
Gore’s drivers offer more practical hope in the shorter term  which may be all that we have. 
 
Conclusion 
The factors of sustainability can be considered in terms of both origins and consequences. The 
IPAT relationship has changed since its conception according to presumptions of the factors of 
environmental impact, but still provides a framework on which to consider the causal 
elements of sustainability. Daly’s 1990s considerations of the natural capital aspects of 
sustainability balance that structure on the effects side (figure 6):  
 
Figure 6: Factors of sustainability 
         Cause          Effect           
Population                 
Sustainability 
               Yield    
Affluence                           Depletion 
Technology                    Assimilation 
 
Much of the debate about sustainability is one between biologists, who more easily see the 
environmental effects of our species, and those economists who have faith in the market as 
the ultimate arbiter and who therefore dispute the nature of intervention required. A third 
group are the visionaries who view sustainability from wider perspectives, whether they are 
science fiction writers, astronomers or inventors. But while science, economics and the far-
sighted might inform sustainability, to achieve sustainability humanity must focus where there 
is significant leverage. Population policies, even if politically acceptable, take a long time to 
effect and still longer to show results. Although many favour its redistribution, few politicians 
are in favour of less affluence. But while our embrace with industrial technology has produced 
this crisis, our partner changes with bewildering speed, perhaps enough to baffle the 
conundrum of sustainability itself. 
 
In the end, however, sustainability is a matter of politics that involves perceptions about 
equality – which is probably why the landmark Brundtland report on sustainable development 
was headed by an accomplished politician. In line with Dryzek (1997), there are several 
discourses that challenge the dominance of industrialism in different ways and to varying 
degrees, the task of politics is still to establish a narrative that finds wide support to underpin 
the actions needed to bring sustainability about – before the long night falls. 
 
The following chapters 3 to 6 discuss in sequence the elements that contribute to sustainability, 
following the formula of the classic IPAT relationship. Thus impact, population, affluence and 
technology are presented and discussed separately. The final chapter 7 of this part is an 
assessment of our sustainability trajectory and the options for dealing with it. 
 
We shall continue to have a worsening ecological crisis until we reject the Christian axiom that 
nature has no reason for existence save to serve man    Lynn White 1967, p. 1207. 
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Chapter 3. Impact 
 
 
Between the idea 
And the reality 
Between the motion 
And the act 
Falls the Shadow                            
 – Eliot, the Hollow Men 
 
The context of this part of the dissertation is how to establish the current and future impact of 
our species, Homo sapiens, on the planet on which we live and especially on our own 
sustainability. In line with the ‘Earth systems’ concept discussed earlier, this chapter argues 
that we must approach the question from a planetary perspective, rather than any narrower 
viewpoint. It compares our species to others and examines whether human impact is already 
unsustainable in relation to particular measures such as biodiversity. It examines significant 
literature and also analyses the elements of IPAT to highlight human energy practice as a 
particular concern.  
 
Frontiers no longer exist. There is no other world to which we can escape should that impact 
be terminal. Yet the wider perspective of astrobiology is instructive. Adam Frank and 
Woodruff Sullivan writing in Anthropocene have attempted to use such an approach to shed 
light on the chances that humanity may become sustainable in terms of our impact on the 
planet. In astrobiology, sustainability is a subset of habitability: a planet may be habitable, but 
it is only sustainable if a human-like civilisation can develop over a long time-scale (Frank & 
Sullivan 2014, p. 37).  
 
Drake equation 
Such is the scale of its field, astronomy is not known for its emphasis on precision. Members 
of rival disciplines have said that astronomers are usually content with an accuracy “within a 
couple of orders of magnitude” or hundreds of times the estimate. With that reservation in 
mind, a key to Frank and Sullivan’s analysis is the classic Drake equation31 that was originally 
developed to predict the chances of other civilisations with radio technology existing within 
the known Universe. The Drake equation takes the rate of star formation, the fraction of stars 
with planets, the fraction of planets that are habitable, the fraction of habitable planets likely 
to contain life, those with intelligent life and those with radio technology to arrive at the 
number of civilisations that may exist (Ibid, p. 33). 
 
Rather like the IPAT relationship, the Drake equation is not strictly mathematical. For example, 
contrary to the equation, it is the net rate of star formation, rather than the gross rate that 
determines the number of stars currently in the Galaxy. Stars form, but stars also die. Also 
contrary to the formula, it is not the rate but rather the total number of stars that must be 
factored in to find the possible number of intelligent species. As has recently been discovered, 
stars with planets have been forming in the galaxy long before the birth of our own sun 
(Campante et al 2015). A modification to the equation conceivably results in an estimate for 
the mean lifetime of species with energy-intensive technology (SWEIT), which frustratingly the 
article fails to develop. Nonetheless, it does provide an estimate of the commonality of our 
plight:  
 
                                                 
31 Attributed to the US astrophysicist, Frank Drake, 1962. 
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Thus even with the odds of evolving a SWEIT on a given habitable planet being one in 
one million billion, at least 1000 species will still have passed through the transition 
humanity faces today within our local region of the cosmos (Frank & Sullivan 2014, pp. 
34-35). 
 
Dynamic modelling 
The ‘transition’ Frank & Sullivan refer to is the possibility of the imminent collapse of our 
civilisation, or worse, the demise of the human species due to our own impact on our habitat. 
Therefore, and more importantly, the analysis proceeds to compare systems dynamics across 
two, and three dimensions. The two-dimensional model plots the SWEIT population (N) 
against energy consumption per capita (Ec) over time. It shows “a stable dynamical system 
[that] experiences oscillations with decreasing amplitude until a steady state is achieved”, as 
shown in figure 7 below: 
 
Figure 7. Species with energy-intensive technology: population and energy per capita over 
time 
 
Source: Frank & Sullivan 2014. 
 
In this two-dimensional model, energy per capita increases to high levels then begins to 
decline and then oscillate until stability is reached at a moderately high level. At the same 
time population at first increases to high levels, then declines as energy per capita is still 
increasing. After reaching a low level, population then varies until stability is reached at a 
moderate level. 
 
The three-dimensional model, however, includes an estimate of feedback on planetary 
systems or ‘forcing’ (F) that result from energy use, such as carbon dioxide increase. It finds 
current circumstances — high population of the energy-intensive species (N), high energy 
consumption per capita (Ec) and resultant high feedback on the planetary system (F) – to be 
unstable, with rapid volatility and deterioration after only a short time. However, low 
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population (N) and high energy consumption per capita (E)c is stable (Ibid. p. 36) - that is, 
‘sustainable’ in the meaning of the term outlined on page 9. 
 
Figure 8 below shows two possible paths. The ‘collapse trajectory’ shows a higher population, 
energy consumption and planetary feedback leading to instability and collapse, while the 
‘sustainability trajectory’ represents a lower maximum population, less energy consumption 
per capita, reduced volatility and ultimate stability at a lower population but still quite high 
energy level. 
 
Figure 8. Species with energy-intensive technology: population, energy per capita and 
planetary forcing 
 
Source: Frank & Sullivan 2014 
 
As this implies, our present energy dilemma may not be unique to our species. Rather, it could 
be “an issue for petrol-heads across the universe”, because having ready access to a highly 
concentrated stock of fossil fuel creates a dependency that is hard to break. Perhaps we have 
not been contacted by other advanced civilisations because of this common ‘great filter’: alien 
civilisations may have wrecked their planet or run out of fossil fuels before they could make 
the transition to renewables (Le Page 2014, p. 39). 32  
                                                 
32 This is one possible answer to the ‘Fermi paradox’: if other civilisations are common throughout the 
universe, why haven’t they contacted us?  
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UK astrobiologist, Lewis Dartnell, argues that while difficult, it still may be possible to 
construct an advanced civilisation without fossil fuels by combining hydroelectricity and 
renewable forest practices. This includes charcoal production for metal smelting with electric 
cars and public transport. Such an industrial revolution would require “very favourable natural 
environments” such as Canada or Scandinavia whose rivers enable hydroelectric power and 
where there are large forests that can be harvested sustainably for thermal energy (Dartnell 
2015, para 39). This, however, also implies a much lower human population and reduced 
consumption. 
 
This conclusion is not so far from Paul Erlich’s 1960s contention – that population is the key 
factor in the welfare of our species and the planet. Nor is it far distant from the conclusions of 
the Limits to Growth (Meadows et al 1972), which used early computer modelling to estimate 
the effects of continuing exponential growth. 
 
Lately, computer modelling of impact was featured by complex systems geophysicist Brad 
Werner, who famously delivered a talk at a large meeting of the American Geophysical Union 
(AGU) in 2012 with the provocative title Is the Earth F***ed? - dynamical futility of global 
environmental management and possibilities for sustainability via direct action activism. 
Although a transcript of the talk may not exist, according to reports (Kintisch 2012), it drew on 
the author’s computer models of humanity’s relationship with environmental systems. 
According to the abstract – and in contradiction to Hinchcliffe’s assertion33 –  its conclusion is 
that:  
 
the dynamics of the global coupled human-environmental system within the 
dominant culture precludes management for stable, sustainable pathways and 
promotes instability (Werner 2012). 
 
Somewhat more positively, as the talk’s subtitle implies, Werner proposes that sustainability 
may be possible through “direct action activism”, rather than global environmental 
management.  
 
However public perceptions of impending catastrophe tend to focus on the impacts of climate 
change (droughts, floods, hurricanes, rising sea levels), as well as resource depletion and 
ecosystem degradation, human overcrowding and pandemics, economic collapse, nuclear and 
biological conflict and “runaway technological change” (Randle & Eckersley 2015, p. 3). 
Arguably all of these potential catastrophes contain technology as their central factor.  
 
Confusion 
Even a landmark paper such as The Anthropocene: From Global Change to Planetary 
Stewardship (Steffen et al 2011) can confuse the factors involved in environmental impact. In 
order to illustrate the acceleration of environmental impact due to change in population, 
affluence and technology since the 1950s, the paper recycles a diagram from an Elizabeth 
Kolbert article in the National Geographic of the same year. The diagram (Ibid, p. 6) purports 
to show the product of population, affluence and technology between 1900 and 2011, 
reproduced below as figure 9. It is a vivid illustration of how the three dimensions form a 
volume of impact. Accepting the units used in the paper (population, GDP in US dollars and 
patents), a simple calculation shows that the impact of 1950 is about 10.8 times that of 1900, 
                                                 
33 Hinchcliffe asserted that the answer to any interrogative title will always be ‘No’, which is 
confounded by Peon’s riposte: ‘Is Hinchcliffe’s rule true?’, which demonstrates that the assertion is 
false – but only if it is true (Peon 1995). 
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but the impact of 2011 is an estimated 134 times that of 1950 – and therefore 1442 times34 
compared with that of 1900!  
 
Figure 9. Global impact of population, affluence and technology 1900, 1950 and 2011  
 
Source: Kolbert 2011, cited in Steffen et al 2011. 
 
Yet all is not as it seems: there are at least two flaws in this representation. First, affluence (A) 
should be per person, not total, otherwise population growth is multiplied by itself, which 
considerably overinflates its value. Second, technology (T) is represented by patents, which 
also tend to increase with population and may not necessarily increase environmental impact. 
Patents in fact better represent innovations, to which they are directly linked, and innovations 
in the current context often reduce rather than exacerbate environmental impact (Chertow 
2000, p. 18). Further, the scope of what is patentable has drastically expanded over the past 
three decades (Mercurio 2014 p. 4) and the number of patents shown in the illustration 
(figure 9) appear to be patent applications, rather than patents granted, which again inflates 
results.  
 
But even accepting that ‘patents’ is a valid cipher for T (technology), when total affluence is 
reduced to affluence per person and patents are reduced to patents per person, the resultant 
impact in 2011 is 95 times times that of 1900. This is still a very large figure, but considerably 
less than the 1442 times implied by the illustration. The ‘per person’ approach is consistent 
with the Holdren-Erlich formulation that proposed “environmental degradation = population × 
consumption per person × damage per unit of consumption” (Holdren & Erlich 1974, p. 282). 
It is consistent with all other formulations, which involve per capita consumption, production 
or economic activity (Chertow 2000). Professor Steffen disagrees with this assessment,35 
saying that much of the increase in GDP in that time was not due to population increase 
because it largely occurred in OECD countries with low population growth rates, and that the 
                                                 
34 1900: 1.8 billion X 2 trillion X 141, 000, whereas 2011: 7 billion X 55 trillion X 1.9 million. Ratio: 3.89 X 
27.50 X 13.48 = 1442 times that of 1900.  
35 Personal email of 26 September 2014. 
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diagram was only for illustrative purposes, not meant to be mathematically rigorous. 
Nevertheless, while this is an important point, the illustration remains misleading. 
 
Relative impact 
In terms of the impact of humanity compared with other species, the US marine biologists 
Charles Fowler and Larry Hobbs have shown just how much of an outlier species we humans 
are. Their Royal Society paper, Is humanity sustainable? (2003), measures the impact of 
humans compared with various other species in biomass consumption, CO2 production, 
geographical range and population size. They compare humanity with seabirds, marine 
mammals, fish and terrestrial mammals. The differences in impact are vast. For example:  
 
[the impact of] the human population is over two orders of magnitude [hundreds of 
times] greater than the upper 95 per cent confidence limit of populations for non-
human mammalian species of similar body size, and over four orders of magnitude 
[36,760 times] greater than the mean (Fowler & Hobbs 2003, p. 2580). 
 
Their conclusion, that the human species is abnormal and that atypical elements of human 
ecology “are among the primary factors” contributing to the environmental problems the 
world now faces, is hardly surprising. What is surprising is the enormous scale of that 
abnormality. However, the features of that abnormality are equally important, discussed 
below under extinctions.  
 
Extinctions 
Apart from relative consumption and waste production, our impact on biodiversity is 
profound. The title of Carson’s 1962 classic Silent Spring evoked a world devoid of animal life 
due to synthetic pesticides. While her work led to the banning of DDT and other biocides, the 
spectre of what has been termed ‘biosimplification’ still haunts our planet. In 2014 Peter 
Fisher wrote of a future eerie silence: 
 
Some have predicted that, within just two or three centuries, we could be alone 
except for pets, chickens, livestock, and an unknown suite of microbes and freeloaders 
such as mice and cockroaches. For a sneak preview of this “biosimplification”, look no 
further than the swathes of European countryside where there has been a crash in 
bird populations – no songs, no glimpses of plumage, just an eerie silence – as a result 
of the wholesale ripping up of hedgerows, draining of wetlands and ploughing over of 
meadows robbing farmland birds of their homes and sustenance in order to boost 
farming production. That would leave us living in a drab, crummy landscape where 
surviving native plants cower in small niches away from the weeds; zoos exhibit a lost 
fauna; and biophilia is reduced to watching carp (Fisher 2014, paras. 19-21). 
 
In the seas, climate change is a major driver of biodiversity loss until 2100, as oceans warm 
and marine species follow thermal niches (Molinos et al 2015, p. 1). Overall, threats to 
biodiversity and whole species on both land and sea are due to over-hunting, over-fishing and 
and over-farming, or in blunt technological terms “guns, nets and bulldozers” (Maxwell et al 
2016, p. 143).  
 
All this is in contrast to the Enlightment’s Thomas Jefferson, who was of the firm view that 
nature never let any species become extinct (Gerbi 2010, p. 257). Of course then North 
America was sway to 40 million or so bison and as well as perhaps five billion prairie dogs, 
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both now reduced to pathetic remnants36 of that earlier “infinitude” (Worster 1993, p. 4). At 
least, what was once 40 million white-tailed deer, reduced to about half a million by 1900, 
have since rebounded to be about 15 million in the same habitat (Smith 1991, p. 5).  
 
A related concept is the idea of ‘great extinctions’, popularised by the National Geographic 
and New Yorker writer, Elizabeth Kolbert in The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History (2014). 
The fossil record shows that there have been five brief eras in which many forms of life on the 
planet became extinct; the extinction of the dinosaurs and the rise of mammals about 60 
million years ago were the most recent – until now. This sixth great extinction is driven by 
humanity and industrial technology, and is extremely rapid, about “a thousand times the rate 
of background extinctions” (Pimm et al 2014). This is discussed under chapter 5 on affluence 
insofar as it relates to consumption.  
 
Whilst extinctions occur due to chance natural causes, only the human species drives other 
life forms to extinction with an organised intense and ruthless brutality. The passenger pigeon, 
once the most common avian species in North America that flew in flocks of millions, finally 
was made extinct over a century ago. According to the Encyclopedia Smithsonian (2014), this 
species once constituted 25 to 40 per cent of the total bird population of the US. There were 
estimated to be between three and five billion of them at the time Europeans reached 
America. That extinction was by direct human agency:  
 
The professionals and amateurs together outflocked their quarry with brute force. 
They shot the pigeons and trapped them with nets, torched their roosts, and 
asphyxiated them with burning sulfur. They attacked the birds with rakes, pitchforks, 
and potatoes. They poisoned them with whiskey-soaked corn (Yeoman, 2014). 
 
Using industrialised methods that exploited the new technologies of the railway and the 
telegraph, the birds were slaughtered more intensely even as their numbers dramatically 
declined, until the final one, named ‘Martha’, that withered away the last years of her life in 
the Cincinnati zoo until her death in 1914.  
 
The Tasmanian tiger (thylacine) is an even swifter and more recent extinction. A top predator 
that had co-existed with an isolated indigenous human population for forty thousand years, it 
was wiped out in the space of little more than a century by the arrival of Europeans, who saw 
it as a threat to farming. European settlement began in Tasmania in 1803. The last wild 
thylacine was shot in 1930 and the very last of the species, called Benjamin, died in a Hobart 
zoo in 1936 (Shreeve 2013). 
 
Many larger fauna extinctions at our hand have occurred on islands, as in Tasmania. The 
human wave that populated the Pacific over the last few thousand years meant the end of 
much animal life, not only many bird species in Hawaii for example, but a species of eagle and 
all of the genus moa in New Zealand during the twelfth century, when it became the last land 
on Earth to be permanently occupied by humans. In the Indian Ocean, the extinction of the 
dodo in Madagascar in the seventeenth century is infamous. On an island there is no refuge, 
no chance of escape, once humans assert it as their territory. 
 
The 2014 report from the World Wildlife Fund, Living Planet: Species and spaces, people and 
places, indicates that between the years 1970 and 2010 more than half of all vertebrate 
                                                 
36 Bison numbers were down to 1091 by 1889, and have rebounded to about 500,000 according to Defenders of 
Wildlife (www.defenders.org/bison/basic-facts). Prairie dog numbers have been reduced by 98 per cent since 1900 
(National Geographic: http://www.nationalgeographic.com/features/98/burrow/pdog.html). 
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species (fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds and mammals)37 have been made extinct. Already the 
human species together with our domesticated animals form 97 per cent of all vertebrates on 
Earth by weight. ‘Wild’ vertebrates form only three per cent (Smil 2011, cited in Hamilton 
2014, p. 1). According to the report (WWF 2014, p. 20), the main factors38 in these extinctions 
are over-exploitation (37 percent) habitat degradation (31 percent) and habitat loss (13 
percent). Other lesser factors are climate change (7 percent), invasive species or genes (5 
percent), pollution (4 percent) and disease (2 percent). Over-exploitation is a product of 
increased consumption based on affluence, or else increased population, or both. Degradation 
and loss of habitat are similarly influenced.  
 
This stark picture echoes the concept of the ‘Eremozoic era’, originally found in biologist EO 
Wilson’s book, The Creation: an appeal to save life on Earth (2006). While the destruction of 
fauna that began when human ancestors began eating meat has continued and increased, it is 
now at cataclysmic proportions. The megafauna on each continent began to disappear as soon 
as humans arrived, such that its destruction marks the spread of humanity through the planet. 
In Australia the animals included the giant kangaroo and the diprotodon. Most recently, the 
giant Moa39 of New Zealand – the final land settled by humans  were eliminated entirely in 
less than 200 years after the arrival of humans around 1200 AD (Flannery 1994, Roberts & 
Jacobs 2008). The Eremozoic era will be a consequence of the sixth great extinction, when the 
Earth will lack nearly all vertebrate life due to the impact of human activities. This permanent 
loss will probably reach final Mesozoic proportions by the end of this century, or much sooner 
according to Ceballosa, Ehrlich & Dirzob (2017), who have deemed it a “biological 
annihilation”. Humanity has begun to enter Wilson’s Eremozoic era — the Age of Loneliness. 
 
Is this destruction intentional? Steven Freeland (2015) points out that the environment is 
often a silent victim of warfare. Like rape once was, it is regarded as an inevitable 
consequence of mass conflict. Dutch ecologist, Sanne van der Hout, asks a related question in 
her 2014 article Is de natuur partner of jachtgrond? – Is nature a partner or a hunting ground? 
(van der Houte, 2014). However, this devastation of species and habitats progressively looks 
more and more like an intentional organised conflict rather than just the unfortunate result of 
overconsumption or a by-product of human warfare. According to legal geographer Bronwyn 
Lay’s paper Ecocide as War, ecological destruction may be “a deliberate power strategy and 
attack against nature, not as collateral damage, but nature as centre stage both as participant 
and victim in warfare” (Lay 2014, p. 1). She asserts that “the mass destruction of forests, rivers 
and soil pollution increasingly resemble battlefields: policed by privatised ‘armies’ masked as 
corporate security” (Lay 2014, p. 4). Certainly this rings true for the manner in which native 
forests are treated in for example, Tasmania and New Zealand. In these places entire hillsides 
are laid waste to monochrome grey mud and fibre like the battlegrounds of Flanders, torched 
by firebomb then poisoned with chemicals to kill any wildlife that may return to nibble on a 
new-sprouting alien seed.  
 
If ecocide were an international crime, then many now unmonitored areas around the world 
would come under legal scrutiny as crime sites rather than regarded in regulatory terms as the 
consequence of ‘environmental degradation’. If ‘nature’ thus becomes a legal subject, as 
‘humanity’ has become after the Second World War and the invocation of the crime of 
genocide, then recognition of ecocide would change the current paradigm from potential 
                                                 
37 Based on the Living Planet Index, calculated using trends in 10,380 populations of over 3,038 
vertebrate species.  
38 Not all populations were assessed, but these factors were identified in 3,430 different species 
populations. 
39 The word ‘Moa’ throughout the Pacific now has a related but reduced meaning: it means ‘chicken’. 
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regulation to “resultant rights and protections” (Ibid). In fact, the international crime of 
ecocide was proposed to be included as one of five Offences Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind in a 1996 UN draft that also listed Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity 
and Crimes of Aggression that have since become International Crimes Against Peace under 
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Higgins 2012, p.10).  
 
While extinctions are global, populations can be decimated locally. Probably to their benefit, 
Atlantic cod survive in some seas, perhaps because they do not share terrestrial territory with 
humans. Cod have been a food staple of Europe for hundreds of years. The Grand Banks, off 
Newfoundland, were regarded as a limitless resource that were exploited to sustain a growing 
human population. As figure 10 below shows, the amount of cod landed from this area 
gradually increased during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, until during the 1960s 
catches were trebled to a peak of 800,000 tons a year. The catch then suddenly collapsed in 
two stages, until 1992 when there were virtually no cod left and the fishing grounds were 
closed. Again it was industrialisation of the industry that enabled the huge increase in catch 
during the 1960s and its subsequent exhaustion. Combined with poor regulation, resulting in 
increased competition, the fishery was doomed (Kurlansky, 1998).  
 
Figure 10. Collapse of Atlantic cod fisheries off Newfoundland  
 
 
The Grand Banks story is a particular example of the industrialised approach to fishing 
generally since World War II, using high-powered diesel engines, sonar, vast nylon nets, and 
satellite imagery to locate and harvest increasing amounts of fish. Since the war, “fishing was 
transformed from a local endeavor into a global one” using much larger ocean-going ships and 
the “permanent occupation of marine ecosystems, instead of the local raids practiced by 
previous generations” (Greenburg & Worm 2015, para 8). This impact is such that despite 
increased use of active fishing technologies such as trawling and purse seining globally there 
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has been a halving of fish caught per fisher, from five to two and a half metric tons a year 
between 1970 and 2012 (World Bank 2017b, p. 14). 
 
In contrast with the Grand Banks, however, the Atlantic cod fishery asserted by Iceland during 
the three ‘Cod Wars’ of the 1950s-1970s with the UK has remained sustainable and is certified 
as such under Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) guidelines (IRF 2014). The result of the 
Cod Wars was to give Iceland exclusive rights to manage an area 200 nautical miles (370 km) 
from its coast, a result ultimately achieved through international arbitration that followed 
aggressive confrontations between the British navy and Icelandic trawlers. Its sustainability 
was achieved due to Iceland’s exclusive rights, and because the fishery is one of Iceland’s few 
resources, which implies a strong focus on its regulation. Iceland has a small tight-knit 
population40 who understand its importance and support its management. There is also 
increasing evidence that stocks of Atlantic Cod are again becoming viable in the North Sea 
following the implementation of fishing bans in that area (Smith 2015). Therefore, Atlantic cod 
do not risk extinction of the entire species, but their remnant population off the Grand Banks 
remains closed to further fishing. 
 
These examples illustrate how new technologies as well as the pressure of a growing human 
population were involved in increasing environmental impact during the last two centuries. 
However, Chertow (2000) shows how the impact of ‘T’ in the IPAT has increasingly become 
regarded as benign or more favourable in reducing impact since the identity was formulated 
nearly fifty years ago. At first, technologies were used to clean up the results of other 
production technologies “at the end of the pipe”. Later, newer technologies were developed 
that were less harmful in their composition. Also some technologies are like Janus. For 
example, Greenburg & Worm (2015) point out that the same electronic technologies that are 
used to track schools of fish are now also used to track fish poachers, an increasingly 
important endeavour as fish stocks decline towards unsustainable levels and marine reserves 
are created in response. 
 
Yet even if newer processes are less harmful and some technologies beneficial, Chertow 
articulates an important conundrum facing policy on environmental impact due to the 
relationship between population and technology. Does an increased population call for 
improved technology that can reduce environmental impact, or does an improved technology 
allow an increased human carrying capacity? While there has been a productivity revolution in 
both energy and resources since the IPAT identity was formulated, new technologies allow for 
more of us, but eventually too many of us may be overwhelming: “Does technology merely 
delay the inevitability of environmental destruction, or is better technology our best horse in 
the race toward sustainability?” (Chertow 2000, p. 18). This is a basic question that this 
dissertation attempts to answer. 
 
The rate of extinction may be compared with the natural rate of speciation, the evolutionary 
creation of new species. Comparisons of the two estimated rates are jaw-dropping. Robert 
May, writing in Science attempts to quantify the possible number of species on Earth. Through 
various extrapolations he produces numbers up to perhaps 50 million, although he “will not 
trust any estimate” without further research. Uncertainties are due to the existence of myriad 
very small species with body sizes less than a millimetre, which have received “relatively little 
attention from taxonomists” (May 1988, p. 1447-1448). Ehrlich & Pringle (2008, pp. 330-331) 
estimate there is of the order of tens of millions of species on Earth, and that estimates of 
extinction rates “are similarly imprecise”. They cite May et al (1995) saying that while only a 
                                                 
40 Around 315,000 people according to the 2011 national census.  
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little more than a thousand extinctions have been certified in the past four centuries, “this is a 
small fraction of the true number” of extinctions because our knowledge of biodiversity is 
“pitiful”. Further, “current extinction rates vastly exceed background ones, perhaps by two to 
three orders of magnitude”, or hundreds to thousands of times. 
 
But while he is unable to establish the number of species with any precision, in a coda to the 
article, May remarks that rates of extinction have roughly matched rates of speciation for 
most of the period of life on Earth. Assuming that half of all existing species evolved within the 
last 100 million years and that half of them will become extinct within the current century, 
then contemporary extinction rates are around a million times faster than contemporary rates 
of speciation (Ibid, p. 1448). 
  
More recent estimates of the number of species appear diminished by comparison.  The 
biologist and ‘ecopragmatist’, Stewart Brand, for example, in Rethinking Extinctions (2015) 
casually mentions “the 1.5 million species so far discovered, and most of the estimated 
4 million or so species yet to be discovered”. However because he is writing in the context of 
the IUCN red list of endangered species,41 the apparent inconsistency between his estimates 
and those of May, Erlich and Pringle are plausible: May et al discuss all species, including 
those at the micro-level. By contrast, Brand seems to be discussing larger organisms, 
particularly mammals, birds, reptiles and amphibians as well as fish, insects, molluscs and 
plants, especially those that have been studied to varying degrees.  
 
Figure 11 below shows the estimated number of (larger) species as at 2007 according to the 
IUCN, a total of 1,388,137 species in eight groups. Of those, 15,790 are threatened, or just 
over one percent of the species studied. Dell'Amore (2013), not unreasonably based on the 
IUCN figures, mentions that 20,000 species are now facing extinction. And irrespective of 
extinctions, the World Wildlife Fund’s Living Planet Index (LPI) shows a 58 per cent drop in 
overall numbers of vertebrates between 1970 and 2012, or two per cent per year (WWF 2016, 
p. 6). 
 
Figure 11. Threatened species  
 
Group Species 
Critically 
endangered 
Endangered Vulnerable Total Threatened 
Mammals 5,416 163 349 582 1,094 
Birds 9,956 189 356 672 1,217 
Reptiles 8,240 79 139 204 422 
Amphibians 6,199 441 737 630 1,808 
Fish 30,000 254 254 693 1201 
Insects 950,000 69 129 425 623 
Molluscs 81,000 268 224 486 978 
Plants 297,326 1,569 2,278 4,600 8,447 
Total   1,388,137 3,032 4,466 8,292 15,790 
 Source: 2007 IUCN Red List 
 
The key assertion of Brand’s article though, is that biodiversity is continuing to increase, rather 
than dramatically plummet as the others suggest. In support of this he includes a graph (figure 
                                                 
41 Although at one point, the IUCN itself says: “According to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, the 
total number of species on Earth ranges from five to 30 million and only 1.7–2 million species have been 
formally identified” (<http://iucn.org/iyb/about/>). 
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12) produced by University of Chicago palaeontologists Sepkoski and Raup42 that shows the 
five past great extinctions as substantial, but ultimately mere blips in a long-term trend 
increase in biodiversity based on the fossil record of genera, the level above species: 
 
Figure 12. Biodiversity: number of genera over time  
 
Source: Sepkoski & Raup, University of Chicago, 2002, and cited in Brand 2015. 
 
This result, based on material from two authoritative palaeontologists, is counter-intuitive and 
appears to completely contradict the findings of May, Fisher, Erlich & Pringle, Kolbert and 
Dell'Amore. There are reasons for this, however. First, increasing biodiversity as suggested by 
the graph still allows for declining populations. Whether there are a billion passenger pigeons 
or one Martha, there is still one species in existence. Now there are far fewer cod in the Grand 
Banks than before, but the number of species of such fish remains the same: one. 
Palaeobiologist Professor Tim Wootton of the University of Chicago’s Ecology and Evolution 
department adds that the graph may be distorted. More recent indicators tend to show higher 
levels of biodiversity due to methodology: fossil preservation is better in more recent material 
and also there are wider sources of information in later periods (called "the pull of the 
recent").  And “some recent papers” show “little sustained increase in diversity once sampling 
effects are considered”.43  
 
But most tellingly, Professor David Jablonski, also of the University of Chicago and former 
associate of Sepkoski and Raup, points out that the data in figure 12 “are binned into million 
year or larger increments” and that the curve is at genus rather than species level, so that 
anthropogenic extinctions of the last 12,000 years would be undetectable at the scale it 
encompasses.44 So Brand has misinterpreted the information in figure 12. There is no doubt 
that over the past millions of years, biodiversity has continued to increase. But over the latest 
few thousand years it has almost certainly declined – precipitously – at human hand. 
 
Pollution  
Contamination from pollutants has been with us for a long time. French and US geologists 
Sungmin Hong and associates found evidence of lead pollution in ancient times  considerably 
before the advent of Industrial Revolution:  
 
                                                 
42 It is from Sepkoski J, 2002.  
43 Wootton, personal email of 25 April 2015. 
44 Jablonski, personal email 25 April 2015. 
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Analysis of the Greenland ice core covering the period from 3000 to 500 years ago—the 
Greek, Roman, Medieval and Renaissance times—shows that lead is present at 
concentrations four times as great as natural values from about 2500 to 1700 years ago 
(500 B.C. to 300 A.D.). These results show that Greek and Roman lead and silver mining 
and smelting activities polluted the middle troposphere of the Northern Hemisphere on a 
hemispheric scale two millennia ago, long before the Industrial Revolution. Cumulative 
lead fallout to the Greenland ice sheet during these eight centuries was as high as 15 per 
cent of that caused by the massive use of lead alkyl additives in gasoline since the 1930s. 
Pronounced lead pollution is also observed during Medieval and Renaissance times 
(Hong et al 1994). 
 
Apart from the longevity of the phenomenon, the operative word here is ‘cumulative’. It is the 
accumulation of pollutants, or the incapacity of the biosphere to absorb their flow, that 
essentially defines them as pollutants. And arguably, it was the exposition of cumulative effects 
by two women that defined modern environmentalism. While the American Rachel Carson 
pioneered the modern environmental movement with her 1962 book Silent Spring on the effects 
of pesticide accumulation, the so-called ‘Japanese Carson’, Ariyoshi Sawako, added new 
dimensions to the concept in her novel Fukugō Osen (‘Compound Pollution’ or ‘Cumulative 
Pollution’) that took Japan by storm in 1974. In another parallel, Ariyoshi’s book was first 
published in serialised form in a major newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun, as Carson’s had been in 
the New York Times45 a decade earlier. Ariyoshi’s book sparked intense public debate about 
environmental toxins, such as pesticides and herbicides, synthetic detergents and chemical food 
preservatives. Such was the success of the serialisation that the newspaper published more than 
sixty articles about cumulative pollution during the subsequent year (Hartley 2014).  
 
The impact of Fukugō Osen was magnified by the then recent awareness of the outbreak of the 
lethal “Minamata disease’ from the late 1950s to the 1970s. The disease, which had profound 
neurological effects similar to cerebral palsy, was found to be due to intense concentrations of 
heavy metals in shellfish in Minamata Bay and its surroundings on the West coast of Kyushu. The 
concentration of heavy metals was due to industrial pollution. While tens of thousands of people 
were affected and more than 1500 died from the toxins, Japanese authorities and the business 
concerned moved at glacial pace to rectify the source of the problem.  
 
Before World War 2, “smoke, sewage, and soot were the main environmental concerns” as they 
had been since the Middle Ages (Chertow 2000), but it was the revolutionary thinker Barry 
Commoner, who observed that there had been a remarkable change since then:   
 
most United States pollution problems are of relatively recent origin. The postwar period, 
1945–46, is a convenient benchmark, for a number of pollutants—man-made 
radioisotopes, detergents, plastics, synthetic pesticides, and herbicides—are due to the 
emergence, after the war, of new productive technologies (Commoner 1972a, p. 345).  
 
These pollutants were not only being produced at vastly increasing rates, but they were artificial 
– synthetic – that were alien to the structure of the biosphere and therefore difficult to break 
down and absorb. Hence they tended to accumulate in ever-increasing concentrations.  
 
                                                 
45 There was an alliance between the two newspapers until 2010, during which the Asahi Shimbun 
produced a version of the International Herald Tribune in English in Japan. This may have been a factor 
in Asahi’s decision to serialise Ariyoshi’s book. 
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However, pollution is not just a local or national issue. Its distribution is global. Former World 
Bank economist and US Treasury Secretary under Clinton, Larry Summers, infamously once asked 
in an email to Bank staff if pollution should be shifted to poor countries:  
 
shouldn’t the World Bank be encouraging more migration of dirty industries to the LDCs 
[less developed countries]?…The economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in 
the lowest wage country is impeccable, and we should face up to that…Under-populated 
countries in Africa are vastly under-polluted; their air quality is probably vastly 
inefficiently low compared to Los Angeles or Mexico City…The concern over an agent 
that causes a one in a million change in the odds of prostate cancer is obviously going to 
be much higher in a country where people survive to get prostate cancer than in a 
country where under-five mortality is 200 per thousand (Summers 1992, p. 66).  
 
While it has been argued that the email was sardonic, or that it was ‘economically impeccable’ 
(Johnson et al 2007, p. 398), the idea has failed to find overt support. But as a matter of reality, 
while not so much to Africa, much polluting industry has shifted to Asia. For example, the ship 
breakers of Bangladesh are renowned for their lack of protection from pollutants such as 
asbestos. In China, power generation and associated manufacturing has displaced much of the 
industry of the West, but at the cost of considerable pollution.  
 
Contamination also takes other forms. For example, pesticides may also be contributing to the 
decline of bees, which are essential to the pollination of many crops (Saunders 2016). Derived 
from nicotine as their name suggests, neonicotinoids are widely used including in around 95 
per cent of the US corn crop. Part of their appeal is that they are simple to use. After seed 
planting, the water-soluble pesticide is absorbed by the growing plant. But when bees feed on 
the nectar of these flowering crops, they are exposed to the pesticide. Bees may even prefer 
treated crops due to the effects of their nicotine content46 (Philpott 2016). ‘Neonics’ as they 
are often called are also sprayed, which risks direct exposure for bees and other insects. 
According to a recent US Environmental Protection Agency report,  
 
for all crops and application methods where on-field exposure is expected, values 
exceeded risk levels of concern [LOCs]…For all use patterns where residue data were 
available, LOCs were exceeded (USEPA 2016, p.18)  
 
And even in the deepest ocean, artificial persistent organic pollutants (POPs)47 have been 
found to be accumulating in marine amphipods, at depths of 7,000 to 10,000 metres (Qui 
2017). Nowhere is safe from chemical contamination.  
 
Air  
According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), air pollution causes more deaths 
worldwide than AIDS, diabetes and road injuries combined and is responsible for "one in eight 
of total global deaths" or more than seven million people each year, making it the single 
largest environmental health risk on Earth (WHO 2012). The impacts of air pollution fall mainly 
on the poor and disadvantaged. People living near major roads or large industrial sites are 
particularly affected, as are many people in rural areas. Nearly 84 per cent of all people live 
with ambient concentrations of fine particulates greater than WHO guidelines,48 and the 
                                                 
46 The effects might be described as a ‘mild buzz’ (pun intended). 
47 These include polychlorinated biphenyls used in plastics and antifoulants as well as polybrominated 
diphenyl ethers, used as flame retardants, which are either banned or being phased out.  
48 Fine particulates are less than 2.5 microns diameter; WHO guidelines allow up to ten micrograms per 
cubic meter. 
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number of people exposed increased by ten percent between 1990 and 2010 (World Bank 
2015b, p. 63). Pollutants such as sulphur dioxide, nitrous oxides and particles resulting from 
energy generation, industry and motor vehicles have serious health and environmental 
consequences, according to the American Meteorological Society (AMS). 
 
Air pollution has been a public issue for centuries, but effective action has been limited to mainly 
rich countries since World War 2. In 1306 King Edward I of England proclaimed a ban on the use 
of sea coal49 in London due to the smoke it caused. The first attempt to control air pollution in the 
US was in 1881 when Chicago and Cincinnati enacted clean air legislation and other cities 
followed. Around 1900, the federal Bureau of Mines briefly created an Office of Air Pollution but 
the office closed soon after due to inactivity. During the late 1940s serious smog incidents raised 
political concern to new levels, resulting in the 1955 US Air Pollution Control Act, the first of 
several clean air laws that are still in effect. Figure 13 below lists some of the important air 
pollution events between the 1940s and 1990. 
 
Figure 13. Air pollution regulation 1948-1990  
1948.  Smog in Donora, Pennsylvania US remains for five days causing 20 deaths. 
1949.  USSR enacts air pollution law and establishes a department to monitor emissions.  
1952.  Smog in London UK lasts for four days causing about four thousand deaths.50  
1955.  US passes Air Pollution Control Act. 
1956.  UK passes Clean Air Act. 
1970s Lead concentrations in products restricted and lead-based paints banned outright in US.  
1974.  The catalytic converter is introduced to cut motor vehicle emissions in the US.  
1974.  Discovery that chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) refrigerants destroy the ozone layer.  
1978.  US bans CFCs.  
1980s Radioactive radon gas found to cause thousands of cancer deaths each year.  
1980s USEPA begins radon research program  
1984.  Thousands killed or injured in Bhopal India, due to isocyanate gas leak from Union Carbide plant.  
1985.  Hole in the ozone layer discovered by the British Antarctic Survey, attributed to CFCs. 
1985-95. Leaded petrol (gasoline) phased out in the EU and OECD countries. 
1986.  US proposes stronger lead restrictions in a wide range of products.  
1986. US and Canada recognise acid rain as “transboundary” issue, industry clean air programs increased.    
1988. Alternative motor fuels act passed in US. Government fleet begins use of methanol and ethanol.  
1989. UN Montreal Protocol phases out CFCs in favour of less harmful substitutes. 51  
1990. US Pollution Prevention Act passed, dealing with pollution at source.  
 Source: American Meteorological Society, 2015.  
                                                 
49 ‘Sea coal’ was mined from easily accessible deposits on coastal cliffs, especially along the Yorkshire 
coast.  
50Source: UK Met Office. <http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/learning/learn-about-the-weather/weather-
phenomena/case-studies/great-smog>. 
51 Those substitutes, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), also proved problematic and are to be phased out 
from 2016, in favour of hydrofluoroolefins (HFOs), that rapidly degrade in the lower atmosphere (Rae 
2016). 
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In 2016, India announced plans for 56.5 per cent of its electricity capacity to be from non-
fossil-fuelled sources by 2026-27 (CEA 2016, xxv). In 2017, China announced cancellation of 
plans to build an additional 103 coal-fired power plants. This represented more than the 
entire coal-fired capacity of Germany (Forsythe 2017). 
 
Carbon  
Carbon pollution is largely unnoticeable because its main vehicle, the gas carbon dioxide 
(CO2), is both colourless and odourless, as well as safe to breathe providing there is sufficient 
oxygen present. Its indirect effects due to increasing concentrations are nevertheless highly 
significant, both in its impact on the atmosphere as the major greenhouse gas and on the 
oceans as the major acidifier.  
 
During the nineteenth century it was known that atmospheric carbon dioxide was increasing 
and that it could cause global warming through the greenhouse effect. In 1895 the Swedish 
chemist Svante Arrheinius quantified the impact showing that a doubling of its proportion in 
the atmosphere would result in a global temperature increase of between five and six degrees 
Celsius (Arrhenius 1896, p. 266). However, he did not specifically link the CO2 increase with the 
burning of fossil fuels. 
 
Nevertheless, over the next century the link and its magnitude became clear. After winning 
the Pulitzer prize for her book The Sixth Extinction, Elizabeth Kolbert, was interviewed by the 
New York Times. She spoke of how fast we are changing the world: 
 
When we use fossil fuels, we are reversing geological history by taking organisms that 
were buried millions of years ago and pumping their carbon back into the atmosphere 
at a very fast rate...Humans have sped up the rate by which we change the world, while 
the rate at which evolution adapts is much slower. There’s a mismatch between what 
we can do and what nature can sustain (Dreifus 2014). 
 
Pumping ancient stored carbon back into the atmosphere at millions of times the rate it was 
fossilised is of course the source of global warming now experienced throughout the 
biosphere. The issue is how to de-carbonise the economy before the impact of resultant 
global warming brings irreversible change including accelerating sea level rise, climate 
disruption, habitat destruction and even more extinctions.  
 
As shown in figure 14 below, the main sources responsible for global carbon pollution are 
petroleum and coal equally, both about a third of the total – around 10 billion tonnes per year 
− plus natural gas at about 17 per cent and cement production at about five percent of global 
carbon pollution: 
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Figure 14. Sources of carbon pollution  
 
Source: Marland, Boden & Andres, 2007 
 
Cement is the key ingredient of concrete, the ubiquitous building material of modernity and 
by volume second only to water in amount consumed world-wide (WBCSD & IEA 2009, p. 2). 
While the rate of carbon emissions per tonne of cement has fallen since 2000, without 
mitigation total carbon emissions from this industry will still rise by mid-century, such is the 
likely increase in production (Ibid).   
 
Still, the energy sector has by far the greatest emissions. Figure 15 below shows the relative 
contribution to global carbon pollution and other greenhouse gases by sector. It demonstrates 
that not only does energy production emit the most greenhouse gases, but emissions are 
growing the most in that sector. Much of this energy production is of course grid electricity 
from thermal power plants that are fired by coal and gas. Where grids do not exist or are 
unreliable, much electricity is produced from diesel generators that use petroleum-based fuel.  
 
Figure 15. Greenhouse gas emissions by sector  
 
Source: World Resources Institute 2009 
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The IPCC, however, takes a broader view of energy sector emissions by assessing the total 
greenhouse gas emissions contributed by various sources of electricity generation over the life 
cycle of the technology. Thus, for example, a concrete hydro-electric dam includes emissions 
incurred during the extraction, transport and conversion of materials (such as cement) used in 
its construction, as well as in its operation. The resulting table (figure 16) shows that coal-fired 
electricity generation is orders of magnitude more harmful than, say, solar, wind or hydro 
power as far as greenhouse gas emissions are concerned. 
 
Figure 16. Median carbon dioxide emissions by source of electricity generation: lifecycle CO2 
equivalent per kilowatt-hour (gCO2eq/kWh)  
Source         (Existing commercial) 
Median emissions 
(gCO2eq/kWh) 
Pulverised coal 820 
Biomass, co-firing with coal 740 
Combined cycle gas  490 
Dedicated biomass  230 
Solar photo-voltaic: utility scale 48 
Solar photo-voltaic: rooftop 41 
Geothermal 38 
Concentrated solar 27 
Hydro 24 
Offshore wind  12 
Nuclear 12 
Onshore wind  11 
                     (Pre-commercial) 
Carbon capture and storage – pulverised coal  220 
Carbon capture and storage – coal – integrated gasifier 
combined cycle 
200 
Carbon capture and storage – gas – combined cycle 170 
Carbon capture and storage – coal – oxyfuel 160 
Ocean  - tidal and wave 17 
Source: based on IPCC 2014c, p. 1335 
 
Even ‘pre-commercial’ generation technologies involving fossil fuel carbon capture and 
storage, though much less polluting than existing coal and gas systems, are far more polluting 
over their life cycle than all renewable and nuclear technologies. This leads to comparing the 
monetary and other costs of each form of generation, which are the major determinants of 
viability. These key relationships are discussed in the chapter 10 case study on nuclear-electric 
power.  
 
Deforestation 
Globally, net deforestation is not quite as bad as might be expected. Generally speaking, 
deforestation is continuing in developing countries, while reforestation is continuing in developed 
countries. As a result, tropical forests are in decline whereas temperate forests are actually 
increasing. As far as tropical forests are concerned, one widely cited World Bank study, based 
on the results of 140 analyses using economic modelling, indicates ambiguity about how 
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factors such as population, income and security of tenure affect tropical deforestation. 
According to the study, economic liberalisation reforms may increase pressure on tropical 
forests (Angelsen & Kaimowitz 1999). More recently, in the Amazon for example, there is 
evidence that the rate of tropical deforestation can be reduced using accurate satellite 
imaging combined with cadastral reform (Chomitz 2015).  
 
However, forests are more than just trees. To the extent that natural forests are replaced with 
monocultural plantations, there is an inevitable loss of ecosystem and biodiversity. The UN 
Forum on Forests (UNFF), which aims to promote sustainable forest management and prevent 
forest degradation was only established as a permanent body at the turn of the millennium 
(UNFF 2004). As the overall net rate of forest loss appears unclear52 and depends on 
definitional factors such as percentage of crown cover (Lang 2015), it is not possible to claim 
that the planet’s forests are at present sustainable overall, and especially in respect of the 
biodiversity they embrace. 
 
Risks 
By way of summarising the risks now faced, the thirty-year old Brundtland report identified the 
stand out risks of a high energy future. They are climate change, urban air pollution and 
acidification of the environment – all produced from the combustion of fossil fuels  as well as 
the risks of accident, waste disposal and proliferation, all associated with nuclear energy 
(Brundtland 1987, pp. 121-122).   
 
Another major problem arises from the growing scarcity of fuelwood in developing countries. 
Brundtland indicated that if trends continued, by the year 2000 around 2.4 billion people would 
be living in areas where wood is extremely scarce. In fact, a more recent study points to fuelwood 
dependency in parts of Kenya as well as in other countries such as Bangladesh and Ethiopia at 
rates of around 95 per cent in rural areas, and that between 84 and 94 percent of people 
experienced fuelwood shortage. Much of this shortage appears due to agriculture replacing 
forest land use (Stacey et al 2013, p. 4140), which due to its unsustainability creates a demand for 
alternative cheap energy in the developing world.  
 
Metrics 
Whilst blatant impacts such as the extinction of particular species can be obvious, there is less 
clarity about the measurement of other impacts, or overall impact for that matter. There are 
four variables in the IPAT identity. Two of them are fairly clear: ‘population’ simply means the 
number of individual humans alive at any one time. ‘Affluence’ in the equation means the 
amount of goods and services consumed, on average, by each person in a year. Population is a 
straightforward measurement, simply a number. Affluence is usually measured by GDP per 
person as it represents average consumption, and is therefore expressed in monetary units – 
usually US dollars – per person.  
 
However, a persistent thread over the decades has been how the ‘T’ in I=PAT has changed. 
And if the meaning of ‘T’ has changed, then so must ‘I’, because the equation says that impact 
is proportional to technology, as well as to population and affluence. Early on, ‘T’ meant 
pollution, then emissions, then waste. It has also meant damage per unit of production, or 
energy per unit GDP, or ‘the residual of all that impacts the environment that is not A or P’, or 
patents (as in the Kolbert-Steffen example above), and so on. Because the nature of human 
                                                 
52 According to the FAO, the net yearly rate of forest lost was 0.18% in the 1990s, falling to 0.08% 
between 2010 and 2015. However, this apparent improvement included a change in definition of forest 
crown cover from 20% to 10% (Lang 2015). 
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impact on the environment critically depends on the meaning of T in the IPAT equation, an 
important question is, what is the best metric for T? 
 
An appropriate metric for technology might follow from the notion of impact as ‘ecological 
footprint’, or the area of ecosystem required to sustain an existing human population 
(Wackernagel 1994, Wackernagel & Rees 1996). If the I in I=PAT is impact, then the equation 
says impact is proportional to T (technology). Footprint is commonly measured in hectares. 
Recasting I=PAT, we find that T=I/PA. Therefore,  
  
T =   I: (footprint (hectares)) / P: (population) X A: (GDP dollars / population).  
 
The populations cancel out, leaving T = footprint (hectares)/GDP (dollars). Thus T is measured 
in hectares of impact per dollar of consumption. This is an annual flow, given that GDP is 
income or consumption over one year.  The original I=PAT formulation then becomes: 
 
 
I: (footprint (hectares)) = P: (population) X   A: (GDP (dollars)) X    T: (footprint (hectares)) 
                                      1                       (population)                     (GDP (dollars)), 
 
which is self-evidently true, since the populations cancel out as do the GDPs, leaving footprint 
(hectares) = footprint (hectares).  
 
It is possible to conceive of a technology that is less harmful than another technology. Thus, 
for the same population and average consumption, T and therefore I would be reduced, or the 
footprint made smaller. The equation shows that this can be achieved by increasing the cost 
of the footprint, but only if it reduces without increasing consumption, or GDP. If the cost of 
the footprint (T: (footprint (hectares)) / (GDP (dollars)), decreases as a result of increased 
consumption, then that consumption will be cancelled by the same increase in A. Rather, what 
is required for a smaller footprint (I) is a technology (T) that minimises footprint independent 
of consumption (A). Technologies that enable more intensive agriculture are examples of this 
sort. There is also support for such a possibility in the ‘environmentalist’s paradox’. Not only is 
human well-being now increasing as ecosystems are degraded, but technology can be used to 
enhance ecosystems rather than just replace them or mitigate their damage (Raudsepp-
Hearne et al 2010, p. 586).   
 
Alternatively, because we are a species with energy intensive technology (SWEIT) that 
distinguishes us from all other species on this planet, and which importantly has caused much 
of our present conundrum, technology and therefore impact may be measured in terms of 
energy intensity. The Earth is essentially a solar-powered life-support system. As well as direct 
radiation, solar services include weather, photosynthesis (food), fossil fuels and natural waste 
disposal. The rate of energy usage per person fulfils the metric of energy intensity: it is a 
property of human society, it is measurable, and there are appropriate units such as kilowatts 
per person. Following this logic, the dimension of impact (I) is therefore power, or energy per 
unit time.  
 
Assuming that we are dealing in rates of change rather than accrued stocks, such as the rate 
of consumption rather than accumulated wealth, a footprint using this metric would measure 
the fraction of the Earth's life support services consumed per unit time. Because the Earth's 
life-support services are solar powered, it is reasonable that footprint can be measured in 
units of solar power, or incoming energy per unit time. A dimensional analysis of the elements 
of the I=PAT equation is therefore based on: e = energy, t = time, and c = consumption: 
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I is Impact, with dimensions e/t,  
P is population, which is simply a number, and 
A is affluence with dimensions c/t/person. 
 
Recasting I=PAT results in T=I/PA as before.  Therefore, the dimensions of technology (T) are: 
(energy/time) / (population X ((consumption/time) / person))). The ‘times’ cancel and so do 
the ‘populations’. Therefore, T = energy / consumption. This is essentially the affordability of 
energy. A valid unit would be kilowatt-hours per dollar. The original I=PAT formulation then 
becomes: 
 
I (footprint: energy/time, or power) = P: (population)    X    A: (GDP)      X    T: (energy/time) 
                                                                                       1              (population)             (GDP), 
 
Thus the more affordable energy becomes through technology, the greater the impact of a 
given human population. This makes sense in the real world. For example, where petrol 
(gasoline) is cheap as in the US, the environmental impact of inefficient ‘gas guzzler’ cars is 
greater than in say France, where fuel is more than double US prices and cars are smaller and 
more efficient, and rail transport is more widely used. Similarly, where electricity is cheap, 
more is used. There are three main impacts: there are resource impacts for the stored 
energies used, there are pollution impacts due to the energy conversions involved and there 
are direct impacts on habitat resulting from processes and machinery using the energy that 
technologies make available.  
 
And yet…there is still another way of looking through the IPAT lens. Cheap energy is not 
necessarily destructive of the environment. It depends on both its source and how it is used. If 
it pollutes and it is used for the destruction of habitat, then impact is greater. But if its source 
is non-polluting and it is used to minimise impact through closed systems, then it can benefit 
both humanity and the biosphere. 
 
Minimising 
A different approach – that of factors – shows promise in policy terms, and does relate to 
resource productivity (Chertow 2000, p. 24). The Factor 10 Club wants to reduce resource use 
to the extent that resource productivity must increase by a factor of ten over the 30-50 years 
from the mid 1990s, based on better technologies and methods. 
 
Vaclav Smil in Harvesting the Biosphere: What We Have Taken from Nature writes of the 
“metabolic imperatives” that still drive us and which have already transformed the planet. The 
harvesting of plants for food remains “the quintessential activity of modern civilisation” (Smil 
2013, p. viii). He later summarises the conditions necessary to “minimise human claims on the 
biosphere’s productivity”, remarking that this is not difficult to do.  
 
First on his list is stabilising the world population at less than nine billion. This is then aided by 
using “best agronomic practices” for food production including crop rotation rather than 
monoculture, limiting per capita food requirements to healthy levels and through much 
greater attention to post-harvest food loss and household food waste. Smil says we should 
develop cereal permacultures, and grain staples that can fix nitrogen. Timber harvesting 
should be limited to the long-term capacities of forest ecosystems and its demand restricted 
by banning disposable packaging. As well as demand reduction through different technologies, 
more productive types of trees should be developed:  
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the greatest savings of woody phytomass could result from a universal adoption of 
efficient rural wood stoves, such as those that have been widely diffused in China 
(Smil 2004); by whole tree utilisation and expanded production of engineered timber 
(Williamson 2001); by even higher rates of paper recycling (McKinney 1994); and by 
further shift from paper-based records to purely electronic files. Looking further 
ahead, expansion of crop and wood harvests may not require conversion of 
substantially larger undisturbed areas to cropping or to wood plantations thanks to 
new high-yielding transgenic plants (Ibid, p. 630). 
 
Indicators and boundaries 
In order to provide a clearer view of human impact from the beginning of the Industrial 
Revolution, a series of global scale indicators has been developed. Figure 17 below shows 12 
indicators, of which four concern atmospheric gas concentrations, two are climate effects, 
three concern ocean and coastal ecosystems, two are about land use and the final one is 
biodiversity, measured by extinctions. Some, such as (h) “shrimp production as a proxy for 
coastal zone alteration” may be questioned, but certainly shrimp farming, which accounts for 
almost all the shrimp production increase since 1950, does significantly affect low-lying 
coastal zones (Hernândez-Cornejo & Ruiz-Luna 2000) and must be proportionate to 
production volumes. Nevertheless, the shape of each graphs is reasonably consistent and 
indicates strong tendencies to unsustainable impacts against all of the indicators. 
 
Figure 17. Global environmental indicators of unsustainability   
 
Source: Steffen et al 2011 
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What these indicators in figure 17 do not show, however, is how close to unsustainable limits 
the Earth is at already. The concept of planetary boundaries – impact limits on key features of 
the earth system beyond which sustainability is jeopardised – was proposed fairly recently. 
Steffen, Rockström & Costanza (2011) argue for boundaries in ten major “Earth-system 
processes” as outlined in figure 18 below.  
 
While there is some loss of clarity due to the metrics used (lower numbers generally represent 
greater sustainability, but represent less sustainability for both ocean acidification and ozone 
depletion), the concept helps clarify the dynamics of human impact, which earth systems are 
most affected, and where limits have already been exceeded.  Notably, it is far broader than 
the issue of climate change. 
 
Figure 18. Proposed planetary boundaries  
 
Source: Steffen, Rockström & Costanza 2011 
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The boundary approach helps focus assessment and policy on some of the most important 
aspects of sustainability. Intriguingly, however, the authors return obliquely to the IPAT 
identity in their final comments: 
 
the planetary boundaries approach doesn’t say anything explicit about resource use, 
affluence, or human population size. These are part of the trade-offs that allow 
humanity to continue to pursue increased well-being. The boundaries simply define 
the regions of global environment space that, if human activities push the Earth 
system into that space, would lead to unacceptably deleterious consequences for 
humanity as a whole…Because the planetary boundaries approach says nothing about 
the distribution of affluence and technologies among the human population, a 
“fortress world,” in which there are huge differences in the distribution of wealth, and 
a much more egalitarian world, with more equitable socioeconomic systems, could 
equally well satisfy the boundary conditions. These two socioeconomic states, 
however, would deliver vastly different outcomes for human well-being. Thus, 
remaining within the planetary boundaries is a necessary—but not sufficient—
condition for a bright future for humanity (Steffen, Rockström & Costanza 2011, paras 
23-24). 
 
A revised assessment (figure 19 below) shows that at least three earth systems processes, 
genetic diversity (formerly ‘rate of biodiversity loss’), and the phosphorous and nitrogen 
cycles’ in biochemical flows53 are already well beyond safe operating space at high risk of 
abrupt change. Three more are of uncertain but increasing risk: novel entities (formerly 
‘chemical pollution’), atmospheric aerosol loading and functional diversity, part of biosphere 
integrity. Only freshwater use, ocean acidification and ozone depletion are yet at relatively 
safe levels (Steffen et al 2015). 
 
Figure 19. Revised planetary boundaries  
 
Source: Steffen et al 2015 
                                                 
53 There appears to be a misprint in the diagram. ‘Biochemical flows’ is referred to as ‘biogeochemical 
flows’ in the text. 
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It is nevertheless implied in all of this that human impact upon the biosphere is unevenly 
distributed. Particulate emissions from factories, power stations and arterial roads is 
concentrated in and around cities. Compound contamination such as from heavy metals most 
affects rivers and especially estuarine bays. The Grand Banks remain devoid of cod, while in 
Icelandic waters cod still thrive. Animals and vegetation adapted for high altitudes and low 
temperatures have nowhere to go as glaciers melt; their low-altitude cousins may still move to 
higher ground. Continents allow for some migration; islands become hunting grounds from 
which there is no escape. Coastal mangroves are destroyed; rocky cliffs remain. The people of 
Kiribati prepare for inundation; the Sudanese, Ethiopians and Kenyans see desert encroaching.   
 
Conclusion 
Human impact on the biosphere is already unsustainable in relation to several earth systems, 
including the rapid decline of many species. Much impact results from the use of cheap 
energy. We are the only species on the planet that artificially harnesses intensive energy and 
compared with similar species, human impact on this planet is orders of magnitude greater 
than any other. Compared with other SWEITs that may have existed or yet exist within the 
galaxy the plight we face may not be unique, but the continuation of our civilisation is 
precarious and clearly interwoven with our energy practice. 
 
The impact of humans in the world is excessive and rapidly getting worse 
 Arne Naess and Stephen Harding, cited in Higgins 2013. 
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Chapter 4. Population  
 
There is only one man too many on Earth, and that is Mr. Malthus     Pierre-Joseph Proudhon  
 
Leaving rural France and arriving in Hong Kong for a rugby match, I wondered if I were in the 
future. Under an angry soot-stained sky in this swarming city, the buildings like close-packed 
daggers thrust around the harbour, there was graffiti in a dark alley. As density grows, so does 
our loneliness, it said in block-lettered English. In the crowded streets it felt true. Faces were 
the inscrutable of cliché, often weary-looking, and each apparently alone with their thoughts. 
But do people packed together equal loneliness any more than life with less human mass? 
And why in English in a Cantonese city? Is it that language is a source of isolation where 
density is greatest because difference becomes more obvious? Before the Industrial 
Revolution, the divergent dialects of separate rural groups mattered little because they 
seldom met. But isolation is made apparent when one cannot understand the language of a 
neighbour who may live only a thin wall alongside one’s apartment.  
 
This chapter evaluates the relationship of population to sustainability, how population policy 
has evolved over time and space, and how it may apply to a present and future world. It 
argues that while the rate of population change is critical, and non-coercive measures such as 
migration, education and contraception are more effective in checking growth in our 
numbers, a viable population policy will result in increasing density this century such is the 
result of momentum. 
 
Half a century ago the ‘population explosion’ had the same central role in public discourse 
that ‘global warming’ does now (Friedman 2013, para. 19). The Erlichs’ 1968 Population Bomb 
was a runaway best seller. Population then was considered the central factor leading to 
poverty, unsustainability and catastrophe54. Policies designed to curb the growth in our 
numbers were applied over much of the developing world – by China with its one-child policy, 
by India with its sterilisation program and by the US as part of its foreign aid agenda. 
 
Friedman’s brief contemporary calculation of population density designed to test the belief 
that overpopulation caused poverty had a counter-intuitive result: the five most densely 
populated countries were all relatively affluent. They were Belgium and the Netherlands, both 
already rich and developed as well as the rapidly developing ‘Asian tigers’ of Taiwan, South 
Korea and Singapore. If Hong Kong were an independent country it would have been included 
as it had about ten times the population density of Singapore (Ibid, para. 20). 
 
Limits 
As far as the wider impact of population is concerned, including poverty, this particular 
variable has a long history of contemplation and warning of dire consequence, beginning more 
than two millennia earlier and especially including the views of Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus 
and David Ricardo in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  
 
Not all are doomsayers, though. For example, one of the original authors of the chilling The 
Limits to Growth (Meadows et al, 1972), Jørgen Randers (2013), since concluded, based on 
demographic trends caused primarily by urbanisation and the availability of contraception, 
that the human world population will peak at less than nine billion by 2040 and then begin to 
                                                 
54 According to The Population Bomb, “In the 1970s and 1980s hundreds of millions of people will starve 
to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon now” (Erlich 1968, p. xi).  
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decline. Europe, Japan, Russia and China have already begun to do so. Africa has already 
reduced its fertility rate from seven to five per woman during the past fifty years. UK science 
author, Fred Pearce agrees, having written about the ‘coming population crash’, and 
particularly links the rise of feminism and education as factors in declining birth rates (Pearce 
2010, Eby 2010). Randers further advocates that it is both desirable and possible to reduce the 
human population to around four billion by 2100 given a focused global public policy. The 
central factor in this optimism is that while population still continues to grow, the rate of 
increase is slowing and may arrive at below the rate need just to maintain our numbers, as 
figure 20 below illustrates: 
 
Figure 20. World population growth rates 1950-2050  
 
Source: US Census Bureau 2011 
 
A zero population growth rate after 2050 does appear possible, but the achievement of any 
significant population reduction after that time seems unlikely. Since Randers’ population 
control optimism, more recent UN estimates project that there could be more than eleven 
billion of us by the end of this century (figure 21 below). Despite the observed decline in 
fertility rates, much of the increase will be from Africa (McKenna 2017), such is the 
momentum from earlier and current increases in our numbers: 
 
Figure 21. World population projections to 2100  
 
Source: UNDESA, Population Division 2015 
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Making accurate predictions of total human population over the long-term is particularly 
difficult because of the cumulative effect of variables affecting birth and death rates. For 
those specialised in disciplines other than demography, it would seem especially so. For 
example, the Cambridge astronomer, Fred Hoyle, in a 1964 discussion on the desirability of 
populating the galaxy, indicated that “some 1010 humans...will be on Earth by the year A.D. 
2000” (Hoyle, 1964, p. 42), or ten billion people rather than the little more than six billion it 
actually was at the end of the millennium. The difference of nearly four billion people 
between his prediction and reality is remarkable. It may have been due to to his discipline as 
an astronomer which, as mentioned above under Impact, is reputedly unconcerned by 
imprecision. It may have been due to the widespread concerns of the population alarmists at 
the time; or perhaps simply due to a flawed assumption that the very high population growth 
rate at the time (see figure 20) would continue.  
  
Fears 
Fears of both over and under-population have in the past gained sway over relatively short 
periods of time. In writing about the connections between early capitalism and slavery, Eric 
Williams (1944 p. 16) observes that in relation to Britain, “fear of overpopulation at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century gave way to a fear of underpopulation in the middle of 
the same century”.  
 
This fear was based on the mercantilist economic argument that in order to compete with 
other countries it was best to reduce costs by paying low wages. And the way to ensure low 
wages was to have a large population. The mercantilist economist and later governor of the 
British East India Company, Sir Josiah Child, in commenting on the colonisation of America as 
an exception, still advanced the then majority opinion that "whatever tends to the 
depopulating of a kingdom tends to the impoverishment of it" (Child 1751 [1668], p. 134) and 
further: 
 
Most nations in the civilised parts of the world, are more or less rich or poor, 
proportionally to the plenty or paucity of their people, and not to the sterility or 
fruitfulness of their lands (Ibid).   
 
While this argument  that greater wealth arises from cheap labour – contains obvious 
contradiction,55 it retained popular currency in that time. A century later, however, Adam 
Smith disagreed. Writing at about the period of the American Revolution and the beginnings 
of industrialisation, he drew attention to populous China and the impoverishment of its 
citizens. He referred to China as an example of an advanced nation that had changed little 
since the time of Marco Polo, where its economic stagnation produced a general poverty that 
“far surpasses that of the most beggarly nations of Europe” (Smith 1952 [1776], pp. 31-32). 
Having noticed that every species multiplies according to its means of subsistence and not 
beyond it, Smith favoured economic growth rather than absolute numbers of people as the 
path to national wealth, a view that again holds sway, so far, in the current century. 
 
Malthus 
At the edge of the nineteenth century and a generation after Smith, the cleric and Cambridge 
political economist, Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), himself one of eight children, found 
popularity, influence and controversy with his best-seller, Essay on the Principle of Population 
(1798) that went through six editions. This is the work to which much of the modern concern 
                                                 
55 The contradiction is that the wealth must not accrue to the labourers, who would otherwise not be 
cheap. 
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about overpopulation can be traced. The essence of his ‘principle’ is that food supply limits 
population growth because it can only increase arithmetically, whereas population can 
increase geometrically. Thus Malthus linked overpopulation to poverty, encouraging harsh 
measures aimed at making the poor more ‘responsible’ and less likely to reproduce 
themselves. In fact, Malthus’ views were developed as another Victorian ‘iron law’, which 
implied that poverty, war, abstinence and birth control were needed to hold the population in 
check lest food supplies ran out.  
 
Malthus’ views were provocative to say the least. In the second edition of his Essay, he 
included the following before it was removed in later editions due to the antagonism it 
created: 
 
"A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence from 
his parents on whom he has a just demand, and if the society do not want his labour, 
has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact, has no business to be 
where he is. At nature's mighty feast there is no vacant cover for him. She tells him to 
be gone, and will quickly execute her own orders, if he does not work upon the 
compassion of some of her guests. If these guests get up and make room for him, 
other intruders immediately appear demanding the same favour (Malthus 1803, p. 
531).  
 
According to Garrett Hardin (1998, p. 182), pointedly writing during the bicentennial of 
Malthus’ essay, while those words almost guaranteed controversy, they also “walked right 
past the central problem of population” –  the denial of “limits in the supply of terrestrial 
resources”.  
 
In a Malthusian spirit, the UK poor law was amended in 1834 to preclude any public money or 
assistance to the able-bodied. Malthus’ friend, David Ricardo (1772-1823), had urged such a 
measure, writing in 1817 that it was in the best interests of the poor:  
 
It is a truth which admits not a doubt that the comforts and well-being of the poor 
cannot be permanently secured without some regard on their part, or some effort on 
the part of the legislature, to regulate the increase of their numbers, and to render 
less frequent among them early and improvident marriages. The operation of the 
system of poor laws56 has been directly contrary to this. They have rendered restraint 
superfluous, and have invited imprudence, by offering it a portion of the wages of 
prudence and industry (Ricardo 1911 [1817], p. 61). 
 
But while Ricardo and Victorian biologists such as Wallace and Darwin were impressed by 
Malthusian ideas in relation to the “survival of the fittest”, other political economists were 
appalled. Socialists and Marxists of the era especially tended to believe that poverty was 
rather a result of maldistribution or economic inequality, reputedly leading the French 
anarcho-socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) to declare his loathing of Malthus as 
per the quotation that begins this chapter.  
 
In direct refutation of Malthus, Friedrich Engels, for example, wrote the following tirade:  
 
                                                 
56 Polanyi (2001 [1944]), details the Speenhamland decision of 1795 in England, which in effect 
guaranteed to labourers a minimum income based on the price of bread irrespective of their effort and 
production.  
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Malthus…maintains that population is always pressing on the means of subsistence; 
that as soon as production increases, population increases in the same proportion; 
and that the inherent tendency of the population to multiply in excess of the available 
means of subsistence is the root of all misery and all vice. For, when there are too 
many people, they have to be disposed of in one way or another: either they must be 
killed by violence or they must starve…The implications of this line of thought are that 
since it is precisely the poor who are the surplus, nothing should be done for them 
except to make their dying of starvation as easy as possible, and to convince them 
that it cannot be helped and that there is no other salvation for their whole class than 
keeping propagation down to the absolute minimum. Or if this proves impossible, 
then it is after all better to establish a state institution for the painless killing of the 
children of the poor...Charity is to be considered a crime, since it supports the 
augmentation of the surplus population. Indeed, it will be very advantageous to 
declare poverty a crime and to turn poor-houses into prisons, as has already 
happened in England as a result of the new “liberal” Poor Law (Engels 1844, para. 53). 
 
Engels was unconcerned about human population pressure because: 
 
The productive power at mankind’s disposal is immeasurable. The productivity of the 
soil can be increased ad infinitum by the application of capital, labour and 
science...day by day science increasingly makes the forces of nature subject to man 
(Ibid, para 51). 
 
Others were not so sure. The American economist, more a “curiosity” than influential, Henry 
Carey (1793-1879), although optimistic about the widespread benefits of progress and 
economic growth, was nevertheless “more than half agreed with Malthus” on the procreative 
power of humanity (Galbraith 1976 [1958], p. 40). Carey wrote that the time may come “when 
there will not even be standing room” (quoted in Gray, 1931, p. 256). At least, despite the 
power of compound increase, we are not yet at that point. 
 
A corollary to Malthus written by Ricardo further demonstrates the interplay between 
population, affluence and technology. Ricardo contended that the level of income at which 
the Malthusian population would be stable depended on the tastes of the poor. In a 
remarkable insight, he argued that the more luxurious the tastes of the masses, the more 
likely population would stabilise, as the relative cost of an additional child was an incentive to 
hold down the birth rate. Hence he concluded that the “friends of mankind” should wish that 
the workers have more luxurious tastes (cited in Friedman 2013, para 15). Before the 
industrial revolution, less attractive “friends of mankind” held the population in check and 
living standards relatively stable. These included the scourges of “war, violence, disorder, 
harvest failure, collapsed infrastructures, [and] bad sanitation” (Clark 2007, p. 5).  
 
It was only after 1800 in the West that population growth escaped from its long flat trajectory 
– before held back by such scourges, especially the food supply. With accelerating production 
technologies, including in agriculture, affluence increased and human population began to 
exceed its Smith-Malthusian boundaries. 
 
In the East, Japan now leads an apparent transition to a much lower population. Its numbers 
peaked at about 128 million in 2008 and is in subsequent rapid decline, currently losing about 
250,000 a year and the rate of loss is increasing:  
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…the Japanese population gradually grew from the beginning of the Meiji period, 
increased by 70 million in the 140 years up to 2008, and is about to decrease by 70 
million in the 90 years leading up to the year 2100 (Masuda 2015, para 8). 
 
This means that the Japanese population is now decreasing faster than its earlier explosive 
growth during the twentieth century. Even if Japan does increase its birthrate significantly in 
line with national targets, its population will not increase because there are now too few 
women of child-bearing age. Geographically, the effect of population decline is evident in the 
concentration of people in Tokyo and the depopulation of the countryside, such that Tokyo’s 
numbers will not begin to decline until after 2020, whereas half of all municipalities have 
faced severe population loss since 2010 (Ibid, paras 5-6). While especially foreign 
commentators point to the obvious measure of increasing immigration to slow population loss 
(Panda 2014) the Japanese cultural attitude to blood purity and unique identity57 prevents any 
implementation. Tokyo University’s Hiroya Masuda, for example, fails to even mention it in his 
public policy lecture quoted above. Ninety-eight per cent of its population are ethnically 
Japanese. As population shrinks, the proportion of older  and more culturally conservative  
people grows, making policy change increasingly difficult politically. At the same time the 
concentration of the population in Tokyo further depresses fertility – lengthy commute times, 
high expenses and extended work and study hours in the big city are not conducive to 
breeding. 
 
However, especially if Japan is a miners’ canary for population, it is the rate of decrease that is 
of policy concern rather than where Japan’s numbers ultimately stabilise. Some very small 
countries (Norway, Sweden, Switzerland) seem to cope well on the human development index 
(HDI). Absolute population is largely irrelevant to economic success. But a teetering, runaway 
population plunge distorts the demographics and, at least over two or three generations, 
leads to a rapidly ageing nation. In Japan, the void of young people is being filled with robots.  
 
Optimism 
In a spirit of technological optimism similar to Engels, but with more respect for nature than to 
simply require its subjugation, writing a hundred and thirty years later Arthur Clarke foresaw a 
transformed future. This was a twenty-third century world, in which the “endless forests of 
the American Midwest...so much the Earth must have looked in ancient days” and which were 
recently all farmland, are restored. Consequently, wolves, buffalo and the grizzly bear roam 
free from the threat of humankind (Clarke 1975, p. 116). The twenty-first century return of 
much New England farmland to the wild and the recent re-introduction of wolves into the 
world’s first national park, Yellowstone, indicates this concept is feasible. This ‘rewilding’ has 
in a short time cascaded58 positive environmental effects including the return of several 
species and even the change of the course of rivers (Monbiot 2014b). But Clarke’s future Earth 
is based on a much reduced population of only a few hundred million, albeit with additional 
human colonies established on the moons of Saturn. 
 
Randers had earlier predicted environmental, resource and human catastrophe this century 
due to the exponential growth of our species and its impacts. Early computer modelling 
helped explain its scenarios. However, the US-based libertarian Foundation for Economic 
Education believes that the risks of overpopulation are overstated. In Overpopulation: The 
Perennial Myth US libertarian David Osterfeld (1993, para. 22) writes that “the prospect of the 
Malthusian nightmare is growing steadily more remote.” In support he quotes the second 
                                                 
57 Nihonjinron (日本人論) is a concept of Japanese national and cultural identity, based on ideas of the 
Japanese race as unique in an isolated archipelago with a unique climate and way of thinking. 
58 That is from a top predator down to other species, to flora and to landforms.  
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century Carthaginian, Tertullian (160-c.220 AD), a Christian priest who lived when the world 
population was around 190 million:  
 
Our numbers are burdensome to the world, which can hardly support us…In very 
deed, pestilence, and famine, and wars, and earthquakes have to be regarded as a 
remedy for nations, as the means of pruning the luxuriance of the human race 
(quoted in Osterfeld 1993, para. 1).  
 
During the 1960s and despite the predominance of Erlich’s Population Bomb, Buckminster 
Fuller was typically optimistic about population growth: 
 
The population explosion is a myth. As we industrialise, down goes the annual birth 
rate. If we survive, by 1985, the whole world will be industrialised, and, as with the 
United States, and as with all Europe and Russia and Japan today, the birth rate will be 
dwindling and the bulge in population will be recognised as accounted for exclusively 
by those who are living longer (Buckminster Fuller 1969, p. 43). 
 
Other than Tertullian, early concerns were expressed about overpopulation by, for example, 
Confucius in the sixth century B.C., Plato and Aristotle in the fourth century B.C., as well as by 
the sixteenth century Italian, Botero. And today, Malthus’ shadow still looms over 
contemporary science. An article, ‘The Millennium Assessment’, in BioScience (Powledge 
2007a) that relates the increasing pressures on ecosystems attracted this criticism in the next 
issue:  
 
What I find lacking in the whole approach, not only in this article but in the profession 
as a whole, is the failure to openly recognise that none of it matters as long as we fail 
to correct the underlying cause of nearly all of our problems: overpopulation (Bennett 
2007, p. 101).  
 
In his response, the article’s author points out that in fact there was reference to 
overpopulation as a fundamental cause: “increasing consumption per person, multiplied by a 
growing human population, are the root causes of the increasing demand for ecosystem 
services” (Ibid, p. 4). However, he laments that what’s missing from most such discussions is a 
plan for dealing with overpopulation that the world will accept. “That’s a terribly difficult cat 
to bell” (Powledge 2007b, p. 101). 
 
Lebensraum 
Population is one thing. Space to accommodate it is another. Alison Bashford, in an article on 
Karl Haushofer’s geopolitics of the Pacific, draws attention to the notion of Lebensraum, 
infamously associated with Nazi policy in the second quarter of the twentieth century. The 
concept was promoted by Haushofer (1869-1946) through his writings around the turn of the 
century. The link with Nazism is quite direct: Haushofer visited his assistant and former 
student, Rudolf Hess, in a Munich prison in 1924. He also visited a friend of Hess in the same 
prison, one Adolf Hitler, who was then writing Mein Kampf, and confined as he was 
personally, may well have felt a particular attraction to the concept of ‘living room’. Certainly 
the loss of the German Pacific colonies59 after the Great War was used as a partial justification 
for Germany’s quest for eastern expansion during the Nazi era (Bashford 2012, p. 121).  
 
                                                 
59 The German Pacific colonies comprised New Guinea, including the Northern Solomons, Nauru, the 
Marshall Islands, the Marianas, the Carolines (now the Federated States of Micronesia), Palau and 
Samoa.  
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The concept is also associated with the ideas of Malthus and Darwin both. The German 
zoologist-anthropologist-geographer, Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), coined the term 
“Lebensraum” in the late nineteenth century (Smith 1980, p. 52). Ratzel was influenced in turn 
by the biologist Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), who had earlier coined the term “ecology”.60 Both 
were familiar with Malthus and Darwin and were especially interested in the concept of life 
forms competing within a confined habitat. Ratzel observed that it was no accident that 
Malthus’ essay on population derived from an island nation, where population pressures were 
often more apparent. Confined countries could either (positively) expand through emigration 
or colonisation, or lacking new territory, (negatively) put a low value on human life while 
remaining within the same boundaries. By this logic, the UK (as well as France and Germany) 
sought virtuous outlet through colony and empire. Japan, another populous island nation, 
sought Lebensraum in Manchuria and Micronesia.61  But in this latter respect, where there 
was no accessible new territory, Pacific islanders had been observed to practise ways of 
limiting population growth – cannibalism, sacrifice, infanticide and gender segregation on 
different islands, amongst others (Bashford 2012, pp. 132-133).  
 
Haushofer was closely associated with this sort of thinking and spent several years in Japan 
working with the military before the Great War (Ibid, p. 121). Interestingly, Haushofer saw 
Australia as an antipodean Germany. Not only hemispherically opposite, but also in the sense 
of an island continent of few people rather than a confined nation of many (Ibid, p. 134). He 
also saw Australia as a country that, with California, had jointly implemented the Pacific 
“colour line” where Asian immigration was forbidden as a result of experience with the overly 
industrious Chinese diaspora during the mid-nineteenth century gold rushes. And at the 1919 
Paris Peace Conference Australia had helped resist Japan’s attempt to propose a clause about 
racial equality in immigration (Ibid, p. 132). As an aside on population representation, when at 
the peace conference US President Wilson queried Australia’s right to annex former German 
colonies in the Pacific on the basis that its five millions were opposing the wishes of twelve 
hundred millions, Prime Minister Billy Hughes retorted that he represented not five million 
living but rather 60,000 dead – those sacrificed during the war (DVA 2015). 
 
The gleam of Lebensraum lingered on well beyond Haushofer and the fascist dreams, 
however. Osterfeld in his 1993 article on the ‘myth of overpopulation’ mentioned above, 
contains a paragraph intriguingly sub-headed ‘Living space’: 
 
But even if food and resources are becoming more abundant, certainly this can’t be 
true for living space. After all, the world is a finite place and the more people in it, the 
less space there is for everyone. In a statistical sense this is true, of course. But it is 
also irrelevant. For example, if the entire population of the world were placed in the 
state of Alaska, every individual would receive nearly 3,500 square feet of space, or 
about one-half the size of the average American family homestead with front and 
back yards. Alaska is a big state, but it is a mere one percent of the Earth’s land mass. 
Less than one-half of one percent of the world’s ice-free land area is used for human 
settlements (Osterfeld 1993, para. 18). 
 
Despite this sceptical view pointing out that the entire human population could comfortably 
fit into Alaska (or New Zealand for that matter), the population issue is not so much about 
                                                 
60 Coined around 1870, as Ökologie in German. It appeared in English in 1873, according to Lynn White 
(1967, p. 1204). 
61 Japan controlled the Carolinas, the Marianas, the Marshall Islands and Palau from 1914 until 1945. 
Once Spanish, then German colonies before Japanese, the islands are now de facto US possessions 
resulting from the Second World War. 
  68 
space for individuals, and it is disingenuous to imply that it is. It is about space for one species 
alongside habitable space for all other life forms at the same time. To argue otherwise denies 
the more threatening issue of sustainability. 
 
This mix of population policy, migration, racism and geo-politics illustrates how complex the 
issue of population is. While there is still much resettlement due to war and poverty, now in a 
different era, there is no more Lebensraum. The idea of nationalist expansion driven by 
population pressures, whether contiguous to a country’s borders or in distant colonies, seems 
ridiculous. Short of an unlikely Battlestar Galactica forced migration through space, or an 
“impossible journey” to a distant exoplanet (Kerins 2017), there just is no more room, any 
more political will, or any more need. The planet is obviously limited, not limitless. Instead, 
larger human populations must now be dealt with, not by Polynesian techniques, but by 
increasing densities – through migration and urbanisation. 
 
Urbanisation 
The world passed a milestone in 2008. For the first time in human history, more people now 
live in cities and towns than in rural areas. And while urbanisation has “increased tenfold in 
the past century” (Crutzen & Stoermer 2000, p. 17), the rate is still accelerating. So-called 
‘migrant workers’ from rural western China still flood the industrialised east and have done so 
especially since Deng Xiaoping’s market-based economic reforms of the late twentieth 
century. The productivity of agribusiness means that increasingly fewer workers are required 
in agriculture outside of subsistence. South Africans can have a better existence in Capetown 
than on the Veld. Formerly rural Tunisians and Senegalese increasingly populate the suburbs 
of Paris, Marseilles and Lyons.  
 
According to the UN, the proportion of urbanised people is more than 54 per cent (UNESA 
2014, p. 2). And contrary to popular perception, cities are often associated with 
environmental benefit: it is easier to provide environmental services where people are more 
concentrated and urban populations are more demanding of them, as the Beijing 
administration is now acutely aware and as London and Pittsburg were a few generations ago 
in relation to air pollution. Cities strive to provide clean water, sewage treatment facilities and 
coordinated waste disposal. A concentrated human population not only demands them, but 
makes such facilities more economically feasible.  
 
However, the megacity centres of Lagos, Mexico City, São Paulo and Dhaka for example, are 
encircled by slums, in which there are no basic services such as safe drinking water and 
sanitation, where tenure is insecure, housing lacks durability and there is overcrowding (UN 
2014, p. 46). According to the UN, the proportion of the urban population who are slum 
dwellers in the developing world declined from 47 to 37 per cent between 1990 and 2005, an 
apparently dramatic and welcomed improvement. But unfortunately, closer inspection of the 
Millennium Development Goals report shows that this apparent advance was mainly due to a 
change of definition:  
 
The decrease in the percentage of populations living in slum conditions is due in large 
part to a change in the definition of adequate sanitation. In 2005, only a proportion of 
households using pit latrines were considered slum households, whereas in 1990 and 
2001 all households using pit latrines were counted as slum households. The change 
affects estimates mostly in those countries where the use of pit latrines is more 
widespread, as in Sub-Saharan Africa (UN 2007, p. 26). 
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However, within a further seven years there appeared to be a more genuine improvement 
with less than 33 per cent of the urban population who were slum dwellers in the developing 
world. Such was the increasing rate of urbanisation combined with a growing population in 
the developing world, however, that this represents more people in absolute numbers than in 
1990  863 million in 2012, compared with 650 million in 1990 (UN 2014a, p. 46). However 
according to the same UN report, there is new hope in technology: one partial answer to slum 
improvement is to increase the typically minimal amount of urban land allocated to streets. 
More and wider streets means that service arteries can be extended more easily. Mapping 
and planning slum upgrades can be facilitated by geospatial information systems including 
satellite imaging. As a result of this sort of approach it is known that Dar Es Salaam allocates 
only four per cent land to streets outside its city centre. The ideal is about 25 per cent (Ibid, p. 
47).   
 
But while increasing concentrations of human beings in urban environments, slums or not, is 
continuing, what does this mean for sustainability? Certainly it appears that there are 
economic benefits, and possibly there are further advantages. According to former 
cosmologist and now New York University growth economist, Paul Romer, “policy-induced 
changes in the urban share of the population could have big effects on GDP per capita 
and...the quality of life for billions of people” (Romer 2015). If both higher incomes and quality 
of life are linked with sustainability in the sense of the theoretical environmental Kuznets 
curve (EKC) that says environmental impact eventually reduces with affluence, then 
sustainability benefits may be real. Although as discussed in more detail in the section on 
affluence, waste and carbon emissions are exceptions to this principle, urbanisation and 
sustainability are partners.  People living closely together facilitate the sharing of ideas, which 
can contribute to both economic and environmental improvement. Higher population 
densities in cities implies lower birthrates and less population pressure on rural land. And it is 
surprising how much of the territory of Hong Kong is uninhabited.62 
 
Migration 
Migration affects population. Globally of course migration makes absolutely no difference to 
the number of people on the planet at any one time. However, it does make a difference over 
time. This is because people tend to migrate from poorer to richer areas, whether attracted by 
better standards of living, or displaced by poverty, conflict or disaster. The continuing urban 
drift within countries is also part of this, typified by the millions of migrant workers from rural 
western China lured to the industrialised East in recent decades.  
 
Between countries there is net migration from the global South to the global North, including 
from Africa to Europe (especially from former colonies), from South Asia and the Middle East 
to both Europe and North America, from Latin America to the US and Canada, from the Pacific 
and the Middle East to Australasia, and from southern-central Africa to South Africa.  
 
However, it is the effect of the host culture and rising affluence that tends to reduce fertility 
within immigrant groups, as high birth rates are associated with rural poverty, lower birth 
rates with urban affluence. While it may take generations for this reduction to play out, there 
are fewer incentives in wealthier circumstance to have large families, and more incentives to 
produce fewer children. Thus immigrant birth rates tend to match the lower birth rates of the 
host urban, wealthier culture over time. While longevity tends to increase in wealthier 
environments due to better hygiene, welfare and medical services, the overall effect is that 
                                                 
62 Only 21.1 per cent of Hong Kong’s land area is built-up (Wang & Lau 2002, p. 11.3)  
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the rate of population growth tends to fall as the reduction in birth rates more than offsets 
the increased longevity. 
 
On this basis, then, sustainability might be enhanced by migration as ultimately it means 
relatively fewer people. However, this would only be true if the increased affluence and its 
associated consumption did not result in proportionately greater environmental impact. The 
state of much of eastern China does not support this possibility at present, especially with 
regard to emissions and chemical pollutants that have been widely observed in the 
international media. However further development along greener lines may yet do so as 
implied by the EKC. 
 
Elephants 
US comedian Doug Stanhope alludes to the “elephant in the room” misperception about 
overpopulation. In his 2010 monologue Abortion is Green, Stanhope says that “the major 
problem is obviously overpopulation” but that the issue never arises. “Even Al Gore has to be 
pressed to admit it’s even a problem” he says, but if as Gore says “it’s gonna correct itself by 
2050, I guess fucking will go out of style”. Moreover, individual efforts to reduce 
environmental impact are trivial. Ironically, the “combined uteri” of the environmentally 
aware in the US “wreak more havoc to the environment than a thousand Dow Chemical 
Corporation accidents combined” (Stanhope 2010).  
 
In Sex and Destiny: The politics of human fertility, Germaine Greer anticipated this last 
assertion in 1985. For her it is the overconsumption of the West interdependent with the 
‘serfdom’ of the East and South that has caused environmental havoc, not the numbers of 
Indians living in poverty (Greer 1985, pp. 409-412). Her book contains pointed criticism of the 
Erlich’s trip to India, from which their book The Population Bomb was conceived. The Erlich’s 
middle class American sensibilities were shocked by one experience whereby, in a 
temperature “well over 100oF” and in a taxi “hopping with fleas”: 
 
The streets seemed alive with people. People eating, people washing, people sleeping. 
People visiting, arguing and screaming. People thrusting their hands through the taxi 
window begging. People defecating and urinating. People clinging to buses. People 
herding animals. People, people, people, people. As we moved slowly through the 
mob, hand horn squawking, the dust, noise, heat and cooking fires gave the scene a 
hellish aspect (Erlich 1968, p. 1).   
 
For Greer however, it is normally hot in the tropics, she has never encountered a flea-ridden 
taxi in India and the area where the Erlichs were taken was probably less populated than 
Manhattan, just that all the people were at ground level, rather than stacked many stories 
above. Greer does not know how many people the Earth can support. She says though that “it 
is quite probable” the world has been overpopulated for some time. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that it can support far more people at a low calorie (as in her contemporary India) than a high 
calorie intake (as in the Erlichs’ US).  
 
From a contemporary business perspective, Joon Yun is concerned about a different elephant 
– depopulation rather than overpopulation. He notes that falling fertility and a future global 
depopulation means that demand for natural resources “could wane” leading to deflation in 
commodity prices, land, housing and debt. While “much would depend on whether the 
central banks would choose to allow low-grade deflation or otherwise continue to target low-
grade inflation in the face of declining aggregate demand” Yun (2012) asks “where would yield 
be found in a depopulating world facing the forces of deflation?” This, he says, is in aged care 
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and health services — an area in which he has a particular interest as CEO of a company that 
services such industries.  
 
Both these views nevertheless illustrate the sort of tensions that are inherent in population 
policy and sustainability. As Stanhope implies, the issue is more of an unspoken concern 
because it is so difficult to deal with. And as Yun infers, the depopulation that is desirable from 
a sustainability perspective runs counter to an economic system built on the growth in 
demand that increasing numbers underpin.  
 
Perspectives 
There are therefore different perspectives on the population problem both over time and 
between disciplines, as well as according to self-interest. However, for this dissertation they 
tend to resolve into two broad questions: (1) Is overpopulation a critical issue for 
sustainability? and (2) What should be done about it in public policy terms?  
 
In assessing the first question, it has been observed (Dorling, Crutzen, Purdy, Steffen) that the 
last 200 years have been the most extraordinary period of human history. In that time human 
population has increased nearly tenfold and carbon dioxide levels started to rise significantly, 
both associated with the effects of the Industrial Revolution including the rise of public health 
measures and the burning of fossil fuels.  
 
Still, it is revealing to undertake some mathematical modelling in relation to the increase in 
human population. One intriguing question is how many people were on the planet around 
10,000 years ago at about the dawn of agriculture, when our species first began to break from 
the immediate growth limits of the environment. If we start with an approximation of the 
current world population (7 billion people) and assuming a net increase of 0.1 per cent per 
year on average, then there were 319,000 people on the planet at that time63.  
 
But assuming an average growth rate of 0.2 per cent per year, there would have been no-one 
on the planet then, and there would have been only 17 people on the planet 1000 years ago. 
Therefore, the former average growth rate of 0.1 per cent is clearly more accurate. The 
current world population growth rate is now far greater − around 1.4 per cent per year and 
estimated to decline to around 0.5 per cent by 2050 (Worldometers 2014). Looking 200 years 
into the future, a growth rate of only the long-term average of 0.1 per cent would result in a 
definitely unsustainable 51 billion people on the planet! Hence it is important, or rather 
critical, that zero or negative population growth is effected.  
 
In 1994, Gretchen Daily and the Erlichs concluded that an optimum world population would 
be between 1.5 and two billion people64 to enable both a creative critical mass, as well as to 
maintain biodiversity: “homo sapiens should foster the continued existence of its only known 
living companions in the universe” (Daily, Erlich & Erlich 1994). Garrett Hardin (1998, para 3) 
believes that there is no question about the need for population control. The key issue is how 
it can be achieved with minimal pain:  
 
The problem is simply this: can the necessity of population control be reconciled with 
the apparent demands of individualism, as that complex concept has developed since 
John Locke? I conclude that there is a fatal contradiction between these two 
necessities; and that the survival of civilisation will require us to modify significantly 
                                                 
63 This is roughly consistent with Purdy (2015), who estimates that the global human population was 
between one and ten million until the start of the agricultural revolution, for example. 
64 1.5 billion is about the population at the turn of the twentieth century. 
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the powers we now grant to individual 'rights.' This social revolution will be painful, 
but it cannot, I think, be successfully evaded. 
 
Dietz & O’Neill (2013) also say that overpopulation is a critical issue and that it should be 
stabilised using ‘compassionate, non-coercive’ methods, which may be less than politically 
palatable as a slogan or policy if only because it eerily echoes George W. Bush’s 2000 
presidential platform of ‘compassionate conservatism’. An extreme view of the desirability of 
reducing human population is the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement, which has an 
extensive website and links on the issue: 
 
Phasing out the human race by voluntarily ceasing to breed will allow Earth’s 
biosphere to return to good health. Crowded conditions and resource shortages will 
improve as we become less dense (Knight 2016).  
 
Of course it was not always thus. Further back in time, as discussed under ‘technology’ below, 
Homo sapiens was once an endangered species. DNA and archaeological evidence suggests 
that around 150,000 years ago our ancestors came close to extinction. This was due to an Ice 
Age that affected Africa - leaving perhaps an absolute total of only hundreds of people clinging 
to an existence on the southern coast. Genetic studies indicate that everyone now living is 
descended from this tiny number of ancestors (Marean 2010). We have come from a smudge 
of mere hundreds of us then to the prospect of a swarm of 51 billion of us by the twenty-third 
century. Between these extremes lies sustainability. 
 
Anthropocene 
Contrary to the long-held views of Paul Erlich and others, Andreas Malm and Alf Hornborg 
(2014, p. 4) argue in the Anthropocene Review that population growth is not a significant 
causal factor in the establishment of the Anthropocene epoch, in which the impact of 
humanity is profound. They point out that between 1820 and 2010, carbon dioxide emissions 
increased by more than 600 times, while population increased by less than seven times, 
“indicating that another, far more powerful engine must have driven the fires”. And recently, 
there has been a negative correlation between population and carbon emissions – since 1985 
population tended to rise fastest where emissions grew slowest, and vice versa 
(Satterthwaite, 2009). However, much of this relationship is due to the unique case of China, 
which has many people but low population growth and high emissions growth due to recent 
industrialisation.  
 
A significant chunk of humanity is not party to the fossil economy at all. Hundreds of millions 
rely on non-fossil charcoal, firewood or organic waste such as dung for all domestic purposes. 
Satterthwaite (2009, pp. 547–550) concluded that one-sixth of the human population “best 
not be included in allocations of responsibility for GHG emissions”, because their contribution 
is close to zero. Moreover, two billion people, or nearly one-third of humanity, have no access 
to electricity, and so “the difference in modern energy consumption between a subsistence 
pastoralist in the Sahel and an average Canadian may easily be larger than 1,000-fold” (Smil 
2008, p. 259). Given these enormous variations over both time and space, human population 
seems far too slender an abstraction to carry the burden of causality.  
 
Some of the apparent issue with population and sustainability is to do with simple accounting. 
We tend to divide nature amongst how many of us there are: per capita. Natural resources 
might appear to slow or shrink, simply because there are more people for them to be divided 
amongst: 
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the general trend is that population has been growing in most of the countries, 
exacerbating thereby the decline in natural capital [per capita] growth rates, as 
resources are accounted for among a larger number of people. The growth in 
population explains more than half of the changes in natural capital per capita in 13 out 
of 20 countries” (UNEP IWR 2012, p. 51). 
 
Will Steffen (2014) points out that most of the economic growth in the last century did not 
result from population growth. Countries with higher population growth rates had lower 
increases in total GDP. This is consistent with both Satterthwaite and Smil above: impact 
depends on how much each person consumes, not just how many people there are. Of course 
politicians tend to gloss over the difference between growth in national GDP and growth in 
GDP per person. Without the population denominator it is not possible to know whether 
average affluence has increased, yet most public announcements of GDP growth are naked of 
how much they may be the result of population increase.  
 
Still, popular opinions about the culpability of population are passionate and diverse, and may 
have to be politically accommodated. The following figure 22 shows an extract of online 
responses to a review of Elizabeth Kolbert’s ‘The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History’ that 
was published in The Guardian (McKie 2014). The last comment is at least succinct: 
 
Figure 22. Online responses to review of The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History 
budgie9999 16 Feb 2014 23:34  
And your solution to the problems identified in this depressing book is...? 
emmagoldmann 18 Feb 2014 8:51  
And you've read it have you? Climate denier paid for troll I believe you have been caught out 
TBombadil 17 Feb 2014 1:39  
1. Reduce output of greenhouse gases as rapidly as possible. 
2. Stop cutting down forests and encourage reforestation. 
3. Ensure that wildlife corridors link wild areas together. 
4. Create large protected areas of ocean, particularly round critical areas such as reefs. 
eyeroller 17 Feb 2014 23:47  
You forgot about drastically reducing the human population. 
emmagoldmann 18 Feb 2014 8:50  
5) Drastically reduce meat & dairy consumption 
EnviroChem 17 Feb 2014 5:30  
Letting career politicians dictate environmental policy is akin to placing them in charge of diagnosing 
and treat illness. It's not something they're capable of, not something they have any idea how to do. 
We need uncompromising science-based rapid policy. 
Champing 17 Feb 2014 5:55  
We, or at least some of us, have not progressed much since the 16th century: 
http://notrickszone.com/2014/02/16/uncovered-16th-century-hallucinatory-images-suggest-that-
todays-climate-science-is-nothing-but-a-human-mental-disorder/. It is all too easy to imagine the 16th 
century equivalents of Ms Kolbert in action. Oh brave new world that has such people in it! 
algoyo 18 Feb 2014 2:26   
The Holocene Extinction is part of a cycle caused by the presence of humans and our natural activities. 
It started thousands of years ago and is already underway. How we are to stop this? We'd have to stop 
being human. The fact we are causing it doesn't make it 'unnatural'. We are part of the biosphere and 
as such are also at risk of extinction. It's not so much "save the planet", but "save the humans". 
Jon Davies 19 Feb 2014 1:38  
Less people=less extinctions. 
Source: McKie 2014, The Guardian. 
 
Nevertheless, Fischetti (2014, p. 80), writing in the Scientific American has a sobering message 
about total population: that it will continue to grow until beyond 2100 is now looking more 
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likely. While Dorling (2014) and others were predicting that population would peak at less 
than ten billion by mid-century due to declining fertility in all regions, more recent evidence 
suggests that fertility in Africa will not decline as much as indicated and that as a result, global 
population may continue to increase to 10.9 billion by the end of the century.  
 
Public policies 
Aldous Huxley’s utopian island of Pala introduced a population policy following experience of 
famine by its founder and new population growth spurred by better health and nutrition. In 
seeking a way between the unpleasant Malthusian horns of famine and ‘moral restraint’, the 
islanders decided that contraception “should be like education – free, tax-supported and, 
though not compulsory, as nearly as possible universal” (Huxley 1979 [1962], p. 97). 
 
In reality, the two largest countries by population, China and India, together account for more 
than 2.6 billion people, well over a third of the world total (World Population Review 2015). 
Both have attempted to control population through public policies.  
 
China’s ‘one-child policy’ was introduced in 1979 in order to curb an explosive population 
growth that stemmed from the peace after the 1948 revolution. It was renounced only in 
2015. The policy rewarded couples who had just one child with cash bonuses and better 
housing, and discouraged larger families with fines, forced abortions and official examinations 
for pregnancy by village family planning officers (Jian 2013). The one-child policy was resisted, 
especially in rural areas, where the predominance of agriculture dictates larger families; and 
within minority ethnic groups. In the first case two children were tolerated where the first was 
a girl, whereas in the second case the family was exempt. Nevertheless, the birth rate of 1.4 
children per woman is now well below the rate of 2.1 needed to maintain the population 
level. As a result, China’s population is ageing as the spectacular economic growth rate of the 
past three decades is slowing. The one-child policy has also resulted in a skewed ratio of men 
to women because boys are traditionally preferred to girls among Chinese families and 
therefore girl fetuses tend to be aborted more often than boys. Hence many men cannot find 
a marriage partner in China and often look to other countries for brides. 
 
India’s national family planning program began earlier  in 1952. It has since promoted 
contraceptive use, especially sterilisation, among married women. The 1992-93 National 
Family Health Survey (NFHS) found that almost 41 per cent of married women used 
contraception. Of those, two thirds had been sterilised, plus a further nine per cent of their 
husbands (Adlakha 1997, p. 3). After declaring a state of emergency in 1975, then Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi led an aggressive campaign under which more than six million 
sterilisations, many forced, were performed. After violent protests, Mrs. Gandhi’s party lost 
office at the 1977 elections and the number of sterilisations declined. However, since those 
times sterilisations have again been adopted as policy, more involving cash incentives. But the 
risks are still great: one hurried mass sterilisation of 83 women by one surgeon in one day 
resulted in 12 deaths from infection in 2014. The women were paid about 600 rupees, or 
about ten US dollars each (Barry & Raj 2014). Sterilisation remains common in India because it 
is cost-effective. It is also common in poorer countries such as Indonesia, especially among 
men. 
 
The Chinese government is more authoritarian than its democratic Indian counterpart and this 
may have contributed to its more effective population control, although poverty reduction 
and urbanisation were also factors. Population control has been achieved at great cost, 
however. Women have had to undergo public scrutiny and forced abortions. The demographic 
profile of the country has distorted both between age groups and gender. The Indian program 
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included forced sterilisations and still results in death and suffering from inadequate medical 
procedures. Its effects fall mainly upon the poor. As a result, neither country has succeeded in 
using coercive policies to reduce population growth without consequent resentment.  
 
The opposite approach was applied during the 1960s when the Romanian government banned 
both contraception and abortion in an attempt to increase its population, following 
considerable decline during the Second World War. But while the birthrate initially tripled, it 
soon returned to lower levels as families were too poor to support the extra children. Illegal 
abortions became widespread. Maternal mortality tripled. Many children grew up in 
orphanages. The architect of the policy, Nicolae Ceausescu, was executed when his 
government fell in 1989. The new government swiftly repealed the bans on contraception and 
abortion (Meadows 2008, p. 114).  
 
This is not to say that population control cannot be achieved through non-coercive and less 
direct means. In crowded Bangladesh the demand for contraceptives outstrips supply65 
(Streatfield & Kamal 2013), but most families use family planning methods. Population growth 
slowed from over three per cent in the 1970s to 1.34 per cent in 2011. Educational and 
awareness programs have helped drive these results (Bangladesh Government 2012). In 
Ghana, women without education have an average of 5.7 children, women with secondary 
education have 3.2 and those tertiary educated 1.5 (Carrington 2014). Italy has changed from 
high fertility to a country almost devoid of children in two generations with the lowest 
birthrates in 150 years (Stanton 2015). Japan and Russia now both have declining populations, 
as would much of the developed world but for immigration. The public policy task is to apply 
such policies appropriately so that popular resentment is avoided. Poverty reduction and 
women’s access to education are both proven indirect means of reducing population 
pressures. Consistent with Huxley’s Pala (1979), according to the UN the relatively simple 
measure of providing access to dependable contraception may be the single greatest 
contribution to population restraint that can be made (Islam 2015, s. 8). 
 
Evaluation 
While the issue of human population growth appears less important now that the rate of 
growth is slowing, our mounting numbers over the present century are a significant threat to 
sustainability due to the resources required and the waste produced, in a world where we are 
already exceeding the capacity of the planet.  
 
Recognising that it is very difficult to halt the momentum of population growth due to its 
course over generations, the key question is how to contain population increases without 
using coercive methods. The recent population decline in Japan and Russia and the natural 
decrease in much of Europe66 have occurred without compulsion and indicate how public 
policy might be applied. Migration, industrialisation, urbanisation, education, gender equality 
and the availability of contraception are all agents of population restraint. To encourage these 
agents will be to brake our impact upon our planet where there are already too many of us for 
the Earth to support.  
 
Otherwise, inevitably, much of the world will look increasingly like Hong Kong does today  
but without the beauty of its harbour. More like Mexico City or Lagos. Like Karachi or Beijing 
or Chongqing. If our civilisation remains viable and irrespective of an increase in loneliness, 
greater density through urbanisation seems inevitable. Sustainability depends on it.  
 
                                                 
65 Largely due to bureaucratic procedures and logistics of procurement. 
66 Population growth in much of Europe tends to be from immigration rather than natural increase. 
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Chapter 5. Affluence  
 
The inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of blessings – Winston Churchill 1945.67 
 
It is commonly asserted that the average contemporary Westerner enjoys greater affluence 
than the kings and emperors of the pre-industrial era. Certainly an investigation of the palace 
of Suleiman the Magnificent in Istanbul is instructive: While between 1520 and 1566 he led an 
empire controlling much of South Eastern Europe, Western Asia, the Caucasus and Northern 
Africa, Suleiman’s personal lavatory, for example, although lined in marble may as well have 
been of concrete. It essentially consisted of a hole in the floor. He possessed no transport 
apart from that which meandered at the pace of a horse or with the lassitude of sail. He knew 
nothing of flight, except that of birds, bats and insects. He communicated at a distance only by 
messenger.68 His entertainment was necessarily live and his literature limited.  
 
This chapter discusses the relationship of affluence to human well-being and the importance 
of nature in the provision of wealth. It argues that the economics of capitalism have distorted 
humanity’s relationship with the natural world and how alternative forms of measurement, if 
genuinely adopted by important institutions, may clarify that bond.  
 
While it may be true of affluence and the average Westerner, it is probably not true of the 
average Southerner that she is better off than an ancient emperor. Her lavatory will not be 
lined in marble. It will at best be a hole on the floor. There may well be no floor. It will 
probably not be a flushing system connected to a sewer. It may be at some distance from her 
dwelling, or not a facility at all. It may be dangerous for her to even venture there for fear of 
violence (McCarthy 2014). She may know of crowded trucks and buses (especially in Africa) 
and trains (especially in India). Aircraft may be seen far above in the sky. She may possess a 
mobile phone and watch films using a communal diesel generator to power the DVD player. 
Neither, however, will protect her from the risk of death in childbirth or from infection by 
malaria, tuberculosis or HIV. She may well be one of billions who are vulnerable to multi-
dimensional poverty (UNHDR 2014, p. 19). 
 
The affluent Westerner and the impoverished Southerner are contemporary extremes in 
geography as well as recent history. Arguably they depend on each other: As Marshall 
McLuhan (1964) famously wrote, “affluence creates poverty”, meaning that the poor are poor 
because the rich are rich; wealth depends on the exploitation of others. However, the 
observation that the sun causes poverty does not hold throughout history. Ancient Egypt, the 
Khmer empire, and the Mayans were all civilisations of immense wealth, yet arose in tropical 
settings. Arguably all three failed to adapt to changing circumstance; the Egyptians failed to 
innovate,69 the Khmer did not cope with degradation of their irrigation system and Mayan 
agriculture failed to cope with drought (Diamond 2003). Today, the tropical city-states of 
Singapore and Hong Kong are icons of wealth. If it was not the sun that caused the poverty of 
the South, then what is it that causes the wealth of the West? Perhaps it is that the ‘North 
                                                 
67 Churchill’s pointed corollary was “The inherent virtue of socialism is the equal sharing of miseries”, 
House of Commons, 22 October 1945. 
68 The system of semaphores originally implemented by Claude Chappe shortly after the French 
Revolution could transmit messages more quickly and was a significant advance on the horse. However, 
it required the construction of towers and equipment, was subject to the vagaries of weather, and 
lacked privacy as well as linguistic subtlety. 
69 Staying with archaic bronze weapons when their enemies, the Hittites, used iron, for example. 
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wind made the Vikings’, or that overexploitation of natural resources − the denuded forest − 
led to the use of coal, in which power is concentrated (Nef 1977, pp. 140-141).  
 
In stark contrast with people of the South, it was only during the twentieth century that it 
became possible for the majority of ordinary people in the West to enjoy unprecedented 
affluence – on a scale unimaginable before the modern era. This was an affluence free from 
past abject drudgery and the daily struggle for survival. It was an affluence that included the 
near universal availability of flushing lavatories. For the first time in human history it was 
possible for vast numbers of people to live fully rather than subsist, to freely exercise desires 
for leisure, for art and for knowledge beyond that of immediate need for food, shelter and 
companionship. Although interrupted by war and economic depression, this new widespread 
affluence was a product of three key factors – a new economic system, the exploitation of 
energy reserves and mass production. 
 
The new economic system was based on “the lure of gain” for individuals effected through the 
market system, “the most important revolution, from the point of view of shaping modern 
society, that ever took place” (Heilbroner 1983, p. 17). This society-wide economic system – 
capitalism – was the third form of societal organisation that has evolved. The first was 
traditional (and largely agricultural), in which societies’ tasks were allocated according to 
custom, where son followed father, daughter followed mother, where occupation was often 
attached to caste. The second form was through command, the whip of authoritarian rule, 
whereby the pyramids were built and in more recent times, Soviet farms collectivised. Neither 
of these economic systems necessarily involved the transfer of money throughout society. But 
it was this third new system that introduced the novel idea of individual gain that, with 
widespread use of money both as wages and as wealth, could build upon earlier gains and 
involve whole societies in the advance of affluence. The reinvention of money during the 
Middle Ages was critical in this new system because, instead of barter, money required 
acceptance of the concept of value. Once this abstract concept was established, it led to its 
expression in a market that could be leveraged and exploited (Sattin 2014). 
 
The exploitation of energy reserves remains central to this new economic system and to the 
affluence it has created.70 During the nineteenth century, the primacy of coal was established 
in fuelling new secondary industries, which could be located where labour was cheap, rather 
than where waterwheels could be powered (Klein 2014, p. 172). The conversion of coal to 
heat allowed steel production, mass transport (railways), mass electrification and new 
factories producing affordable consumer goods. During the twentieth century, oil and gas 
made individual autonomous transport (cars) and aircraft feasible. This fossil-based energy is 
highly concentrated, considerably more so than primitive windmill, waterwheel or animal 
power. Accordingly, without the extensive use of concentrated energy, modern affluence 
would not be possible. Metals, electricity and consumer goods cannot be provided on a mass 
scale by a horse plodding around the axis of some crude turbine. Rather, billions of tonnes of 
coal and billions of barrels of oil71 – or their equivalent – are needed each year to enable the 
elements of mass affluence. 
 
Mass production techniques involved new factories producing affordable consumer goods. 
When applied to complex manufactures and use of the assembly line, this technique became 
                                                 
70 Indeed, one US physicist asserts that the maintenance of societal wealth is directly proportionate to 
the generation of energy (Garrett 2014). 
71 According to the International Energy Association (IEA), global coal consumption in 2012 was about 
7.7 billion tonnes, while oil consumption was about 32 billion barrels a year or 90 million barrels a day. 
  78 
known as ‘Fordism’, after Henry Ford the car manufacturer,72 a term coined by Antonio 
Gramsci in his 1934 essay Americanism and Fordism. But the most important aspect of 
Fordism was its virtuous re-cycling of profits through increased workers’ wages, that then 
enabled the workers to buy the cars they made, that then enabled higher production, 
enabling lower unit costs through economies of scale and so on. Gramsci was sceptical about 
this virtuous cycle and questioned “the so-called ‘high wages’ paid by Fordised and 
rationalised industry”, rather suggesting that Fordism was “the ultimate stage in the process 
of progressive attempts by industry to overcome the law of the tendency of the rate of profit 
to fall” (Gramsci 1999 [1934], pp. 562-563). Growing affluence based on reducing the relative 
costs of new complex manufactures remains with us today. However, much of the lower costs 
of, for example, cars, apparel and homewares in the West is now due to exploiting the lower 
wage structures and economies of scale of the East, foreshadowed by Gramsci as part of an 
‘international division of labour’ (Ibid, p. 607). 
 
There are parallels between the economies of the early twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries. In both eras the prices of iconic items continually fell while quality improved, due to 
the effect of scale: 
 
Economies of scale allowed the robber barons to keep reducing prices and improving 
quality. Henry Ford cut the price of his Model T from $850 in its first year of 
production to $360 in 1916. In 1924 you could buy a much better car for just $290. 
The silicon sultans performed exactly the same trick. The price of computer 
equipment, adjusted for quality and inflation, has declined by 16 per cent a year over 
the five decades from 1959 to 2009. Each iPhone contains the same amount of 
computing power as was housed in MIT in 1960 (The Economist 2015a). 
 
Definition 
The word ‘affluence’ appeared in English around the mid-fourteenth century, according to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, and derives from the Old French affluence and Latin affluentia, "a 
plentiful flowing, an abundance, rich, copious", including a sense of ‘wealth’ from about 1600, 
from the notion of "a plentiful flow" of the gifts of fortune. The word ‘wealth’ is from the mid-
thirteenth century Middle English ‘wele’ or ‘well-being’ and is based on the analogy of 
‘health’. In economics, ‘wealth’ means ‘the sum of all goods and services that have an 
exchange value’ but it originally meant ‘happiness’, as well as its contemporary meaning of 
‘prosperity in abundance of possessions or riches’. The association of affluence with wealth 
and thus with happiness may have been lost as a meaning because objectively the connection 
is in fact, not entirely clear. Rather, it is more of a paradox: 
 
the happiness - income paradox is this: at a point in time happiness varies directly 
with income, but over time happiness does not increase when a country’s income 
increases (Easterlin & Angelescu 2009, p. 2). 
 
This finding is based on an analysis of responses to questionnaires about life satisfaction and 
income in 37 countries in different stages of development.  
 
The same study shows that people are more dismayed about loss of income than we are 
elated by an equivalent gain (Ibid. p. 12). In a similar vein, at the intersection of economics 
and psychology, there is also the profound observation that affluence is relative as much as it 
                                                 
72 The Ford Motor Company was one of the first multi-national corporations (MNCs). After 
incorporation in 1903 it expanded production to Canada in 1904, to Europe in 1917and to Australia in 
1925. 
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is absolute. It is distressing if we are less affluent than our friends and neighbours and 
comforting if we are wealthier, irrespective of absolute levels of affluence (Veblen 1899, ch. 4, 
Solnick & Hemenway 1998, pp. 380-381). Thorsten Veblen, who coined the term ‘conspicuous 
consumption’, detailed the display behaviours of the wealthy that both symbolised and 
underscored their relative material superiority during the Golden Age of the late nineteenth 
century. 73 However, the abundance now generally enjoyed in the West is conspicuous relative 
to the scarcity of the South. And it appears to be built on fragile foundations. 
 
At the individual psychological level, western affluence has also produced a dysfunctional 
behaviour known as hoarding. Cherrier & Ponnor (2006, p. 26) make a distinction between 
collectors, functional hoarders and non-functional hoarders. While collectors enjoy societal 
approval for their organised collections based on aesthetic or historical value, functional 
hoarders risk disapproval of family and friends because they find it difficult to part with many 
useless items for sentimental reasons or perceptions of wastefulness. Non-functional 
hoarders, however, risk not only societal intervention but also their own well-being and safety 
as a result of compulsive accumulations of valueless items. There is evidence that some of this 
hoarding behaviour may be due to perceptions of resource shortage originating, for example, 
during the Depression, during rationing in the 1940s or during the oil crises of the mid-1970s. 
Nevertheless, it is facilitated by affluence. Basic material goods in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries are cheap and diverse. In many cases they are made to be disposable, but 
instead, this stuff is hoarded as a form of psychological security. Sometimes its manifestation 
is extreme: 
 
The Collyer brothers, for example, died in the United States in 1947 due to over-
cluttered space. It is reported that their house contained 136 tons of refuse. One 
brother was buried alive when piles of rubbish collapsed on him, leaving his blind 
brother starving to death (Ibid, p. 6). 
 
The world’s first shopping mall, ‘Southdale’ near Minneapolis in Minnesota, started in 1954 in 
a building complex purpose-designed by Victor Gruen and “spread like an epidemic across the 
USA and the rest of the world” along with convention centres, sports arenas and indoor 
theme parks. Such malls are an embodiment of mass consumerism, and despite the current 
prevalence of online shopping continue to exert a powerful attraction throughout the world. 
The term ‘Gruen transfer’ refers to the sense of disorientation many people feel when they 
first enter these spaces such that they forget their original intentions and buy more than 
initially planned (Sloterdijk 2005, p. 274).  
 
Stuart Jeffries points to the stress associated with too much material choice that consumerism 
encourages: 
 
Once upon a time in Springfield, the Simpson family visited a new supermarket. 
Monstromart’s slogan was “where shopping is a baffling ordeal”. Product choice was 
unlimited, shelving reached the ceiling, nutmeg came in 12lb boxes and the express 
checkout had a sign reading, “1,000 items or less”. In the end the Simpsons returned 
to Apu’s Kwik-E-Mart (Jeffries 2015, para. 1). 
 
Aristotle viewed wealth as either ‘unnatural’ if it were attained through trade, or ‘natural’ if 
attained through “skilful management of house and land”. Trade is unnatural because it 
involves using things for other than their natural purpose, and because it involves money, 
                                                 
73 Although he was largely anticipated by Adam Smith (1776, p. 202): “With the greater part of rich 
people, the chief enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches”. 
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which has no real use other than exchange. Thus the most hated, most unnatural form of 
wealth is that produced from money itself – usury  the lending of money at interest (Aristotle 
1952 [c. 330BC], 1258b).  
 
Aristotle may have only been reflecting his class interests, however. Throughout history 
debtors have disapproved of interest while creditors have the opposite attitude. Because 
Greek philosophers were aligned with the landowning class who were often in debt, they did 
not like usury (Russell 1980 [1946], p. 198). Nevertheless, Aristotle presented a more 
profound insight: wealth of the household is limited, but monetary wealth, the spurious kind, 
has no limit and nor has the desire for it. As “money supplants other values and becomes their 
only measure”, no matter how affluent a person becomes, there is always a desire for more 
(Harvey 2014, p. 277). 
 
Nonetheless, as far as the relationship between affluence and sustainability is concerned, 
there are several key dimensions. These include how affluence is measured, created and 
distributed, and how it relates to the environment, including its effects on resources, energy, 
species and habitats. 
 
Measurement 
While the invention and widespread use of money enabled the easy storage, measurement 
and accumulation of wealth, only since the 1930s were detailed national accounts constructed 
for government policies, especially in the UK and US, due to pressures of the Depression and 
in preparation for the Second World War (Van Dieren 1995, p. 39, Coyle 2014, p. 12). Up until 
that point, ‘the economy’ was essentially the private sector only. Government was excluded 
because it had minimal input into production. It was only since the Depression and the 
supporting General Theory of J.M. Keynes (1936)74 that government became significant in 
economic growth, especially in the US, Europe and the remainder of the West. In the 
Communist states of course, government was already pre-eminent.  
 
The universal use of GDP to measure national wealth and economic growth is even more 
recent. While the measure was formally established in 1953 through the UN statistical system, 
its universal use did not occur until towards the end of last century. Up until then GDP was 
one of several similar but competing concepts, in particular Gross National Product (GNP), 
which measures the net wealth generated by national citizens and corporations, irrespective 
of their location. GDP, however, is the market value of everything produced within a country’s 
borders. With GNP, a US corporation operating in say Botswana, would have its profits 
counted towards US GNP. Conversely a foreign firm operating in the US would not have its 
profits counted towards US national figure. Gross National Income (GNI) is the same concept 
as GNP but uses an income rather than a production measure. One reason for the persistence 
of GNP and GNI as a measure of national economic output in the US, may be that unlike most 
countries, US income tax is payable irrespective of in which country its citizens reside. At the 
global level of course, all three measures are theoretically equal since total exports75 should 
equal total imports and production is accounted for but once in each system. 
 
                                                 
74 Keynes’ The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money was published in 1936, some years 
after Franklin Roosevelt’s practical application of demand creation through New Deal government 
spending on infrastructure, employment and welfare programs.  
75 In practice however, total global exports tend to be higher than imports, probably due to political 
pressures to produce favorable statistics. Interplanetary imports and exports (soil, rocks, spacecraft, 
solar-powered robotic cars) are not usually ascribed a monetary value, but may have to be in the 
foreseeable future as their volume and total value increase. 
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The gross national product does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their 
education or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength 
of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials. It 
measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our 
compassion nor our devotion to our country, it measures everything in short, except that 
which makes life worthwhile  Robert Kennedy, speech at University of Kansas, 1968. 
 
The most common way of measuring GDP is the expenditure method: GDP = consumption 
expenditure + investment expenditure + government spending + (exports – imports), or, GDP 
= C + I + G + (X-M). Thus GDP measures both total production and total consumption, which 
are directly related. Interestingly, Simon Kuznets, who was later awarded a Nobel prize for this 
work, was in charge of developing a comprehensive system of national accounts in the US 
during the Roosevelt years. He wanted the accounts to measure human welfare, not just total 
output or consumption. Accordingly, he argued  unsuccessfully  that the new national 
income measure should subtract all expenditure on armaments, advertising, “speculative 
activities” and “necessary evils”, like subways. In this, however, he was at odds with the spirit 
of the time, and particularly with Roosevelt who wanted government spending to be included 
as a positive economic contributor and thus demonstrate that the US economy was growing 
again post-Depression (Coyle 2014, pp. 13-15). Today, the resultant GDP measures without 
moral perspective. A billion dollars’ worth of nuclear bombs is counted as exactly equal to a 
billion dollars’ worth of baby food. 
 
But irrespective of Kuznets’ or FDR’s views on what should be included, this dimension is 
quantitative, which tends to lead to an over-emphasis on the notion of ‘growth’ at the 
expense of ‘development’. Former World Bank ecological economist Herman Daly (1990, p. 1) 
argues that the distinction between ‘growth’ and ‘development’ is that the former is about an 
increase in size, whereas the latter is about qualitative improvement. Thus ultimately the 
human global economy cannot grow to be more than the finite global ecosystem of which it is 
part. Yet while economic growth cannot be sustainable in the longer term, it is possible for 
economic development to be sustainable, because the global ecosystem develops without 
growing. In measuring wealth as the quantitative GDP, ironically we tend to value that which 
leads to unsustainability and its own negation. 
 
Before that point is reached, however, when comparing the wealth of different countries, it is 
important to be clear about what is meant by the size of an economy and how it relates to 
affluence. The US has the world’s largest economy and China the second largest. However, 
this can be measured in nominal as well as in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, where the 
value of goods and services consumed is weighted according to the cost of living in each 
country. For example, if ten dollars (or its exchange currency) buys one Happy Meal in the US, 
but two Happy Meals in China, then each dollar equivalent of GDP in China is worth twice each 
dollar of GDP in the US, at least as far as Happy Meals are concerned. The difficulty in PPP 
measurement is ensuring that the basket of goods used to indicate purchasing power is 
representative of consumption in both countries. In nominal terms, US GDP was about USD16 
trillion compared with China’s GDP of about USD9 trillion in 2013. But in PPP terms China’s 
GDP is nearly the same as the US, according to the World Bank (2014b). However, in terms of 
personal affluence, both are distorted comparisons. China has more than four times the US 
population; therefore the average American is more than four times as affluent as their 
Chinese counterpart in PPP terms76. It is this measure – GDP per person (PPP) – that is more 
                                                 
76 And more than eight times as affluent in nominal terms 
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relevant when discussing relative national affluence as well as, more importantly, its impact 
on the entire planet. 
 
It is also important to be aware that GDP is a measure of production, consumption or income. 
It is a gauge of flow. It does not measure the stock of accumulated wealth. Thomas Picketty 
(2014, p. 463) points out that more and more countries are becoming owned by their own 
billionaires, including especially the established billionaires of Europe, rather than being taken 
over by foreign wealth. Thus, consistent with the fears of Aristotle, wealth is accumulating and 
concentrating within national borders as much as it is concentrated in the West compared 
with the South. 
 
Hazel Henderson (2014), among others including Joe Stiglitz, believes that the measurement 
of GDP contributes to a debt imbalance and therefore artificially weakens national economies. 
Unlike business accounts with flows of income and expenditure and stocks of assets and 
liabilities, national accounts lack assets: 
 
So, the Grossly Distorted Picture in current GDP only records levels of public debt for 
vital infrastructure and public services (police, fire protection, teachers, etc.). Omitted 
is an asset side to account for valuable taxpayer investments in public infrastructure: 
transport, ports, railways, schools, etc., many of which last for over 50 years and 
should be carried on the books, just as they are on corporate balance sheets. Imagine 
trying to run a company this way! (Henderson 2014). 
 
Governments focus on GDP, however, because not only is it a simple measure that correlates 
with other indicators of well-being (such as employment and education levels), but also that it 
can be influenced by government policy in the medium term. Other indicators also can be 
influenced by government policy, but few combine all these apparent virtues as well as does 
GDP.  
 
Wealth creation 
The concept of national (and now global) wealth is central to political economy and economics 
generally, and is generally attributed to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776). In fact, the 
notion of national wealth as a capital stock appeared in texts that predate Smith’s works. In A 
Discourse of Money for example, John Briscoe (1696, p. 198) writes of "the capital stock of 
national treasure". Andrew Hooke, in his Essay on the National Debt and National Capital 
(1750), treats the "national capital" as consisting of (1) "cash, stock, or coin," (2) "personal 
stock" or "wrought plate & bullion, jewels, rings, furniture, apparel, shipping, stock-in-trade, 
stock for consumption, and live-stock of capital," and (3) "land stock," "the value of all the 
lands in the kingdom."  
 
During the eighteenth century the French physiocrats77 developed an economic theory 
whereby national wealth is composed of the value of agricultural land and its produce, due to 
productive work. According to its proponents such as François Quesnay (1694–1774) and 
Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727–1781), capital (derived from surplus saved) is necessary 
for economic growth and economies function best where each participant is free to pursue 
their own wants (‘laissez-faire’).  
 
                                                 
77 Physiocracy: from the Greek ‘government of nature’. 
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When Adam Smith took the term ‘capital’ in hand, he began by distinguishing capital from 
interest. In his Lectures on Jurisprudence it first appears as a sum of money lent, as opposed to 
the interest paid, on the loan. 
 
When a sum of money is lent to a private person, the creditor can come upon the 
debtor when he pleases for both capital and interest; but it is not on this footing that 
the government borrows money; they give you a right to perpetual annuity of 3 or 4 
per cent, but not to re-demand your capital (Smith 1766, p. 248). 
 
Much of a century after Smith, Engels was more concerned with how the concept of national 
wealth masked poverty: 
 
The term national wealth has only arisen as a result of the liberal economists’ passion 
for generalisation. As long as private property exists, this term has no meaning. The 
“national wealth” of the English is very great and yet they are the poorest people 
under the sun. One must either discard this term completely, or accept such premises 
as give it meaning. Similarly, with the terms national economy and political or public 
economy. In the present circumstances that science ought to be called private 
economy, for its public connections exist only for the sake of private property (Engels 
1844, para 13).  
 
More generally, wealth is created through the application of human labour, according to 
Adam Smith, and this was the original basis of exchange value. The exchange value of a good, 
Smith said in the Wealth of Nations, is determined by the amount of labour it contains in its 
production. In a primitive society it is the only way of determining how goods can be 
exchanged. If it takes twice the labour to kill a beaver as it does a deer, then one beaver is 
worth two deer (Smith 1952 [1776], p. 20). But in advanced societies, the price of a good 
includes three factors – labour, the owner’s profit plus rent. However, “the real value” of all 
three components, “is measured by the quantity of labour which they can, each of them, 
purchase or command” (Smith 1952 [1776], p. 21). Consistent with Smith’s insight, machinery 
and technologies that facilitate the production of goods in modern economies are simply 
stored labour, since it is human labour that enabled their conception and creation. Skill is the 
embodiment of earlier labour. Services, as distinct from goods, are still more directly 
composed of labour.  
 
Other theorists, notably Karl Marx, based much of their analysis on this concept, in particular 
that the surplus value inherent in a good derives from the value of the labour it embodies 
beyond that needed for the subsistence of the labourer (Wolff 2011, s. 3). Marx’s model of 
perfect contemporary capitalism demonstrated that the only source of profit was this surplus 
value, because the labourer must sell his labour at a subsistence rate, considerably less than 
the value of labour he makes available to the capitalist. The difference is the profit that fuels 
capitalism (Heilbroner 1983, pp. 120-121).  
 
While the labour theory of value has been described as “an appalling jumble of ideas” 
(Whitaker (2001 [1904], p. 6), it did underline the central importance of labour to political 
economics and the creation of wealth. That organization of labour to create wealth, according 
to Smith in his early Lectures on Jurisprudence, progressed in four societal stages: 
 
…hunting, pasturage, farming, and commerce. If a number of persons were 
shipwrecked on a desert island their first sustenance would be from the fruits which 
the soil naturally produced, and the wild beasts which they could kill. As these could 
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not at all times be sufficient, they come at last to tame some of the wild–beasts that 
they might always have them at hand. In process of time even these would not be 
sufficient, and as they saw the Earth naturally produce considerable quantities of 
vegetables of its own accord they would think of cultivating it so that it might produce 
more of them...The age of commerce naturally succeeds that of agriculture. As men 
could now confine themselves to one species of labour, they would naturally 
exchange the surplus of their own commodity for that of another of which they stood 
in need (Smith 2005 [1766], pp. 522-523).  
 
Smith was writing at the brink of the industrial era, which was unknown to him. However, 
affluence, in the sense of the accumulation of wealth, increasingly depended on possession of 
the means of production. Therefore, in line with Smith’s societal stages, the means of 
production was for hunters the spear, for herders the stock, for farmers the land and for 
entrepreneurs the firm. Further, the associated development from communal to private 
ownership enabled wealth to be concentrated in fewer hands. In the industrial era, factory 
ownership was key to affluence. In the post-industrial era it is more the ownership of a 
technology or ‘intellectual property’ that is the source of affluence, as no doubt Bill Gates and 
the geeks of Silicon Valley would concur. Especially in its patent-protected recent forms, 
technology tends to concentrate affluence.  
 
Thus in both classical and Marxist political economy, nature is peripheral. Human intervention, 
invention and organization is presumed more significant. Smith’s desert island illustration, 
however, did begin to recognise the importance of the natural world. It is the source of 
sustenance from gathering and cultivation, from hunting and husbandry. Human labour does 
not produce wealth from nothing. It produces wealth from the natural world. Marx too, was 
aware of nature and its relationship to human wealth (Bellamy Foster 2000). Engels also knew 
that wealth ultimately derives from nature: “labour is the source of all wealth…next to nature, 
which supplies it with the material that it converts into wealth” (Engels 1925 [1883], p. 452). 
 
That ultimate foundation of wealth, however, “based on ever-more alarming environmental 
reports”78 is now dramatically “sinking under the weight of demands to supply more resources 
and absorb more wastes” (Gale 2014, p. 1).   
 
Indeed, capitalism is built on unending economic growth: 
 
A purely private enterprise system can only function if companies can obtain sufficient 
profits which in turn requires that the selling price of goods exceeds the costs of 
production. This means that the selling price must exceed the spending power that 
has been distributed through payments to factor inputs. Hence, to ensure sufficient 
“aggregate demand” to clear the market, additional spending power is required from 
some other source. In a purely private enterprise system, this normally derives from 
investment in new productive capacity which will increase the amount or quality of 
goods supplied, but only after some interval. Investment therefore serves the dual 
role of increasing productive capacity and creating additional demand to clear the 
market of whatever has already been produced (Sorell 2010, p. 1797). 
 
As far as consumption is concerned, the economist Kenneth Boulding was one of the first of 
that discipline, however, to point out that “the closed Earth of the future requires economic 
principles which are somewhat different from those of the open Earth of the past” (Boulding 
                                                 
78Gale cites reports about climate change (IPCC 2013), forestry and fisheries depletion (FAO 2010; FAO 
2014), ocean acidification (UNEP 2010), and species extinction (MEA 2005).  
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1966 p. 10), a challenge to economists to re-think the centrality of growth, which has yet to be 
fully accepted. This may be because he was less than complimentary to others of his 
profession: “Anyone who believes exponential growth can go on forever is either a madman 
or an economist”. Redclift (1993, p. 19) accuses “modern economics” of causing 
“unsustainable development” due to the pursuit of growth at the expense of ecological 
consequence. This “has its roots in the classical paradigm which informed both market 
economies and state socialist ones”. 
 
And economic growth does not even translate to more happiness. Easterlin & Angelescu’s 
(2009, p. 2) study of 37 countries showed, as with income relativities, there is no relationship 
between the rate of growth of GDP per person and increase in happiness. Whilst there may be 
short-term associations between the growth of happiness and income due to fluctuations in 
macroeconomic conditions, the long-term relationship “is nil” (Ibid). That our happiness has 
little to do with economic growth is an encouragement for environmentalists who advocate 
restraint in production and consumption (Trainer 1985, Alexander 2015), and an obstacle for 
development economists who advocate continuous growth.  
 
But wealth is not necessarily material. Engel’s friend, Karl Marx, writing his notes in the 
Grundisse approvingly quotes an earlier view of Charles Dilke  that true national wealth is not 
a matter of money or other capital, but rather consists of more free time for everyone: 
 
Truly wealthy a nation, when the working day is 6 rather than 12 hours. Wealth is not 
command over surplus labour time’ (real wealth), ‘but rather, disposable time outside 
that needed in direct production, for every individual and the whole’ (Dilke 1821, p. 6, 
quoted in Marx 1973 [1861], p. 706) 
 
Charles Dilke’s view of wealth as ultimately free time is in turn probably based on that of the 
utopian socialist, William Godwin79 (1793): "Is there not a state of society beyond that needed 
for production…in which leisure shall be made the inheritance of every one of its members?”. 
Indeed, in this century there have been studies of the phenomenon of “downshifting”, 
whereby significant numbers of people in affluent societies choose simpler, cheaper lives that 
consume less while providing more leisure and pleasurable time outside of ‘the rat race’. 
Involving around 20 per cent of adults in both the US and Australia, these people voluntarily 
forgo what they regard as unneeded income and material goods, and are mostly happy with 
their decisions. The most prominent reason for downshifting is that old trope of retiring 
politicians – ‘to spend more time with their family’ (Hamilton & Mail 2003, p. 20), but 
probably meant more sincerely.80  
 
This profoundly different view of wealth as free time is arguably now within the grasp of 
contemporary advanced economies as automation replaces unskilled labour. To a significant 
extent, now even the skilled labour of, for example, journalists, accountants and marketing 
executives is demonstrably replaceable. In ancient times it was the few who enjoyed the 
wealth of leisure, the freedom to create rather than the drudge of repetitive unskilled labour. 
Now that machines are capable of that production as well as routine labour of the mind, the 
political issue again is distribution. 
 
                                                 
79 Husband of Mary Wollstonecraft and father of Mary Shelley. 
80 However, a more recent (albeit limited) international comparison did not support the notion that 
‘post-materialist values’ had any influence on consumption in industrially advanced countries such as 
Germany, Canada and Sweden (Eklund 2012, p. 27).  
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Wealth distribution  
In Plato’s Republic its distribution would result in an inequality of wealth no more than four to 
one, otherwise it threatened social order (1952 [c.380BC], s. 744). That ratio has been since 
far exceeded in modern republics, but there remains a certain wariness about its implications 
for unrest. The 1789 French and the 1917 Russian revolutions are obvious examples of its 
menace.  
 
While there were minimum income payments by the state in eighteenth century England via 
the 1795 Speenhamland81 Law, abandoned because it inhibited the creation of an industrial 
labour market (Polanyi 2001 [1944], pp. 81-82), industrialisation at first brought with it greater 
inequality, justified as virtue. During the Victorian era there was a tendency to assert various 
political and economic doctrines as ‘iron laws’, so as to imply their universality as if they were 
the enduring principia of some economic Isaac Newton. They include the ‘iron law of wages’ 
attributed to, amongst others, Malthus and Ricardo, which states that wages of labourers will 
tend to fall to the minimum for human subsistence, such is the unfortunate tendency for the 
poor to reproduce themselves in numbers that create an oversupply of their kind. This is 
associated with a latterly named ‘iron law of population’, which states that a rapidly increasing 
population inevitably leads to poverty.  
 
Hence it became virtuous for harsh measures to be taken against the poor  as if they were 
some undesirable separate species. If the poor were provided with more than the barest of 
necessities via wages or social welfare measures, then they would simply increase their 
numbers through ill-discipline and fornication. Wages would thus fall still further, below 
subsistence levels, to their greater detriment. How kind it was therefore to be cruel; how 
much better for the poor to be contained in a misery that made possible their subsistence, but 
no more. There was no affluence for the masses to be found in Victorian economic theory cast 
as enduring truth. 
 
However, the beginnings of the modern era began to bring leverage to the cousins of these 
early wage slaves in the former colonies of Australasia and North America. Universal suffrage, 
unions and the creation of political movements entwined to result in wages that provided 
“reasonable comfort” in Justice Higgins’ decision of 1907 in Australia (Robbins et al 2005, p. 
488) and the beginnings of welfare measures in the US during the Depression. Winston 
Churchill, who observed in 1945 that capitalism is good at accumulating wealth, but poor at 
distributing it, nonetheless opposed welfare measures in post-war UK and was dismissed by 
electors in the same year.  
 
As welfare measures took hold in the West, a degree of universal affluence was identified mid-
century in the work of Simon Kuznets. After his involvement in quantifying national income, 
Kuznets found evidence for an inverted U-shaped curve that described the relationship 
between inequality and economic development. As economic development proceeds and 
more people take advantage of greater opportunities, average incomes rise. At first there is 
increasing inequality as only a few benefit, which then peaks when the entire population is 
involved in the more developed economy. Inequality then begins to fall and return to earlier 
levels as progressive taxation and social welfare programs are implemented.  
 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, who both championed the resurrection of economic 
liberalism during the 1980s, oversaw rising inequality in the West as wealth generation was 
                                                 
81 The Speenhamland Law guaranteed a family income based on the price of a loaf of bread. 
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regarded as more important than distribution, their national economies having suffered a 
decade of stagnation.82   
 
The predominance of neoliberalism has since been undermined by the global financial crisis of 
2008 and the subsequent continuing global recession. Recently, French economist Thomas 
Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014) created a scholarly storm with its thesis 
that in the longer-term since the Industrial Revolution, inequality will continue to increase, as 
the return on capital normally exceeds income from labour. Inequality grows especially in 
times of political stability, but can be reversed in times of crisis such as the Depression and the 
two world wars. This contradicts earlier assumptions and narrow evidence that increasing 
economic growth produces greater equality (Kuznets 1955). 
 
Picketty’s research greatly widens the scope of Kuznets’ earlier inquiry into inequality and 
encompasses it in a manner that recalls Einstein’s subsumption of Newton. Kuznets had found 
that inequality tended to decline over time in developed economies. Piketty, by analysing a 
much greater range of data covering most major economies over the past 300 years, shows 
that Kuznets was accurate, but that the period he chose (1913-1948) was an aberration in the 
long-term trend of growing inequality. What appeared to Kuznets as a compression of wealth 
disparities was due to the disruption of the two world wars and the effects of reconstruction. 
When less chaotic times returned, wealth – including income — again resumed its long march 
to widening disparity. Picketty’s findings have since been dramatically extended to encompass 
even ancient times. The only factors that reduce otherwise inevitable inequality are ‘the four 
horsemen of levelling’  mass warfare, revolution, state failure, and pandemics (Scheidel 
2017). 
 
Importantly, Picketty surmises that economists became uninterested in inequality and its risks 
after Kuznets mid-century. Although it was a central concern of nineteenth century political 
economists, such as Marx, Engels and Ricardo, inequality became no longer an issue because 
of his reassurance. But Picketty goes further in showing how Kuznets brought his immense 
prestige as a Nobel laureate and president of the American Economics Association (AEA) to 
bear on the issue. For the first time the dire predictions of Marx – growing inequality, 
overproduction, collapse of demand, impoverishment, revolution – were apparently 
disproven, based on Kuznet’s detailed research of then newly available data. In future, 
according to Kuznets’ enthusiastic 1954 speech to the Association,83 providing that countries 
followed the US model, economic growth would not only diminish poverty, but society would 
become more equal as development matured. In the middle of the Cold War, for America and 
the West this was good news indeed.  
 
Kuznets was careful to decorate his crucial news with qualification, but any proviso was soon 
swept away behind the word ‘however’: 
 
No adequate empirical evidence is available for checking this conjecture of a long 
secular84 swing in income inequality; nor can the phases be dated precisely. However, 
to make it more specific, I would place the early phase in which income inequality 
might have been widening, from about 1780 to 1850 in England; from about 1840 to 
1890, and particularly from 1870 on in the United States; and, from the 1840's to the 
1890's in Germany (Kuznets 1955, p. 19). 
                                                 
82 Especially the ‘stagflation’ due to the OPEC-induced oil price increases.  
83 Kuznets speech to the American Economics Association was made in December 1954 and was 
published in the Association’s journal in 1955. 
84 The word ‘secular’ refers to ‘long-term’ rather than cyclical trends.  
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These three countries, England,85 the US and Germany, are the only three that Kuznets was 
able to study in detail. Picketty’s sources are not only much more extensive in time, but also 
many more countries are covered.  
 
It is hard to overstate Kuznets’ prestige before Picketty arrived. Not only was Kuznets a Nobel 
laureate and president of the AEA, he was also one of the economists central to the 
development of national accounts and the very concept of GDP. Earlier he had been trusted 
by Franklin Roosevelt to provide the constructs and data to enable the recovery of the US and 
the world from the Great Depression of the 1930s (Coyle 2014, pp. 12-13). He was, at least 
until 2014 and Picketty, regarded as one of the most important authorities on the effects of 
economic development and poverty reduction. The ‘Kuznets curve’ that describes economic 
development and inequality, the ‘Kuznets ratio’ that relates income of the highest-earning 
households against the lowest, and the ‘environmental Kuznets curve’ that relates 
environmental degradation against economic development are all indications of his regard. It 
is a tragic irony that one of the conclusions of his watershed 1954 speech concerns Marx and 
an “overgeneralization” of tendencies not properly understood: 
 
It is also possible that much of Marxian economics may be an overgeneralization of 
imperfectly understood trends in England during the first half of the nineteenth 
century when income inequality may have widened; and that extrapolations of these 
trends (e.g. increasing misery of the working classes, polarization of society, etc.) 
proved wrong because due regard was not given to the possible effects upon the 
economic and social structure of technological changes, extension of the economic 
system to much of the then unoccupied world, and the very structure of human wants 
(Kuznets 1955, p. 27). 
 
Inequality tends to fray society, reduce opportunity and innovation and produce social unrest. 
Picketty suggests public policy measures including wealth and property taxes to redress the 
situation. His point is well made. World Bank president Jim Yong Kim mentioned Picketty’s 
findings in a speech not long after the book was published, suggesting that growing inequality 
affected capitalism’s legitimacy: 
 
As an economic system, global market capitalism has produced affluence and 
innovation. These are very good things. However, an economic system’s legitimacy is 
also tied to its ability to make two things accessible to all: the riches it generates and 
the social benefits that arise from that wealth. Unfortunately, national income gains 
from growth tend not to be shared among a population in anything close to equal 
measure. In his 2014 best seller Capital in the Twenty-First Century, French economist 
Thomas Piketty showed that, in developed economies, these gains generally flow at 
substantially higher rates to owners than to workers. Ultimately, we want to ensure 
the global economic system’s gains are distributed in a fashion that creates 
opportunity and respects human dignity (Kim 2014). 
 
This sort of observation may be valid as far as it goes, but it is restricted in its focus to 
inequalities within nation-states. Yet as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the 
differences in affluence between the global West and the global South are immense. In human 
terms the contrast is probably far greater as almost everyone in the West enjoys standards of 
infrastructure, health and nutrition that are out of reach for many in the South. Further, 
                                                 
85 Presumably Kuznets is referring to the UK here. 
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contemporary global capitalism relies on the poverty of the South to drive low cost resource 
extraction and the manufacture of consumer goods. 
 
But what is the relationship between increasing inequality and humanity’s impact on the 
environment? The relationship is positive between the two variables  and is therefore 
negative for the environment. Apart from the plausibility that the rich might favour nature, 
clean air and clean water in their own interests, concentration of wealth implies a 
concentration of political power. Political rules and legislation therefore tend to favour the 
interests of the wealthy, who are less concerned with the environmental impact of their own 
consumption because they are insulated from its effects. There is extensive research evidence 
that supports such findings, including that of the UN’s Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (Islam 2015). The wealthy can choose where they live, which will not be the deltas of 
Bangladesh or the atolls of Kiribati that will be inundated as sea levels inexorably rise. The 
wealthy can pay more for increasingly scarce resources to fuel their limousines and their 
business jets. The wealthy can heat their swimming pools and surround themselves with 
security walls as others might become increasingly desperate for food, shelter and fuel, as in 
the gated communities of South Africa, the US and Brazil. They can afford organic food that is 
free from contaminants as do the elite of a polluted China. The wealthy and the powerful will 
continue to meet together at Davos86 to ski, to dine finely together and to reinforce their own 
perceptions, not to prioritise the environment. 
 
Unless of course those with children and grandchildren may worry about the world their 
descendants will inherit. The media baron, Rupert Murdoch, for instance, says he worries 
about increasing inequality because it leads to social polarisation (Blutstein 2014), although he 
does not appear to have environmental concerns. Yet inequality is based on unequal benefit 
from the exploitation of natural resources. In Australia, for example, much wealth is 
concentrated amongst the owners of iron ore and coal mines and it is not that elite that is 
concerned about the effects of the dredging and infrastructure needed to enable its transport 
through the Great Barrier Reef. But to extend Murdoch’s point: inequality tends to reduce 
societal cohesion. It is harder to debate political issues when society is polarised, and certainly 
more difficult to reach a consensus on what needs to be done, especially on environmental 
matters. The wealthy, who benefit from less regulation, tend to resist it. The impoverished, 
who often rely on environmental regulation to maintain their access to natural resources, may 
advocate more. As the World Bank notes:  
 
environmental income shares are higher for low-income households than the rest. 
This is because the poor are more reliant on subsistence activities and products 
harvested from natural areas such as forests and lakes (World Bank 2015, p. 173).  
 
Other interests, such as blue collar labour unions, may give priority to short-term jobs over 
long-term environmental protection, especially where jobs are in short supply. Growing 
inequality thus implies dwindling sustainability. 
 
Better measures  
Apart from Dilke’s concept of wealth as free time, there may be better measures of affluence 
than GDP and its clones – at least some that involve environmental impact. However, this is 
tricky because “the ecological and social sciences have developed independently and do not 
                                                 
86 Swiss village and site of the annual World Economic Forum. 
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combine easily” (Ostrom 2009). As yet, none has been able to establish the value of an 
irreplaceable songbird (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1994, p. 197).87 
 
Most measures that relate to sustainable affluence are either monetary or physical. Most 
monetary indicators are expressed as flows (such as GDP), and most physical indicators 
describe stocks. 
 
There is Gross National Happiness (GNH) for example, which results from household surveys in 
the Kingdom of Bhutan to measure a “multidimensional” happiness index that includes 
“subjective well-being”. However, it is much wider than this. GNH uses 124 variables 
ultimately grouped into nine domains. People are considered happy when they have 
“sufficiency” in two thirds of the variables. The nine equally-weighted domains are: 
psychological well-being, health, education, culture, time use, good governance, community 
vitality, ecological diversity and resilience, and living standards (Ura et al 2012, pp. 1-2). 
Ecological diversity and resilience is based on:  
 
Article 5 (Environment) of the Constitution of Bhutan, [whereby] every Bhutanese 
citizen shall ‘...contribute to the protection of the natural environment, conservation 
of the rich biodiversity of Bhutan and prevention of all forms of ecological degradation 
including noise, visual and physical pollution...’ (Ibid, p. 30). 
 
It attempts to measure such variables as pollution and traffic congestion as well as “wildlife 
damage to crops”, which may appear inconsistent with environmental protection, but is 
important to an agricultural economy.  
 
Under the ‘living standards’ domain, Bhutan’s GNH comes closest to ‘material well-being’ and 
Western notions of GDP and GNP. This includes such variables as consumption, income and 
expenditure, including household per capita income, assets and ‘housing conditions’ (Ibid, p. 
33). Some of the results are fascinating. For example, there appears to be no relationship 
between per capita income and the GNH index for each district. The district with the highest 
per capita income is the capital (Thimphu), but the district with the highest GNH is Paro, which 
has considerably less per capita income. Also there is much more equality in GNH across the 
twenty districts than there is in per capita income.    
 
The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) ‘Human Development Index’ (HDI) is 
a related concept that, like GDP, also enables cross-country comparisons to be made. The 
Index is based on three factors – health, education and wealth, specifically, life expectancy at 
birth, mean and expected years of schooling and gross national income (GNI) per capita 
($PPP). According to the UNDP, it was created because “people and their capabilities should 
be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth 
alone” (UNDP 2014b). But while life expectancy is indirectly related to the environment, there 
is no attempt to measure environmental quality as there is with GNH. 
 
The ‘Sarkozy Report’ (Stiglitz et al 2009) arose from the Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress (CMEPSP). It was instigated by the former French 
President to assess the feasibility of alternative measurement tools to GDP, which he regarded 
as a distorted measure of economic and social progress. Richard Easterlin (2010, p. 1) points 
out that the Report’s recommendations concerning the inclusion of subjective (as well as 
objective) measurements of human well-being are economically “revolutionary”, almost 
                                                 
87 Funtowicz & Ravetz suggest that ecological economics is a ‘post-normal science’ in which the 
songbird has a qualitative, beyond ordinary, value.  
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“heresy”, especially considering that almost all its 25 members were trained in the era of 
behavioural economics. With regard to the environment, however, the Report finds that: 
  
Choices between promoting GDP and protecting the environment may be false 
choices, once environmental degradation is appropriately included in our 
measurement of economic performance (Stiglitz et al 2009, p. 7). 
 
Further, the Sarkozy Report assesses the measurement of sustainability, which it regards as 
aspects of economic, environmental, and social dimensions of well-being over time (Ibid, p. 8). 
Measuring sustainability implies the measurement of wealth, or stocks of physical, natural, 
human and social capital that can be carried over into the future (Ibid. p. 13). It considers two 
approaches to measuring sustainability. One kind estimates changes in each stock separately 
with a view to keeping each one above its critical threshold. The other kind converts all assets 
into a monetary equivalent, which implies that different types of capital can be substituted for 
each other. However, there are problems in this latter approach, such as the lack of market 
values for some items as well as the validity of the assumption. As well as the songbird 
conundrum above, for example, Donald Worster takes exception to it in his collection of 
essays The Wealth of Nature. Rather than the market, "ecological harmony is a nonmarket 
value that takes a collective will to achieve" (Worster 1993, p. 133).  
 
According to the Sarkozy Report, this suggests a more limited method, involving monetary 
measurement of stocks that already have valuation techniques available. In so doing, it should 
be possible to assess the economic component of sustainability, that is, whether or not 
countries are over-consuming their economic wealth (Stiglitz et al 2009, p. 17). 
 
As with the Sarkozy Report, a key issue with assessing inclusive wealth is how to measure the 
value of environmental assets. Many natural assets are not traded in a market and therefore 
have no price. Or as the report quaintly puts it, their price is of a “non-observable nature” 
(UNU-IHDP & UNEP 2012, p. 18). Also, if natural assets did have a price, it would tend to rise 
with scarcity, so that environmental destruction would be rewarded in the index as a result of 
higher values for parts of the environment that remain. For example, if the value of natural 
forest (or ‘non-timber forest benefits’ (NTFB)) is, say, a thousand dollars per hectare, and 
there are a million hectares of it, then the total value of natural forest is a billion dollars. But if 
half of that forest area were destroyed through logging, mining and fire for example, then 
each remaining hectare would be worth much more, conceivably double its previous value. 
The total monetary value of forest assets thus remains the same, even though half has been 
destroyed. 
 
Microcosms 
In this light, one wonders what price could have been put on the last palm tree on Rapa Nui. 
While that Pacific outpost often serves as a microcosm of the whole Earth, there is conjecture 
about the alleged collapse of its population and its link to over-exploitation of its resources, 
especially tree cover. The most famous of these conjectures is in Jared Diamond’s Collapse, 
which does draw such a conclusion (Diamond 2005, p. 118). Others, however, point out that it 
would have been possible to know that the last tree was being destroyed - if it happened - as 
the whole island is visible from its centre. An alternative and plausible reason for 
deforestation is that the rats that arrived with the Polynesians around 1000 AD ate the seeds 
of the palm trees, and that during the nineteenth century its population was devastated by 
Western diseases and the practice of blackbirding to service the mines of Chile (Hunt & Lipo 
2009, Lynas 2011).  
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Perhaps Nauru is a more accurate microcosm of a future degraded planet, as Naomi Klein 
suggests in This Changes Everything (2014, pp. 161-162). A lone Pacific island that was once 
per person the richest country in the world is now reduced to the status of a gaol for people 
seeking refuge in Australia. Its modern history began with its annexation by Germany in 1880 
with an eye to its one main natural resource. Allocated to Australia by the 1919 Paris Peace 
Conference (Bashford 2012, p. 120) and made rich due to the extraction and export of its 
phosphate deposits,88 those deposits are now long exhausted and much of the island is a 
pitted moonscape of a dug-out resource. The capital from those deposits was badly invested. 
Its few thousand people now appear to maintain a diet that maximises weight and diabetes. 
Before the arrival of refugees in detention, its only village area – a place I myself have visited 
several times – appeared desolate and windswept like some ghost town; its only sources of 
income the sale of territorial fishing rights and fees for ‘processing’ unnecessary transit visas.  
 
Banaba, formerly Ocean Island and now politically part of the Republic of Kiribati in the central 
Pacific, is a variant of the Nauru story. Like Nauru it was extensively mined for phosphate, but 
was depopulated during World War II due to massacre by the Japanese and forcible relocation 
by the British (Hindmarsh 2002, pp. 9-10). Ultimately a trust fund of $10 million was 
established sourced from its profits, prior to Independence in the 1970s. That fund has been 
hardly touched since its establishment and now totals about $650 million, a vast sum 
representing several thousand dollars for each inhabitant of the republic,89 let alone the 
island, making the republic debt free. However, the ownership of the fund is now a matter of 
dispute between the Banaban diaspora, who live mainly in Fiji where they were relocated by 
the British, and the government of Kiribati, that incorporates the island as part of its territory. 
The population of the island itself is now only about 300 and it is almost completely isolated 
as there is no regular transport link between the island and anywhere else, either by sea or 
air. Thus even though the (natural) capital of the island was at least partly converted to the 
(financial) capital of the trust fund, neither the island itself, its inhabitants nor their 
descendants have benefited to any degree. The island remains derelict, its inhabitants are 
reduced to subsistence and the Fijian diaspora face an uncertain future. 
 
Makatea in French Polynesia was the third Pacific phosphate island, mined between 1917 and 
1964. Like its more westerly neighbours it too now lies ravaged and desolate.  
 
In the Indian Ocean, Christmas Island’s phosphate deposits were exhausted during the late 
twentieth century and grandiose proposals for an international casino and a spaceport have 
yet to eventuate. Instead, like Nauru, its main industry is now as detention centre for asylum 
seekers to Australia. Its namesake, Kiritimati90 Island, the world’s largest coral atoll, located in 
the Central Pacific, escaped phosphate mining only to become a site for nuclear testing by the 
US and UK during the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
Whether or not these six examples foretell a global calamity, they at least demonstrate the 
importance of maintaining, or at least offsetting the loss of natural capital. The possession of a 
considerable natural resource can be a curse as much as a blessing. 
 
 
  
                                                 
88 Nauru’s phosphate rock was highly concentrated – up to 39 per cent usable phosphate (McKelvey 
1967). 
89 About $6500.  The total Kiribati population is about 100,000. 
90 Pronounced similarly – the ‘ti’ is pronounced as an ‘s’ in Gilbertese, which uses only 13 letters. 
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Inclusive wealth 
The value of Rapa Nui’s last palm tree was never quantified, which may be connected to its 
demise. Achim Steiner91, writing in the United Nations University-United Nations Environment 
Program (UNU-UNEP) Inclusive Wealth Report 2012, points out that the very lack of 
measurement of nature contributes to environmental damage:  
 
There has for some time been a shared recognition that conventional indicators such 
as gross domestic product (GDP) or the Human Development Index (HDI) are failing to 
capture the full wealth of a country. These limitations may be in part fuelling 
environmental decline and degradation because changes in natural or “nature-based” 
assets are not factored into national accounts, rendering those accounts less useful as 
an indicator of changes in human well-being (UNU-IHDP & UNEP 2012, xi). 
 
The Inclusive Wealth Report begins to rectify this lack of measurement and resultant focus. It 
attempts to construct an ‘inclusive wealth index’ (IWI) that shows how the full range of 
productive wealth is changing over time. The basis of ‘inclusive wealth’, according to the 
Report, is three types of productive assets – capital, human and natural. So not only does it 
broaden the accountant’s view of wealth to include both human and natural capital (the 
environment), but it also focuses on the stock (wealth) rather than the flow (income or 
production) of GDP-style accounting, as recommended by the Sarkozy report. This is similar in 
concept to the adjusted net savings (ANS) approach (World Bank 2013). 
 
Therefore, importantly, positive growth rates in ‘inclusive wealth’ represent sustainability, 
because the total productive base is not eroding. As a result, the asset base can continue to 
produce similar or better levels of output for consumption by future generations (UNU-IHDP & 
UNEP 2012, p. 11). By contrast, positive growth rates in GDP accounting often correlate with 
loss of sustainability because they are based on the exploitation of limited resources. The HDI, 
because it includes GNI per person as one component, is similarly limited, although to a lesser 
degree.   
 
The Inclusive Wealth Report (IWR 2014) shows how natural resources, along with human and 
productive capital, can be monitored through calculation of the Index over time. However, the 
representation of the three sub-categories as well as the total wealth index in the report 
facilitates monitoring of each separately and shows how they are inter-related. For example, 
there are five countries that had reductions in their IWI over the period 1990-2008, (Colombia, 
Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela) but had an increase in GDP per capita. Most of 
these countries were drawing down their large oil reserves without sufficient compensatory 
increases to their produced and human capital bases. Thus the negative IWI growth rates 
“suggest an unsustainable track and most of the GDP growth has come at the expense of the 
natural capital base” (UNEP 2014, p. 43). 
 
The contrast between IWI change and GDP growth becomes clearer in chapter 4 of the 
Report, where each of the contiguous states of the US are compared for both measures. In 
summary, states with high GDP growth tend to have much lower rates of inclusive wealth 
growth, again suggesting that GDP is generated by running down capital stocks (UNU-IHDP & 
UNEP 2012, xxiv). 
 
There are three main problems with GDP. First, well-being is associated with income alone, 
which may be a necessary condition for well-being, but not a sufficient one. ‘Peace of mind’, 
                                                 
91 Under Secretary-General of the United Nations Environment Program 2006-2016.  
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belonging to a community, safety and good health also support well-being. Second, GDP 
ignores the environmental externalities that result from the production process or the scarcity 
of dwindling natural resources, which are often public goods with no market prices. Third, 
GDP represents flows over a short time period, but does not provide information on the state 
of the capital stocks necessary to generate the income measured, or if they are sufficient for 
future generations. It masks production based on an unsustainable exploitation of natural 
resources. 
 
The key variables used to measure inclusive wealth are shown in figure 23 below. Of the 54 
categories; more than half relate to natural capital (A-E) and how it is adjusted. The reason for 
including ‘population’ under ‘produced capital’ is not clear, however, given that it is directly 
relevant to ‘human capital’, as is the separate category of ‘health capital’. 
 
Figure 23. Variables used to measure inclusive wealth.  
Natural capital Human capital 
A. Fossil fuels Population by age and gender  
Reserves Mortality probability by age and gender 
Production Discount rate  
Prices Employment 
Rental rate Educational attainment  
 Employment compensation 
B. Minerals Labour force by age and gender 
Reserves  
Production Produced capital  
Prices Investment 
Rental rate Depreciation rate  
 Assets lifetime  
C. Forest resources Output growth  
Forest stocks Population 
Forest stock commercially available Productivity 
Wood production  
Value of wood production Health capital 
Rental rate Population by age 
Forest area Probability of dying by age 
Value of non-timber forest benefits (NTFB) Value of statistical life 
Percentage of forest area used to extract NTFB Discount rate 
Discount rate  
 Adjustments in IWI 
D. Agricultural land A. Total factor productivity 
Quantity of crops produced Technological change 
Rental rate  
Price of crops produced B. Carbon damages 
Harvested area in crops Carbon emission 
Permanent cropland area Carbon price 
Permanent pastureland area Climate change impacts 
 GDP 
E. Fisheries Discount rate 
Fishery stocks  
Value of capture fishery C. Oil capital gains 
Quantity of capture fishery Reserves 
Rental rate Oil production 
 Oil consumption 
 Prices 
 Rental rate 
  95 
Source: Inclusive Wealth Report, UNU-IHDP & UNEP 2012, p. 31. 
As shown above, natural capital assets are grouped as fossil fuels, minerals, forest resources, 
agricultural land, and fisheries. The IWI attempts to measure the value of these natural assets 
through the technique of ‘shadow pricing’, whereby a monetary value is assigned to the asset 
and compared with the stock of the asset at a later time. For non-renewable resources such as 
oil, the stock diminishes according to how much has been extracted during the period. The 
shadow price of each unit is the market price minus the marginal cost of its extraction92 (UNU-
IHDP & UNEP 2012, p. 53).  
 
There are also ‘externalities’ involved. Because using the oil also damages the environment 
through oil spills and carbon dioxide accumulation for example, the total value of the asset 
must also be reduced to account for the cost of rectifying the damage. These ‘externalities’ 
are listed in the section ‘Adjustments in IWI’ (A-C) in figure 23 above. Some are positive 
adjustments, such as productivity increases arising from new technology and the discovery of 
new oil reserves, while some, such as carbon damages of fossil fuels are negative. While parts 
of the index could be calculated differently – oil and mineral reserves could be simply 
diminished by extraction and increased by discovery of new deposits for example – the index 
is reasonably comprehensive without being overly detailed. 
 
The IWR points out that its ‘inclusive wealth’ is different from the ‘comprehensive wealth’ 
concept that the World Bank developed in the late 1990s. Because inclusive wealth is the 
social worth of an economy’s capital asset base, crucially its accounts do not assume 
sustainability of consumption. Changes in wealth are measured directly from the changes in 
the asset base. ‘Comprehensive wealth’, however, assumes that wealth is the discounted flow 
of consumption and the Bank’s formulation “inadvertently assumes that consumption is 
always on a sustainable path” (Ibid, p. 24). On the other hand, according to the World Bank 
itself, its comprehensive wealth allows changes in wealth “to measure the sustainability of 
development” (World Bank 2011, p. 4). The IWR claim about the Bank may be debatable, but 
the single index it produces is an outstanding and valuable feature. 
 
Importantly for this dissertation, however, the IWR also says that:  
 
population has to be acknowledged as a critical factor in sustainability. Although the 
comprehensive wealth accounts do provide per capita figures, the underlying 
assumption is that population is kept constant. In the case of the inclusive wealth 
estimates, population growth is intrinsically captured in the framework and the 
growth rate has been factored in the analysis. Not surprisingly, results show significant 
differences between estimates with and without population growth (UNU-IHDP & 
UNEP 2012, p. 23). 
 
But while the Inclusive Wealth Index has advantages as a measure of well-being and 
sustainability, it also has several weaknesses.93 Most importantly, its breadth of data is limited. 
                                                 
92 Also known as the ‘rental value’. 
93 The report suffers from poor editing and, for the English version at least, it is obvious that many of 
the authors are not writing in their mother tongue or that they are translations. Also labelling is 
sometimes incoherent. In appendix 1 for example, it is difficult to identify which sub-index is which 
because the key does not correspond to the three categories shown. Some of the defects may well be 
due to coordination difficulties due to the scope of the report and the nature of the two organisations 
that produced it. The UNEP headquarters are in Nairobi, whereas the United Nations University 
operates from Bonn. Further, the small UNEP tends to have less clout than the larger established UN 
agencies and institutions such as the World Bank. 
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While they are reasonably representative, it covers only twenty countries,94 and only four of 
them in relation to fisheries due to lack of comparable data for the rest. It also covers only ten 
types of minerals,95 albeit generally the more valuable. Also, the obscure language used may 
explain why the IWI has failed to become more widely used outside of ecological economics, 
as in the “non-observable nature” of market prices terminology mentioned earlier (Ibid, p. 
18).  
 
However, the strength of the IWI is the singular clarity it brings to sustainability. None of its 
weaknesses are insurmountable, but if the IWI is to gain the wider acceptance of measures 
such as GDP, its incorporation into broader programs and the securing of institutional political 
clout are indicated. 
 
Footprint 
If the IWI has yet failed to gain much political traction, the now-familiar concept of the 
ecological footprint (EF), is an alternative that has several advantages. The EF is a relatively 
simple aggregate indicator, developed by Wackernagel & Rees in 1996. It calculates the 
productive land area needed to sustain the consumption and assimilate the waste generated 
by populations. It is expressed as the land area required to meet consumption levels and can 
be compared to a country or region’s natural carrying capacity. If the EF exceeds the natural 
carrying capacity, then the population is living beyond the carrying capacity of the land they 
occupy. It must be either depleting its own natural resources unsustainably, or living off the 
natural capital of other nations or regions. Of course globally, apart from fanciful ideas of 
comet and asteroid mining, the latter option is not available. If the global EF is greater than 
the carrying capacity of the Earth, then it is unsustainable. Wackernagel has calculated 
estimates of the EF for 52 countries or 80 per cent of the world’s population (Anielski 2001, p. 
7). 
 
Other indicators 
Anielski mentions several other significant attempts to measure sustainable well-being in line 
with Kuznet’s earlier dashed hopes in constructing the national accounts for GDP. These 
include the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) developed by Herman Daly, John 
Cobb Jr and Clifford Cobb in the late 1980s. It is a flow measure, based on consumption 
expenditure as for GDP, but it adds benefits such as unpaid work. It then deducts social costs 
such as crime and further deducts environmental costs such as pollution and depletion of non-
renewable energy. The Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) is a modification of the ISEW concept 
that originated in the US in the 1990s by Cobb, further developed by Clive Hamilton in 
Australia (Hamilton & Denniss 2000), and elaborated in Nova Scotia, Canada. There is also the 
‘dashboard of sustainability’, developed by the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD), which aggregates the three clusters – economic, environmental and 
social – as dials on a car or aeroplane dashboard (Anielski 2001, p. 6). In this respect, it has 
been observed that “the idiot lights on our planet’s dashboard are flashing” yet we continue 
with business as usual (Sutton & Costanza 2015). 
 
Prompted by the activity surrounding the SDGs, the fifth OECD World Forum held in 
Guadalajara, Mexico, centered on the limitations of using GDP as a measure of progress and 
discussing alternatives. Within its 34 developed-country members there is increasing 
                                                 
94 Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Germany, India, Japan, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Norway, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, United Kingdom, the United States 
and Venezuela 
95 Bauxite, copper, gold, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, silver, tin, and zinc. 
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acknowledgment that well-being does not automatically flow from economic growth and that 
the natural environment must be preserved (Shaw 2015, paras 3-7). 
 
Environmental Kuznets curve 
The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) is a construct named for him, rather than ascribed to 
him, that emerged during the 1990s (Stern 2004, p. 1420) and which crucially addresses the 
relationship between affluence and environmental damage. The EKC concept says that, like 
Kuznet’s inequality curve, environmental damage will at first rise with economic development, 
then peak at a certain level of income, and then decline again as the economy matures into a 
‘developed’ state. As Grossman & Krueger (1995 p. 353) put it in their influential study 
Economic Growth and the Environment:  
 
Will continued economic growth bring ever-greater harm to the Earth's environment? 
Or do increases in income and wealth sow the seeds for the amelioration of ecological 
problems? The answers to these questions are critical for the design of appropriate 
development strategies for lesser-developed countries. Exhaustible and renewable 
natural resources serve as inputs into the production of many goods and services. If 
the composition of output and the methods of production were immutable, then 
damage to the environment would be inextricably linked to the scale of global 
economic activity.  
 
The study involved matching national-level GDP with local air and water quality data (urban air 
pollution, oxygen levels, fecal contamination and heavy metal contamination of river basins) 
in representative urban areas of 42 different countries between 1977 and 1988. Grossman & 
Krueger confirm and extend earlier findings, especially including those of the World Bank 
(1992, p. 11). They say that: 
  
Instead we find that while increases in GDP may be associated with worsening 
environmental conditions in very poor countries, air and water quality appear to 
benefit from economic growth once some critical level of income has been reached 
(Grossman & Krueger 1995, p. 370).  
 
That critical level of income varies again by indicator or pollutant. However, it averages about 
USD8000 per person per year in 1985 dollars, or around USD14,000 in 2015 terms – 
coincidentally about the mean global GDP per person. Thus the underlying concept of the EKC 
has significant support.  
 
However not everyone favours growth in whatever form. For example, the former Professor 
of Economics at the London School of Economics, EJ Mishan, lamented that: 
 
The ‘Age of Abundance’, it transpires, is abundant with pre-packaged and chemically 
processed foodstuffs, with plastic knick-knacks, with plug-in electric gadgets and 
stereo equipment. And a part of the price that people in the West pay for this 
unending procession of shiny assembly-line products is the concomitant loss of those 
now rarer things that once imparted zest and gratification – the loss of individuality, 
uniqueness and flavour; the loss of craftsmanship, local variety and richness; the loss 
of intimacy and atmosphere, of eccentricity and character (Mishan 1992 [1967], pp. 
125-126). 
 
Similar attitudes are evident in Kenneth Galbraith (The Affluent Society 1958) and Hamilton & 
Denniss (Affluenza 2005). 
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More specifically, Grossman & Krueger (1995) do not address two critical findings of the 1992 
World Bank report on economic development and the environment.96 While the Bank found 
that increasing levels of income were associated with better access to clean water and 
sanitation, as well as ultimately to cleaner air, the Bank also found that municipal waste rose 
dramatically with income per person as did carbon dioxide emissions per person.97 Municipal 
waste is of course a major issue. However it is not an issue that is insurmountable: there is 
plenty of scope for profit in its minimisation, and especially in its collection and treatment, as 
the recent fortunes of Veolia, the French multinational, demonstrate.98 Further, the impact of 
carbon dioxide emissions on climate change is now of course probably the most important 
global issue. In 1992 the Bank suggested several policy measures aimed at improving the 
general situation, especially including the reduction of fuel and energy subsidies, which they 
say would cut emissions substantially (World Bank 1992, p. 12). Today it is clear that much 
more is required (IPCC 2014a). 
 
Consumption and capitalism 
Aside from the issue of pollution and environmental degradation, the Nobel laureate 
astrophysicist, Brian Schmidt, in arguing for scientists to have formal input into science policy, 
has summed up the situation of affluence that confronts us. Affluence depends on the 
availability of energy, but using readily available energy has negative consequences:  
 
...the great world challenge is figuring out to transition to an Earth of ten billion 
people who all want what we have, which turns out to be seven times what the 
average person has right now and 80 times more than the median person has. My 
guess is that we rich are not keen to drop our standard of living, so we need to raise 
the standards of everyone else...prosperity correlates better worldwide with the 
amount of energy consumed...we already have a ready supply – coal and gas – but the 
problem is that it leads to climate change...the greatest scientific challenge for the 
world is figuring out how to use technology to develop the energy necessary to 
sustain in relative harmony the needs of ten billion people (Schmidt 2014). 
 
There are other perspectives. For example, apart from Fowler & Hobbs’ (2003, p. 2579) finding 
that human consumption differs from other species by orders of magnitude, Vitousek et al 
had earlier assessed the total use of the world’s food supply by humans, then numbering 
about five billion. They found that humans were appropriating 40 per cent of that available 
through photosynthesis on land, crowding out that available to the other “5 - 30 million 
animal species on Earth” (Vitousek et al 1986, p. 368). A more recent study found that humans 
consume 25 per cent of the production of all land plants, nevertheless still twice the rate of 
replacement (Charlton 2011, p. 6) 
 
The contemporary Marxist perspective is that there is an ecological contradiction at the heart 
of capitalism (Foster 2002, para. 1). A particularly jaundiced view of this is from the US 
political scientist Michael Parenti in Against Empire (1995): 
                                                 
96 World Bank World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment. 
97 Grossman & Krueger do not directly state why these measures were not included, but rather imply 
that the data sets they analysed did not include them. 
98 Veolia Environment S.A., formerly Vivendi, formerly Compagnie Générale des Eaux (CGE), or the 
Universal Water Company, was originally set up in Lyons by Napoleon III in the mid 19th century. 
According to its website, in 2012 it had more than 300,000 employees in 48 countries and revenue of 
nearly 30 billion euros.  
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The essence of capitalism is to turn nature into commodities and commodities into capital. 
The live green Earth is transformed into dead gold bricks, with luxury items for the few and 
toxic slag heaps for the many. The glittering mansion overlooks a vast sprawl of shanty towns, 
wherein a desperate, demoralised humanity is kept in line with drugs, television, and armed 
force. 
 
The psychologist, Oliver James, in The Selfish Capitalist: Origins of Affluenza tends to support 
such a view. Writing on the brink of the Great Recession, he finds that misery and distress 
especially in the English-speaking West has become widespread since the 1970s as inequality 
has increased and the wealth of a tiny minority has ballooned. He ascribes this situation to the 
extreme neoliberal capitalism that afflicts the Anglosphere and the inequalities it has 
produced. Such a political economy is not as entrenched in other cultures (James 2008). Devin 
Nordberg (2002, p. 15) takes a wider view, writing that the issue is based on “serious, 
structural injustices on a global scale”. Sustainable futures should not be built on “technical 
imperatives”, but rather “on political values”, he says. While hungry people will always 
support growth in the hope “it will relieve their misery”, “as long as production occurs for 
profit rather than for human needs, growth will continue”, irrespective of any human values 
of sufficiency.  
 
The Australian philosopher Clive Hamilton believes that there are forces that tell us as 
individuals that it is our fault and that it is up to each of us to save the environment through 
our own personal habits of consumption. But the forces that produce unsustainability are 
much wider and need to be approached socially and politically:  
 
The fact is that we are not personally responsible for the ecological dangers we face. 
The structure of our society is responsible99 and we are responsible as citizens for our 
failure to insist that the necessary measures are taken. In the end we cannot consume 
our way to sustainability (Hamilton 2005).  
 
Thus affluence – ultimately material wealth rather than happiness – is measured by both 
human production and human consumption. It is created originally from nature using human 
labour and technologies that define both an age and our relationship with the environment. 
Affluence is accumulated and distributed increasingly unevenly both within and between 
countries and, because it tends to deplete stored sources of energy, it will have to become 
less dependent on fossil sources (as well as scarce non-renewables) if its distribution is to be 
made more equal. Its effects on species and their habitats have been highly destructive, 
especially in recent decades as consumption is amplified through pervasive technologies and 
population increase.  
 
To the extent that economics’ worship at the singular altar of growth is a barrier to 
sustainability in the developed world, it is trumped by the basic need for survival. A better 
economics would emphasise sustainability. ‘Growth’ would emphasise deep quality, not brute 
quantity. More could be better off if durability, energy conservation and zero waste were 
revered more than obsolescence, extravagance and effluent.  
 
  
                                                 
99 Even at neighbourhood level, communal societies with shared technologies such as laundries tend to 
consume less per person than individualist societies where each household has a washing machine, for 
example. Also, urban densities may dictate low-consumption public transport compared with high-
consumption private cars in suburban areas.  
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Lip service 
The World Bank’s 1992 World Development Report Development and the Environment, 
showed promise in its awareness and policy prescriptions for sustainability: 
 
The main message of the Report is the need to integrate environmental 
considerations into development policymaking. The value of the environment has 
been underestimated for too long, resulting in damage to human health, reduced 
productivity, and the undermining of future development prospects (WDR 1992, p. iii). 
 
But despite the positive developments of the 1990s, the measurement options and analyses 
produced since, and the climate imperatives of the early twenty-first century, recent World 
Bank reports indicate that sustainability has yet to be mainstreamed within the Bank’s 
collective consciousness. The issue of environmental impact is almost entirely ignored in its 
2015 report, A Measured Approach to Ending Poverty and Boosting Shared Prosperity, for 
example.  
 
The opening statement of the report mentions that prosperity must “fully account for 
environmental degradation and natural resource depletion” (World Bank 2015a, p. 1) and 
later in a faint echo of Brundtland, stresses that “the path toward [growth and prosperity] 
must be environmentally, socially, and economically sustainable over time” (Ibid, p. 14). 
However, the document is otherwise all about growth. Apart from the risk of climate change 
and access to natural resources treated cursorily in chapter 4 – and the back cover declaration 
that it is printed on environmentally-friendly recycled paper – these examples are the only 
times the environment is mentioned in the entire 280-page report. Thus for this major Bank 
report, the issue is still how to get economic growth to reduce poverty, while it pays lip service 
to the environment in the face of overwhelming concern about how that growth is achieved. 
The Bank’s 2017 Atlas of Sustainable Development Goals does mention decoupling 
environmental degradation100  from economic growth, which is one of the 169 SDG targets. It 
usefully proposes how it may be measured and ranks countries by performance. However, it 
shows the same target as ‘8f’ in the main text (World Bank 2017a, p. 48) and ‘8.4’ in the 
appended list of goals and targets (Ibid, p. 118), which tends to show it is not fully in focus. 
 
The IMF also appears to lack focus on environmental sustainability in its endorsement of 
growth. While in a particular statement about the SDGs, there is a mention that the Fund is 
“deepening policy advice on aspects of inclusion and environmental sustainability and bringing 
this advice to its operational work” (IMF 2017a), this is the last and least specific of several 
initiatives outlined. Its World Economic Outlook (IMF 2017b) also mentions the term 
‘sustainable’  but only in the context of debt repayment.  
 
However, where economic growth has been spectacularly successful in raising affluence, yet 
disastrous in environmental terms, there is renewed emphasis on environmentally sustainable 
economic growth (Liu 2010, Zhang 2012, Cohen 2016). But this is because pollution in China is 
so pervasive that it is impossible to ignore, including the political consequences of failing to 
address it. Elsewhere, the environmental price of growth may be more conveniently ignored 
because it is out of sight. Few governments – and major international institutions like the Bank 
                                                 
100 “Degradation includes the costs of greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels, agriculture, forestry, 
and land use change; the harvest of forest timber resources beyond sustainable rates; and reduced 
labour output due to premature mortality caused by exposure to environmental risk factors such as air 
pollution, unsafe water and sanitation, and harmful substances in the workplace” (World Bank 2017a, 
p. 48).  
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and the Fund  risk dilution of the ‘growth and jobs’ paradigm where political success 
demands it. Governing elites tend to avoid complicating the message. Economic growth 
delivers prosperity. Any environmental nuance that takes nature into account threatens 
political defeat. 
 
Species perspective 
As José Mujica, then President of Uruguay, said to the UN General Assembly on 28 September 
2013, we tend to think and reason as individuals or as countries, but “poverty could be 
eliminated from the planet if we could begin to reason as a species. The current form of 
civilisation cannot be maintained. We must understand that we are a species and we must 
govern ourselves as a species” (Mujica 2013). Pope Francis echoes this in his encyclical 
Laudato si’:  
 
We need to strengthen the conviction that we are one single human family. There are 
no frontiers or barriers, political or social, behind which we can hide, still less is there 
room for the globalisation of indifference (Pope Francis 2015, s.52). 
 
Mujica occupied no palace as president of his country. At his insistence, his dwelling was little 
more than a shack. It did, however, have a Victorian water closet; at least in this small way he 
was more affluent than Suleiman the Magnificent.  
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Chapter 6. Technology  
 
All history is relevant, but the history of technology is the most relevant 
 – Melvin Kranzberg 1986101 
 
Humanity has an ancient and intense relationship with technology. Such is our mutual 
embrace that it seems unique to our species and is definitive of us. But in its relationship to 
sustainability, contradictions are apparent. It is technology that has led to resource depletion 
and degradation of the environment, whereas it is in technology that there lies hope for a 
more sustainable future. Technology has enabled the creation of modernity that briefly 
shields our species from its long-term consequences. It has both allowed us to become more 
crowded and consume ever more, yet it may also enable us to become happily fewer and for 
each of us to tread more lightly on the planet. Technology is associated with industrial 
pollution, but at the same time it can help reduce pollution. Its impact differs according to the 
nature of technology and how it is deployed. As Kranzberg also said, “technology is neither 
good nor bad; nor is it neutral” (Kranzberg 1986, p. 545).102 
 
There is a yawning chasm between extreme views of the relationship concerning technology 
and humanity, both positive and negative polar opposites. How that void is bridged may well 
determine our continued existence as a species, as well as the fate of the other life forms that 
cohabit the Earth with us. This chapter assesses key approaches to technology and 
sustainability and their development over the length of human history, including issues of 
economics, energy and ethics. It concludes with a summary of the present relationships in 
which technology is bound.  
 
Warnings 
Warnings about technology include the wings of Icarus that enabled him to fly to the heavens 
but brought about his death. Significantly the wings were built for him by his father Daedalus, 
the artisan who had also constructed the labyrinth that imprisoned the Minotaur. Daedalus’ 
creation of a means to achieve the god-like power of flight has destructive consequences, and 
the gift of this technology results in a double disaster: the death of a son and a father’s grief. 
Similarly, the titan Prometheus stole fire to benefit the humanity he had created, and was 
condemned to eternal torture for his efforts by Zeus, because it was a challenge to the power 
of the gods. One version of the myth includes the vesting of the troubles of an archetypical 
Pandora onto humanity by an angered Zeus: “From her the tribe of women comes - for men a 
grievous bane” (Hesiod 2010 [c.800BC], 590). Hephaestus was the god associated with the 
technologies of the forge, but he was deformed due to poisoning from the arsenic used in 
bronze metallurgies in ancient times. 
 
During the Middle Ages mechanical technologies involving clockwork and other means spread 
through Europe from the East. They were regarded as magical, much as nature was regarded 
as a powerful entity to be feared rather than understood. According to the historian E.R. Truitt 
(2015), eventually around the seventeenth century these mechanical wonders were generally 
regarded as operating according to natural laws, instead of by magic. At about the same time, 
nature was further diminished by Newton’s Principia (1952 [1686]), a work made possible by 
                                                 
101 This is the historian Kranzberg’s fifth law of technology. His 1985 address listed six in total.  
102 This is Kranzberg’s first law. 
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optical technologies.103 Rather than a powerful entity, ‘nature’ became abstract, predictable 
and subject to law much like a mechanical clock.   
 
During the same era the morality tale of a Dr Faustus, who sold his soul to the Devil for the 
chance to know everything and to command nature, was widespread throughout northern 
Europe. This fable was later disseminated by the technology of print and became available to 
the English playwright, Christopher Marlowe who wrote it as a play in 1602. Faustus’ authority 
over nature was;  
 
To do whatever Faustus shall command,  
Be it to make the moon drop from her sphere,  
Or the ocean to overwhelm the world (Marlowe 2009 [1604], p. 23). 
 
Two hundred years later at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Johan von Goethe’s Faust 
was published on a similar theme. 
 
Still during the early Industrial Revolution, Mary Shelley’s fear of technology was evident in 
her immensely popular novel Frankenstein: The Modern Prometheus (1818),104 which involved 
the creation of life through technology, as the titan had created humanity. In the introduction 
to the 1831 edition, Shelley mentions Erasmus Darwin, the grandfather of Charles, and Luigi 
Galvani as sources of inspiration. Darwin had earlier written of experiments concerning life 
developing from apparently lifeless forms and Galvani’s theories of animal electricity had 
already famously been applied to the corpse of a murderer (Simili 2014). Dr Frankenstein’s 
god-like creation of life was a warning about new technology, but technology and humanity 
were linked to total catastrophe by Shelley in her later book, The Last Man, published in 1826. 
In the book, at the end of the twenty-first century, masculine belief in technological mastery 
over nature is proved false when rapid climate change, famine and finally plague exterminate 
humanity on Earth (Shelley 1997 [1826]). 
 
Apocalyptic visions of the future based on technological catastrophe are now commonplace, 
such as Margaret Atwood’s 2003, Oryx and Crake in which a genetically modified virus wipes 
out the entire population. Earlier similar works include René Barjavel's 1943 novel Ravage, in 
which a future France is devastated by the sudden failure of electricity as well as E. M. 
Forster's 1909 novella The Machine Stops, in which humanity is entirely dependent on a god-
like machine that deteriorates and eventually stops, ending the lives of everyone.  
 
Less cataclysmic but more poignant is Hans Christian Andersen’s 1843 tale The Nightingale105 
in which the emperor of China banishes his living nightingale in preference to a bejewelled 
mechanical bird – “As soon as the artificial bird was wound up, it could sing like the real one, 
and could move its tail up and down, which sparkled with silver and gold“ — sent to him by 
the emperor of Japan (Andersen 1843). The emperor is, however, overwhelmed with despair 
when the mechanical nightingale can no longer sing due to a broken spring. Nearing death 
from his misery, finally the emperor hears the song of the living nightingale and is revived 
                                                 
103 Optical technologies included lens making and the production of parabolic mirrors. Newton himself 
designed and constructed an improved telescope using both these techniques. 
104 The book has been reprinted numerous times, including in French as early as 1821, and it has 
inspired many plays and films. 
105 The story was also the basis for Stravinsky’s 1916 Le Chant du Rossignol. 
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(cited in Johnson 1990, p. 71).106 Mechanical technologies can be alluring but are ultimately 
only imperfect imitations of nature.  
 
From a subtler perspective, German existentialist philosopher Martin Heidegger was a major 
twentieth century critic of technology. In The Question Concerning Technology (1953), 
Heidegger said that the modern technological "mode of being" saw the natural world only as a 
resource to be exploited, as a means to an end. Heidegger illustrated this with what many 
would now regard as a rather benign form of technology - a hydroelectric plant on the Rhine – 
but which changed the river from an unspoiled natural wonder to merely a power supply 
(Heidegger 1953, p. 321). Thus technology is not just a collection of tools, but rather a way of 
understanding the world, which is both “instrumental and grotesque” (Wheeler 2013). 
Whether Heidegger would have preferred his electricity to be supplied from a coal-fired 
power station is not made clear in the essay. Yet his insight remains: existing technologies, 
especially those that derive energy from natural resources, reduce nature to that singular 
measure. In this sense, humanity too is diminished by our technologies. 
 
Technology equates to pollution in some views. As well as the poisoning of Hephaestian 
bronze workers, there is evidence of lead pollution from mining in ancient times (Hong et al 
1994) and atmospheric pollution from fires and furnaces has been a problem since at least the 
Middle Ages.107 Before the Second World War, “smoke, sewage, and soot were the main 
environmental concerns” (Heaton et al. 1991, p. 5).  
 
However, something changed after 1945 and it concerned new technologies. There was the 
new threat of radiation and radioactive waste from nuclear technology, as well as concern 
about the new synthetic chemical technologies highlighted by Carson’s Silent Spring (1962). 
Barry Commoner, “the Paul Revere of ecology” in The Closing Circle (1971) identified the 
“technological suicide”108 caused by the scale and nature of pollution that had engulfed the 
US, also since the 1940s. Commoner showed how these unregulated new technologies 
(especially synthetic organic chemicals from plastics, detergents and biocides) caused great 
harm to the ecosystem, at a rate far greater than economic growth:  
 
Postwar technological transformation of the US economy has produced not only the 
much heralded 126 per cent rise in GNP, but also at a rate about ten times faster than 
the growth of GNP, the rising levels of environmental pollution (Commoner 1971, p. 
146). 
 
Commoner engaged in intense public debate with population alarmists such as Paul Erlich, 
arguing that humanity’s negative impact on the planet was largely due to these uncontrolled 
new technologies rather than due to too many people who consumed too much. In 1974 
Ariyoshi Sawako, published the first instalment of the novel Fukugo osen (Compound Pollution), 
which tapped into deep concerns about the effects of pesticides and organic chemicals in Japan. 
The destruction of the Earth’s protective ozone layer by chlorofluorocarbons from refrigerants 
and spray can propellants was identified in the 1970s, as was the resulting enlargement of the 
‘ozone hole’ over the Antarctic.  
  
                                                 
106 Johnson also points out that the industrialisation of Japan during the nineteenth century was a 
conscious top-down political response to the technological imperialism of the West, rather than the 
more organic economic and technological processes of Britain and the US (Ibid, p. 72). 
107 Burning ‘sea coal’ was prohibited in London in 1306 because it emitted too much smoke.  
108 Quotations are from the 1972 edition book jacket. 
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Positives 
More positively, Carson’s book led to the banning of DDT109 and to far greater scrutiny of the 
effect of pesticides on the environment. Commoner contributed to an awareness of 
ecosystems, while Sawako’s work led to organised consumer demand for organic products in 
Japan (Moen 1997). Protecting the ozone layer was effected through the world’s first 
universally signed treaties – the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985) 
and its Montreal protocol (1997)  both endorsed by 197 states including the European Union. 
 
Far earlier, but decisively, the relationship of technology to humanity has been linked to 
ultimate survival by recent science. In When the Sea Saved Humanity, anthropologist Curtis 
Marean (2010) explains how the development of advanced composite stone tools, including 
“sophisticated implements such as microblades” involving heat‐treated quartz to make it 
easier to shape and attached to wooden shafts to form spears, was a factor that enabled the 
last remnants of humanity to stay alive during an Ice Age around 150,000 years ago110 in 
southern Africa. Humanity, then reduced to a total of only a few hundred breeding individuals 
literally clinging to the edge of the continent, would likely have become extinct without these 
technologies that enabled successful fishing when there was no game and little vegetation. If 
so, we now owe our very existence to that relationship – all of us are descended from those 
lucky few.  
 
Nevertheless, Gore (2013, p. 357) asserts that this critical time for humanity before migration 
from Africa occurred, was one of three occasions when humanity did not appear sustainable. 
The other two were in the 1960s when nuclear war between the US and the USSR appeared 
imminent, and now when we are changing the biosphere irreversibly to the detriment of 
ourselves as well as other species. In the first case technology is positive. But the latter two 
cases show that complex technologies can have profoundly negative effects. 
 
Nevertheless, and more generally, technology as a positive force is defined by the future. The 
future appears to attract technology as iron to a magnet, because the future is all about 
technology; it represents the notion of human progress. Without technological change the 
future would consist of successive generational replacement and little else. In prehistoric 
times there might be tomorrow or even next winter, but there was no future.  
 
The future, especially a better future, only became possible with the development of complex 
technologies. How those technologies might be applied became the stuff of science fiction. 
For example, Jules Verne anticipated submarines (in Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea) 
and spaceflight (From the Earth to the Moon) during the nineteenth century. The Internet, or 
at least part of it, was invented in fiction long before it existed in reality. H.G. Wells publicised 
the idea of a ‘world brain’ or permanent encyclopedia using microfilm in 1936, so that anyone, 
anywhere could examine any book or document that had been assembled by the 
encyclopedia (Wells 1938). Arthur Clarke presciently suggested in 1962 that this encyclopedia 
or library could be accessed by personal computers by the year 2000, but that its extension to 
involve artificial intelligence might take another century.  
 
Isaac Asimov in his Foundation series, beginning in the 1940s, conceived of a foundation 
located at the end of the galaxy. This foundation enabled human knowledge to be preserved 
                                                 
109 At least in the West. India, however, continued its use as a malaria control agent (Kranzberg 1986, p. 
546). 
110  According to Marean, about 195,000 years ago the planet entered a long glacial stage known as 
Marine Isotope Stage 6 (MIS6) that lasted until about 123,000 years ago. 
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and advanced during a period of galactic chaos, which was predicted by the invention of a 
mathematical sociology, psychohistory. The foundation’s technology is regarded by its 
neighbouring primitive planets as a form of religious magic, which anticipated Arthur Clarke’s 
famed third law: “any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic” 
(Clarke 1962, p. 14). Clarke’s later work, Imperial Earth predicts desktop “communications 
consoles” with screens and keyboards as well as “minisec” mobile computing devices that can 
communicate with the consoles, albeit only within visual proximity (Clarke 1975, pp. 126-128). 
And the once ubiquitous Samsung flip-phone of the early twenty-first century was reputedly 
modelled on the ‘Beam me up Scotty’ communicator device of the 1960s Startrek television 
series, set in the twenty-third century.  
 
Meanings 
The word ‘technology’ was first recorded in English in the early 1600s, meaning "a discourse 
or treatise on an art or the arts," from the Greek ‘tekhnologia’ - the "systematic treatment of 
an art, craft, or technique". The meaning "study of mechanical and industrial arts" such as 
"spinning, metal-working, or brewing" was first recorded in the mid 1800s. Its former 
component, ‘techno’ is from the Greek ‘tekhne’ "art, skill, craft in work; method, system, an 
art, a system or method of making or doing," originally related to weaving. Its latter 
component ‘-logy’ means "a speaking, discourse, treatise, doctrine, theory, science," from the 
Greek ‘-logia’ from root of legein "to speak" (‘Technology’ 2014). 
 
However, the contemporary meaning of the word ‘technology’ is much broader. As a result of 
the so-called ‘second Industrial Revolution’ during the latter part of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, when steel making, electrification, the telegraph and the production line 
defined a new era, the term came to mean both the study of the useful arts and crafts, as well 
as the useful or practical arts and crafts themselves. According to Google (2014),111 use of the 
word ‘technology’ in books rose sharply during the second half of twentieth century, levelled 
off around 1998 and then went into slight decline. The reason for its rise may have been the 
enormous output of applied science during and after the Second World War. However, the 
reason for its later decline may be that its most common association is now with the word 
‘information’, which is usually abbreviated as ‘IT’ and would not be picked up by the Google 
algorithm. The phrase ‘high technology’ is from 1964 while its short form ‘high-tech’ (later ‘hi-
tech’) is from 1972. New technology arises from the application of different or innovative 
systems and methods, whether for the same or different ends.  
 
The word ‘technology’ also incorporates the applied sciences in its meaning, although not all 
technologies are derived from science. Most generally, it is the “practical application of 
knowledge” (Merriam-Webster 2014). In fact, many significant technological developments 
have been contributed by non-scientists, or rather people with practical skills such as James 
Watt, an instrument maker; Henry Ford, a metal machinist; Samuel Morse, a professional 
artist; Thomas Edison, a telegrapher; Guglielmo Marconi, an aristocrat inventor-entrepreneur; 
and Steve Jobs, a geek and college drop-out. Technological innovations depend more on the 
skills of technicians than on scientific theories (Coen 2014), and, rather than science driving 
new technology it is more likely that new technologies are “the force that move science 
forward” (Wise 1985, p. 229), as no doubt Galileo, Pasteur and the Wright brothers would 
agree. Much of Galileo’s science depended on his use of the telescope; Pasteur’s of the 
microscope and the Wright brothers’ miracle of powered flight depended most on the 
technology of internal combustion and the practical observation of kites.  
 
                                                 
111 Google books N-Gram viewer 
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Technologies have been with us since pre-historic times, whereas science is a newcomer. But 
most importantly, technology is about system-based method. Technology may incorporate 
aspects of art and aesthetics (the functional beauty of an Apple computer springs to mind), 
but neither is intrinsic to technology. What is intrinsic to technology is the systematic use of 
particular methods.  
 
It is tempting also to associate technology with mass production, as it has continued to be so 
at least since the early Industrial Revolution and even earlier with the use of pottery moulds in 
ancient times. This is because the use of systemic method often leads to reproducibility and 
hence to mass production  that multiplier of investment capital. Certainly the rise of modern 
technology is connected with capitalism and the Industrial Revolution, and especially through 
mass production. Early capitalism encouraged the development of new technologies by simply 
rewarding them. Arkwright’s spinning jenny was probably the first use of technology that 
resulted in mass production (of cloth) and its associated concentration of a workforce 
alongside factories. However, these early factories at first used water from fast flowing 
streams to power the looms. Newcomen’s invention of the steam engine to pump water from 
coal mines enabled coal production to feed new furnaces and factories, while later 
developments (Watt, Trevithick, Stevenson) enabled the railways that began to connect cities 
and ports, and powered ships that linked ports around the globe. Edison’s breakthrough 
technologies such as grid electricity, the electric light and the phonograph resulted from an 
intensive and systematic approach to innovation propelled by the motive for profit.  
 
From a philosophical and ultimately encompassing point of view, Clive Hamilton points to 
Brian Arthur’s definition, ‘a phenomenon captured and put to use’: 
 
...where phenomena are mostly physical effects such as the release of energy when 
carbon-based molecules are oxidised and heated, the way light is refracted through a 
lens, the way wind energy turns a propeller that can drive a turbine, and so on. These 
myriad phenomena—mechanical, electrical, photonic, biological, nuclear, etc. — are 
waiting to be discovered by humans and then orchestrated to our benefit (Hamilton 
2013, p. 30). 
 
Karl Marx in Capital, distinguishes between "natural technology" in the evolution of plants and 
animals and “human technology” in human history:  
 
Darwin has directed attention to the history of natural technology, i.e. the formation 
of the organs of plants and animals, which serve as the instruments of production for 
sustaining their life. Does not the history of the productive organs of man in society, 
of organs that are the material basis of every particular organization of society, 
deserve equal attention?... Technology reveals the active relation of man to nature, 
the direct process of the production of his life, and thereby it also lays bare the 
process of the production of the social relations of his life, and the mental conceptions 
that flow from those relations (Marx 1952 [1883], p. 181). 
 
Engels described man as the ‘tool-making animal’.112 We lack the ability to evolve the 
specialised organs Marx and Darwin refer to and instead we develop “specially prepared 
instruments” that are found “in the oldest caves”. Human technology is the tools we develop 
that shape our relationship with nature  and that in turn shape us in both hand and mind 
                                                 
112 Engels does allow for some other animals that use rudimentary tools in some circumstances. 
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(Engels 1940 [1876], p. 281). This is an important observation. The creature at the computer 
screen thinks and acts differently from a tiller of the soil, and so whole societies are shaped.  
 
However, the concept of technology can be confusing. According to other definitions man is 
not alone in technological behaviour. Other creatures construct technological artefacts such 
as nests, webs, traps, complex termite mounds and beaver dams. The artefacts that 
characterise humans are rather machines (Polanyi 1968, p. 1308), complex manufactures with 
more than one part (such as the bow and arrow)113 that give us added power over nature. 
Machine-making was both enabled by and enabled specialisation, exchange value and the 
creation of ever more complex technologies. It has meant that now, in the contemporary 
West, we are entirely surrounded by machines, networks and the product of specialised 
technologies that few understand enough to recreate, but which are in universal use (Aunger 
2010). 
  
Slavery and capitalism 
The relationship between slavery, capitalism and technology is intriguing. The economic 
historian, C. Knick Harley, says it is commonly asserted that the West Indies slave trade 
financed the Industrial Revolution in England (Harley 2013, p. 5), based on Eric Williams’ 
seminal work Capitalism and Slavery (1944). Certainly the timing is consistent: slavery and the 
slave trade was at its profitable height immediately before the Industrial Revolution, yet the 
slave trade was abolished in 1807 and slavery itself eventually abolished in 1833 within the 
British Empire (Harley 2013, p. 8). But while the transatlantic slave trade and its profits were 
based on sugar during the eighteenth century, it was the technological and resultant 
organisational changes in the cotton industry “that were central to the emergence of a 
modern economy based on mechanised factory production” (Harley 2010, p. 2). Further,  
 
there is general agreement that technological change lies behind historical economic 
growth and that the creation of knowledge and technology must be seen as a part of 
the economy, i.e. endogenous (Harley 2013, p. 21). 
 
Yet while the British cotton industry still depended on slavery for its raw material at the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution, by the mid-nineteenth century it was less dependent 
on slavery due to sourcing from India and the Levant, and also the industry was much less 
significant. At that time, it was the export of manufactured goods to the Empire and North 
America that was the source of new profits. The Industrial Revolution in Britain arose from a 
process of industrial research and development that resulted from the relatively high wages 
and cheap energy at the time. This provided incentives to find manufacturing techniques that 
substituted fuel and capital for labour, and this in turn created new knowledge that further 
enhanced the process of technological change (Harley 2013, pp. 21-23). Thus, plausibly, 
slavery (in the sugar industry) was one source of capital for the Industrial Revolution. Slavery 
also was associated with the production of an important raw material (cotton) that was 
exploited by new technology.  
 
It was the divergent costs of labour and energy that pressed the technological innovations 
that defined the era. That there was no Industrial Revolution in ancient times indicates that 
slavery is a negative factor in technological advance. The ancients devised many technological 
innovations, including steam engines, pumps and watermills, a form of railway across the 
Corinthian neck, as well as canals in Egypt, Greece and in China.114 However, none of these 
                                                 
113 Which in turn are composed of shaped wooden lengths, stone, bone or metal tips, gut or hemp 
stringing and fibrous binding.  
114 The Grand Canal dates back to the fifth or sixth century BC 
  109 
innovations spread far. One reason was the presence of slaves in all ancient societies, which 
obviated the need for labour saving devices (Cowell 1964, p. 368). Thus, conceivably, the 
slavery that helped produce the technological advances of the Industrial Revolution did so 
because it was at a distance from it. The slavery that prevented an ancient Industrial 
Revolution did so because it was part of the societies that would have been affected. In the 
ancient world, there was already an army of intelligent robots and thus no need for the 
evolving labour saving technologies of the Victorian era.  
 
However, capitalism is not essential to technological development. During much of the last 
century, for example, the command economy of the Soviet Union at least mimicked much of 
the technological development of the West and in significant ways exceeded it. The 
indisputably revolutionary Sputnik of 1957 is the most obvious example of this. Others include 
the Voskhod space capsule that could land on the hard earth, rather than at sea as the US 
capsules had to; the world’s most popular assault rifle, the Kalashnikov AK-47; superior 
aircraft such as the MiG 15 fighter during the early 1950s, the MiG 25 Foxbat of the 1970s that 
could fly at over Mach 3, and the giant Antonev transport plane that is still in use in many 
parts of the world. Perhaps, as C.P. Snow asserts, it was partly because the Soviet education 
system managed to blend the arts and the sciences: 
 
An engineer in a Soviet novel is as acceptable, so it seems, as a psychiatrist in an 
American one. They are as ready to cope in art with the processes of production as 
Balzac was with the processes of craft manufacture (Snow, 1959, p. 19).  
 
And whilst technological innovation was certainly less frequent before the Industrial 
Revolution and capitalism, several pre-modern economic epochs are discernable from around 
7000 BC that are based on it. The innovations that drove economic (and population) growth 
include the invention of agriculture itself (c.7000-4000BC), bronze metallurgy (c.4000-
1900BC), the iron plough (c.300-930AD) and the spectacle lens (c.1340-1600AD) (Šmihula 
2011, p. 66). 
 
In fact, modern economic growth is more dependent on technological innovation than it is on 
capitalism. Simon Kuznets’ Nobel speech on modern economic growth illustrates this in his 
discussion of economic epochs:  
 
we may proceed on the working assumption that modern economic growth 
represents such a distinct epoch - growth dating back to the late eighteenth century 
and limited (except in significant partial effects) to economically developed countries. 
These countries, so classified because they have managed to take adequate advantage 
of the potential of modern technology, include most of Europe, the overseas 
offshoots of Western Europe, and Japan (Kuznets, 1971). 
 
Interestingly, the rest of this lecture – presumably an example of the best thinking of the time 
– has but one dismissive reference to the sustainability of economic growth: “even if we 
disregard the threatening exhaustion of natural resources, a problem that so concerned 
Classical (and implicitly even Marxian) economics...” (Ibid), but goes no further on the subject, 
suggesting that the question of resource depletion was then thought no longer an issue.  
 
Kenneth Boulding, too, was in agreement with the link between economic growth and 
technology, insofar as technology is applied knowledge. His 1966 paper The Coming Spaceship 
Earth is explicitly about limits. But as far as economic development is concerned: 
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The cumulation of knowledge, that is, the excess of its production over its 
consumption, is the key to human development of all kinds, especially to economic 
development (Boulding 1966, p. 5). 
 
Kondratieff waves 
Long-term 50 to 60 year economic cycles, known as Kondratieff115 waves, have been 
associated with technological innovation since the early twentieth century. The Soviet 
economist Nikolai Kondratieff identified these phenomena in his book The Major Economic 
Cycles (1925), although some of his observations had been anticipated by Dutch economists, 
Jacob van Gelderen and Samuel de Wolff, in 1913 (Narkus 2012, p. 12). Kondratieff believed 
that the crises that punctuate periods between cycles in capitalism were indicative of a 
clearing away of debris to allow for new technological and economic growth, rather than 
leading to the inherent doom predicted by Marx. These views were in obvious conflict with 
Stalinist orthodoxy, and after working in agricultural reform for a time, he was sent to a Gulag 
labour camp and subsequently executed in 1938. In 1939, the economist Joseph Schumpeter, 
whose views on ‘creative destruction’ in capitalism and new growth based on “the swarming 
of technological innovations” (Phillimore 2001, p. 28) benefited from this work, suggested 
calling the cycles ‘Kondratieff waves’ in his honour.  
 
Several other possible factors that contribute to long economic waves have also been 
identified, including demographic “baby booms” and debt deflation as part of the credit cycle. 
However, according to the more mainstream technological innovation theory as championed 
by Schumpeter, these waves arise from the clustering of innovations that launch technological 
revolutions, which in turn create leading industrial or commercial sectors.  
 
We tend to overestimate the effect of a technology in the short run and underestimate the 
effect in the long run                                                                 – Roy Amara, Institute for the Future 
 
A modification of Kondratieff’s theory was recently developed by the Slovak, Daniel Šmihula, 
who identified six long-waves within modern capitalist economies. Each of these was initiated 
by a specific technological revolution and each successive wave is shorter than the one before 
(Šmihula 2011, p. 51): The financial-agricultural wave occurred between 1600 and 1780, 
especially in the leading sectors of finance, agriculture and trade. The Industrial Revolution 
wave occurred between 1780 and 1880, especially involved textiles, iron, coal, railways and 
canals.116 The technical wave occurred between 1880 and 1940, especially involving the 
chemical,117 electro-technical and machinery industries. The scientific-technical wave was 
between 1940 and 1985 and involved the aviation,118 nuclear,  space,119 synthetic materials, 
oil and cybernetic industries. The wave of the information and telecommunications revolution 
is from 1985 until 2015, and involves telecommunications, cybernetics, “informatics” and the 
Internet. The sixth wave is a prediction of a ‘post-informational technological revolution’ 
between 2015 and 2035, involving biomedicine, nanotechnology and alternative fuel systems 
such as hydrogen.   
 
Unlike Kondratieff and Schumpeter, Šmihula believes that each new cycle is shorter than its 
predecessor, but does not advance any particular reason as to why this may be so. It is odd 
                                                 
115 Also written as ‘Kondratiev’. 
116 Šmihula’s paper says ‘channels’ rather than ‘canals’ here. However, I assume that the former is 
correct and the latter is a problem of translation, shades of Galileo’s canali of Mars. 
117 Here Smihula uses the word ‘chemistry’, which I have changed. 
118 Written as ‘air-industry’. 
119 Written as ‘astronautics”. 
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that he refrains from voicing an opinion on this as it his central conjecture. If the observation 
is valid, then it seems evident that the combined effect of the increasing number and mass of 
all preceding innovations logically would result in compression of the cycles that spring from 
later innovations. Earlier technologies facilitate newer technologies, as the printing press 
spread ideas on heat and steam engines, as smelting produced steel, as railways linked 
industries that enabled complex manufactures. The accumulation of technical knowledge is 
geometric and technological progress accelerates. Richardson (2013, p. 161) tends to support 
this view in his paper on holarchies and technological evolution, in which he says that the idea 
of a “continual acceleration of change” is credible. The concept of ‘holarchies’, or nested 
layers of systems, he says, is common in many disciplines, including physics120 and biology,121 
but also applies especially to technology. Imagine what could happen if the technological 
systems of our world were “integrated into an organic whole” supporting both “humanity and 
nature in an elegant and sustainable way”, he writes (Ibid, p. 167). 
 
Šmihula (2011, p. 53) stresses technological progress and new technologies as decisive factors 
of any long-time economic development. Each of these waves has an innovation phase, which 
is described as a technological revolution, and an application phase in which the number of 
revolutionary innovations falls and the focus is on exploiting existing innovations. Each wave 
of technological innovations is characterised by the sector in which the most revolutionary 
changes took place. Every wave of innovations lasts until the profits from the new innovation 
or sector fall to the level of other, older, more traditional sectors. Šmihula goes on to identify 
the important difference between technological invention and innovation:  
 
The invention is a making-up of something new which did not exist before. But as 
such, it may finish at the bottom of a drawer. Only an invention which is applied in 
practical life can be a real innovation. The source of such innovations may be not only 
inventions but also imitations taken, for example, from some other society. The 
economic and social consequences of innovations – regardless of their origin - are the 
same. From the seventeenth century, European society was the most developed 
world society and therefore all new inventions arose in Europe. In the more distant 
past this had not been true and many European innovations were in reality imitations 
of Arabic and Chinese inventions (Ibid, p. 61). 
 
Carbon  
While economic development may occur in technological waves, as many commentators have 
observed (Commoner, Boulding, Gilding), the technological icons of modernity are all based 
on the combustion of carbon – coal, oil and gas – that is in effect the stored sunlight from 
plant life that was laid down during the Carboniferous period of the late Paleozoic era. Those 
icons – grid electricity, cars and aeroplanes, as well as more lately the computer - enable us to 
be shielded from the environment and isolated from perceiving the harm that has been 
mounting especially since the Industrial Revolution. With electricity we have light when the 
world is dark, warmth when it is cold and we can be cool when it is hot. We are transported in 
comfort in extremes of weather. We can communicate instantly and we have more 
information – and trivia – stored than we will ever need. The everyday carbon technology of 
the West provides more comfort than concern in our daily lives, yet this luxury is fragile 
because it is based on a limited resource that in its use is ultimately detrimental. In fact, “all of 
                                                 
120 Atoms > molecules > cells > organelles > organs > individual > species > planet > solar system > 
galaxy > universe. 
121 Fibonacci sequences that signify such systems appear in branching trees, the fruitlets of a pineapple, 
the flowering of artichoke, an uncurling fern, and the scales of a pine cone.   
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our current environmental problems are unanticipated harmful consequences of our existing 
technology” (Diamond 2003, p. 44). 
 
However, the significance of a link between capitalism or communism, technological 
innovation and economic growth may be overdrawn. Some, such as George Monbiot (2014a), 
deny the force of ideology as “mere subplots” when compared with the real ‘meta-trend’. 
Rather than any ideology, he says, it was simply the exploitation of carbon reserves that 
enabled the modern world: 
 
it was neither capitalism nor communism that made possible the progress and the 
pathologies (total war, the unprecedented concentration of global wealth, planetary 
destruction) of the modern age. It was coal, followed by oil and gas. The meta-trend, 
the mother narrative, is carbon-fuelled expansion. Our ideologies are mere subplots. 
Now, as the most accessible reserves have been exhausted, we must ransack the 
hidden corners of the planet to sustain our impossible proposition (Ibid). 
 
Monbiot also says that the failure of our society is inescapable because it is built on compound 
growth and the destruction of the Earth’s living systems. He is not alone in this (Meadows et al 
1972, Huesemann & Huesemann 2011, Higgs 2015 for example). 
 
One key aspect of the carbon meta-trend is its relationship to that gift of Prometheus, fire. The 
idea of the Anthropocene prompts us to see humanity as a geological agent, that our agency 
involves the use of pyrotechnology to transform materials and thus “shape our social and physical 
worlds” (Clark 2014). Pre-humans, the hominids of East Africa, may have mastered the use of fire 
for cooking and for tool-making more than 500,000 years ago. But it was only around 10,000 
years ago that the technology of the containment of fire led to the transformation of materials 
such as metals from ore, bricks and pottery from clay and glass and ceramics from silica, as well 
as the baking of bread from grain. This containment – ovens, hearths, furnaces, boilers – made 
possible much higher temperatures than available before and led to the very fabric of ancient 
civilisations (stone cutting tools, metal spears and armour, bricks and concrete) and ultimately 
thence to the Industrial Revolution.  
 
This is supported by the insight that two of the three key factors in the domination of the West 
identified by Jared Diamond (1999) are made possible by the furnace – guns and steel. Germs 
already existed and were transported to the new worlds largely by accident. In this sense, the 
European settlement of Australia can be viewed as a clash between the indigenous land-altering 
technology of open fire and the European metals technology based on contained fire (Clark 
2014).  
 
But as Stephen Pyne observes it is industrial combustion that is changing the nature of diversity:  
 
The new energy is rewiring the ecological circuitry of the Earth. It has scrambled 
ecosystems and is replacing biodiversity with a pyrodiversity – a bestiary of machines run 
directly or indirectly from industrial combustion (Pyne 2015). 
 
Alternatives 
A feminist counter-view may be to put the technology of weaving ahead of that of fire in terms of 
importance, which is certainly arguable as it is supported by the etymology of the word itself.122 
Such a view is also consistent with the fact that little of this ancient technology remains – fabric is 
                                                 
122 The Greek word root of ‘technology is from ‘teks’ ‘to weave’ or ‘fabricate’. 
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soft and decays, metal is hard and durable. Nevertheless, Penelope’s weavings and re-weavings 
in Homer’s Odyssey establish it in ancient times as do sophisticated Egyptian relics from much 
earlier periods. Various forms are observable in many indigenous societies today, depending on 
the plant fibre available. Weaving enables not only the production of clothing from plant or 
animal fibre, but also enables lightweight containers (baskets) for the transport and security of 
food, the making of shelters and the production of portable fencing for herding as was practised 
in Neolithic times. It is a technology that is not fuelled by carbon and, ironically, runs counter to 
the ‘mother narrative’. 
 
A broader alternative to the mother-narrative is a recent article by Michael Le Page, which 
imagines a modern world in which fossil fuels do not exist (Le Page 2014, pp. 34-39). He suggests 
that such a world would be dependent on hydroelectricity, with that technology possibly 
originating in Norway and Switzerland rather than in England. Such a world may have more highly 
developed electrical motors and batteries, cleaner air, and more electric powered public 
transport. Long-distance travel would be by sailing ship, electric railway and possibly by 
hydrogen-filled airship. However, he points to an apparent consensus that at best, there would 
be much slower growth and such a civilisation could not support a similar population to the 
present, even if industrialisation did proceed in this manner. This would be due to limiting factors 
such as an impossible number of dams required, as well as lack of materials required for 
construction. The intensity of fossil energy sources is very hard to replace (Le Page 2014, p. 39). 
 
Silicon 
Kenneth Boulding (1966) would have agreed about the carbon meta-trend. However, he was 
optimistic about the possibility of technology to provide answers to the exhaustion of carbon 
reserves:  
 
Failing this [development of atomic fusion], however, the time is not very far distant, 
historically speaking, when man will once more have to retreat to his current energy 
input from the sun, even though this could be used much more effectively than in the 
past with increased knowledge. Up to now, certainly, we have not got very far with the 
technology of using current solar energy, but the possibility of substantial improvements 
in the future is certainly high. 
 
In line with Boulding’s prophetic observation, the most recent ‘meta-trend’ or ‘mother 
narrative’ arises less from the exploitation of carbon and more from its fraternal element, 
silicon: that is the knowledge explosion resulting from interlinked computers.  
 
The history of computer development really starts in Bletchley Park in England during the 
Second World War, when Tommy Flowers and Alan Turing led teams that were trying to break 
German military codes and applied computing theory to the problem. In so doing they 
constructed ten electronic programmable computers, each, appropriately, called ‘Colossus’. 
Turing himself pointed out two key advantages of electronic computer technology when he 
delivered a lecture to the London Mathematical Society in 1947 on the automatic computing 
engine (ACE). Digital computers were unrestricted in both their accuracy and their 
applications: 
 
From the point of view of the mathematician the property of being digital should be of 
greater interest than that of being electronic...That the machine is digital however has 
more subtle significance. It means firstly that numbers are represented by sequences 
of digits which can be as long as one wishes. One can therefore work to any desired 
degree of accuracy. This accuracy is not obtained by more careful machining of parts, 
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control of temperature variations, and such means, but by a slight increase in the 
amount of equipment in the machine... This is in sharp contrast with analogue 
machines...where each additional decimal digit required necessitates a complete 
redesign of the machine, and an increase in the cost by perhaps as much as a factor of 
10. A second advantage of digital computing machines is that they are not restricted 
in their applications to any particular type of problem. The differential analyser is by 
far the most general type of analogue machine yet produced, but even it is 
comparatively limited in its scope. It can be made to deal with almost any kind of 
ordinary differential equation, but it is hardly able to deal with partial differential 
equations at all, and certainly cannot manage large numbers of linear simultaneous 
equations, or the zeroes of polynomials. With digital machines however it is almost 
literally true that they are able to tackle any computing problem. A good working rule 
is that the ACE can be made to do any job that could be done by a human computer, 
and will do it in one ten-thousandth of the time. This time estimate is fairly reliable, 
except in cases where the job is too trivial to be worth while giving to the ACE (Turing 
1947, p. 509). 
 
Just as the exploitation of carbon had an enormous impact across a vast range of industries, so 
has the exploitation of silicon shortly after the Bletchley Park era. This was when vacuum-tube 
valves were replaced with transistors123 and then microchips in much smaller computers 
through exploiting the semi-conducting properties of silicon. It was also when photovoltaic 
cells began to be developed that exploited the capacity of silicon to translate photonic energy 
into electronic energy124. But while carbon is exploited directly in vast quantities for both 
energy and materials, silicon is exploited indirectly and in much lesser quantities for the 
manipulation of vast amounts of data, as well as for harnessing energy from the sun. 
Compared with carbon, our relationship to silicon is not, and need not be, voracious. 
 
The silicon-based development of linked computers has since enabled data gathering and 
manipulation across all fields and industries as well as creating new endeavours such as those 
based on chaos theory and the information sciences. The origin of the DIKW (data-
information-knowledge-wisdom) hierarchy125 concept is uncertain (Boulding 1955?), but 
linked computing has enabled a new universe of possibilities within the first three categories. 
The fourth category, wisdom, may be enhanced by the availability of better information and 
knowledge on which to base good judgement.  
 
Again, exponential growth is apparent, but unlike carbon technologies, silicon-based 
information technology uses a virtually limitless resource – data  that is created and 
processed at increasing rates. Moore’s Law, that computing power doubles approximately 
every 18 months, is looking a little ragged now that processing chips are at near sub-atomic 
levels. Yet the law has held for the past several decades. And in any case, the growth of the 
amount of information available is independent of growth in computing power; it relates 
more closely to storage and retrieval capacity. This most recent technological trend forms a 
kind of symmetry with the major technological revolution of the mid-millennium: printing, 
which produced a radical increase in the sharing of knowledge and ideas, and which therefore 
made the Industrial Revolution possible.  
 
                                                 
123 Initially germanium rather than silicon was used for transistors 
124 Although Alexandre Becquerel noticed the conversion of light into electricity in 1839, practical 
photo-voltaics were first developed at the Bell laboratories in 1954.  
125 Often expressed as ‘data is not information, information is not knowledge, knowledge is not 
wisdom’. 
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Other technologies  
Brundtland (1987) first mentions (new) technology at page 13 as a “mainspring of economic 
growth” which has the potential to reduce “the dangerously rapid consumption of finite 
resources”, but which risks new forms of pollution and new life forms that could change the 
direction of evolution. Later the Brundtland report also asserts that technology will continue “to 
change the social, cultural, and economic fabric of nations and the world community” but that 
new technology encompasses both promises and risks. The promises outlined in the report 
include information and communication technologies that can benefit productivity as well as 
energy and resource efficiency.  
 
The Brundtland report also highlights the advantages of new materials including composites that 
require less energy and less matter to manufacture. She mentions how biotechnology could 
dramatically improve human and animal health and how renewable plant-sourced energy may 
substitute for non-renewable fossil fuels, as well as how engineered crop varieties “could 
revolutionise agriculture”. Biotechnology could be an answer to polluting products as well as to 
the issue of hazardous waste disposal. New satellite remote sensing technology could ensure 
better short-term agricultural forecasting and longer-term “optimal use of the Earth's resources” 
by monitoring climate change, marine pollution, soil erosion and plant cover (Brundtland 1987, 
pp. 150-151).  
 
Some of these examples did not quite work out as forecast, however. Brundtland also mentions 
“new plant strains that can fix atmospheric nitrogen” and so reduce pollution from chemical 
fertilisers. The use of nitrogen-based fertiliser started to peak in 1988, around the same time as 
the Brundtland report was issued, after its invention early in the twentieth century had “incited 
fears of a runaway technology causing a rain of N” (Frink et al 1999, p. 1179). While the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) cautions that the method is not effective in all plants, a 1995 
technical report on the concept of biological nitrogen fixation using bacteria that naturally occur 
in the roots of some plants, summarises such a development as suitable for farming of tropical 
legumes: 
 
Since nitrogen is commonly the most limiting plant nutrient in arable farming in the 
tropics and also the most expensive element as a mineral fertilizer, biological nitrogen 
fixation (BNF) holds great promise for smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa. Alley 
farming systems which use leguminous woody species in the hedgerows can reduce or 
eliminate farmers' needs for commercial N fertilizer (Mulongoy 1995). 
 
However, in 2013, twenty-six years after the forecast in the Brundtland report, a different 
method for fixing atmospheric nitrogen was announced by researchers at the University of 
Nottingham after a decade of research. Rather than using new plant strains, the method uses 
bacteria that naturally occur in sugar cane that are harvested to provide a sustainable biological 
coating for any plant to enable it to fix nitrogen (KurzweilAI 2013).  
 
While this alternative nitrogen-fixing technology appears to be beneficial, the Brundtland report 
warns that other technologies may have negative consequences. The report says developments 
in seed technology could lead to greater dependence on fewer crop varieties owned by even 
fewer transnational companies. Also, new materials may create previously unknown hazards to 
health. Further, the report anticipates the genetically modified (GM) food debate by pointing out 
that genetically engineered organisms may have unforeseen effects on the environment.  
 
Pessimism 
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One recent text stands out as a denial of the possibility that technology can be an answer to 
unsustainability. With Technofix, Canadians Huesemann & Huesemann (2011), who aptly live on a 
small island in British Colombia, have drawn praise from some ecologists for their 
“mythbusting”126 explanation of “why technology won’t save us or the planet”. After showing 
that all new technologies cause significant unanticipated problems, the Huesemanns suggest that 
there are basically three types of technological remedy: (1) counter technologies that neutralise 
the negative effects of other technologies, such as environmental remediation (2) social fixes, 
which use technology to solve social, economic, political, or cultural problems, such as 
industrialised agriculture to solve world hunger and (3) efficiency improvements to technological 
processes, such as better fuel efficiency of cars (Huesemann & Huesemann 2011, p. 73).  
 
Although lacking clarity about which category of remedy it falls, the Huesemanns are 
pessimistic that even renewable energy technologies contribute to sustainability, contrary to 
the opinions of many ecologists, as “all renewable energy technologies are expected to have 
significant environmental impacts” when deployed on a sufficiently large scale. They base this 
view on “land limitations, severe environmental impacts and public opposition” as well as the 
greater expense of particularly solar technology compared with coal (Ibid, p. 132). This view is 
questionable. Certainly there has been public opposition to renewable wind farming on both 
land and sea, where there has been visual, auditory and birdlife impacts. But this has been 
observably less than the sort of opposition engendered by coal and nuclear power plants. As 
far as solar energy is concerned, there has been opposition to large-scale solar farms in the UK 
for example, where they may have been sited “insensitively” (Gosden 2014), but this could not 
be said to be a wave of discontent that has prevented such harvesting. Moreover, the future 
of solar energy is as much about decentralised domestic and local production as it is about 
large scale grid-based energy delivery, and the cost of renewables at the point of delivery is 
already lower than coal (Parkinson & Gilding 2014), only three years after the Huesemanns’ 
assertion to the contrary.  
 
Nonetheless, more ominously Huesemann & Huesemann outline three general preconditions for 
environmental and societal collapse “(i) rapid growth in resource use and pollution, (ii) limited 
resource availability and waste absorption capacity, and (iii) delayed responses by decision-
makers when limits have already been exceeded or soon will be” (Huesemann & Huesemann 
2011, p. 139). While this text has weaknesses, such as its tendency to accept that unanticipated 
problems are inevitably of a great magnitude compared with the benefits of a technology, these 
three preconditions are cause for concern. The first two are largely met - partly due to the vastly 
increased growth and consumption in both China and India in the past few decades, combined 
with the foreseeable exhaustion of global oil supplies and the obvious incapacity of the 
atmosphere to absorb more carbon dioxide without dramatically affecting climate. With respect 
to the third precondition (delayed response by decision-makers), the planetary scale of the 
problem suggests that any delay may render any action too late.  
 
To illustrate this issue of scale, it has been observed that in the time leading up to Australia’s 
1964 ‘Voyager’ naval disaster, which involved the collision between a destroyer and an aircraft 
carrier, there was an interval of 45 seconds during which no avoidance manoeuvre whatever 
could have averted the tragedy because the speed and course of the ships could not be varied 
enough in that time (Hickling 1965, p. 141). The momentum of ships is large. Yet it is infinitesimal 
when compared with the momentum of the planet’s biosphere and the destructive course it is 
following. Over how many times longer than 45 seconds will it matter not at all whatever 
corrective action is taken? Unless of course, that point in time has already passed. 
                                                 
126 Rees, W, University of British Colombia, quoted in the book frontispiece. 
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Optimism 
Whether or not it is indeed too late, technology is involved in yet another paradox, but with 
potentially positive consequences. Edward Wilson, the Harvard biologist mentioned in chapter 
3, draws attention to the “inconvenient truth” that no ecosystem under human pressure can 
be made sustainable without humanity knowing all the species that compose it. The paradox 
is that the more species that we extinguish, the more we discover. We currently identify less 
than two million, whereas there may be at least five million or even possibly 100 million 
species on Earth (Wilson 2013). At microbial level, 99 per cent of such organisms remain 
unknown to us: the soil remains a “terra incognito” to our species (van der Hout 2014, p. 435). 
Nevertheless, the technology that is now helping to identify and preserve species, which 
involves a kind of barcoding of DNA sequences, is some distance from Heidegger’s lament. 
 
Technology optimists include the US industrial ecologist Jesse Ausubel, whose article Can 
Technology Spare the Earth? (1996) outlines how improving efficiencies in resource use 
through especially silicon-based technology can restore the environment even as the 
population grows:  
 
Families named Smith, Cooper, and Miller people our nation because until not long 
ago most of us beat metal, bent casks, and ground grain. Now few workers hold such 
jobs. So far, except in video, we are not named Programmer, Sub-Micron, and 
Genesplicer. We easily forget how much the modem world has changed and yet how 
early our day is. We forget the power of compounding our technical progress, even at 
one or two percent per year. Knowledge can grow faster than population and provide 
abundant green goods and services. The message from history is that technology, 
wisely used, can spare the Earth. You can click on it. 
 
This message echoes that of Marx and Engels more than a century and a half ago. While Marx 
attacked Malthus’ views of the limits to growth and the inevitable impoverishment of the 
working class (cited in Dresner 2008, pp. 13-14), Engels asserted that any geometric increase 
in population would be matched by a geometric increase science and its application:  
 
Yet, so as to deprive the universal fear of overpopulation of any possible basis, let us 
once more return to the relationship of productive power to population. Malthus 
establishes a formula on which he bases his entire system: population is said to 
increase in a geometrical progression – 1+2+4+8+16+32, etc.; the productive power of 
the land in an arithmetical progression – 1+2+3+4+5+6. The difference is obvious, is 
terrifying; but is it correct? Where has it been proved that the productivity of the land 
increases in an arithmetical progression? The extent of land is limited. All right! The 
labour-power to be employed on this land-surface increases with population. Even if 
we assume that the increase in yield due to increase in labour does not always rise in 
proportion to the labour, there still remains a third element which, admittedly, never 
means anything to the economist – science – whose progress is as unlimited and at 
least as rapid as that of population. What progress does the agriculture of this century 
owe to chemistry alone – indeed, to two men alone, Sir Humphry Davy and Justus 
Liebig127! But science increases at least as much as population. The latter increases in 
proportion to the size of the previous generation, science advances in proportion to 
the knowledge bequeathed to it by the previous generation, and thus under the most 
                                                 
127 Both eminent chemists 
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ordinary conditions also in a geometrical progression. And what is impossible to 
science? (Engels 1844). 
 
Incongruously, it is a similar sort of argument that now attaches to its opposite ideology of 
neoliberal economics (there will be no resource crisis because applied science and technology 
will be “incentivised” to find and develop substitutes as resources become harder to extract 
and their price rises). However, the argument is also consistent with the key advantage of a 
silicon-based technology – that it uses vastly less material resource and more an inexhaustible 
virtual resource: it grows geometrically, building upon the ‘knowledge bequeathed to it by the 
previous generation’ as Engels suggested in a different era. 
 
Jevons paradox 
Much technological development has been driven by the quest for efficiency, highlighted by 
Watt’s improvements to Newcomen’s steam engine and the continuing pursuit of more 
efficient internal combustion. The IPCC endorses efficiencies through improved technologies 
as a way of mitigating climate change and promoting sustainable development (IPCC 2014a, 
s.4.3.6). But all is not as it seems; efficiency can be a mirage that recedes as it is neared. The 
Jevons paradox (or ‘rebound effect’) is an observation made about coal consumption in the 
nineteenth century and has much wider application for all forms of technological efficiency. 
Jevons (1865) projected that the consumption of coal in Britain would follow an exponential 
curve so that it would be almost infinite by 1950, the middle of the following century, if its 
then rate of increase were maintained. At that time many in the UK worried that coal reserves 
were rapidly dwindling, but some believed that improving technology would reduce coal 
consumption. Jevons argued that this view was incorrect, as further increases in efficiency 
would tend to increase the use of coal, as Watt’s improved steam engine had generated more 
demand for the resource. More generally, the proposition is that as technology progresses, 
the increase in efficiency with which a resource is used tends to increase the rate of 
consumption of that resource.128  
 
This tendency is apparent because greater efficiency makes the resource effectively cheaper 
and hence will tend to be used and depleted faster. However, the degree of this tendency 
does depend on the elasticity of demand for the resource, so there is not a rigid link between 
efficiency and resource use. Demand elasticity is partly a function of the availability of 
substitutes, and this also must be taken into account. According to energy economist Harry 
Saunders (1992, p. 131), there is a further factor linking efficiency with increased energy 
consumption: at the macroeconomic level, more efficient technology also leads to faster 
economic growth, which in turn increases energy use throughout the economy. Thus 
technological progress that improves energy efficiency will tend to increase overall energy 
use.  
 
Nevertheless, the Jevons paradox assumes an unregulated market, whereas in reality it is 
possible to tax undesirable consumption. As Joe Stiglitz (2014) said recently in respect of 
deficit reduction and the carbon tax, “it’s absolutely clear that it’s better to tax bad things 
than good things; that way you get a double dividend”. Finally, on this efficiency issue, the 
Jevons paradox obviously does not result in the same concern when the energy source is 
renewable: as photovoltaics, for example, are becoming more efficient, they are able to 
generate more electricity per unit. But there is no concern about depletion of the energy 
resource. That concern only applies where the energy source is not renewable. Technology 
                                                 
128 The Jevons paradox is in principle similar to the Downs–Thomson paradox, that increasing road 
capacity can make traffic congestion worse. 
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and sustainability is less about fuel efficiency and more about the nature of the technology 
and the form of energy it uses.  
 
Automation, artificial intelligence and development 
For both the developed and developing worlds, an important technological issue is associated 
with automation and artificial intelligence (AI). Al Gore, for example, believes that:    
 
The technological extension of the ability to think is therefore different in a 
fundamental way from any other technological extension of human capacity... [thus 
the impact of AI] will be far greater than that of any other technological revolution 
(Gore 2013, p. 40). 
 
David Roden (2015, pp. 16-17), in discussing the concept of ‘posthumanism’, speculates on the 
implications of a robot or computer system with better than human reasoning ability. Such a 
possible super-intelligence may be ambivalently good or evil. He cites the cryptographer Irving 
Good as saying that since the design of machines is an intellectual activity, then an intelligent 
machine could design even better machines, resulting in an “intelligence explosion”, leaving 
human intelligence far behind. “Thus the first ultra-intelligent machine is the last invention 
that man need ever make” – as long as it can be kept under control (Good 1966, pp. 33-4). The 
cosmologist Stephen Hawking agrees. In a widely reported BBC interview of 2 December 2014 
discussing new anticipatory software that enables him to communicate more easily, he said he 
was worried about the idea of creating machines that think because an artificial intelligence 
would be able to independently re-design itself at an ever-increasing rate, so that humans 
would be “superseded”. While Isaac Asimov anticipated and attempted resolution of such an 
issue sixty years ago with his three laws of robotics,129 it is conceivable that a sophisticated AI 
could re-program itself or its progeny beyond such constraints, or become dangerously 
dysfunctional as did HAL in Clarke’s 2001: A Space Odyssey. 
 
Asimov’s laws are an example of highly distilled AI regulation.  According to The Economist (9 
May 2015), coping with AI will be relatively easy because we are used to controlling 
autonomous bureaucracies, markets and armies, all of which can do great harm without 
appropriate regulation, oversight and means of accountability. It points out, though, that the 
most important safeguard for controlling a future AI will be an off switch. 
 
The current approach to AI though is to ignore the goal of human-like intelligence or 
understanding and rather teach machines through vast numbers of example, rather than by 
adopting certain principles. Known as ‘machine learning’, this is how the first successful 
machine translation system, Candide, worked130. Google Translate, with its vast database uses 
the same approach. According to one of its software engineers:  
 
you can take one of those simple machine-learning algorithms that you learned about 
in the first few weeks of an AI class, an algorithm that academia has given up on, 
that’s not seen as useful—but when you go from 10,000 training examples to 10 
billion training examples, it all starts to work. Data trumps everything (Estelle quoted 
in Somers 2013, para. 60). 
                                                 
129 The first law is that a robot must protect its human master from harm. The second law is that a robot 
must obey the commands of its human master, unless it conflicts with the first law. The third law is that 
it must protect itself unless it conflicts with the first or second laws. In later stories there is also a 
‘zeroth law’, that a robot must primarily protect humanity. 
130 Candide used 2.2 million pairs of sentences, mostly from the bilingual proceedings of Canadian 
parliamentary debates for its English-French translations (Somers 2013, para. 56). 
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The technique is so effective that Google Translate people do not speak most of the languages 
that the application translates. Engineers are much more important to the system than 
linguists. Translation through machine learning is “data-mining at a massive scale” (Ibid, para. 
61). It is not understanding, nor is it anything like self-awareness. 
 
But while AI is yet to achieve “singularity” – the point at which machine (general) intelligence 
exceeds that of humans – nevertheless automation, or the replacement of human labour by 
embodied capital, appears to be progressing at pace, exemplified by the explosion of 
computerisation and robot factories of recent decades. It is not just manufacturing 
employment that is at risk in both rich and poor countries; more skilled jobs are susceptible to 
replacement by machine intelligence, including routine legal work. Already journalism is often 
the product of software rather than human effort, as are translations due to Google translate.  
 
Some are skeptical of the degree of automation possible due to Polanyi’s paradox131 and the 
recurring phenomenon of “automation anxiety” since the time of the Luddites (Autor 2014, 
pp. 2-3). Nevertheless, the futurist Martin Ford’s (2009 p. 237) view is that, as technology 
accelerates, machine automation may create a ‘downward economic spiral’ as predicted by 
Marx, due to overproduction coupled with unemployment and hence lack of consumer 
demand. Automation is already established even in developing economies and there is no 
possibility of arresting the trend: “the world economy is a closed system”, he says (Ibid, p. 97). 
However, Ford does not accept Marxist solutions, instead valuing the consumer more than the 
worker-producer. He proposes that as automation accelerates, people in developing countries 
should be paid incentives for conserving resources and protecting the environment, thus 
maintaining consumer demand while at the same time “decoupling economic prosperity from 
negative ecological impact” (Ibid, p. 198). 
 
More recently, but for different reasons, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) is in line with such thinking. The Panel finds that the basic clean energy and nutritional 
needs of billions of people remain unmet. Therefore, there is a need to adopt non-
conventional incentives “for technology innovation and diffusion processes that respond to 
social and environmental goals” (IPCC 2014a, Ch. 4, p. 25).  The World Bank too, believes that 
innovation and technology can lead to better development models. Its former Chief 
Innovation Officer, Chris Vein, says that:  
 
technology evolves and the possibilities of movements like the 'Internet of Everything' 
come in to focus, new and innovative approaches become the antidote to 
development in the usual manner (Vein 2013).  
 
This is noticeably different from the sort of approach suggested by earlier sustainable 
development advocates. Schumacher (1989 [1973], p. 61) of ‘small is beautiful’ fame, 
advocated “maximum well-being for minimum consumption” and small-scale, local 
“appropriate” technologies for the developing world. As John Phillimore (2001, pp. 24-25) 
points out, Schumacher’s ideas, once influential, fell from favour as Schumpeterian big-scale 
technological innovation ideas showed success in the economic development of East Asia. 
Although the two economists are usually seen as opposites, they actually have much in 
                                                 
131 Polanyi’s paradox: our tacit knowledge of how the world works often exceeds our explicit 
understanding. We understand how to use our body or drive a car, but can do so without any 
knowledge of physiology or the dynamics of transport objects. It is therefore very difficult to create a 
robot to emulate human capability (Michael Polanyi 1966). 
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common, not least that Schumacher was once Schumpeter’s pupil — in Bonn in 1929. Both 
were especially interested in technology and its relationship to economic growth. Both 
favoured entrepreneurial innovation, although politically the two were rather further apart 
(Narkuss 2012).  
 
Transitions  
I think that four hundred years hence the power question in England may be solved somewhat 
as follows: The country will be covered with rows of metallic windmills working electric motors 
which in their turn supply current at a very high voltage to great electric mains. At suitable 
distances, there will be great power stations where during windy weather the surplus power 
will be used for the electrolytic decomposition of water into oxygen and hydrogen  
– JBS Haldane, Daedalus, Science and the Future, Cambridge, 4 February 1923. 
 
The question as far as technology and development is concerned, is how to encourage more 
sustainable ‘green’ (Schumacherian) technological development on a Schumpeterian scale. 
This essentially depends on energy source (Phillimore 2001, p. 27). Bill McKibben (2008 p. 
206), while favouring small-scale, local and appropriate technologies in the Schumacherian 
tradition, also allows that centralised ‘clean-coal’ and even nuclear power generation should 
not be ruled out in the “desperate” fight to slow carbon emissions (Ibid, p. 144). However 
Phillimore points out that information and communication technology (ICT) is not inherently 
green because it has aspects that  shades of Jevons  encourage more energy use, such as 
increased travel, materials and energy consumption based on the production shift to Asia. 
Ultimately he laments that the ICT paradigm depends on fossil fuels as its main source of 
energy (ibid). This is still true, but increasingly less so, as silicon replaces carbon in the 
generation of electricity in both grid and off-grid applications, leading to a transformational 
‘tipping point’ (Parkinson & Gilding 2014; CEA 2016; Forsythe 2017). 
 
There is a widespread view that coal, oil and gas will be with us for many more decades, 
despite concerns about climate change. This is based on a world view of an energy system 
defined by large, long-life assets like power stations and coal mines, whereas there is an 
emerging distributed system that more closely resembles the growth of mobile phones – a 
consumer driven, rapidly shifting market with diverse players. It has been argued that, driven 
by dramatic price falls in solar, the energy system may be on the verge of a revolutionary 
transformation. This would involve a shift from fossil fuels to renewables; a transition from 
centralised utilities to distributed house scale generation; a car industry that might enable 
storage of renewable energy; and perhaps global energy price deflation in stark contrast to 
forecasts of peak oil and spiralling prices (Parkinson & Gilding 2014). 
 
Even though this transition has just begun, the challenge to regulatory frameworks and 
institutional arrangements are already felt. In many countries policy makers are caught 
between the demands of consumers testing the current boundaries of institutional structures 
and utilities that want to defend their business models from what is a serious challenge. 
 
In Africa, renewable energy has already made inroads at the non-grid household level. 
Kerosene lamps have been described as the “vampires” of developing communities on the 
continent because although used in almost every home they are expensive, using up to one 
third of average household income for their fuel. These lamps also provide poor light, emit 
noxious fumes and cause house fires and child poisonings. As of 2014, it was estimated that 
110 million households in Africa did not have electricity. But recently, new solar powered 
lights manufactured in China have begun to replace kerosene lighting. These lights cost eight 
dollars each, cost nothing to run and have none of the other disadvantages of kerosene lamps. 
  122 
SunnyMoney, a supplier of the lights, which is now the biggest solar lighting company in Africa, 
has sales of more than one million units per year. Profits are returned to local communities 
(Science Show 2014). Because kerosene is derived from oil and uses still more fuel in its 
transport, this solar lamp project has the potential to reduce up to three per cent of global oil 
consumption (Miller et al 2013).  
 
Already, within key economic sectors energy demand is not what might be expected. 
According to The Economist (2014), agriculture is now far more energy-intensive than 
manufacturing. While this appears counter-intuitive, considerable energy is needed to produce 
fertilisers, and in many countries much electricity is needed to pump water from deep aquifers 
and distant rivers, for example. Each dollar of agricultural output needs four or five times as much 
energy to produce as the same value of manufactured goods. The transition to a future 
sustainable agriculture to feed ten billion people will demand a lot of energy.  
 
The cloud 
The ‘Internet of Everything’ (IoE), or ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT) concept mentioned above is 
based on cloud data storage and the wireless interconnection of myriad computing devices 
through the Internet. Increasingly it is powered by sunlight directly, as illustrated by Apple’s 
decision to convert all its data centres as well as some of its manufacturing to solar power 
(Goldenberg 2014b). Of the IoT’s many potential applications, two in particular stand out in 
relation to sustainability. These are its potential for environmental monitoring and 
remediation, and its potential for energy management. Monitoring of the environment is 
made vastly more sophisticated through applications of the IoT. There is potentially limitless 
data available from environmental sensors132 already, and when wirelessly connected through 
the cloud, both real-time and historical information is made available with which to link with 
social and economic data, and therefore on which to target remediation and mitigation 
decisions (Sense-T 2014).  
 
With respect to energy management, cloud connectivity makes it possible to individually and 
remotely manage energy-producing and energy-using devices, thus minimising energy 
production through matching it more exactly to real-time demand. While this does not yet 
drive a stake through Jevons’ resilient heart, this oblique approach must help reduce energy 
needs.   
 
Of course the inventor and futurist, Buckminster Fuller, believed this half a century ago: 
 
You may very appropriately want to ask me how we are going to resolve the ever-
acceleratingly dangerous impasse of world-opposed politicians and ideological 
dogmas. I answer, it will be resolved by the computer. Man has ever-increasing 
confidence in the computer; witness his unconcerned landings as air transport 
passengers coming in for a landing in the combined invisibility of fog and night. While 
no politician or political system can ever afford to yield understandably and 
enthusiastically to their adversaries and opposers, all politicians can and will yield 
enthusiastically to the computers safe flight-controlling capabilities in bringing all of 
humanity in for a happy landing (Buckminster Fuller 1969, p. 44). 
 
Thermodynamics  
The relevance of thermodynamics to the issue of the sustainability of the anthropocene Earth is 
that the planet is, in effect, a ‘closed’ thermodynamic system. However, in the language of 
                                                 
132 According to the World Economic Forum there will be one trillion sensors connected to the Internet 
by 2022 (WEF 2015, p. 16). 
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applied physics, this is different from a completely isolated system: a closed system does 
exchange energy (in the form of sunlight and other radiation) with its surroundings while an 
isolated system exchanges neither energy nor mass. An isolated system is a theoretical construct, 
since within the real universe there must always be the effect of gravitation and exchanges of 
particulate matter, however small.  
 
The laws of thermodynamics have been described by the Colombia theoretical physicist, David 
Albert, as “one of the monumental achievements of the physics of the nineteenth century”, a 
“beautiful and breathtakingly concise summary of the behaviours of macroscopic material 
systems” (Albert 2015, p. 3).  
 
The Earth does contain the means for the creation of energy, such as reserves of coal, oil and gas. 
However, those reserves are limited to perhaps a century or two and are due to the sunlight of 
past eons and the process of photosynthesis. Other apparently internal energy sources such as 
hydro-electricity, wave and wind power are also the indirect result of sunlight, albeit with 
unlimited availability. The burning of biomass also appears internally-sourced, whereas it too 
results from external solar input. Tidal power is largely derived from the orbit of the Earth relative 
to the moon and the sun, combined with the effects of the Earth’s rotation. It is externally 
sourced due to gravity. Nonetheless as the tides slow the rotation of the Earth albeit 
infinitesimally, it does have an ultimate limit due to the law of conservation of energy. Lastly, 
there are two genuinely internal energy sources – geothermal and radioactivity (from uranium 
and potentially thorium deposits). While geothermal supplies, including off-grid heat pump 
extraction, are probably available for the very long-term, supplies of uranium are estimated to 
last perhaps only 200 years even ‘at current rates of consumption’ (Fetter 2009).  
 
Popular sustainability literature suggests that energy sources can be conceived of as either 
‘renewable’ or ‘non-renewable’. However, energy sources also can be seen as either external or 
internal to the Earth’s thermodynamic system. Most energy sources are based on the input of 
sunlight, whether over the shorter or longer term. The key point is that sustainable energy must 
balance the flow from external sources with its use over time - that is, power. Internal sources are 
a limited stock, whereas we must focus on matching the external flow rather than the internal 
stock to become sustainable.   
 
That leaves other energy sources that are as yet little more than theory. In particular, this means 
nuclear fusion, rather than the controlled fission reaction currently used in nuclear power 
stations. Fusion research, however, although currently funded by an international government 
consortium centered on France is typically “ten years” from any practical development and is 
frequently announced as such, as recently by the US military manufacturer, Lockheed Martin 
(Tollefson 2014).   
 
Still, the US science writer, Dawn Stover, disputes that so-called renewable forms of energy are as 
renewable as they are thought to be. She says that ‘renewables’ need non-renewable resources 
to be effective, including the stuff of photovoltaic panels, precious groundwater for solar and 
geo-thermal, steel and rare Earths133 for wind turbines as well as vast amounts of concrete for 
hydro-electric dams. In many countries, biomass for heating and cooking results in “severe 
deforestation and air pollution”. Further, meeting the world’s energy demands from such sources 
in the foreseeable future is completely impracticable as it would require the construction of an 
impossible number of solar farms, wind turbines and the like (Stover 2009, p. 1).  
 
                                                 
133 Rare earths such as neodymium are used in wind turbine generator magnets.  
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Her critics, however, point to the recyclability of photovoltaics and steel, as well as the fact that 
the “rare Earths” of generator magnets are not actually so rare, as they are distributed in the 
Earth’s crust at about the same volume as copper. Richard and Marc Perez of the Atmospheric 
Science Research Center, on the other hand, point to a comparison between renewable and finite 
energy reserves measured in terawatt-years (TW-yr). 134 Of the finite (non-renewable) reserves, 
coal has estimated total reserves of 900 TW-yr, petroleum 240, natural gas 215 and uranium 90-
130.  The total world energy use is about 16 TW-yrs each year (Perez & Perez 2009). This means 
that if coal were the only source of energy it would last for only a further 56 years. Likewise, 
petroleum would last only 15 years, natural gas 13 years and uranium around ten at current 
usage rates. By contrast, potential hydro and biomass energy could each account for about a 
quarter of energy needs indefinitely, wind for two or three times current consumption 
indefinitely, ocean thermal about half, and geothermal about one tenth. However direct solar 
potentially could provide more than 1400 times our current world energy consumption  
indefinitely.  
 
The US ecological economist, Eric Zencey’s view, is that economics is subsumed by energy deficits 
and that our current use of energy is but a frantic moment that must inevitably diminish: 
 
Seen through the thermodynamic lens, what has been called the Industrial Revolution is, 
more properly, the Hydrocarbon Revolution, a once-in-planetary-history drawdown of 
stored sunlight to do work and make wealth in the present. The petroleum era will most 
likely depart as suddenly as it came; in the grand sweep of geologic time, our use of 
petroleum is just an instant, a brief burst of frantic activity that has produced exponential 
growth in wealth and human population—and in humanity’s impact on planetary 
ecosystems (Zencey 2013 pp 73-74).  
 
He goes on to sketch the history of ecological economics through Georgescu-Roegen and his pupil 
Herman Daly, who developed a thermodynamic critique of economics and the non-market 
“ecosystem services” it takes for granted (Zencey 2013, p. 77). 
 
Entropy 
The concept of entropy relates to matter, biology and knowledge as well as to energy. An isolated 
system is more restrictive than a closed system as it does not interact with its surroundings in any 
way. Mass and energy remain constant within the system, and no energy or mass transfer takes 
place across the boundary. As time passes in an isolated system, internal differences tend to even 
out and pressures and temperatures tend to equalise, as does density. A system in which all 
equalising processes have gone practically to completion is in a state of thermodynamic 
equilibrium. 
 
The second law of thermodynamics for isolated systems states that the entropy of an isolated 
system not in equilibrium tends to increase over time, approaching maximum value at 
equilibrium. Overall, in an isolated system, the internal energy is constant and the entropy can 
never decrease. However, a closed system's entropy can decrease, for example when heat is 
extracted from the system. 
 
According to the mathematician-economist Nicolas Georgescu-Roegen, who was particularly 
influential in the development of ecological economics, understanding what entropy is relates to 
the distinction between available and unavailable energy. “This distinction is anthropomorphic” 
because energy is available or unavailable according to whether it is suitable for human use. 
                                                 
134 One terawatt equals one trillion (or 1012) watts. 
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Within “an isolated system, the amount of energy remains constant (the first law of 
thermodynamics), while the available energy continuously and irrevocably degrades into 
unavailable states (the second law). Therefore, irrespective of technical detail, “entropy is an 
index of the amount of available energy relative to the absolute temperature of the 
corresponding isolated system” (Georgescu-Roegen 1986, pp. 3- 4).  
 
Georgescu-Roegen also outlines how matter is similarly affected by entropy and in so doing 
denies that that continuous recycling, or re-creation of ordered states of matter is feasible:  
 
It is an elementary fact...that matter also exists in two states, available and 
unavailable...just like energy, it degrades continuously and irrevocably from the former 
to the latter state. Matter, just like energy, dissipates into dust, as is best illustrated by 
rust, by wear and tear of motors [or] of automobile tyres (Ibid, p. 7).  
 
More specifically this will lead to scarcity of materials for, as he puts it, “materials vital for the 
current hot technology will sooner or later become extremely scarce...even scarcer than the 
available energy from fossil fuels”, which then exposes the “logical weaknesses” of Herman Daly’s 
(1973) promise of salvation through steady-state economics (Ibid, p. 8).  
 
The Nobel laureate, Erwin Schrödinger, who was invited to live in Ireland by Eamon de Valera 
after the Anschluß, lectured in Dublin in 1943 about life from a physicist’s perspective. The 
lectures centred on the notion of entropy and the laws of thermodynamics. Usefully for this 
dissertation, his lectures define ‘life’ in terms of a kind of ‘entropy border’. Inside the boundary of 
a living organism is order, or negative entropy.135 This order within is achieved at the expense of 
increasing entropy without, that is in its environment: 
 
entropy, taken with the negative sign, is itself a measure of order. Thus, the device by 
which an organism maintains itself stationary at a fairly high level of orderliness (= fairly 
low level of entropy) really consists continually sucking orderliness from its environment 
(Schrödinger 1944, p. 26). 
 
James Lovelock picked up this theme when working at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory pondering 
how to identify life for the first Mars lander during the 1960s. His first step was to look for 
“entropy reduction” as it must be a characteristic of every life form (Lovelock 2000 [1979], p. 2). 
He also goes on to describe the key but elusive nature of entropy in the following passage: 
 
...few physical concepts can have caused as much confusion and misunderstanding as 
that of entropy. It is almost a synonym for disorder and yet, as a measure of the rate of 
dissipation of a system’s thermal energy, it can be precisely expressed in mathematical 
terms. It has been the bane of generations of students and is direfully associated in many 
minds with decline and decay, since its expression in the second law of thermodynamics 
(indicating that all energy will eventually dissipate into heat universally distributed and 
will no longer be available for the performance of useful work) implies the predestined 
and inevitable run-down and death of the Universe (Ibid).  
 
Zencey (2013, p. 73) makes the notion of entropy still clearer in his article Energy as Master 
Resource. The first law of thermodynamics says that both matter and energy cannot be created 
or destroyed, only transformed. The second law says that when energy is transformed, its 
capacity to do useful work is diminished. While the total amount of energy remains the same (the 
                                                 
135 Sometimes referred to as ‘negentropy’. 
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first law), some of it is no longer useful. This degraded energy is known as entropy, a term 
invented by Rudolf Clausius in 1865, who observed that “within any thermodynamically closed 
system, energy is conserved but entropy must increase”. Further, Albert describes the first law of 
thermodynamics as simply “a translation” of the principle of conservation of energy. Whereas he 
describes the second law – the famous one – as meaning that “entropy can never decrease as 
time goes forward”. Smoke spontaneously spreads from but does not collect in a cigarette. Soup 
cools not heats in a cool room. Chairs slow, not accelerate, when sliding on a floor. Eggs hit a rock 
and break, not jump from a rock and reassemble. All tends to less order, energy ultimately 
disperses as heat, temperatures equalise (Albert 2015, p. 3). 
 
The US historian Henry Adams used entropy as a metaphor to interpret history at around the end 
of the nineteenth century, thus bringing the concept to the humanities. Kenneth Boulding writing 
in the 1960s, although verging on racism in his observations, thought to apply the concept to 
knowledge and culture:  
 
The question of whether there is anything corresponding to entropy in the information 
system is a puzzling one, though of great interest. There are certainly many examples of 
social systems and cultures which have lost knowledge, especially in transition from one 
generation to the next, and in which the culture has therefore degenerated. One only has 
to look at the folk culture of Appalachian migrants to American cities to see a culture 
which started out as a fairly rich European folk culture in Elizabethan times and which 
seems to have lost both skills, adaptability, folk tales, songs, and almost everything that 
goes up to make richness and complexity in a culture, in the course of about ten 
generations. The American Indians on reservations provide another example of such 
degradation of the information and knowledge system. On the other hand, over a great 
part of human history, the growth of knowledge in the Earth as a whole seems to have 
been almost continuous (Boulding 1966, pp. 6-7). 
 
More recently, the observation has been made that some of the stock of useful knowledge tends 
to decline due to technological change. Knowledge of how to handle a square rigged sailing ship 
is no longer needed. Nor is how to produce antibiotics rendered ineffective by overuse. At the 
same time, useful knowledge is replenished and advanced only due to research and invention 
(Matson, Clark & Andersson 2016, p. 49).  
 
The astronomer John Barrow cites Clarke’s cautionary fable of technology and entropy 
Superiority (1951), in which an advanced civilisation is defeated in a space war by its 
technologically inferior opponents. The advanced group keeps developing ever more 
sophisticated high-tech weapons136 that require downtime to upgrade delivery systems. In their 
final iteration the new systems bamboozle each other because each deployment warps space-
time and gradually increases entropy so that electronics and communications are mismatched. 
“The more sophisticated and powerful a technology becomes, the more susceptible it is...to 
breakdowns and subtle malfunctions’ (Barrow 1999, p.153). 
 
The second law of thermodynamics has been described as “the supreme” law of nature, whereby 
if any new theory is found to contradict it, then the new theory must collapse rather than the 
converse (Eddington 1928, pp. 73-75). It is only in the field of economics that its force is ignored 
(Zencey 2013, p. 83). Therefore, it is only when economics takes into account present 
‘externalities’ such as energy return on energy invested (EROEI) can human civilisation hope to be 
                                                 
136 One of which, ‘The Analyser’ contains “just short of a million vacuum tubes” (Clarke 1951).  
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sustainable. A “bare minimum” of 3:1 EROEI would be required, while at least 5:1 EROEI would be 
needed to maintain “anything like what we call civilisation”. But while renewables are well above 
this figure, they nevertheless require a net energy input to build, as well as their infrastructure. A 
windmill cannot be built on promised energy (Ibid, p. 80; Sgouridis, Bardi & Csala 2015, p. 2). 
 
Exponential growth 
The opposite face of entropy is exponential growth, a growth built on technology, especially since 
the Second World War. The curves have the same shape, but are inverted. In fact, it is the 
converse interactions of these theoretical twins that describes our possible futures. Schmidt & 
Cohen (2014, p. 253), citing Kurzweil (1999), assert that technology is a continuation of evolution 
by other means and is itself evolutionary, “building on its own increasing order, leading to 
exponential growth and accelerated returns over time”.  
 
Complementing the global environmental indicators illustration at figure 17, Steffen et al 
demonstrate many other examples of near exponential growth since 1750, as shown in figure 24 
below. Fertilizer consumption is a little jagged and there are few rivers left to dam, but the other 
examples since the 1950s show alarming rates of growth. In each case, this growth is based on 
the amplification afforded by technology. 
 
Figure 24. Examples of exponential growth 1750-2000  
 
Source: Steffen et al 2011, pp. 4-6 
 
If it is increasing entropy that ultimately limits growth (Ekins 1993, p. 272), then there are only 
two ways of raising that limit. One way is by exploiting the continuous flow of incoming energy 
available from the sun. While economic activity increases entropy by depleting resources and 
creating wastes, sunlight can have the opposite effect as it is both a direct energy source and the 
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fuel of nearly all life on Earth.137 Physical production might then be increased, but would still be 
limited by the quantity of that energy available − about 1.36 kilowatts per square metre, known 
as the ‘solar constant’. Economic growth may still continue beyond these physical limits to the 
extent that it is non-physical  which it increasingly is. This is a form of ‘decoupling’138 and 
depends on adding value while using fewer physical resources, such as Internet applications, 
recycling and provision of services rather than physical goods.  
 
Systems theory 
Systems theory was developed from different discipline perspectives by such thinkers as 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Anatol Rapoport, Talcott Parsons and Kenneth Boulding during the 
middle of the twentieth century. This approach involves both the physical and the social 
sciences, and concentrates on “the dynamics that define the characteristic functions, 
properties, and relationships that are internal or external to the system”, rather than so much 
on its components (Laslo & Krippner 1998, p. 49).  
 
Systems theory is useful because disciplinary worldviews are increasingly fragmented. While 
the natural sciences have tended to synthesis through unified theories, in contrast the social 
sciences have tended toward relativism and to deny normative behavioural views (Ibid, p. 50), 
as well as being mutually incomprehensible (Boulding 1956, Snow 1959). 
 
This concept is relevant to technology and sustainability in several ways. The technology to 
model Earth systems such as climate is now well-developed and involves vast numbers of 
sensors throughout the biosphere combined with mathematics, binary algorithms and the 
power of cloud computing. This approach is also applicable to the development of possible 
solutions to human impact. It enables evolutionary systems designers to align their 
simulations with the dynamics of civilisation change and with patterns of sustainable 
environmental development.  
 
To an evolutionary systems designer, a ‘situation’ is a system of interconnected problems. One 
such situation is the evolution of economics. Another is the development of energy intensive 
technologies. And a third is the destruction of the Earth’s ecosystems. Humanity is in a 
conundrum of interconnected problems that relate to sustainability in which technology is 
interwoven in different ways. Their dynamics may be more important than their static 
components. Nevertheless, as Donella Meadows cautions, it is unwise to assume that a 
dynamic systems approach brings with it the prospect of all-conquering control. Rather than 
control, or even predict, a systems approach can help envision and bring into being, as 
systems can be designed and redesigned: “we can’t control systems or figure them out. But 
we can dance with them!” (Meadows 2008, p. 170). Systems thinking implies humility. 
 
Ethics 
The Dutch eco-philosopher, Sanne van der Hout, approaches the question of sustainable 
technologies from an ethical framework. She describes new technologies that increasingly 
mimic natural systems from the molecular level and larger — ‘biomimetic’ or ‘homeo’ 
technologies (van der Hout 2014, pp. 424-425) — which have been associated with a more 
sustainable co-existence between humans and nature. These technologies contrast with the 
classical technologies, or contrivances that are fundamentally different from natural 
organisms, such as the wheel and combustion engines. Classical technologies tend to 
                                                 
137 Except for some life forms in deep sea volcanic vents. 
138 Mentioned in chapters 1, 4, and earlier in this chapter at p. 118. 
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“counteract or disturb the dynamics of nature” and are “radical simplifications” that enable 
some degree of human control over our environment (Ibid, p. 429).  
 
But van der Hout disputes that biomimetic technologies are necessarily ecologically benign. In 
their very mimicry they may enable subtler and more pervasive ecological interference than 
classic brutalism. She argues that to fulfil the potential of biomimetic technologies to enhance 
the carrying capacity of the Earth, humanity’s predilection for luxury and consumption, for 
dominance over and separation from nature, must be contained by an ethic of peaceful 
coexistence, of humility towards nature, of being part of rather than separate from our 
environment. In this hope she cites Norman Cousins (1979, p. 31) who put the beginnings of a 
changing world view most eloquently: “What was most significant about the first lunar voyage 
was not that men set foot on the moon, but that they set eye on Earth”.  
 
In this discussion, the different reach of our current technologies, whether classical or 
biomimetic, compared with earlier technologies is also apparent. In the ancient past, human 
ethics were based on the immediate – the family, the neighbour, the locality — because it was 
only the immediate that could be affected by our technologies. However now that technology 
affects the entire planetary biosphere, ethics must encompass this dimension because we are 
now responsible for it, both in time and space (Jonas 1984, Plumwood 1993 and 2002, 
Sloterdijk 2009). Thus the scale of human technological reach brings with it an ethical 
imperative of technological accommodation with the natural world. 
 
Relationships 
This then is where humanity is poised in its ancient and intensifying relationship with 
technology. How that relationship is wrought in the near future will have a major, probably 
decisive, impact on sustainability. But there remains a gulf between attitudes to technology 
and sustainability. Those who regard technology as dangerous, potentially disastrous and to 
be kept under firm control (Goethe, Shelley, Heidegger, Atwood, Carson, Commoner, the 
Huesemanns, and van der Hout) are distant from the technological transformationalists (Marx, 
Engels, Verne, Schumpeter, Turing, Clarke, Fuller, Ford, Richardson, Miller, Gilding, Gore and 
Vein), for whom nothing is impossible. Others see technology as useful in particular contexts, 
but that economic relationships have to change to achieve sustainability (Jevons, Schumacher, 
Brundtland, McGibben, Dresner, Stiglitz, Wilson, Dietz & O’Neill, the IPCC). It is this inter-
relationship with economics that is unresolved. Technology may be used as a shield from the 
reality of increasing environmental degradation for the few, or it may be used to improve the 
environment for the many.  
 
Technology’s relationship to population is already clear. Courtesy of the Industrial Revolution, 
technology once implied more people due to higher birthrates and lower death rates. It now 
implies the opposite: modern technology implies fewer people due to declining birthrates 
because fewer people are needed. Technology’s relationship to affluence has always been one 
of association. With a world connected through its latest expression it becomes possible that 
such affluence can be more evenly distributed as well as less destructive for the planet. 
 
The following chapter 7 considers options to further the quest for sustainability given the 
foreseeable political and economic constraints upon its interconnected elements.  
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Chapter 7. Options 
 
There is absolutely no inevitability as long as there is a willingness to contemplate what is 
happening                                                                                                      – Marshall McLuhan 1967 
 
Human impact on the biosphere already approaches or has reached unsustainable levels in 
several areas, including the extinctions of other species, fish harvesting, de-forestation and 
carbon pollution of the atmosphere. Options for sustainability policy are limited. Where to 
act: population, affluence or technology? 
 
While fewer people on the planet is clearly most desirable for the entire biosphere, 
population measures are problematic. Direct population policy such as the one child policy in 
China and the sterilisation program in India have resulted in inequity, demographic distortion, 
resentment and abuse of human rights. Even if able to be applied in Africa or other high 
population growth areas, similar outcomes would inevitably result. Better ways to check 
population are indirect – making reliable contraception accessible as well as upholding 
women’s rights, the education of girls, encouragement of urbanisation, facilitation of 
migration and increasing family incomes.  
 
Nevertheless, neither direct nor indirect approaches are at all likely to achieve global 
population reduction within coming decades such is the lag between action and result, that 
necessarily spans generations rather than the few years of a political cycle. Short of a super-
pandemic, asteroid collision or nuclear war, our numbers are most likely to continue to 
increase until at least mid-century, and probably beyond that. There is no more lebensraum 
into which our society can expand. Those extra people will have to be accommodated, fed and 
educated within the bounds of one world.  
 
If humanity has a future into the next or the twenty-third century, then the sort of civilisation 
envisaged by Arthur Clarke becomes thinkable: hundreds of millions of us rather than billions; 
much of the Earth re-wilded and biologically diverse. Counter-intuitively, that possibility 
depends on the many more people this century becoming not poorer, but more affluent, as 
Ricardo foresaw centuries ago affluence is inversely related to population increase. That 
affluence, as the SDGs suggest, includes access to modern sanitation, energy and medicines, 
and to education  and especially in the use of technologies that advance sustainability. 
 
From any perspective, it is neither feasible nor desirable to set out to diminish affluence as a 
political platform. It is challenging, but not impossible though, to reduce inequality and it is 
desirable from several perspectives. The inverse nexus between income and population 
growth underlines the absurdity of policies that aim to reduce average levels of affluence. It 
might possibly aid the biosphere that more billions of us are reduced to subsistence – there 
might be less resource use and chemical pollution – but those same billions would resent that 
decline; the politics of primitivism are clearly unsaleable. Alternatively, policies that tend to 
reduce inequality may benefit sustainability because much of the impetus for conspicuous 
consumption would tend to be lessened, luxury markets for private jets and swimming pools 
would shrivel,139 and especially because more people who are better off, better educated and 
better connected would have a stronger voice on the environmental quality that affects them.  
 
                                                 
139 Although it might be argued that markets for more prosaic items such as air conditioners, sport 
utility vehicles and flat screen televisions may continue to increase as demand is driven by falling prices 
due to low-cost manufacturing in Asia. 
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Churchill’s observation that capitalism tends to increase inequality has been borne out by 
Picketty, and considerable evidence is available that links inequality and environmental harm. 
But while policies that aim to reduce affluence are simply not viable, policies that tend to 
reduce inequality also can be extremely difficult to make stick. The fate of the Affordable 
Health Care for America Act and its later variants is a significant example here. Known as 
‘Obamacare’, the Bill was diluted by the US Senate and passed in 2010 to the consternation of 
conservative Republicans. Due to be substantially wound back by ‘Trumpcare’ in whatever 
form in 2017, this major step in the reduction of inequality in the US would be undermined.  
 
Nevertheless, elements of Kuznets’ ‘golden era’ world of rising mass affluence and declining 
inequality might conceivably return on a global as well as a national scale, given determined 
public policies driven by the urgency of action to combat unsustainability. Such policies would 
include an approach to economics that measures impact on natural resources and emphasises 
non-material consumption rather than growth at all cost. Otherwise, unless the ‘four 
horsemen of levelling’140 revisit, inequality will inexorably rise, and the quest for sustainability 
will be made even harder in a world where major institutions pay only lip service to its pursuit. 
In any case, a rising affluence in the South implies both increased resource use and more 
waste in the shorter term. In the absence of significant technological development directed at 
these issues, sustainability will become a mirage, more elusive than an arctic fox in the snows 
of a Siberian winter. 
 
Of the three main options implied by the IPAT identity, achieving a smaller global population 
may be feasible in the very long term, but the factor of population will continue to press 
probably at least until the end of this century. The denial of greater human affluence may 
underlie some proposals for a return to ‘simplicity’, but there are very few poor people in the 
world who would prefer to remain so. This is demonstrated not only by the dramatic increases 
in affluence in China and other countries of the East, but also by the increasing phenomenon 
of economic migration (as well as more immediate forms), whereby millions are motivated to 
seek the affluence and relative security of developed countries. Thus neither population nor 
affluence are factors that encompass practical hope for achieving a sustainable existence on 
this planet.  
 
It is therefore only in technology that there may be opportunity to rein in unsustainable 
practices and reduce human impact, while at the same time accommodating a still rising 
population, growing affluence and reducing inequality. But without a different approach to 
technology, the practices that have already wrought mass extinction and damaged the 
biosphere will continue. Those practices depend upon a form of passivity, an attitude of 
inevitability, or the view that any innovation is good, industrial processes are progressive and 
that technologies give us mastery over the Earth. 
 
Whilst humanity has been warned about technology throughout history, we have nonetheless 
been defined by our relationship with it and that relationship has continued to intensify. 
Commoner’s point that technology most amplified environmental damage in the mid-
twentieth century has been updated and detailed by Steffen et al in the twenty-first, and the 
trends are arresting. Yet technology has transformed since Commoner’s time. It increasingly 
encompasses a much expanded range of alternatives, so much that it appears to be on the 
brink of a new era. In the critical energy sector, photovoltaics and other renewable sources 
are already viable, scalable and cheaper than established high emissions generation. In 
transport, electric and self-driving cars are poised to predominate. Tesla is already worth more 
                                                 
140 Mass warfare, revolution, state failure, and pandemics -see page 87. 
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than Ford; India plans to ban petrol-powered cars by 2030; private urban car ownership is 
diminishing. High-speed rail has replaced much short-flight aviation in Europe, Japan and 
China.141 In agriculture, precision techniques and robotics minimise both inputs and waste, 
enabling an intensification that uses less land, and machine learning enables reliable 
prediction. In the chemical industry less toxic substitutes are being developed and deployed. 
Digital technologies enable communication networks without poles and wires, monitoring of 
the entire Earth, and the application of big data analytics to environmental harms.  
 
On the demand side there are significant opportunities to cut domestic and industrial energy 
consumption, to reduce depletion of non-renewables and to increase demand for products 
from sustainable sources. This would amount to a redesign of developed economies to be 
more based on services rather than physical goods and to design objects for re-use rather 
than disposal as waste, as part of the circular economy concept.  
 
While it is not always progressive, for sustainability to be furthered, innovation is to be 
encouraged and channelled in that direction. And while innovation does not depend on 
capitalism, capitalism is quick to exploit its fruits. Its agility and practicality cannot therefore 
be discarded in the quest for sustainability. Yet capitalism’s stripped down neo-liberal version 
tends to focus on short-term returns irrespective of other merits, and enables the massing of 
large fortunes and political power of the few. Because it is antipathetic to sustainability, it is 
evidently imperative that changes to the dominant technological paradigm within capitalism 
are effected if human civilisation is to have a long-term future. The next question is how best 
to do so. 
 
Way forward 
In 1976 Marshall McLuhan wrote a manuscript with his colleague Robert Logan titled ‘The 
Future of the Library’ that remained unpublished for nearly three decades,142 delayed by 
McLuhan’s stroke in 1979 and consequent death the following year. In it they made several 
observations about technology that resonate with this research. They noticed that: 
  
We live in a complex world of high technology and intractable social problems [where] 
we must confront the effects of exploding population, diminishing resources, 
information glut and over-specialisation…We live in an era of information explosion. 
We are flooded by a plethora of data, yet seem unable to use our knowledge and 
understanding to come to terms with the difficulties facing us...The solution to any 
one problem exacerbates one or more of the others…Our society and technological 
environment has grown so complex that we find ourselves victims of a double bind 
where each solution creates additional problems (McLuhan & Logan 1976, p. 19).  
 
They observe that the tradition of Western thought implies a failure to consider the impact of 
technology on ourselves or our environment. Technocrats are “naïve about the effects of their 
technologies” as Henry Ford failed to foresee the carnage of the automobile alongside the 
mobility benefits that it promised. In this “electric age”, they say, “there can be no more 
monopolies of knowledge” (Ibid, p. 26), a challenge yet to be met.  
 
With the wisdom of hindsight, this manuscript identifies aspects of our relationship with 
technology that appear central to our present dilemma and suggests a way forward: to 
interrogate the vast amount of available data to help resolve sustainability; to pay much more 
attention to the effects of technologies; and in doing both to fuse the quantitative with the 
                                                 
141 Including the 430km/hour Shanghai maglev train, China’s high speed network is the world’s largest. 
142 The quotation is from an edited excerpt published with the approval of Robert Logan. 
  133 
qualitative, the engineer with the artist  as was suggested in the same era by Robert Pirsig 
(1984 [1974]). 
 
Alien overlords 
So there is a need for stronger policy-making, especially about using technology to consume 
resources sustainably. Yet there remains an issue of values. The icons of contemporary new 
technology – algorithms, smartphones, virtual reality, artificial intelligence  associated with 
Silicon Valley may have vastly increased human connectivity and made fortunes for their 
creators, but physically and symbolically these creators and their clergy are isolated from 
normal life. These are our “alien overlords” the “hoodied young software engineers who ride 
to work aboard luxury buses”, oblivious to all but the music in their headphones and the 
screen of their mobile device (Solnit, cited in Beacock 2015, para 17). The term ‘clergy’ for 
these aliens is appropriate more than just for its evocation of their hooded cassocks and their 
language of esoteric codes. Their numbers are overwhelmingly male  and young and white  
which tends to result in norms and values hostile to those who are not (Corbyn 2015). It 
means that much technological development reflects the values of this group. Yet instead of 
more of the same violent gaming, drone warfare or social trivia, it is possible to imagine 
technologies that rely on more imaginative and creative outlooks, technologies driven by 
different values.  
 
For those of us for whom the Google bus does not stop, our lives increasingly depend on 
technologies we do not understand, nor conceive of how we could change them. It is as if we 
are part of something we “cannot quite grasp, like there has been a phase shift from humans 
struggling to survive to humanity struggling to survive our success” (Bures 2016). Indeed, the 
present inevitability that we now use technologies different from each preceding generation 
only extends back in time about five generations. The struggle for survival for most people 
before the Industrial Revolution was waged with technologies unchanged for centuries – the 
plough, the terrace, the harness, the loom and domestic fire. Now with change seeming to 
compress time and our adjustment to it, there is a renewed imperative to understand how 
technology might serve our highest priority  sustainability.   
 
Resource productivity 
There is evidence that sustainable prosperity by mid-century is possible through “mobilising 
technology” and delivering incentives to reduce environmental pressure. This would amount 
to a decoupling of economic growth from material impact through technology. It is claimed to 
be demonstrable through computer modelling by economic and life scientists at the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), Australia (Hatfield-
Dodds et al 2015). The Club of Rome has also undertaken extensive modelling of a new 
economy in which economic growth is decoupled from resource use in five European 
countries. Its report on the ‘circular economy’ links technology, policy reform and resource 
productivity to its achievement: 
 
With a growing population, and in the developing countries a much-needed increase 
of per capita income (affluence), technology innovation, in combination with 
behaviour change  and underpinned by policy reforms  are the only options we 
have to bring down the environmental impacts. Luckily, there are many types of 
decoupling that could and should be achieved by improved technology, often 
complemented by behavioural change. Unfortunately, policies to promote such 
actions are rare. While the promotion of labour productivity has been a priority for 
economic policy-making in the past, resource productivity has been more or less 
neglected (Wijkman & Skånberg 2015 p. 8) 
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Resolution 
As Roden (2016) observes, technology is probably “not in control of anything, but is largely out 
of our control”. If sustainability is to be progressed, then that control must be reasserted. But 
progressing sustainability is extremely complicated, involving judgments of “intergenerational 
ethics, science, economics, politics, and much else” to questions of “energy, agriculture, 
forestry, shelter, urban planning, health, livelihood, security, and the distribution of wealth 
within and between generations” (Orr 2006, p. 267). Ultimately, as historian Leo Marx in his 
The Machine in the Garden (1964) noticed, the resolution to the problem of technology and 
the environment is one not for historians or technocrats, whatever their values, but for 
politicians. 
 
In this vein, the following Part Two of this dissertation concerns effecting a direction for 
technology that benefits a sustainable world. It considers the elements of good governance, 
where particular case studies show it is lacking and how it might apply to technologies in the 
future. 
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Part Two. Governing technology for sustainability 
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Chapter 8. Technology and governance 
 
The essence of technology is by no means anything technological – Martin Heidegger 1953. 
 
The ‘technology as tiger’ metaphor in the introduction highlights the need for control of its 
lethal power. Yet a different image, of an embrace, a dance with a duality, may be closer to 
our present relationship. As described in chapter 2, some technologies can both advance and 
degrade sustainability, depending on their targets. This dual nature is intrinsic to our bond 
with its many forms. Humanity’s relationship with technology is a tango with Janus without 
end. As technology advances, this embrace seems ever closer and the tempo ever quickens. 
Swept along together, humanity follows rather than leads, our partner switching between 
benevolence and malice. In this image, the issue is how to wrest control over the dance before 
calamity ensues.  
 
This Part Two is about the governance of technology for sustainability. It addresses two 
related questions:  
(1) ‘What weaknesses exist, if any, in current global governance arrangements for 
ensuring that technology contributes to sustainability, including in its development 
and commercialisation?’, and its corollary: 
(2) ‘What reforms to global governance arrangements are needed to ensure that 
technology contributes to sustainability, including in its development and 
commercialisation?’  
 
This chapter 8 discusses humanity’s relationship with technology and its expression through 
governance. It examines the dimensions of governance, and its paradigms that frame 
technology in relation to sustainability at state and global levels. The following chapters 9, 10 
and 11 comprise a comparative analysis of three case studies of chemical herbicides, nuclear 
power, and robotics and artificial intelligence to identify problems with existing governance 
approaches. Chapter 12 summarises lessons from the case studies, and chapter 13 discusses 
implied reforms to technology governance and related measures to advance sustainability. 
The conclusion, chapter 14, is called ‘The Owl of Minerva’, wisdom’s companion that takes 
flight at the end of the day (Hegel 2001 [1820], p. 20). 
 
A form of madness 
While technology is key to sustainability, how it is governed is at issue. This is because there is an 
‘anything goes’ approach to technology that has both negative and positive consequences for 
sustainability. Not only are we using technology to ransack our world to fuel our machines and to 
push consumption of the superfluous, technology remains largely free of constraint, direction or 
accountability for the loss of sustainability it causes. As Bertrand Russell (1946, p. 482) observed, 
the modern attitude to technology is “a form of madness”, everything non-human is “mere raw 
material”; ends are not considered, only the skilfulness of the process. Yet, paradoxically, of the 
key factors affecting sustainability, only a changed relationship with technology holds practical 
hope of achieving it.  
 
It has been said that, at least in the post-Enlightenment West, our time is always special, and 
much relates to technology: 
 
Temporal narcissism demands that we must always live in the most crucial, most 
urgent, most dangerous, yet most opportunity-rich time in human history. Technology 
must always be “moving faster than ever before.” And law and policy, of course, must 
“not be keeping up with technology” (Vaidhyanathan 2015, para. 11). 
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It does seem that technology is accelerating and becoming harder to control through policy 
and regulation. This may be partly because the word ‘technology’ is increasingly assumed to 
mean the plethora of rapidly developing digital technologies rather than its wider meaning 
used here. ‘Innovation’ and ‘disruption’ are worshipped, yet much innovation is trivial and 
much disruption is economic; sustainability consequences are generally ignored.  ‘Innovation’ 
has replaced the notion of ‘progress’, as perhaps it is more easily demonstrable; a diminished 
goal, free of annoying ‘values’. If sustainable innovation is to be fostered and unsustainable 
innovation curtailed, new ways of governing technology are needed. Innovation may then 
contribute to genuine progress.  
 
Humanity’s relationship with technology is much deeper than is immediately apparent. Yet 
our entire past has been transformed by technology’s cascade – from mastery of fire to the 
construction of hunting tools, to sewing and weaving, to the specialisation of Adam Smith, the 
industrial world of Karl Marx, to the telephone, electricity and radio, the car, the aeroplane 
and spacecraft, to the personal computer, the Internet and social media. Not only have we 
used technology to shape our world, as Engels (1940 [1876]) observed, equally humanity has 
been shaped by its creations, but not always in a manner obvious or benign: 
 
Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately 
affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we 
regard it as something neutral (Heidegger 1953, p. 4). 
 
A one-dimensional subject-object view of our relationship with technology is consistent with 
its ability to objectify our environment. For example, as geoengineering enters mainstream 
consciousness, such technologies can be seen as a threat based on extended objectification 
and capture of the planet:  
 
Before geoengineering was conceivable, the Earth as a whole had to be representable 
as a total object, an object captured in climate models that form the epistemological 
basis for climate engineering...by objectifying the world as a whole, geoengineering 
goes beyond the mere representation of nature as ‘standing reserve’; it requires us 
...to see technology as a response to disorder breaking through (Hamilton 2013). 
 
In a similar way, Pope Francis (2015, s.53) believes there is a “techno-economic paradigm” 
that threatens to overwhelm ecosystems and politics, based on a one-dimensional subject-
object view of humanity and nature. Russell, Engels, Heidegger, Hamilton and Francis 
recognise the significance of our bond with technology and its capacity to alienate us from the 
environment. The key to governing technology for sustainability then seems to be recognition 
of this relationship as a mutual interaction rather than a one-way street. The consequences of 
technology are increasingly hard to predict, but prediction is increasingly needed, and more 
and more the information is available on which to base such judgements.  
 
At the same time, it is also acknowledged that there is an extensive critical Freudian and neo-
Marxist143 body of literature concerning humanity’s relationship with technology. This includes 
sociological works from the Frankfurt school, beginning in the 1920s, and involving such 
notables as Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse. Consistent with his own historical experience, 
the former was most concerned with the rise of totalitarianism and humanity’s psychological 
“fear of freedom” (Fromm 1941), while the latter regarded technology as originally a 
                                                 
143 Hegel, Kant and Weber were also significant influences on critical theory of the political economy 
and society. 
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liberating force due to its instrumental approach, but which “turns into a fetter of [human] 
liberation; the instrumentalisation of man” (Marcuse 1964, p. 159). Marcuse goes on to 
elaborate that: 
 
Nature, scientifically comprehended and mastered, reappears in the technical 
apparatus of production and destruction which sustains and improves the life of the 
individuals [while] subordinating them to the masters of the apparatus (Ibid, p. 166). 
 
Much of Marcuse’s central assertions were based on those of the school’s acknowledged 
leader, Max Horkheimer, who led the school in exile at Colombia University before reinstating 
it in Frankfurt after the war (Berendzen 2017). The essence of Horkheimer’s view is that the 
expression of technology in industrialism and its associated consumption imperative creates a 
human existence that is a slave to rationality (such as efficiency), and which negates any moral 
dimension. He also criticises Science as being overly specialised and divorced from its 
relationship with society (Ibid s.2.5). Overall, contemporary critical theory aims to allow 
people to “transform themselves on their own terms” instead of demanding their adaptation 
to existing conditions in order to survive (Schecter 2013, p. 133). 
 
This present dissertation, however, goes further than the amorality of technology and its 
relationship with human society. As mentioned at the outset, all else in human aspiration is 
rendered void if our species suffers the same fate as that which has already befallen so many 
of our fellow creatures  extinction. And the key to that fate as well as to its avoidance is 
technology. Despite industrialism, efficiency imperatives and pressures to consume, humanity 
is self-aware. If that understanding is then applied to technology and sustainability, then such 
forces can be blunted so that humanity may become sustainable over the long term. 
 
Irrespective of its power to both magnify and shrink human impact, much of the present 
emphasis of governance and sustainability is not on technology, but rather on where it impacts – 
on particular parts of the biosphere and on the global ‘earth systems’ that are represented 
through computer modelling. Aspects of the biosphere are beginning to be governed as part of 
the global commons by international agreement – especially the atmosphere in terms of 
pollutants and the oceans in terms of sustainable catch. However, the terrestrial lithosphere is 
governed more or less directly by national and local governments while agriculture, resource 
extraction, industrialism and human populations intersect. Without diminishing this existing 
geographic governance, it would seem prudent to reinforce its web by incorporating a stronger 
weft  the governance of critical technologies to give priority to sustainability.  
 
Even where technology assessments do take place in respect of policy, much of the assessment 
undertaken is focused not on environmental sustainability, but is rather concerned with  and 
diffused by  wider social and economic impacts: 
 
based on normative filters such as notions of proportionality and precaution (or as we 
have in the EU, the requirement to implement the precautionary principle in policy 
frameworks), various forms of impact analysis, such as sustainability impacts, cost-
benefit analysis, environmental policy impact analysis etc., the application of particular 
consensual norms or prioritisation of norms (for instance that health and environment 
takes precedence over economic considerations) and the application of normative 
standards for product acceptability (Von Schomberg 2011, p. 8). 
 
Further, there is a lot of overlap between the methods used in technology assessment, social 
impact assessment and environmental impact assessment. For technology assessment in the late 
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twentieth century, the most common methods used  often in combination  were relatively 
simple: expert opinion, monitoring and trend extrapolation, as well as less frequently, scenarios, 
qualitative modelling, non-expert opinion, quantitative modelling, checklists, and matrices in that 
order (Porter 1995, p. 144). At issue here is that technology assessments were not focused on 
their contribution to environmental sustainability, and conversely environmental impact 
assessments did not concentrate on the impacts of technologies. This becomes self-perpetuating, 
as not only do “indicators arise from values (we measure what we care about), …[but] they create 
values (we care about what we measure)” (Meadows 1998, p. 2). As discussed in chapter 5, the 
universal reliance on GDP as an indicator of economic well-being during the past century has 
meant that analysis and policy is directed to its growth at the expense of other possible 
measures, for example.  
 
Two decades later, the field had become rather more complicated. Singh et al (2012, pp. 296-
297), for example, list 41 major composite indices that are each themselves composed of dozens 
of different indicators used to measure “sustainability”, or “sustainable development” of the 
Brundtland kind. They apply mainly to corporations, government, or processes rather than to 
technology directly and relate to social and economic as well as environmental sustainability. But 
even the “innovation, knowledge and technology” set of nine composite sustainability indices 
almost entirely measure the sustainability-neutral, such as the ‘monetary investment in research 
and development’, or the ‘number of graduates or post-graduates in the sciences’ or the ‘number 
of patents granted per year’, or the ‘value of high-tech exports’ (Ibid, p. 288). A single indicator of 
a technology’s contribution to sustainability remained elusive.  
 
In the US, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment spanned the years from 1972 until 
1996, when it was closed under speaker Newt Gingrich’s ‘Contract with America’ program of 
expenditure cuts. Its purpose was to assess largely developing technologies so that members of 
Congress, who tended to be unfamiliar with such issues, could make meaningful decisions about 
them. However, many of its several hundred background papers and reports144 concerned the 
social and industrial consequences of technology rather than their sustainability. This included 
such reports as ‘Demographic Trends and the Scientific and Engineering Workforce’ (December 
1985) and ‘Displaced Homemakers: Programs and Policy’ (October 1985), which provided no 
suggestions for sustainability governance and were only indirectly linked to technology. Further, 
some of its reports may have been true, but were unhelpful on the issue of technological 
sustainability. Its 1994 paper, Studies on the environmental costs of electricity, for example, 
concluded “that no clear consensus exists on quantitative estimates of environmental costs of 
electricity, or on methodologies for making those estimates” (US Congress Office of Technology 
Assessment 1994, p. 2), and the paper did not suggest any.  
 
Some decades after the closure of the Office of Technology Assessment, its functions were picked 
up by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), which is independent of Congress and has 
a much wider field of interest than technologies. While far fewer technology assessments have 
been undertaken by the GAO, some do directly relate to technological sustainability, such as its 
2015 assessment on ‘reducing freshwater use in hydraulic fracturing and thermoelectric power 
plant cooling’ (USGAO 2015). But more generally, it seems telling that a 2017 keyword search of 
GAO assessments shows that the word ‘sustainability’ is rarely mentioned in their titles and sub-
titles. In the few cases where it is mentioned, it relates to fiscal sustainability and sustainability of 
nuclear weapons. The purely military term ‘sustainment’ is more common, but it bears little 
relationship to the quest described here, rather relating to the ability to sustain combat or other 
                                                 
144 “In its 24 years, OTA published nearly 750 full assessments, background papers, technical 
memoranda, case studies, and workshop proceedings” (Office of Technology Assessment 1995 annual 
report, p. 7), or more than 31 per year. 
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missions resulting from logistics. Also, in 2012 the GAO won a satirical ‘Ig Nobel’ prize for 
literature145 for a report about reports that recommends a further report (USGAO 2012), which 
further tends to undermine confidence in its capacity to focus.   
 
Nevertheless, the concept of a body to undertake technology assessments influenced the 
establishment of similar institutions in other countries, and especially in the EU, where it became 
the European Parliamentary Technological Assessment (EPTA) – to which, ironically, the US GAO 
technology assessment group later became affiliated. Again, EPTA reports do not always concern 
technology and sustainability, but at least some do. There are reports on technology and waste 
management, on energy systems, sustainable transport and genetically modified food, for 
example. But the basic notion of these assessment offices implies that it is only through 
government that technology governance is effected, whereas this may not be so in the practical 
‘real world’. Alternatively, the Office of Technology Assessment pioneered the adoption of 
electronic reporting and distribution, taking advantage of the emerging Internet during the 
1990s. It may appear trivial closer to 2020, but it meant that structured reports at least 
potentially oriented to technology and sustainability became universally accessible.   
 
Governance 
While the term ‘governance’ has been described as a ‘weasel’ word that is “slippery and 
elusive, used to obscure, not to shed light” (Bevir & Rhodes 2004, p. 133), in this context its 
meaning is clear. It means how we control technology in important conscious ways, rather 
than allowing its development unchecked by considerations of sustainability.  
 
Crucially, ‘governance’ is not ‘government’. Rather it is the “traditions, institutions and processes” 
that shape the exercise of power in making decisions of public concern (Graham, Amos & 
Plumptre 2003). Its emergence as a concept in the latter part of the last century, hinged on the 
“vast increase, in both numbers and influence, of non-state actors” as well as “the implications of 
technology in an age of globalisation” (Weiss 2000, p. 796). The World Bank, which is especially 
concerned with governance of developing states, says it is a process of interaction between state 
and non-state actors shaped by power. It involves government, international organisations, civil 
society organisations and business associations operating at various overlapping levels in “a 
complex network of actors and interests” (World Bank 2017b, p. 3). Importantly, governance  
like technology  is systematic (Greer, Wismar & Figueras 2016, p. 3). It can apply to international 
society and to public and private organisations as much as to nation states and local 
communities. An important consideration is thus the boundaries in which it operates.  
 
Old style command-and-control regulation was appropriate to simpler societies when governance 
was directly effected by government as its dominant agent. The key weakness in this style is of 
course that it not possible to command nor control fast changing technologies no matter how 
many administrators there are. Another is that controls tend to be implemented in case of rare 
events and exceptional cases, which unnecessarily degrades normal operations. If each step of a 
long process is under government control, then the process becomes ponderous; often 
accompanied by reams of paperwork and barriers to innovation. A more nuanced style of 
governance involving complex technologies is indicated to improve sustainability. On the other 
hand, there are fundamental sustainability issues that may not be abandoned by government. 
These are the issues of major, even existential risk as discussed in the case studies on nuclear 
power (chapter 10) and artificial intelligence (chapter 11).  
 
                                                 
145 Source: Wikipedia list of Ig Nobel prize winners 
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As mentioned in chapter 3, there is a contrast between attempting to control waste-producing 
technologies at the ‘end-of-the-pipe’ and encouraging more sustainable technologies in the first 
place (such as particulate filters for combustion engines compared with electric engines that do 
not produce particulates). Whatever the form of governance, it is important that non-polluting 
technologies are preferred, as well as those that sustainably make use of renewables or 
substitute for non-renewables (Daly 1990). Doing so, it would appear, tends to make governance 
simpler and easier. A clear trend in general regulation, however, is that it is ultimately 
governments that set standards for outcomes, rather than for technological and industrial 
processes. Ends are more important than means, and if the same ends can be achieved more 
efficiently, then this should not be impeded. Thus for technological sustainability, such regulation 
would specify standards of impact, in terms of yield, substitution and assimilation rather than 
how they would be achieved. Whilst outcome standard-setting is logically a government role, 
how it concludes and enforces them can vary considerably between industries and between 
jurisdictions. The glyphosate case study at chapter 9 illustrates different approaches between the 
US and the EU for example, where in the former there is a closer relationship with industry 
compared with the latter, while this is different again in the case of the nuclear power industry 
(chapter 10) as the global French industry is particularly close to government. While the 
development of artificial intelligence is essentially left to Silicon Valley to determine (chapter 11), 
the recent struggle over what should be counted for cost-benefit analyses of US rivers and 
wetlands illustrates how political ideology can drive and distort outcomes (Boyle, Kotchen & 
Smith 2017).  
 
None of this denies that there is a relationship between regulation and innovation. But rather, 
the relationship is not as straightforward as might be imagined. Strong regulation does not 
necessarily imply lack of innovation. It is probably more true that weak, confused and ‘rule-book’ 
regulation results in inertia and uncertainty. The key issue is the quality of the regulation. High 
standards appropriately enforced can enable competitive advantage built on that quality rather 
than commodity competition built on price. And the key issue in innovation is not its novelty, but 
ultimately its sustainability value. Implied political measures that would enable more sustainable 
technologies are discussed in ‘alternative visions’, the penultimate chapter 13. 
 
Most generally, governance is about the determination and implementation of collective 
decisions. ‘Good governance’ is therefore about the quality of that decision-making and the 
exercise of power. Whilst expressed in different detail, there is general consensus about what 
it entails across several areas. The UNDP, for example, which is especially concerned with 
development objectives, lists nine good governance characteristics: participation, rule of law, 
transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, 
accountability, and strategic vision (UNDP 1997). 
 
 The EU condenses these to five broad categories more relevant to developed country 
programs: openness and transparency, participation of all stakeholders, accountability, 
effectiveness, and coherence (EU 2001, EU 2015). As to focus, Weiss (2000, p. 801) asserts that 
good governance centers on overcoming both “the unrepresentative character of 
governments and the inefficiency of non-market systems”. Arguably, representation and 
efficiency remain important to its meaning. 
 
The international Canadian Institute on Governance in reviewing environmental protection 
suggests five principles based on the UNDP formulation, which are similar to those of the EU. 
These are: legitimacy and voice, direction, performance, accountability and transparency, and 
fairness (Graham, Amos & Plumptre 2003, p. 3). Pierre & Peters (2005, pp. 3-5) writing about 
state-related governance say that it involves (i) articulating goals and priorities; (ii) providing 
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coherence and coordination; (iii) steering and implementing, directly or indirectly; and (iv) 
providing accountability to society. It is implied therefore that ‘good governance’ is doing 
these things well.  
 
Biermann (2007) in discussing earth systems governance suggests that there are four related 
principles  credibility, stability, adaptiveness and inclusiveness  much due to the uncertainty 
and potentially extreme impacts of anthropogenic earth systems. Von Schomberg (2011, p. 
16) of the European Commission advocates models of responsible innovation governance 
whereby actors become mutually responsive; companies identify the risks as well as the 
benefits of new technologies and NGOs consider the value of using new technologies as well 
as their potential hazards.  
 
Ultimately, Greer, Wismar & Figueras (2016, pp. 28-29), whose focus is health policy within the 
EU, cite a comprehensive table linking 16 authors writing between the years 1997 to 2013 against 
23 dimensions of governance,146 in different contexts. The table is at figure 25 below.  
 
Figure 25. Common dimensions of governance across literature reviewed 
 
Source: Barbazza and Tello 2014, cited in Greer, Wismar & Figueras 2016. 
 
From this and other information, they distil a set of five broad dimensions, which they arrange 
into the acronym ‘TAPIC’: transparency, accountability, participation, integrity and capacity. (Ibid, 
pp. 116-120). These dimensions are consistent with earlier proposals, but have three key 
advantages  an empirical rationale, an easily remembered acronym, and brevity. (There is also 
the serendipity of a near mirror of the IPAT acronym). Further, because they are universal 
categories and already apply to a field rife with technologies,147 these elements are applicable to 
the governance of technology. While the authors point out that none of these dimensions is 
unequivocally good (too much participation can reduce efficiency, for example), they form a 
                                                 
146 Interestingly, ‘sustainability’ appears only once: the last under ‘Council of Europe 2012’. 
147 That is, the health and medical field. 
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framework for gauging how technologies are and might be governed for sustainability. This 
structure is also used for the case study analyses in later chapters.  
 
Transparency means that stakeholders and the public are informed of how and on what grounds 
decisions are made. Mechanisms include watchdog committees, inspectorates, and regular, clear 
and usable reports. Transparency mechanisms make it possible to understand an institution, 
identify corruption or incompetence, and ultimately rectify faults or adapt behaviours. Too much 
transparency can have contradictory results, however. For example, onerous freedom of 
information (FOI) rules can drive decision makers to conduct meetings without notes and in 
secret. At its best, transparency produces useful and accurate information that can be used by 
those who rely on or seek to influence the organisation. Ultimately, optimal transparency 
produces trust (Greer, Wismar & Figueras 2016, pp. 32-33). 
 
Accountability involves both explanation and sanction. It is the relationship between an actor and 
a forum whereby the actor must inform of actions and explain decisions and can be sanctioned 
for infringements. Accountability mechanisms include contracts, rules that specify objectives and 
reporting mechanisms, conflict of interest policies, codes of conduct and regulation. Yet while 
accountability is hard to argue against in public, it can be difficult to implement and is often 
pursued unproductively by focussing on the relatively trivial at the expense of the important. 
Also, too much accountability can produce rigidity due to lack of discretion, and overly complex 
accountability systems can produce inefficiency. Fewer such relationships are therefore often 
remedial (Ibid, pp. 34-35). Accountability goes wrong when regulators are captured (Friedman 
1982, p. 128) or codes of conduct ignored, which implies that more than one accountability 
mechanism is desirable.  
 
Participation means that affected parties have “access to decision-making and power to give 
them a meaningful stake in the work of the institution” (Greer, Wismar & Figueras 2016, p. 35). If 
decisions are made and authority exercised without the participation of affected groups, results 
tend to be sub-optimal. Conversely, Fung (2006, p. 66) argues that well-structured participation 
improves legitimacy and ownership of implementation, justice in outcomes, and policy 
effectiveness through better information. Participatory mechanisms include stakeholder forums, 
consultations, elections or appointed representatives, choice mechanisms, advisory committees, 
partnerships, surveys and joint workings. However, participatory mechanisms can fail. One 
important issue is whether or not the purpose of participation is clear and justifiable. Another is 
whether the mechanism is effective in providing useful input. Creating many different 
participation mechanisms can create inefficiencies and delay or make difficult important 
decisions.  
 
Integrity counters corruption in that it creates a trustworthy and purposeful organisation. It 
involves ethics, predictability and rule of law, together with well-defined roles and responsibilities 
aligned with clearly specified processes of representation, decision-making and enforcement. 
Integrity mechanisms include internal career paths that obviate officials seeking profit outside 
government, audit processes, personnel practices that encourage talent and remove the 
unsound, legislative mandates, budgets, meeting procedures and documentation. On the 
downside it can also mean more bureaucracy, in that procedures intended to enhance integrity 
can proliferate at the cost of effectiveness and efficiency. Lastly, while the benefits of well-
defined organisational roles can be overstated, clarity of mission and focus on key goals cannot 
(Greer, Wismar & Figueras 2016, pp. 38-39). In this particular case then, mission clarity might 
involve ensuring that current and emerging technologies contribute to sustainability. It would 
also involve the identification of technologies that most jeopardise the continuation of life within 
the biosphere. Goals might include the development of sustainability criteria for each cluster of 
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technologies, the development of indices to measure progress, determining how best to phase 
out and substitute technologies found wanting. This critical issue is revisited in chapter 13 on 
alternative visions at page 203, which follows the case study summary. 
 
Capacity generally is the capability of an organisation to undertake its mission. ‘Capacity building’ 
or ‘capacity development’ concern building organisational skills and abilities to accomplish 
ongoing objectives (e.g. UNDP 2009). Whilst relevant to governance as a general concept, in the 
TAPIC framework ‘capacity’ has a more specific meaning relating to policy. Policy capacity is the 
ability to develop policy in pursuit of goals aligned with resources. It is the “competencies, 
resources, and experience that governments and public agencies use to identify, formulate, 
implement, and evaluate solutions to public problems” (Forest et al 2015, p. 265). In this sense, 
capacity means identifying opportunities to have an impact. It includes the ability to harness data, 
and to understand interest group and partisan politics. It also means undertaking activities that 
align with its mission, as well as having the technical and political skills to participate in 
discussions across sectors, and to create workable regulatory structures that produce desired 
policy outcomes (Greer et al 2016, p. 120). Mechanisms that improve policy capacity include 
performance analyses to identify problems and gauge the effects of policies; process analysis to 
highlight legal, budgetary and systems issues; and procedures to incorporate specialist advice into 
policy formulation. While it is possible to have too little policy capacity, or one that lacks 
experience in particular areas, too much such capacity is rare, if not unheard of (Greer, Wismar & 
Figueras 2016, pp. 39-40).  
 
Paradigms148 
While any rigid form of direct global regulation over technologies would likely tend to ossify 
progress towards sustainability, there are other ways to govern them. Beyond these views of 
humanity’s relationship with technology and the elements of governance, three key paradigms 
are evident in which technologies may be governed. These are the state-first, the market-based 
and emergent network models, characterised by increasing numbers of actors respectively. These 
paradigms are outlined below and their strengths and weaknesses assessed against the TAPIC 
elements.  
 
The state-led approach 
The state-led paradigm is extensive over both time and geography. It involves significant input 
from government and has been especially prominent in times of war, both hot and cold. But as 
well as collaboration on military research and development, the state has also been especially 
involved in energy as well as medical technologies (Harvey 2014, p. 94). At the global level, states 
are its singular key actors, operating in order to gain military and industrial advantage over other 
states.  
 
Apart from weapons, historically the governments of industrialised countries actively invested 
in new technologies. The first telegraph line was US government financed in 1842, for example 
(Stiglitz 2001, p. xiii). State-private partnerships resulted in railroads, aviation and new energy 
technologies (Jenkins et al 2010, pp. 4-6). The greatest technology advances since World War I 
were derived from public investment in university research that became public goods, rather 
than via the private patent system. Penicillin was based on public research going back to 
Pasteur in the nineteenth century. The industrial techniques for its volume manufacture were 
developed at the US Drug Administration during the 1940s (Ibid).  
 
                                                 
148 In the interest of variety and readability, synonyms such as ‘regime’, ‘model’ and ‘form’ are also used 
instead of ‘paradigm’ in this discussion. 
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Other state-developed technologies included radar and the digital computer during World War 2, 
together with satellite communications, space travel and the Internet during the Cold War. As 
well as such benign examples, however, nuclear bombs, ballistic missiles, and biological weapons 
such as Sarin gas were also developed under this paradigm. The conflicts of both world wars and 
the post-war intense rivalry between the US-led West and the Soviet Union were central factors 
in these developments.  
 
Strengthening the patent system protecting private research in biotechnology during the 
latter half of the twentieth century did not cause the bio-industrial revolution, but “was rather 
an outcome”. The basis of the biotechnology industry had already been created by the state. 
Similarly, some of the superior technological achievements of the Soviet Union149 resulted 
from concentrating public investment on innovation in certain fields, rather than from patents 
and other protections provided under the neoliberal regime (Drahos & Braithwaite 2001, p. 
213). 
 
Geographically, the ‘Asian tiger’ economies achieved economic growth through state-led 
industrialisation and technological innovation, including digital technologies and robotics (Japan) 
mobile computing and communications (South Korea), and computer hardware (Taiwan). Such 
regimes attempt to gain technological comparative advantage over other states to support their 
own development. In China, advances in photo-voltaics combined with the huge scale of their 
manufacturing have led to continuing price reductions in solar energy systems around the world. 
Much of this expansion results from the government’s response to mounting concerns about air 
pollution due to coal-fired electricity generation. 
 
However, over the past century it is in weapons technologies that the state-led approach has 
been most significant for sustainability governance. Biological150 and chemical weapons such 
as the mustard gas of World War I and the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, and the smallpox and 
bubonic plague weapons developed during the Cold War are now prohibited. Cluster 
munitions and landmines are also prohibited, if not yet eliminated.151 One reason for this is 
that all of these weapons have uncontrollable, unsustainable effects over the longer term that 
involve people and animals not part of the conflict, such as the mines laid down during the 
1970s conflict in Cambodia and Lao PDR (Laos). Notably, these governance measures are all 
simple bans. The technology is identified and it is prohibited. This suggests that state-led 
governance is a blunt instrument that tends to lack capacity in more complex situations.  
 
But while nuclear weapons prohibition was the first item on the agenda of the UN General 
Assembly in 1946, nuclear weapons have since proliferated (Cochran 1995). This may be 
because nuclear weapons remain ultimate symbols of technological superiority. If so, this is in 
irrational contrast to other weapons, as Angela Kane, former UN High Representative for 
Disarmament, observed recently:  
 
How many states today boast that they are “biological-weapon states” or “chemical-
weapon states”? Who is arguing now that bubonic plague or polio are legitimate to use 
as weapons under any circumstance, whether in an attack or in retaliation? Who speaks 
of a bioweapon umbrella? (Kane 2014).  
 
                                                 
149 See chapter 6 above 
150 US President Nixon ordered an end to the US biological weapons program in 1969. 
151 Under the 1998 Ottawa Treaty, signatory countries promise not to manufacture, stockpile or use 
anti-personnel mines. As of 2015, it has been signed by 162 countries, notably not including China, 
Russia or the US. 
  146 
Especially because its ultimate role is destructive, it is odd that the military appears to have 
escaped scrutiny in relation to sustainability. Eisenhower’s famous last US presidential speech 
warned of the conjunction of the military, industry and technology:  
 
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted 
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential 
for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist…largely responsible for 
the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological 
revolution during recent decades (Eisenhower 1961, s. IV).   
 
The destruction the US military has wrought since his speech has been immense, especially in 
South-East Asia and the Middle East.152 While military interests and the technology of warfare 
have continued to be significant despite Eisenhower’s warnings, nonetheless, US consumer 
technologies also developed in parallel. By contrast, the Soviet system of state planning over-
emphasised military rather than consumer, energy or resource-efficient technologies. Non-
military inventions were made but there was little incentive for them to be developed, until 
the failure of the system became obvious (Fukuyama 1989, p. 2; Dresner 2008, p. 151).  
 
However, military-industrial technologies were not the only thing that Eisenhower’s address 
warned about. Another caution anticipated the generational equity of Brundtland. It 
concerned sustainability, or eating the future: 
 
As we peer into society's future, we  you and I, and our government  must avoid the 
impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own ease and convenience, the 
precious resources of tomorrow (Eisenhower 1961, s. V).  
 
Contemporary India offers a different take on the state-led approach to technology 
governance. India was a stimulus for early theorists on sustainability. The Erlichs wrote their 
book on overpopulation after a visit there in the 1960s (Erlich 1968, p. 1, Greer 1985, p. 402, 
Dresner 2008, p. 25,) and the other wife-husband team, the Meadows, “intuited” the basis of 
The Limits to Growth after visiting there shortly afterward (Dresner 2008, p. 28). Then, India 
was a country of widespread poverty, whereas today poverty remains a major problem, but 
India is regarded a ‘middle income’ rather than a ‘poor’ country. Since the 1960s its 
population has trebled, but affluence has risen considerably more (World Bank 2016).153  
 
Rising affluence without loss of sustainability depends on access to low emissions energy. The 
election of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with Narendra Modi as Prime Minister in mid-2014 
began to build on this principle. With cheap photo-voltaic panels sourced from China, Modi 
proposed that much of India’s rural energy needs could be fulfilled by leapfrogging traditional 
large coal-powered electricity grids. Instead, rural households could use solar cells linked to 
battery storage, completely off-grid (Parkinson & Gilders 2014). This coal-free, grid-free 
approach was demonstrated in his home state, Gujarat, where solar power also links to the 
established grid in urban areas. During the election campaign, Modi emphasised his 
commitment to "maximum governance and minimum government" (Biswas 2014), especially 
relevant in a country entwined with layers of frustrating bureaucracy based on the red tape 
                                                 
152 Including the carpet bombing of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia during the 1960s and 1970s, and the 
invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003. 
153 Despite trebling her population from about 400 million in 1961 to more than 1300 million in 2015, 
India’s GDP per person rose five-fold in the same period. In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, GDP 
per person rose nearly six-fold between 1990 and 2015, from US$1,146 to US$6,088 in 2015 
international dollars (World Bank 2016). 
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detritus of the British Raj, where politics are contentious and often corrupt (Sivaram 201, p. 
47).  
 
Although also building new coal-fired and nuclear electricity plants where hundreds of millions 
are without access, India’s energy path is different from China, which originally based its 
economic growth on a coal-fired energy grid. The development of both off and on-grid solar in 
India is due to several factors. First, the cost of coal in India from sources such as the Galilee field 
in Australia is rising (Buckley 2014), while the price of Chinese photovoltaics is continuing to fall. 
Further, India’s climate would seem ideal for solar and, if decentralised, would not require the 
construction of a grid. Lastly, the example of air pollution in Chinese cities is a major disincentive 
to coal fired generation. The outstanding issue for solar is how to resolve energy storage using 
either batteries that are as yet unproven on a large scale, or pumped hydro storage where it is 
feasible. The Indian renewable energy development agency is nevertheless clear about its goals 
to harness the “huge potential of renewable energy resources” to supply “24 x 7 power to all 
but also to reduce the GHG emissions”. These plans include 100 gigawatts of solar power, plus 
wind and hydro, as well as biomass and bagasse cogeneration by 2022 (IREDA 2016). 
 
As suggested above, China’s state capitalist economic development brought about huge 
increases in consumption that are evidently unsustainable, especially in the emissions of its 
fossil-fuelled technologies, and its impact on fishing grounds in the South China Sea.154 The 
challenges in shifting to a more sustainable economy “remain breathtaking” (Adams 2006 p. 
8), but it is evident that its state leadership is responding by, for example, encouraging 
photovoltaic manufacturing and anchoring measures to achieve the Paris COP 21 
commitments, including closure of it dirtiest electricity plants. 
 
France’s approach to industry is based on a strong centralised state grounded in Napoleonic 
institutions and an elite technocratic education system. This favours big state-supported 
enterprises that operate on a global scale. These include Veolia,155 which operates in waste, 
water and energy management, and EDF (Électricité de France), the world’s largest electric 
company, which derives most of its capacity from nuclear power.156 As well as energy-related 
institutions, the French state also developed high speed rail (SNCF TGV) and aero-spatial (Air 
France-Industrie, Airbus and Dassault) technologies. For these technologies, the French state-
led approach indicates both opportunities and threats for sustainability governance. The 
opportunities centre on reach across continents, the standardisation of basic services and the 
capacity to determine priorities within the influence of a democratic state. Threats are the 
sheer size of its enterprises, possible over-reliance on nuclear power and a tendency to loosen 
control in favour of international market pressures. 
 
Overall, it is typically the lack of participation in technological governance under this paradigm 
that stands out. The exercise of power that facilitates such large-scale technologies also 
depends on centralised control, whereas the capacity of the state to manage complex 
processes is questionable.157 Where the military is involved, transparency is especially 
deficient, allowing such programs as nuclear weaponry to proceed in secrecy. Participation 
outside of these two spheres is also negligible, while accountability to democratic institutions 
                                                 
154 China’s assertion of territorial rights over the reconstructed Spratly Islands may be motivated by the 
decline of fishing resources closer to its coast. 
155 Veolia, formerly Vivendi, originated as Compagnie Général des Eau in 1853, the national water utility.  
156 France has 56 nuclear power plants due to a state development program originating in 1945 and 
accelerated in 1973 due to the OPEC crisis. EDF controls plants throughout Europe and the Americas. 
157 The obvious passwords Nuclear1 and Rad1at10n that were offered on Russian hacking sites after 
being stolen from senior EDF employees suggests such an issue (The Times UK, 24 June 2017). 
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is mainly effected through budgetary measures, and is otherwise limited. 
 
The market-based model 
At the global level this paradigm involves both states and corporations acting within the world 
market to exploit new profitable technologies. This involves corporations funding their own 
research and development while the state provides subsidies and regulatory support to foster 
free trade and investment capital. Through international agencies such as the WTO and 
agreements such as TRIPS, ‘mutual advantage’ cooperation is encouraged, while ‘winner-loser 
disadvantage’ is rejected. Where specific technical issues risk incoherence, epistemic 
communities may be called on to broker technology regimes that are market compatible. 
 
This presently dominant techno-economic paradigm is intended to promote innovation rather 
than sustainability. It is essentially a neoliberal approach158 that supports private sector 
innovation with tough global-scale laws on intellectual property. These laws probably originated 
in 15th century Venice and were subsequently codified throughout Europe following the 
introduction of the printing press (Sichelman & Veneri n.d.; Mgbeoji 2003).159 The current 
approach to intellectual property rights largely derives from nineteenth century US and German 
industrial practice, first internationalised with the 1883 Paris agreement (WIPO 2016) and 
globalised with the creation of the WTO in 1995. While in the modern era, the law increasingly 
lags technological innovation (Wadwa 2014), in theory private firms can roll out technological 
innovations quickly and profits are protected in doing so. Government is supportive rather than a 
technology innovator itself.  
 
This is the system that was exploited by Thomas Edison with his remarkable series of 
inventions from the 1870s that defined the modern era. His industrial approach to invention 
at Menlo Park led to more than a thousand separate patents for devices such as the electric 
light, the phonograph, the motion picture camera, the microphone, the electricity grid and the 
car battery, all of which depended on the platform innovation of generated electricity. 
Influential figures helped ensure that profits were maximised. The financier-industrialist, JP 
Morgan, was a prominent investor who helped promote and safeguard Edison’s inventions 
and the New York attorney, Edwin J Prindle, was a leading agent for patents to protect 
industrial profit. The dominant German chemical industry was similarly organised around 
protective patents and systematic innovation at around the same time (Drahos & Braithwaite 
2001, pp. 36-44). 
 
Yet while technological governance has focused on the protection of intellectual property, both 
nationally and globally, its weaknesses are now that it may well discourage genuine innovation 
and that it is fixed on increasingly inappropriate outcomes that acknowledge no natural limits. 
This is the regime that so lacks sustainability governance that it gave us chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs), dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) and thalidomide. Each of these three examples 
would have fulfilled the fundamental requirements of current US patent law – essentially that the 
product, design or process be genuinely new and “has a useful purpose” (USPTO 2016). CFCs 
were useful as refrigerants, DDT was useful in eliminating malaria mosquitoes and thalidomide 
was useful in preventing morning sickness during pregnancy. 
 
                                                 
158 ‘Neoliberalism’ is understood to mean the current dominant form of political economy characterised 
by market supremacy, free trade and corporate dominance.  
159 In Venice, separate laws were issued for each patent prior to a more general statute of 1474, 
although there were ancient claims of state reward for creativity back to the time of Aristotle (Mgbeoji 
2003). 
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Measures enforcing intellectual property rights under this regime are part of global and 
regional trade agreements, including the WTO and the stillborn 12-nation Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), which would have bound countries such as Japan, Vietnam and Australia to 
US-based regulation. The TPP followed years of negotiations over the application of patents in 
the different countries of the partnership, especially on the issue of how long each set of 
patents would apply, but may never enter into force.160 
 
Under the 1995 WTO agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), copyrights on software and coding, designs for integrated circuits and patents are 
protected.161 Patents protect “any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application” (TRIPS, article 27.1). The TRIPS agreement also mentions public policy 
“developmental and technological objectives”, as well as the special needs of least-developed 
countries, which may need flexible regulation to create a “viable technological base” (Ibid, 
preamble, para. 6). The agreement also states that “intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination 
of technology” (article 7). Nonetheless, rather than from any desire to foster innovation and 
transfer, it seems reasonable to conclude that developed countries and their MNCs 
established TRIPS in order to profit from countries that lack Western technologies (Mercurio 
2014, p. 1).  
 
The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), a UN specialised agency, is closely 
related to TRIPS and the WTO. A successor to the Franco-Swiss nineteenth century United 
International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property, WIPO’s role is to promote 
and protect intellectual property generally, not just in trade. Consistent with the TRIPS 
assertions, according to WIPO human progress depends on technological inventions,162 and 
their legal protection encourages further innovation. WIPO also claims that intellectual 
property protection “spurs economic growth, creates new jobs and industries, and enhances 
the quality and enjoyment of life” (WIPO, p. 3).  
 
However, there is doubt that innovation was a substantial beneficiary of patent rights in 
history (Mgbeoji 2003), while others argue that intellectual property rights now actually 
constrain technological innovation. For example, a ‘think piece’ for the International Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and the World Economic Forum (WEF) argues 
there is a contradiction between innovation and patent protection, as patents impede 
diffusion and block potential gains from collaboration and competition (Mercurio 2014). It 
points out that patent-related legal costs amount to around US$20 billion each year and that 
overlapping patents result in incremental improvement of existing technologies rather than 
development of new technologies. ‘Patent thickets’163 and ‘patent trolls’164 are significant 
hazards for those trying to innovate, such that the social and economic costs of patent 
protection may now outweigh their benefits:  
 
                                                 
160 The TPP was signed in February 2016 after seven years of negotiations, but has not entered into 
force. US President Trump has since rejected its provisions. 
161 TRIPS also protects other copyrights, trademarks, regional labels (such as wine origins), industrial 
designs (such as on textiles), and undisclosed commercial information. 
162 As well as new cultural works. 
163 Thickets: a series of patents surrounding related inventions that can trigger litigation and act to 
prevent their development. 
164 Trolls: Those who derive profit from litigious action on patents rather than from the invention 
patented. 
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...stronger patent protection leads not to enhanced innovation or an improvement in 
overall welfare, but to firms protecting their interests by advocating even more 
protection… In so doing, firms divert resources away from R&D, and into lobbyists and 
lawsuits (Ibid, pp. 2-3).   
 
Others, following their own research investigations at WIPO in Geneva, agree that intellectual 
property rights constrain innovation. Drahos & Braithwaite (2001, p. 2) make a case for this in 
their book Information Feudalism, in which they outline how inequality and division caused by 
intellectual property rights only grow stronger, and where innovation is stifled in the interests 
of rights holders. This occurs because rights holders increase the cost of information on which 
innovation depends. 
 
In biotechnology especially, the patents market is a vehicle for commercial agglomeration 
rather than protection for start-ups: 
 
Aggressive patenting of biotechnology has been a feature of the US biotech market by 
both public and private players. Patents over biotechnological information enhance 
the tradability of that information. For most small biotech firms and universities, the 
market for their patents is constituted by multinationals with interests in chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals and agriculture. For many biotech start-ups their preferred destiny is 
to be swallowed in one way or another by the very large fish… Patents act as a signal 
that they are worth swallowing (Ibid, p. 166). 
 
‘Swallowing’ is also the business model in information technology. For example, WikiLeaks 
founder Julian Assange observes that Google “innovates through aggressive acquisition, then 
integrates what it has acquired” (Keane 2015, p. 32). But biotechnology has other ways of 
maintaining monopolies. During a ‘data-exclusivity period’ for biologic medicine,165 
manufacturers of generic copies cannot use original clinical trial data for approval to distribute 
their cheaper products. Many of these drugs are extremely expensive and are used for cancer 
treatment.166 Under the TPP negotiations in 2015, the US sought 12 then eight years’ 
exclusivity for its corporations, still significantly longer than domestic laws in many other 
countries (Gleeson & Lopert 2015). 
 
Thus the measures designed to enhance and encourage innovation under this paradigm, 
paradoxically tend to distort its most basic assumptions. Even if these measures were 
successful in promoting innovation, the sustainability of any innovation is irrelevant to the 
measures themselves. Sustainability is at best incidental to the corporate drive for possession, 
agglomeration and profit. 
 
Within the neoliberal model, the knowledge economy is a concept based on technological 
innovation, ultimately rooted in Kondratieff and Schumpeter’s concept of technological-
industrial waves. The notion emerged in the 1980s, relying on mathematical modelling by US 
economists, including the two Pauls – Krugman and Romer – and Robert Lucas, who worked in 
the new field of ‘growth economics’. The central problem as they saw it was to design an 
economy that would produce continuous growth and thus avoid the cyclic and structurally-
induced recessions of earlier eras. Technological progress is a product of economic activity, 
according to this theory, whereas earlier theories regarded technology as a given, a product of 
non-market forces. Unlike physical objects, knowledge and technology are characterised by 
                                                 
165 Biologic medicines: medicines made from living organisms. 
166 Such drugs can cost more than US$100,000 per patient per year. 
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increasing returns, and it is these increasing returns that drive the process of growth 
(Cortright 2001, p. 3). 
 
An important concept in the knowledge economy is that of ‘rival’ versus ‘non-rival’ goods. 
Rival goods are like pizza: if I eat it, you cannot, whereas non-rival goods include ideas and 
information that can be shared without loss. Some kinds of ideas have great economic 
significance. These are the ‘platform’ or ‘meta’ ideas that are the basis of other innovations 
and thus generate widespread new growth. For example, the Internet is a platform innovation 
whereas a router is not. Edison’s electric generator is a platform whereas the microphone is a 
dependent device. The idea of ‘innovation and the knowledge economy’ has since entered 
into the popular imagination as it appears to be “self-evident”, and has become virtually a 
“semi-religious belief system” (Coan 2012).  
 
The importance of the knowledge economy for sustainability is that it suggests that economic 
growth can be dematerialised, or ‘de-coupled’ from resource use, especially through digital 
technologies and the dissemination of ideas and innovation. There are two main issues with 
this proposition, however. First, it presumes the existence of a technologically advanced 
economy in which material needs are already largely satisfied, and also it supposes a digital 
infrastructure for communications, for data provision and for its manipulation. The knowledge 
economy cannot fulfil the unmet material demand that exists in much of the world; data is 
inedible, nor does it supply energy. Yet it can do more than just satisfy the more ephemeral 
demands that emerge once basic needs are met. It can enhance and spread new knowledge. It 
can apply new knowledge to the global economy as much as to local ones. It can minimise 
human impact and help maximise resource intensity. 
 
But such is the neoliberal paradigm that the very basis of the knowledge economy concept – 
the sharing of non-rival goods – can be constricted or made ‘excludable’ by the ownership of 
the data, the algorithms and the information on which it depends. For example, data from 
farm sensors on microclimates, soil and plant growth are uploaded in vast quantities by the US 
agricultural multinational John Deere and then resold as conglomerated information to 
others, such as seed and chemical companies. Data are also sold as discrete chunks of 
information back to the farmer. Farmers do not own the data from their own farms. Similarly, 
Facebook and Google sell their client data to advertisers, as does Microsoft,167 which also 
dominates the personal software market and cloud data repositories. In the knowledge 
economy, data are as much a commodity as oil and wheat are to its industrial predecessor.  
 
This is increasingly significant. Not only do intellectual property rights tend to constrain 
innovation and agglomerate market power, but as data proliferates and becomes potentially 
more valuable in the knowledge economy, it is owned, restricted and sold by the 
agglomerators  the John Deeres, the Facebooks, the Googles and the Microsofts of corporate 
capitalism. Governance over this aspect is weak and often years behind the data harvest and 
reuse techniques of major corporations. It demonstrably lacks both integrity and capacity. 
 
The knowledge economy in its present form then, is not as attractive for sustainability as 
might first appear. It is rather its techniques that offer prospects to drive sustainability 
through technological governance. For example, the patent system itself can be trawled by 
algorithms that seek new combinations of ideas, new innovations that build upon existing 
inventions. This is a form of ‘evolutionary mimicry’ that designs progressively improved 
                                                 
167 Microsoft issues a unique identifier for each client when their Windows 10 upgrade is installed, 
which is used to target personalised ads to clients based on their usage and demographic data (Glance 
2015). 
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versions of devices or concepts that are tested in simulations and then the best of them 
selected for the next round of improvement (Marks 2015, p. 34). There is no reason to suggest 
that the improvements sought cannot be those that deliver sustainability. 
 
Likewise, the application of information technology to prosaic objects of production has 
already enhanced their sustainability. For example, the contemporary jet passenger aircraft 
visually resembles its 1960s ancestor, yet it is quite different. The current version is an 
intelligent machine, first flown in cyberspace after its design, virtual manufacture and 
computer stress-testing optimised its construction. As it flies in reality, it transmits real-time 
information back to its manufacturers to enable further improvement and optimal 
maintenance (Mason 2015). The Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner, which first flew commercially in 
2014, looks like the 707-120 of 1958. Yet its body is made from one-piece composite material 
rather than the riveted aluminium sheets of the 707 and its in-flight engine performance is 
constantly monitored in real time at one of several global centres owned by the three major 
engine manufacturers.168 Such intelligent machines are thus more complex but more efficient 
than the visually similar but cruder technologies they replace.  
 
In these ways, the techniques of the knowledge economy can enhance sustainability, but 
would be more valuable if data governance were inclusive, rather than the exclusive, low 
participation model that tends to be the case at present. Its capacity is lacking, and as most 
social media users would know, integrity and transparency are also governance qualities that 
are inclined to be bewildered in the corporate fine-print under this regime. 
 
Market-based governance is also sometimes assisted by ‘epistemic communities’  
associations of experts who help decision-makers define problems, identify policy solutions 
and assess outcomes, typically across national boundaries (Haas 1992). This aspect of 
governance is driven by increasing technical complexity that makes it harder for decision-
makers to fully understand the issues they are dealing with. These experts typically may be 
academics, scientists or economists. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) is a high-level example of an epistemic community. 
 
Expertise is not always associated with wise governance, however. An extreme case of the 
‘cult of the expert’ is embodied by Alan Greenspan, chair of the US Federal Reserve 1987-
2006, who oversaw the leveraging of sub-prime mortgages that resulted in the financial crash 
of 2008. Greenspan’s reputation was such that when he spoke at international meetings of 
central bankers, “the distinguished figures at the table, titans in their own fields, took notes 
with the eagerness of undergraduates”. Both politicians and markets regarded his words as 
infallible  which they turned out not to be (Mallaby 2016). 
 
Yet one notable example of epistemic technology governance with global sustainability effects 
occurred in an earlier era. The US Nobel laureate, Paul Berg, helped organised the 1975 
Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA to discuss the regulation of new forms of 
biotechnology involving the manipulation of DNA between species. This technology is 
potentially hazardous since it involves the creation of new life forms that might escape the 
laboratory and multiply with unpredictable effects. The conference was to decide whether to 
lift a voluntary moratorium on such research and determine guidelines so that it could safely 
proceed (Berg 2008).  
 
                                                 
168 Rolls-Royce, Pratt and Whitney and General Electric. 
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Berg’s account is intriguing because he says it was scientists rather than politicians who were 
concerned about the issue. While the call for restraint was “hotly debated”, the public 
“seemed comforted” because the cautionary call was made by the science community, and 
the public were kept informed of discussions. As well as scientists, conference participants 
included lawyers, journalists and government officials (Ibid). Although not directly mentioned, 
Asilomar was probably inspired by the international Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).169 
Berg does say, however, that the threat of government legislation helped overcome 
disagreement. Resolution of the issue was based on assessments of the experiments and 
safety measures that varied according to the degree of risk.170 The conference 
recommendations were ultimately adopted as official US guidelines in 1976 and subsequently 
influenced global practice. At least according to Berg, “they have proved remarkably 
effective”.    
 
Now though, Berg says securing public trust for experimental biotechnologies is “much more 
difficult”. In the 1970s such research was mainly within public institutions, whereas scientists 
now tend to work for corporations where commercial pressures preclude open discussion. 
Current political, ethical and religious conflict over values would further doom any similar 
consensus. The best way to secure adequate regulation of emerging technologies is for 
scientists from publically funded institutions to find “common cause with the wider public” as 
soon as possible. Once there is corporate dominance of research “it will simply be too late”, 
he writes (Ibid). 
 
Despite such pessimism, a similar conference met in 2015 to consider the emerging 
technology of genome editing, which enables heritable alteration of nuclear DNA. The 
conference and a subsequent study committee171 ultimately recommended that the 
technology could be used on human embryos under stringent conditions, including an ‘only 
option’ to prevent serious disease. Significantly, the study committee consulted with “patient 
and disability rights advocates, clinicians, scientists, ethicists, and public engagement 
specialists”, a list considerably more controlled than in 1975. Resolution was found despite 
apparent tensions between democracy and corporate influence (Alta Charo & Hynes 2017).  
 
Overall, while these examples concerned two very particular and controversial technologies, 
their process and results indicate that the TAPIC elements were largely fulfilled. In this 
paradigm, participation is at risk due to its highly technical nature. But while scientists led the 
process, in both cases there was significant participation of other interests. Notably, both 
cases were about regulating a narrow and emerging field, and were a ‘one off’ event. This 
does not necessarily mean that the same results would occur in ongoing wider technology 
governance where transparency is obscure and participation can tend to become exclusive. 
 
Overall, this market-based model, tends to stress technology ownership at the expense of 
sustainability. Nevertheless, it is evident that some of the newer digital and geospatial 
technologies can enable not only resource efficiency and evolutionary improvement, but also 
the transparency and participation that governance of complex systems demands. At the 
same time, its tendency to allow exclusive data ownership threatens integrity and precludes 
capacity development. Epistemic groups have proven valuable for the resolution of particular 
technology-related issues and can add to the policy capacity of wider governance. The market-
                                                 
169 The Biological Weapons Convention opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. 
170 Safety measures varied from open benches for no risk, to flow hoods, to airlocks and to negative 
pressure, as well as to special facilities for high risk containment. 
171 The “Human Genome Editing” consensus study committee of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences 
and National Academy of Medicine (NAM).  
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based approach will probably increasingly rely on epistemic groups as technologies become 
more intricate and bring greater risk, while transparency is threatened by the same dynamic. 
 
Network governance paradigm 
Network governance has much greater participation than the other two models. Due to the many 
organisations involved in contemporary society, combined with shifting boundaries, complex 
coordination and different levels of authority, the concept of network governance emerged fairly 
recently in several disciplines and many of its theoretical underpinnings remain unclear (Sørenson 
& Torfing 2007, pp. 3-7). Emphasising cooperation and partnership rather than laissez-faire or 
exclusion, the approach still involves the state, often combined with international institutions, but 
more in orchestration roles than as direct regulators in the traditional sense (Greer, Wismar & 
Figueras 2016, p. 12). Corporations are also key actors as are civil society organisation, and often 
the interested public as well.  
 
Its fundamental structure is informed groups of different stakeholders that share governance 
responsibilities within a defined sphere. Two of its prominent features are the central role of 
private actors combined with a voluntary, or ‘soft law’, rather than ‘hard law’ treaty approach 
(Abbott & Snidal 2009, pp. 505-506). While not yet applied to any particular technology, some of 
its characteristics are apparent in the governance of technical processes such as manufacturing 
supply chains and agricultural practices.  
 
These network characteristics overlap with the corporate social responsibility (CSR) approach to 
business ethics. Both have arisen in parallel with the rise of civil society organisations, and both 
depend on digital communications. CSR began as a defensive response to accusations of 
exploitation against multinational firms that use third world workers to produce first world 
consumer goods. It describes situations where the firm goes beyond regulatory compliance 
and engages in “actions that appear to further some social good” (McWilliams, Siegel & 
Wright, 2005 p. 3). Although derided by an ascendant Milton Friedman in the early 1980s 
(Friedman 1982, p. 133), beginning with labour conditions and notions of ‘fair trade’, CSR has 
since expanded to especially include the environment in the business ‘triple bottom line’ of 
economic, social and environmental sustainability.172 Yet there is much massaging of what CSR 
means. Even within industries there is a proliferation of codes and the maintenance of 
standards beyond legal minima is voluntary and often less than transparent. But ultimately 
business’ compliance with CSR measures depends on consumer knowledge and consumer 
pressure. Digital technologies can facilitate both.  
 
The joint ILO-World Bank program, Better Work, is an example of network governance 
combined with CSR. Under this program, the compliance of apparel factories in developing 
countries with hundreds of labour and environmental standards173 is accessible through its 
multi-lingual global database. This program involves diverse stakeholders in its governance 
including nine national governments, employer groups, labour unions, national and 
international NGOs, the UN’s ILO and the Bank’s International Finance Corporation, as well as 
the global apparel brands such as Nike, Adidas and The Gap. Results of factory monitoring are 
                                                 
172 Business for Social Responsibility (BSR) is a network of more than 250 member companies, many of 
which are well-known global brands. Its mission is “to work with business to create a just and 
sustainable world…in which everyone can lead a prosperous and dignified life within the boundaries of 
the Earth’s natural resources”. The UN Global Compact claims over 8,000 signatory companies and aims 
“to work with business to…create a sustainable and inclusive global economy that delivers lasting 
benefits to all people, communities and markets”. How much these statements are aspirational rather 
than tangible is a matter of debate. 
173 There are over 500 standards based on ILO Conventions and national labour law. 
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entered directly onto handheld tablet computers onsite and are automatically uploaded to the 
database for reporting and decision making. Consistent with the ‘soft law’ approach, though, 
much of the focus is on remediation rather than sanction (Bolwell 2015). Because command-
and-control bureaucracies are incapable of governing complex societies (Offer 2005), this 
network approach of varied stakeholder involvement combined with digital technology is a 
way to make CSR and its sustainability aspirations realisable across global supply chains. 
 
In the Amazon, two networked governance measures have helped reduce deforestation. They 
were both aided by the “political sea change” after the 2003 election of Lula’s174 Workers’ 
Party and the consequent loss of influence of big landowners. The Soy Moratorium (SoyM) cut 
soy-related deforestation from nearly 30 per cent to only one per cent between 2006 and 
2013, due to a supply-chain governance that involves farmers, buyers, NGOs and government 
agencies (Gibbs et al 2015, pp. 377-378). Similarly, the Amazon beef industry has been 
governed along these lines since 2008. A new code reduced to 50 per cent the previous 
unenforceable requirement that 80 per cent of land should remain forest,175 and allowed 
landowners to trade forestation credits. Public prosecutors stopped beef wholesalers buying 
from illegally deforested areas and a bilateral financial arrangement with Norway bolstered 
political will. Technologies include satellite imagery, GPS tracking and remote sensing. 
Combined with a digital rural cadastre registry to track land ownership, the rate of 
deforestation has significantly slowed, as shown in figure 26 below (Chomitz 2015).  
 
Figure 26. Annual deforestation rate in the Legal Amazon,176 1988-2014.  
 
Source: Chomitz 2015.  
 
These governance examples depend on geo-spatial and digital technologies. Yet the same 
enthusiasm is not apparent in applying the concept to technologies themselves. Agricultural 
technologies used in the Amazon for example, include synthetic fertilizers, herbicides and 
pesticides, as in most farming areas. Despite risks to wildlife, workers and food consumers, 
they are largely uncontrolled, unsustainable and based on access to cheap petroleum (Jordan 
2001, pp. 161-163).  
 
                                                 
174‘Lula’: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of Brazil 2003-2011.  
175 The legal requirement is known as the Reserva legal. 
176 Amazônia Legal or ‘Legal Amazon’ is Brazil’s largest socio-geographic division, containing all nine 
states in the Amazon basin. The region was created in 1948 and has a population of about 24 million. 
Dramatic decline in deforestation post 2004
Source:
INPE
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As its name suggests, one of the characteristics of this form of governance is participation  a 
particular virtue in areas of complexity and potential controversy. The network structure also 
provides both a resilience and redundancy safeguard in that capacity weaknesses in some 
organisations or individuals are more likely to be compensated by the capacities of other 
stakeholders. Transparency is also a characteristic because network governance, which 
necessarily involves many participants, cannot function without it. Integrity, too, is reinforced 
because such an approach tends to reflect the interests and views of the many, rather than the 
few and its actions are more visible to stakeholders. The remaining TAPIC characteristic, 
accountability, may be diluted by the numbers involved; when everyone is accountable, no-one is 
accountable. At the global level, accountability may also be weakened by distance from 
stakeholder constituencies. However, that risk is not unique to this form of governance alone. But 
while networks may not always be appropriate, they often work better “when there is some kind 
of authority in the background to give them legal force or oblige them to do their jobs well” 
(Greer et al 2015, p. 15). 
 
These three governance paradigms (state-led, market-based and network) help clarify issues of 
how technology can be regulated and their strengths and weaknesses against the TAPIC criteria. 
The state-led approach has several weaknesses, especially in transparency, accountability and 
capacity. Whereas the capacity of the market-led is improved through use of epistemic 
communities, its tendency to restrict data ownership weakens accountability and participation. 
Network approaches are yet undeveloped, but indicate strengths due to its wider participation 
and capacity reserves. 
 
To complete this governance overview, this chapter now highlights key aspects of the institutions 
and fabric of global governance that relate to sustainability and technology. This chapter ends 
with an introduction to the three case studies that follow separately, in which issues of their 
governance and sustainability are examined in more depth.  
 
Fabric of global governance  
While there are over 77,000 multinational firms operating in the global economy (Ruggie 2007, p. 
823) and over 900 international environmental agreements in force (Biermann 2007, p. 335), 
there is little focus on technology and sustainability.  
 
The WTO and the World Bank are part of the institutional framework of global environmental 
governance, as are several UN agencies. These especially include the UNEP, UNDP, UNESCO and 
the IAEA, as well as the IEA.177 Only the two latter energy agencies relate directly to technology, if 
not to sustainability, whereas UNESCO mentions its carriage of technology transfer policy for 
development. The other two UN institutions mention ‘sustainable development’ or 
‘sustainability’ as one of their objectives, but not technology at all. The Bank mentions a ‘clean 
technology fund’ among its functions, while WTO decisions can affect the environment indirectly.  
 
Many global environmental interventions are modelled on the 1992 UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a pact between almost all countries that accepts commitments 
that are the responsibilities of individual states. The UNFCCC aims to prevent dangerous human 
interference with the climate system. It was developed by the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), itself formed by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the UNEP in 
1988. The IPCC has an annual plenary of individual governments, a secretariat located within the 
WMO in Geneva, and several working groups with technical support on different aspects of the 
                                                 
177 The IEA is an agency of the OECD. 
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issue. The UNFCCC has three sister Conventions  on biological diversity, on desertification, 
and on wetlands. (UNFCCC website 2017). 
 
While global summits beginning with Stockholm in 1972 and especially including Rio in 1992 
have aimed to drive consensus action for the environment, results have been mixed. 
Nevertheless, other governance initiatives have also been undertaken with more specific aims 
that involve technology. Born from frustration with the 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit, the 
OECD set up the High Seas Task Force178 to make practical proposals on the governance of 
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Its 2006 report, Closing the Net, 
recommended several important governance measures involving technologies (1, 2, 6, 7 and 
9) and wider stakeholder participation (3, 8), as shown in figure 27 below: 
 
Figure 27. Measures recommended to reduce IUU fishing 
1  Strengthen the International monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) Network.  
2  Establish a global information system on high seas fishing vessels.  
3  Promote broader participation in the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) and the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Compliance Agreement.  
4  Promote better high seas governance by:  
 developing a model for improved governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 
(RFMOs);    
 independent review of RFMO performance;    
 encouraging RFMOs to work more effectively through better coordination; and    
 supporting initiatives to bring all unregulated high seas fisheries under effective governance.    
5  Adopt and promote guidelines on flag state performance.  
6  Support greater use of port and trade measures by:  
 promoting the concept of responsible port states; promoting the FAO Model Port State Scheme 
as the international minimum standard for regional port state controls and supporting FAO’s 
proposal to develop an electronic database of port state measures;    
 reviewing domestic port state measures to ensure they meet international minimum standards; 
and    
 strengthening domestic legislation controlling import of IUU product.    
7  Fill critical gaps in scientific knowledge and assessment.  
8  Address the needs of developing countries.  
9  Promote better use of technological solutions.  
Source: High Seas Task Force 2006 
 
One proposal prompted by the study is to close the high seas to fishing altogether supported 
by satellite surveillance technologies and an expanded automatic identification system (AIS) 
for shipping. Modelling indicates that this would not reduce the overall catch but would would 
improve equity between countries (Sumaila et al 2015, pp. 3-4). But while all these measures 
involve various technologies to improve regulation, none of them address the regulation of 
fishing-related technologies themselves. For example, relatively simple measures to reduce 
by-catch could be mandated in the interests of biodiversity, yet are not.179  
                                                 
178 The Task Force was a ministerial-level group of several maritime nations including Australia, Canada, 
Chile, Namibia, New Zealand and the UK, with the WWF, the IUCN and the Earth Institute, which 
formed out of frustration with the cumbersome nature of the 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit 
deliberations.  
179 These include bright lights mounted at the front of prawn nets, devices that emit audible signals to 
warn dolphins and whales away from fishing nets (GWA 2011, and line weighting and streamer lines to 
exclude seabirds from longlines. The report does refer to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which 
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In 2001, all UN member states agreed to eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for the 
period 2001-2015, including the last minute goal seven: ensure environmental sustainability. 
The 21 targets included ‘reversing losses of environmental resources and biodiversity’, but the 
MDGs tended to concentrate on measures such as poverty reduction, health and education.  
 
However sustainability measures took more  priority for the following years to 2030, when a 
set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets (Clark 2014) were adopted  
more than twice as many goals, and eight times as many targets than the MDGs. Consistent 
with an analysis that helped shape the process, the much wider consultations undertaken for 
the SDGs were probably a factor in this conglomeration of objectives (Rippin 2013, p. 16). 
However, another recommendation from the analysis was the need for ‘focus’ (Ibid, p. 34), 
which seems to have been ignored.180 To overcome this lack of focus, Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon’s 2014 report to the General Assembly framed the SDGs in six themes, as in figure 28 
below:  
 
Figure 28. Six themes of the Sustainable Development Goals  
1. dignity: to end poverty and fight inequality; 
2. people: to ensure healthy lives, knowledge and the inclusion of women and children;  
3. prosperity: to grow a strong, inclusive and transformative economy;  
4. planet: to protect our ecosystems for all societies and our children;  
5. justice: to promote safe and peaceful societies and strong institutions; and  
6. partnership: to catalyse global solidarity for sustainable development. 
Source: UNGA 2014, p. 1. 
 
Themes #4 and #6 are particularly relevant to sustainability as defined in this dissertation. But 
while this thematic overlay was not entirely successful at making the package clear, the same 
report did make important points about sustainability and technology, as highlighted in figure 
29 below:  
 
Figure 29. Key points on technology and sustainability from Secretary-General’s report  
s.118. Access to new technologies will be crucial to a sustainable world beyond 2015. 
s.119. Environmentally sound technologies are unevenly spread, both within and between countries. 
The poor in many developing countries are “locked out” from access.  
s.120. We must phase out unsustainable technologies. 
s.125. The UN will build an online platform to map technology needs and initiatives in sustainable 
development areas such as agriculture, cities and health, to promote networking and technical 
assistance and to scale up the application of clean technologies. 
s.126. Member states should build a “technology bank” for least developed countries (LDCs); global 
intellectual property regimes including TRIPS should contribute to sustainable development; public 
resources should shift from harmful technologies towards the sustainable development goals; and the 
innovation-to-market-to-public good cycle of clean technologies should be accelerated  
Source: UNGA 2014, pp. 26-27 
                                                                                                                                              
encourages measures to mitigate by-catch, although they are “far from fully realised” (Balton & Koehler 
2006, pp. 8-9). 
180 Although the UN’s central agency responsible for the SDGs, the UNDP, did at the same time produce 
its Strategic plan 2014-2017 that centred on seven sets of outcomes, compared to the previous 35 
(UNDP 2014a). 
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While these points do address technologies directly, much so far has proven more aspirational 
than concrete. Progress has been slow in the construction of the technology platform, for 
example, possibly due to the forest of other initiatives and targets. Indeed, while the MDGs 
were developed by a handful of people in a basement, the SDGs by contrast appear to have 
suffered from too much participation. 
 
The 2015 Paris Agreement, however, does have clear focus. The COP21 UN Climate Change 
Conference181 aimed to achieve a legally binding and universal agreement on climate changing 
emissions from all nations. Negotiations were led by French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, 
whose experience helped make for a positive outcome.182 The equivalent conference in 
Copenhagen in 2009 had foundered on the same reef that Brundtland had tried so deftly to 
avoid thirty years before – the issue of current versus future equity, or “progress versus the 
planet” (Charlton 2011). In Paris, not only was consensus reached on the draft agreement, but 
most countries committed to specific measures before the meeting. The biggest emitters all  
pledged substantial emissions cuts,183 although the US pledge was since signalled to be 
revoked under the Trump administration in 2017.  
 
Commitments under the agreement aim to limit emissions so that global warming will be no 
more than two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and desirably less than 1.5 degrees. 
Targets are to be reviewed every five years. Developed countries agreed to fund $100 billion a 
year for developing country investment in clean technologies and adapt infrastructure to 
minimise damage from climate change. A record 168 countries signed on day one, and 14 
ratified immediately.184 The agreement entered into force in November 2016 (Jeyaratnam et 
al 2016). Much of these emissions reductions depend on emissions reductions in electricity 
generation, transport and agriculture. Fossil-fuelled technologies are under increasing 
pressure as a result. Emissions trading schemes, carbon taxes and renewable energy certificates 
are some of the methods now used to ensure that more sustainable technologies are deployed.  
 
In summary, the many environmental institutions and treaties tend not to address technology 
and sustainability as linked issues. Even the High Seas Task Force, which is essentially all about 
using technologies to limit unsustainable catch, fails to address technologies directly in the 
same aim. For the MDGs, sustainability was an afterthought, while the SDGs are a form of 
global governance that still lack a genuine focus on sustainability, with results yet unclear.   
 
Against the TAPIC criteria, the High Seas Task Force recommendations are consistent with 
each element of the framework, although much depends on the capacity of states to 
implement and its accountabilities are vague. The MDGs were relatively successful despite the 
extremely narrow participation in their formulation, while the SDGs effectively fudge 
                                                 
181 This was the 21st yearly session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 11th session of the Meeting of the Parties 
(CMP11) to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. 
182 Fabius was France’s youngest ever Prime Minister under Socialist President Mitterand 1984-1986 
and Foreign Minister under Socialist President Hollande 2012-2016. 
183 The EU pledged to cut emissions by 40 per cent compared with 1990 levels by 2030. China vowed its 
emissions would peak by 2030. The US pledged to cut its emissions by 26-28 per cent compared with 
2005 levels by 2025. 
184 Of the 14 countries that ratified immediately, 12 were small island states vulnerable to sea level rise 
(Barbados, Fiji, Granada, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, St. Lucia, Samoa, Seychelles, St. 
Vincent & Grenadines, and Tuvalu, all members of the Climate Vulnerable Forum). One was the equally 
vulnerable Belize, which has the world’s second longest barrier reef. The other was landlocked 
Switzerland, which was concerned for its glaciers and snowfields, and for its own financial security.   
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transparency due to their complexity, possibly due to too much participation. In a related way, 
they also lack accountability, because responsibility for their implementation is split over 
several UN agencies. They do, however, at least attempt to grapple with technologies, with an 
effectiveness yet to be adjudged.185 The Paris Agreement is a focused global pledge that puts 
the onus on individual states to progressively cut emissions by using more sustainable 
technologies. The major governance issue for Paris is singularly ‘capacity’, especially the 
political capacity of states to deliver. 
 
Three case studies 
These arrangements are all part of humanity’s tango with technology. But to advance human 
control over the dance, it may help to know in some detail how key technologies were 
developed and are governed. While Part One of this dissertation approached the notion of 
sustainability through the IPAT structure primarily using an interdisciplinary review of 
available literature, this Part Two relies on a comparative case study approach. The following 
three chapters 9, 10 and 11 outline each case study separately: the herbicide glyphosate, 
electricity generation by nuclear reactor, and the development of robotics and artificial 
intelligence.  
 
These particular case studies were chosen because they are all important applications of 
major technologies in different key industries, including chemicals, agriculture, electricity 
generation, manufacturing, and information technology together with its wider applications 
across other sectors. Glyphosate governance relates to potentially dangerous chemicals in 
general. The global chemical industry, built by especially German, British and US multinational 
corporations such as Bayer, ICI (Imperial Chemical Industries) and Dow is pervasive across the 
‘effortless industrialism’ of the West and the East and its technologies are part of almost all 
the processes and products of modernity. While in this case study it relates particularly to 
agriculture, glyphosate also pervades our homes, the streets upon which we walk and the 
parks in which our children play. It has done so only since the past few decades. It is the 
centre of considerable controversy and relates directly to sustainability, corporate behaviour 
and governance. 
 
Nuclear power is a core example of managing the risks of hazardous waste as well as ultimate 
disaster. It is associated with the possibility of nuclear proliferation. It has been lauded as a 
reliable source of ‘baseload power’ that has few emissions compared with other means of 
power generation. Yet it also brings with it issues of location – needing geological stability, the 
availability of large amounts of water and somewhere to store waste, as well as, preferably, 
distance from major population centres. Nuclear plants are also expensive and take a long 
time to construct. Nonetheless, as the consumption of electricity increases, there are 
temptations for policy-makers to turn to nuclear to assume a larger share of generation 
technologies. This, despite forms of governance that have demonstrable flaws. 
 
Much of robotics and artificial intelligence governance  or lack of it  relates to the oversight 
of all new technologies, especially those with potential for drastic societal and environmental 
impacts. Yet this set of technologies is at the brink of a new industrial era, a time long-
promised, where inexorable logic, data and systems are combined to release humanity from 
drudgery so that people can benefit from the affluence of time and creativity. Or, perhaps, a 
darker future looms where dull machines roam the world independently and beyond human 
control, or where artificial intelligences dwarf human capacity and resist the finger on their 
‘off’ switch.  
                                                 
185 SDG goal 14, ‘Life below water’, does pick up some of the High Seas Task Force concerns, as well as 
regulation of destructive fishing practices, at target 4.  
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Many other technologies such as the steam engine, the Internet, or the compact fluorescent 
lightbulb might also have served as case studies. However, the steam engine is well-
documented as a nineteenth century platform and its relationship to sustainability is obvious 
and - except for electricity generation – uncontentious.  The Internet is a profound and recent 
technology. However, its governance is largely focussed on issues of privacy rather than 
anything connected with sustainability, although it has considerable value in its capacity for 
collaboration and the dissemination of information and ideas. The compact fluorescent 
lightbulb produces more light from less electricity than the earlier incandescent technology, 
yet is a mid-step towards the still more sustainable light emitting diode (LED) form. It is 
interesting as an illustration of how it superseded incandescents yet itself was superseded so 
quickly by LEDs. Its governance is unremarkable and essentially relies on pure market forces. 
 
The three chosen technologies  glyphosate, nuclear power and robotics and artificial 
intelligence  are all quite different in their underlying platforms, but are similar in that all 
were commercialised after World War 2. All are associated with the ‘great acceleration’ of 
human impact since. All three are contentious. All have had, and are having, profound 
environmental impacts, as well as influences on human society. 
 
In assessing the qualities of their governance, in each case reference is made to the TAPIC 
dimensions, which cut across these examples. Other relevant lessons are also elaborated in 
the case study summary at chapter 12 and support a preferred governance model in the 
‘alternative visions’ at chapter 13. 
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Chapter 9. Case study: Glyphosate 
 
All substances are poisons; there is none which is not a poison. The right dose differentiates a 
poison from a remedy                                                                                               — Paracelsus 1567. 
 
Glyphosate is the world’s most used herbicide, designed and used as a poison. As such it 
warrants close scrutiny and effective governance. But it is also associated with powerful US 
multinationals, with the military and with persistent controversy. Its governance involves 
more than just matters of fact, and it illustrates how chemicals in general are governed.  
 
Paracelsus’ observation that ‘the dose makes the poison’ remains fundamental to the science 
of toxicology. And the dose of glyphosate required to produce toxic effects in mammals is 
extremely high, considerably higher than substances such as caffeine and common table salt, 
for example. Therefore, in line with numerous research findings, it is safe to use in agriculture, 
especially at safety margins of many times less than toxic levels. Yet despite these reports 
there persists a counterbalance of investigations that identify reasons for caution, especially in 
its effects on non-mammals. The development of this substance illustrates how the neoliberal 
paradigm of patent protection, takeover and commercialisation evolves. It also shows how its 
governance is entangled with science, economics and politics. As a result, its status is 
contested along several axes. 
 
The military 
The close relationship between institutions of the military, chemical corporations and 
regulatory bodies is illustrated in the development of herbicides during the twentieth century. 
The broadleaf herbicide, 2,4 dichlorophenoxy-acetic acid (2,4-D) was developed 
independently by both British and US researchers during World War 2. Its purpose was to 
starve enemy populations through destruction of their staple crops – potatoes in Germany 
and rice in Japan  as well as for the destruction of “food supplies of dissident tribes” within 
the British empire (Perera & Thomas 1985, pp. 34-35). Whilst fortunately 2,4-D was not then 
cost-effective, according to an early research report it was remarkably effective in killing 
broadleaf plants:  
 
one of these, 2,4 dichlorophenoxy-acetic acid [2,4-D] at a concentration of 1,000 ppm in 
water was applied as a spray to two 100-foot rows of apple nursery stock infested with 
bindweed…The sprayed plants showed change within a few hours following application 
(Hamner & Tukey 1944, p. 155). 
 
Before this herbicide was developed, the control of weeds throughout history was almost 
entirely a matter of mechanics. Weeds were covered, pulled, ploughed, hoed or otherwise 
removed from the ground, largely by hand or with the animal-powered technologies.186 Their 
removal by chemical spray therefore represented a major leap for technology and agricultural 
productivity.  
 
A similar compound, 2,4,5 trichlorophenoxy-acetic acid (2,4,5-T), was also found to be likely 
“effective as an herbicide” at around the same time (Ibid). Manufactured by US multinationals 
such as Dow and Monsanto, these chemicals were widely used as weed killers from the 1950s. 
Their military applications were also tested during this decade — by the British in East Africa 
and during the ‘Malayan emergency’ as a defoliant. As the mixture Agent Orange, they were 
sprayed by US aircraft over crops and more than 17 per cent of Vietnam’s forests in an 
                                                 
186 Although there were limited attempts at steam and even sulphur control in the 19th Century. 
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attempt to reduce food and cover for the North Vietnamese Army during the Vietnam War. 
UN resolutions that sought to outlaw the practice were vetoed by the US and the UK, on the 
technical grounds that they were not direct military weapons as such. The UN General 
Assembly did condemn the practice in 1969, but without apparent effect (Bach 2015, s. 5). 
 
Both these compounds kill broadleaf plants by overstimulating their growth processes. But the 
production of both substances is associated with dioxins, ‘persistent organic pollutant’ (POPs), 
that contaminate the herbicides and accumulate in the bodies of animals. As top predators, 
humans are therefore most at risk of suffering from their effects (WHO 2014a). These include 
skin lesions,187 as well as developmental and carcinogenic effects associated with prolonged 
exposure. 
 
While both Dow and Monsanto benefited from US military contracts during the Vietnam 
War,188 Monsanto in particular would have assumed military support for its herbicide 
development efforts during the 1940s and 1950s. Monsanto was directly involved in the 
nuclear bomb Manhattan project during the Second World War through its research director 
Charles Thomas,189 who declined an offer to co-direct the Manhattan project with Robert 
Oppenheimer in New Mexico, instead preferring to stay in Ohio, working on the linked 
‘Dayton project’ to extract polonium used in the atomic bombing of Japan (Shook & Williams 
1983). According to an Army report, the nuclear program continued with Monsanto at Dayton 
until the mid 1980s (USDoA  2004, p. E1). 
 
Restrictions 
But as doubts grew about their effects on both people and ecosystems, these herbicides 
became subject to restriction and outright bans (especially on 2,4,5-T) in some jurisdictions, 
including in the US, Canada, Australia and parts of Europe and Asia from the 1980s onward 
(Cohen & Michelmore 2013). Whilst pursuing legal action in Canada against bans on 2,4-D as 
late as 2008 (McKenna 2011), Dow chemical finally gave up trying to defend 2,4,5-T in the 
1980s after spending more than $10 million in hearings in the US, stating that the ban was due 
to “public concern and public misinformation” rather than scientific reasons (Holusha 1983). 
Public anxiety certainly was increased by the 1976 dioxin explosion in Seveso, Italy that 
resulted in a toxic cloud (Bertazzi et al 1998, p. 625), cases brought by Vietnam War veterans 
against manufacturers in the early 1980s citing serious health effects and the 1982 evacuation 
and permanent closure of the town of Times Beach, Missouri190 due to dioxin contamination 
(Holusha 1983).  
 
All this created an opportunity for a new, hopefully less dangerous herbicide to be developed 
and rolled out. Enter glyphosate, or ‘Roundup’, as it is known commercially. A chemist who 
worked for the small Swiss pharmaceutical company, Cilag, discovered glyphosate (N-
phosphonomethyl glycine) in 1950. The discovery was not patented or reported in 
professional journals as Cilag did not find any pharmaceutical application. The company was 
taken over by the US Johnson & Johnson corporation in 1959, which subsequently sold 
research samples of the compound to the Stauffer chemical company and to Monsanto, 
                                                 
187 As suffered by former Ukraine president Viktor Yushchenko who was poisoned with dioxin in 2004 
(BBC News 11 December 2004). 
188 In fact, by 1967 supply to the US military accounted for the entire commercial production of 2,4-D 
and 2,4,5-T (Perera & Thomas 1985, p. 36). 
189 Later Monsanto President between 1951 and 1960 and Board Chairman from 1960 to 1965. 
190 Involving 800 families, or more than 2000 residents. The area is now a ghost town, ironically used for 
high-temperature disposal of dangerous chemicals.   
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amongst others. Stauffer first patented191 glyphosate as a ‘chelator’, which removes minerals 
from solutions, in 1964. A Monsanto chemist identified the plant killing properties of 
glyphosate in 1970 and patented it as a herbicide in 1973.192 It was first commercialised in 
1974 (Dill et al 2010; Benbrook 2016).  
 
Glyphosate works quite differently from the components of Agent Orange. While Agent 
Orange selectively destroys only broadleaf plants rather than narrowleaf crops such as wheat, 
glyphosate destroys all plants with which it comes into contact – except for plants that have 
been specifically engineered to be resistant to it, or have become resistant to it as a result of 
natural mutation. For the first few decades after commercial release therefore, glyphosate 
spraying was limited to places where all vegetation was to be destroyed, such as between 
rows in orchards and vineyards, and along rights of way such as train tracks and power lines.  
 
But in 1996 Monsanto introduced Roundup Ready genetically modified crops into the US and 
subsequently elsewhere. These crops were specially engineered to resist the effects of 
glyphosate and they have since transformed the practice of agriculture throughout the world. 
Now, many genetically modified crops193 are sprayed with glyphosate as a matter of course, 
negating the need for mechanical weed control and avoiding the limitations of earlier 
broadleaf herbicides (Seneff 2014). Although it was already intensifying, global agricultural use 
of glyphosate “mushroomed” following introduction of these genetically modified herbicide 
tolerant crops.194 The total amount applied by farmers rose nearly 15-fold, from 51 million 
kilograms in 1995 to 747 million kilograms in 2014 (Benbrook 2016, p. 7) and was used in 
more than 130 countries by 2008 (Dill et al 2010, p. 20). As of 2015, on average more than half 
a kilogram of the salt was sprayed over each hectare of cropland throughout the world 
(Benbrook 2016, p. 1). Its normal application rate, however, is about one kilogram per 
hectare, and the increase in total use is mainly due to the increased area treated, so this is not 
especially concerning according to the eminent toxicologist, Professor Keith Solomon.195  
 
But not all of this vast tonnage of glyphosate represents profit for the company that patented 
it. Monsanto patents for glyphosate as a herbicide began to expire during the 1990s and many 
other companies began to produce it as a generic substance. Now less than a third of 
Monsanto’s $15 billion yearly revenue comes from glyphosate herbicide products. Most 
revenue comes from the patented genetically modified crops that work in synergy with 
glyphosate’s properties as a universal weed killer (Gillam 2016). As the patents on these crop 
seeds would begin to expire in 2014, Monsanto since applied for a third patent on the same 
substance as a treatment for microbial parasitic infections such as malaria. The patent was 
granted in 2010.196 
 
Risks 
This most recent 2010 patent has particular significance because much of the environmental 
risk of glyphosate turns on two concepts. One is the notion of its inhibition of an enzyme197 
                                                 
191 US patent no. 3,160,362. 
192 US patent no. 3977860 A, “N-phosphonomethylglycine and novel derivatives thereof useful as 
phytotoxicants or herbicides”. 
193 Such as wheat, soybeans, barley, legumes, corn, sunflower, kiwifruit, grapes, raspberries, apples, 
alfalfa and sugar cane. 
194 Glyphosate-GMO cropping in the US and Canada has shown no advantage in yield compared with 
France and Germany where GMO seed is not used and pesticide use is much higher (Hakim 2016). 
195 Personal email communication of 22 August 2016. 
196 US patent no. 7771736 B2. 
197 The enzyme is known as 5-enolpyruvylshikimate-3-phosphate synthase (EPSPS). 
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through the shikimate pathway,198 found in plants, fungi and bacteria, but not found in 
animals, whereby it achieves its effect (Ibid, p. 10). Thus, in theory, glyphosate cannot be 
harmful to animals, including humans – except that all animals possess large numbers of gut 
bacteria that do have such enzymes and pathways. Adverse effects on animals are therefore 
possible, albeit indirect, and based on the very property relied on for its latest patent. 
 
The other concept is the ‘surfactants’ in the weed killing spray, which are not an active 
ingredient themselves, but are rather intended to enhance glyphosate’s efficiency by helping 
it more easily penetrate foliage (Dill et al 2010, p. 10). While glyphosate itself may or may not 
be safe for animals and the environment, the presence of surfactant in some preparations 
“has been found to have greater toxicity to aquatic organisms than glyphosate (Folmar et al. 
1979, cited in Dill et al 2010, p.10), although in field conditions in places such as the Ontario 
wetlands fell “well below” toxic concentrations observed in laboratory conditions (Ibid, p.13). 
Although others warn that not only are the surfactants themselves toxic, but they also 
enhance the toxicity of the active ingredient (Antoniou 2012, p. 9). 
 
While chemicals may be patented, in the US all pesticides such as glyphosate also must be 
registered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the ‘Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act’, (US Congress 2012, s.3). Pesticides are registered providing 
there are no ‘‘unreasonable adverse effects on the environment’’ (including people) “taking 
into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits” of its use (Ibid, s.2 
(bb)). To support registration, applicants must provide appropriate research data in a form 
prescribed by the agency (Ibid, s. 3. (c)(F)). If the Agency is satisfied by the evidence following 
its own investigations and risk assessment, then applicants are permitted to distribute the 
product. However, the EPA assessment process is based on mathematical computer 
modelling, rather than its own direct investigation (EPA email of 15 September 2016,) as the 
following rather arcane extract from one of its guides illustrates: 
 
The Surface Water Concentration Calculator (SWCC) estimates pesticide concentrations 
in water bodies that result from pesticide applications to land. The SWCC is designed to 
simulate the environmental concentration of a pesticide in the water column and 
sediment and is used for regulatory purposes by the USEPA Office of Pesticide Programs 
(OPP). The SWCC uses PRZM version 5.0+ (PRZM5) and the Variable Volume Water Body 
Model (VVWM), replacing the older PE5 shell (last updated November 2006), which 
used PRZM3 (Carousel et al., 2005) and EXAMS (Burns, 2003). This updated model will 
improve users' interactions with the program and facilitate maintenance and operation 
of the software (Fry et al 2014, p.2). 
 
As this example also shows, both applicant and EPA assessments are quantitative and 
decidedly technical, which tends to diminish transparency. It also opens the question of 
whether the system might be able to be gamed, as Volkswagen were able to evade EPA 
standards in the emissions scandal, whereby technicians were duped by software that reacted 
to the precise conditions of testing (WVU 2015, Merkel 2015). Further, for ‘commercial 
reasons’, many of the Monsanto studies in support of glyphosate are not available for scrutiny 
by the broader scientific community or the public. This also tends to undermine confidence in 
the process, irrespective of any routine opportunity for public comment before final decisions 
are made.  
 
                                                 
198 Although exactly “how glyphosate-induced inhibition of the shikimate pathway actually kills plants is 
not entirely clear” (Duke & Powles 2008, p. 320).  
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Agencies 
The EPA was born from related areas of several agencies in 1970, and continues in “the 
extended shadow of Rachel Carson” (Lewis, 1985). As the largest regulatory agency in the US, 
the EPA is evidently the global leader in establishing chemical and other environmental impact 
standards, in cooperation with equivalents such as the European Environment Agency and its 
Chinese and Canadian counterparts, as well as global agencies such as the WHO and the FAO. 
The EPA can, however, be hoodwinked. In getting approval to sell a mixture of glyphosate and 
2,4-D in 2011, Dow chemical told the EPA that the concoction was no more toxic than the two 
chemicals considered separately. It was later shown in court that Dow had told the Patent 
Office the opposite  that the combination of herbicides had a “synergistic effect” that 
increased its toxicity (Charles 2015). 
 
However, there have been different findings from different regulators as to tolerance. As it did 
with DDT under its founder head, William Ruckelshaus, the EPA has the power to ban 
undesirable chemicals. That it has not done so with glyphosate indicates that as yet it is 
satisfied that the substance is, on balance, beneficial. The EU, however, is less certain: its daily 
chronic reference dose for human exposure is set at 3.5 times lower than the EPA rate, and a 
level 17 times lower has been recommended199 (Benbrook 2016, p. 11). China officially regards 
the substance as “harmless” with no tolerance level set (Chen 2014).  
 
The differing tolerance standards of the US and the EU may be due to culture and economics 
rather than science. The US, like Australia and Canada, has an agriculture based on a broad-
acre efficient approach to the farming of commodities. Whereas Europe tends to smaller scale 
agriculture based on tradition and the desirability of maintaining a village-scale demographic. 
Hence industrialised agriculture in North America is more tolerant of toxicity in the name of 
efficiency, while in Europe, where small-scale farming is directly subsidised, farmers and 
consumers are more sensitive to how food is produced. China’s position is probably due to an 
authoritarian government most concerned with economic development. Its official position 
has been challenged by several hundred “Beijing food safety volunteers”, without success. 
Greater transparency or tighter regulation seems unlikely as it would jeopardise China’s 
position as the world’s largest producer of the substance. Recently Chinese authorities refused 
a petition to release the research on which it based glyphosate registration, made in 1988.200 
In a familiar story, Monsanto provided the original (1985) toxicology for the registration 
process, but it could not be released because it contained “commercial secrets”. The Chinese 
government said it would “seek permission” from Monsanto to release the research, so far 
without apparent result (Ibid).  
 
Of the multi-lateral agencies, the WHO is concerned only with human health. In 2015 its 
cancer research agency found that glyphosate is “probably carcinogenic to humans” (Guyton 
et al (2015, p. 491).201 However this was contested by the European Food Safety Authority 
meeting under German leadership a few months later, which drew the opposite conclusion, 
despite several “missing” pieces of information (EFSA 2015, pp. 1-3).  
 
In its own response to the WHO verdict, Monsanto paid consultants to convene an “expert 
panel” similar in size to the WHO group that with some minor caveats found “the data do not 
                                                 
199 The EPA rate is 1.75 mg/kg/day, the current EU rate is 0.5mg/kg/day and a group of EU scientists are 
recommending 0.1 mg/kg/day. 
200 Ministry of Agriculture registration number PD73-88. 
201 It was reported in The Lancet that 17 experts from 11 countries meeting in France as the WHO’s 
cancer research agency, found that glyphosate, produced as more than 750 different products, is 
probably carcinogenic  on a similar level to preserved meat. 
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support” the WHO finding. Monsanto then paid for the expert panel’s conclusions to be 
published in a ‘special supplement’ of a toxicology journal (Williams et al 2016, p. 16) and 
publicised the article. All but four of the Monsanto panel were former consultants or 
employees of the corporation (Monsanto 2015; Williams et al 2016, p. 3). The lead author, a 
former employee, had earlier published a review of glyphosate, which found that glyphosate 
is “practically non-toxic” (Williams et al 2000, p. 117) and so was probably a safe choice for 
appointment to the panel. Another safe choice had publicly attacked the WHO finding before 
his appointment (Arnason 2015). According to email records, “Monsanto officials discussed 
and debated scientists who should be considered, and shaped the project” (Hakim 2017). 
Further, while all of the panel appear to be experts in their fields, most are consequently at a 
career stage where they are probably less sensitive about reputation  aged in their 60s and 
70s with the word ”emeritus” often appearing in their titles. While the article was peer-
reviewed, Monsanto’s involvement in the process appears less than exemplary. 
 
Also in 2015, Monsanto filed a lawsuit against California’s health hazard assessment agency 
for listing the substance as a carcinogen202 following the WHO finding (Plume 2016), which at 
the time of writing is unresolved. In a further contradiction, the EPA had subsequently found 
glyphosate to be not likely carcinogenic on preliminary review, with a final assessment 
scheduled for 2017 (Huffstutter 2016). But as part of the legal process, the federal court 
considering glyphosate’s health effects unsealed internal Monsanto emails and other emails 
between Monsanto and the EPA. The Monsanto emails showed that an EPA deputy director 
had vowed “to beat back” an attempt by the Department of Health and Human Services to 
conduct its own glyphosate review. In another email a Monsanto executive told other 
company officials that they could hire academics to put their names on papers about 
glyphosate that were actually ghost written by Monsanto. The company has denied the 
practice (Hakim 2017).  
 
With the FAO, the WHO has also published regulatory guidelines for states, especially 
developing countries, on the management of pesticides, which are not substance-specific 
(FAO-WHO 2014). However, the FAO-WHO Codex Alimentarius, does list individual pesticides 
and shows maximum limits for glyphosate residues in 31 different foodstuffs and fodder.203 
One of its most important functions according to its own website is to limit tighter standards 
by importing countries that would form a restraint on trade; the Codex is an instrument under 
the WTO’s free trade provisions.204 In effect, it puts a limit on standards higher than its own 
assessments. The range of food residues for glyphosate covered by the Codex is far narrower 
than the EPA (31 against 158), the classification descriptions are not consistent between the 
two and, as with dosage tolerances, food residue limits are different in several cases. In the 
Codex, meat from both mammals205 and poultry have a maximum glyphosate residue of 0.05 
parts per million, whereas the equivalent EPA levels are 5.0 and 0.10.  
 
Use 
How glyphosate is used also differs. Toxicology studies typically refer to the mixing and use of 
glyphosate compounds “in accordance with the label” instructions. But even if most US 
farmers are literate and observe the instructions, some may not. Further, as the compound is 
                                                 
202 The California listing results from ‘Proposition 65’, a direct voter initiative that was carried 
overwhelmingly in 1986, which requires carcinogenic substances to be so labelled.  
203 Including alfalfa fodder, meat, milk, soy and wheat (WHO-FAO 2016). 
204 “WTO members that wish to apply stricter food safety measures than those set by Codex may be 
required to justify these measures scientifically” (WHO-FAO 2016: About Codex). The Codex originated 
in the early 1960s and was included in WTO provisions during the Uruguay round (1986-1994). 
205 Mammals other than marine mammals, such as pigs, horse, goat, cattle. 
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used in over 130 countries, many people involved may not even be able to read the 
instructions, let alone take care in its handling. Further, in industrialised countries, glyphosate 
is typically sprayed from a tractor towed boom. But North American farmers tend to be 
enclosed in air conditioned cabs, unlike farmers in South America, for example, who are 
typically open to the elements and are therefore exposed to glyphosate drift. These risks have 
been ignored in some regulatory studies, as have other adverse findings in Ecuador and 
Argentina (Antoniou 2012, p. 9). 
 
There are some further concerns. There is evidence that any research critical of glyphosate is 
subject to a coordinated academic censure: many of the critics are in the employ of Monsanto 
or benefit from its funding and therefore are conflicted and cannot be free of apprehended 
bias (Séralini et al 2014, pp. 2-3). Also, one public relations counter to negative publicity is 
‘GMO Answers’, a website that responds to individual concerns about genetically modified 
organisms and glyphosate. According to the site itself, “GMO Answers is funded by the 
members of the ‘Council for Biotechnology Information’”, which includes BASF, Bayer, Dow 
AgroSciences, DuPont, Monsanto and Syngenta. A random sample of answers to concerns in 
August 2016 indicated that most of the “qualified experts” answering were in fact employees 
of Monsanto or the Council.  
 
Beyond the Anglosphere, where there is less leverage from such corporations, more critical 
studies of the effects of glyphosate have emerged. In Sweden in 2008, it was reported that 
glyphosate exposure is a risk factor for non-Hodgkin lymphoma. In Argentina there was 
controversy in 2009 after a scientist reported a high incidence of human birth defects and 
cancers in those living near crop-spraying areas, as well as genetic malformations in 
amphibians (Gammon 2009). 
 
A particular example of how the science surrounding glyphosate is contested is the French 
molecular biologist, Gilles-Éric Séralini cited above, whose 2012 study of the effects of 
genetically modified corn that had been sprayed with glyphosate drew a wave of criticism, 
including from reviewers who were associated with Monsanto. Séralini’s paper,206 which 
found that rats fed on the corn tended to develop tumours, was subsequently withdrawn by 
its original 2012 publisher following criticism of its methods. However, a revised version was 
re-published in different open-access journals two years later and reported in the prestigious 
Nature, which tended to increase publicity of its findings and the controversy it stirred 
(Casassus 2014).  
 
Later biological research at the same institution207 found major discrepancies between the 
official view of glyphosate and the reality of its formulation: 
 
It is commonly believed that Roundup is among the safest pesticides…Despite its 
reputation, Roundup was by far the most toxic among the herbicides and insecticides 
tested. This inconsistency between scientific fact and industrial claim may be attributed 
to huge economic interests, which have been found to falsify health risk assessments 
and delay health policy decisions (Mesnage et al. 2014). 
 
The Anglo-Brazilian paper cited above on the effect of glyphosate on embryos (Antoniou et al 
2012) found that German and EU approval of glyphosate levels was partly based on 
“unpublished industry-sponsored studies”, and “minimised” earlier findings of malformed 
                                                 
206 The paper, ‘Long term toxicity of a Roundup herbicide and a Roundup-tolerant genetically modified 
maize’, was published in Food and Chemical Toxicology in September 2012. 
207 The University of Caen, Normandy. 
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fetuses allowing potentially unsafe acceptable daily intakes of the substance. They further cite 
several studies showing a link between birth defects and miscarriage in Canada and Argentina 
from glyphosate spray exposure. Based on these sorts of studies, glyphosate is now banned in 
several countries — Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Brazil, and India. Unlike 
the US EPA registration system, in these countries there is significant distance between 
industry experts and government regulators who decide what is or is not toxic (Davis 2016). 
 
By contrast, the EPA released a report on 29 June 2015 that concluded that glyphosate was 
not an endocrine disruptor (USEPA 2015). However, a popular critical review points out that 
much of the evidence considered was studies funded by Monsanto and other companies. Of 
the five independent studies considered, three were cautionary, but were outweighed by 
industry provided evidence (Strauss 2015). Interestingly, the EPA report does refer to one 
study that raised concerns about the adverse effects of a surfactant commonly used with 
glyphosate (USEPA 2015, p. 60), but this is not mentioned in the summary findings.  
 
Overall, one of the most comprehensive reviews of the substance, Székács & Darvas’ (2012) 
‘Forty Years with Glyphosate’, which refers to almost 200 earlier studies, found that 
glyphosate formulations can increase fungal infection of soy crops, are toxic to amphibians 
and can produce tumours in both amphibians and birds at relatively low concentrations. 
According to the review, glyphosate can also cause malformations and developmental 
disorders in a range of species (Ibid, pp. 262-266). Importantly, the article further puts a figure 
on Monsanto’s unpublished studies: “of 180 research reports of Monsanto, 150 are not public, 
or have never been presented to the scientific community” (Ibid, p. 264).  
 
Cuhra et al’s (2016) Norwegian review study concludes that glyphosate regulation should be 
tightened, not relaxed as has happened in the US, because the industry is too close to 
regulators, there is evidence of fraudulent practice and many research studies do not assess 
its effects in its commercial formulations. They found that more than 62,000 articles208 on 
“glyphosate” were published between 1965 and 2014, with about 20,000 concerning “safety” 
or “risk’.209  
 
Similar to the US, European corporations involved with glyphosate have a website 
(www.glyphosate.eu) that publishes positive articles and ‘fact sheets’ about the substance in 
English, German, Spanish and French. One such fact sheet210 does admit that spray surfactants 
“could be harmful to aquatic organisms by impairing the integrity of cellular membranes”.  
Reassuringly, it says that risks are “mild or negligible if glyphosate is used in accordance with 
label instructions and good agricultural practices”. Less comforting is the label instruction for 
Roundup that it should not be used in or near freshwater to protect amphibians and other 
wildlife. Confusingly though, the Australian 11-page guide to Roundup for example, similarly 
says it should not be used near freshwater (Nufarm 2013, p. 1) but also refers to its use “for 
weeds in aquatic situations” as long as “the entry of spray into water” is minimised (Ibid, p.7). 
On the one hand it is not to be used in or near freshwater, on the other it can be — to kill 
aquatic weeds. Both cannot be true.  
 
Influence 
It has been further suggested that the glyphosate industry influences government policy and 
safety regulations in favour of its products. This is shown in figure 30 below. Because 
                                                 
208 These were peer-reviewed scientific articles and related posts such as technical reports and patent 
documents found on Google scholar. 
209 Similar results were obtained by the author of this dissertation in October 2016. 
210 Glyphosate the environment and wildlife faqs, p. 3. 
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glyphosate has been applied in increasing amounts only days before harvest especially in the 
North America, there are now much higher residues in the harvested crops than previously.211 
After Monsanto and others requested substantial increases in glyphosate tolerance levels for 
these crops, typically they were granted. The table shows that in the most extreme examples, 
alfalfa hay and silage tolerances have increased by 2000 times between 1993 and 2015, from 
0.2 to 400 parts per million.  
 
Figure 30. Changes in glyphosate tolerances, US. Environmental Protection Agency levels, 
parts per million  
 1993 1999   2012 2015 
Soybeans  (grain) 20 20 20 40 
Soybeans   (hay) 15 200 200 100212 
Soybeans   (forage)  15 100 100 100 
Maize (corn grain)  0.1 0.1 5 5 
Maize (corn stover)  NT NT 6 100 
Maize (sweetcorn) 0.2 0.2 3.5 3.5 
Oats (grain) 0.1 0.1 0.1 30 
Wheat (grain)  0.1 5 5 30 
Wheat (straw) 0.1 85 85 100 
Edible beans  0.2 0.2 5 5 
Alfalfa (dry hay)  0.2 200 200 400 
Alfalfa (silage) 0.2 75 75 400 
Source: Benbrook 2016, p. 9, table 7 
 
Large tolerance increases were also granted in Europe on application by Monsanto in 2012, 
after it was found that imported Canadian lentils showed high residual levels of glyphosate. 
The existing residue limit for glyphosate in lentils was then 0.1 mg/kg and the application 
recommended raising it to at least 10 mg/kg —  a factor of at least 100. The EU acceded to the 
10mg/kg limit in May of the same year (EU 2012, L 135/15; Cuhra et al 2015, p. 9).  
 
Despite increasing concerns, as late as 2008 one paper by leading plant biologists described 
glyphosate as “very toxicologically and environmentally safe” and a “virtually ideal herbicide” 
(Duke & Powles 2008, p. 319). Although eight years later Professor Duke was wary when asked 
if he still held the same views, instead referring the question to a toxicologist.213 But 
irrespective of its toxicity, these authors caution that there are sustainability challenges in the 
very success of the world’s number one herbicide because “glyphosate-resistant weeds will 
emerge” so that there needs to be less reliance on glyphosate and more on new chemical, 
“mechanical and precision application technologies” (Ibid, p. 324). Professor Duke advised in 
2016 that weed resistance “has grown much worse since our paper was published.”  
 
But as far as its toxic effects are concerned, he observes that “papers more critical of 
glyphosate than Séralini's…[are] mostly in predatory (‘pay to play’) journals”, whereas there 
are many studies showing ‘no effect’  despite the difficulty of getting a journal to publish a 
‘no effect’ paper. Duke further comments that “unfortunately, this topic is politically charged, 
with many unqualified people taking sides. That is not the way science should be done”.214 
This issue is one that lingers across its governance. For example, a 2015 article in a Canadian 
                                                 
211 In an email of 3 August 2016, Dr Benbrook advised that the three food varieties shown under 
‘Soybeans’ are consistent with terms used by the Environmental Protection Agency.  
212 Note: as at September 2016, the EPA showed this as 200 parts per million. 
213 Personal email of 20 August 2016. 
214 Ibid 
  171 
agricultural newspaper ‘Toxicologist pans UN glyphosate report’ drew more than 30 pages of 
online comments reflecting divergent views of the substance and its effects (Arnason 2015). 
Indeed, this is a matter of politics as much as science.   
 
Bearing in mind the old joke about Russian roulette whereby five out of six scientists declare 
the practice safe, there are patterns apparent in the politics. On the basis of the information 
reviewed for this assessment, the axes of contention are speculated in figure 31 below:  
 
Figure 31. Glyphosate: axes of contention  
More tolerant Axis Less tolerant 
Industry (profit) Motivation NGOs (health and environment) 
Toxicologists, plant biologists Discipline Molecular biologists, entomologists 
Anglophone Culture Francophone 
US, China Geography Europe, South America 
Nation states Scale    UN agencies, EU 
 
Industry tends to support more tolerant glyphosate standards because it is good for profit, 
whereas civil society represented by NGOs is more concerned about health and the 
environment. Toxicologists, who concentrate on “active ingredients” and by-the-label 
instructions (and who are often employed by chemical companies) tend to support industry, 
whereas more independent entomologists tend to be concerned about its effects on insects, 
especially pollinators. Anglophones, who commercialised the substance and have large scale 
agriculture, tend to be more tolerant than say francophones, who are more suspicious of 
genetically modified crops and favour smaller scale intensive agriculture. The large producer 
states – the US and China – tend to be more tolerant than the consumers of Europe and South 
America, while national environment agencies tend to be more tolerant of glyphosate than 
multilateral agencies of the UN and EU that are more removed from commercial pressures. 
 
Agreements 
Apart from the WHO and FAO institutional involvement described above, there are several 
related multilateral agreements relevant to the sustainability of chemical technologies. These 
include the Montreal Protocol (adopted 1987) banning ozone-depleting substances, the Basel 
Convention (1989) restricting the transboundary disposal of hazardous waste, the Rotterdam 
Convention (1998) restricting trade in hazardous chemicals and the Stockholm Convention 
(2001) that limits persistent organic pollutants, such as dioxins. There is also the Minamata 
Convention (2013) on the control of mercury. These Conventions typically involve a global 
secretariat, a committee of scientific experts and regular meetings of the signatories, each 
known as a ‘conference of the parties’. Signatories can be states as well as regional groupings 
such as the EU.  
 
All of these measures resulted from major disasters, such as the emergence of an ‘ozone hole’ 
in the early 1980s, the dumping of thousands of tons of US industrial waste on a beach in Haiti 
in 1986 (Avril 2002), and thousands of deaths in Japan and Iraq between the 1950s and 1970s 
due to mercury poisoning. None, however, capture glyphosate within their net. Any future 
Convention involving glyphosate would only arise due to a major international calamity, which 
appears unlikely. It is therefore more probable that the present mixed voluntarist regime plus 
industrialised state regulation will continue. 
 
‘Responsible Care’ is a form of voluntary private governance in this industry, which began in 
Canada in 1985 and now claims most of the world’s chemical production. As such, it does at 
least theoretically encompass glyphosate. It is essentially a commitment to a program of 
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continuous improvement in both workplace safety and environmental impact. Its leading 
safety indicators215 are the number of worker fatalities (about 40 per year globally) and the 
‘lost workday case rate’ (about four days per year per ‘case’). Its environmental indicators are 
emissions of various gases (NOx, SO2, CO2 and ‘chemical oxygen demand’,216) energy and 
water consumption, as well as ‘distribution incidents’, all compared with production. 
‘Distribution incidents’ are cases of spillage of dangerous chemicals (around 1800 per year).  
 
Its origins were not entirely altruistic: “there is no question that the threat of regulation 
served as a major incentive for the development of the program” (Moffet et al 2004, p. 204). 
Also its indicators relate to only a few impacts of its technologies – the ones easy to measure; 
indicators of environmental accumulation and toxicity, for example, are missing. It lacks 
consumer involvement and its coverage is not universal. Yet it does link with other elements 
of global governance such as the UN Global Compact and the International Standard 
Organisation’s 14000 series on environmental impact management.217 Responsible Care also 
acknowledges the UN Sustainable Development Goals (2015-2030), especially goal 6 (clean 
water and sanitation) and goal 12 (responsible production and consumption) that target waste 
reduction and chemical pollution in general, especially as they affect water supplies -- an area 
pertinent to glyphosate and its effects on amphibians. 
 
The Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM) is the 
intergovernmental response to increasing chemical risk. It is a ‘policy framework’ to foster the 
sound management of chemicals, and unlike the above initiatives, focuses directly on the 
chemical technologies concerned. Developed in 2006, it concedes one of the challenges is 
assessing the risks (and opportunities) “associated with more than 100,000 different 
chemicals”. While participation is again voluntary, it does encourage better regulation from its 
stakeholders, which are unusually wide-ranging and include nearly 300 “governments, 
regional organisations, intergovernmental organisations, plus non-government organisations, 
from industry, consumers, farmers, transporters, producers, researchers, suppliers, waste and 
disposal handlers, and unions” 218 (UNEP 2015, p. 5 and p. 1). A child of the UNEP and WHO as 
well as other UN agencies such as the ILO and FAO, it includes a governance strategy that 
embraces integration with development programs, together with stronger regulation and 
compliance measures. Much of it is focussed on the developing world and it remains relatively 
underfunded.219  The SAICM also continues to face serious obstacles. At its recent meeting in 
Brasilia, some stakeholders, including industry and developed country governments, argued 
for concentrating on the development of a solid chemical regulatory regime and building 
technical capacity. A proposal for a science-policy interface for chemicals and waste similar to 
the IPCC or the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services (IPBES) was rejected. Yet to be agreed too, is how to practically implement the 
strategy (ENB 2017, p. 12). 
                                                 
215 Indicators are taken from its 2015 Responsible Care status report: <https://www.icca-chem.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/2015-Responsible-Care-Status-Report.pdf>. 
216 Presumably not an emission, but rather oxygen used in chemical production. 
217 The 14000 series are essentially sets of checkboxes that guide and evidence that an enterprise 
conforms with a standard of environmental management, rather than a set of environmental standards 
that must be met. A key change in 2015 was that enterprises are encouraged to think of environmental 
impact over the entire life cycle of their product, from resource extraction to use and disposal, not just 
at production and sale. It appears to be a more extensive approach than Responsible Care, is 
complementary to it and is likewise voluntary. 
218 Comprising 175 governments represented by environment or foreign affairs ministries, and 17 by 
health, labour or agriculture ministries, with 85 NGOs from industry and civil society. 
219 SAICM has “supported projects worth more than US$110 million in more than 100 developing 
countries” (UNEP 2015, p. 02) 
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At the US national level though, the professional body for the chemical industry has adopted a 
set of principles called ‘green chemistry’. These are summarised at figure 32 below: 
 
Figure 32. Twelve principles of green chemistry  
1. Prevention. It is better to prevent waste than to treat or clean up waste after it has been created. 
2. Atom economy. Synthetic methods should be designed to maximize the incorporation of all 
materials used in the process into the final product. 
3. Less hazardous chemical syntheses. Wherever practicable, synthetic methods should be designed to 
use and generate substances that possess little or no toxicity to human health and the environment. 
4. Designing safer chemicals. Chemical products should be designed to affect [sic] their desired 
function while minimizing their toxicity. 
5. Safer solvents and auxiliaries. The use of auxiliary substances (e.g., solvents, separation agents, 
etc.) should be made unnecessary wherever possible and innocuous when used. 
6. Design for energy efficiency. Energy requirements of chemical processes should be recognized for 
their environmental and economic impacts and should be minimized. If possible, synthetic methods 
should be conducted at ambient temperature and pressure. 
7. Use of renewable feedstocks. A raw material or feedstock should be renewable rather than 
depleting whenever technically and economically practicable. 
8. Reduce derivatives. Unnecessary derivatization (use of blocking groups, protection or deprotection, 
temporary modification of physical or chemical processes) should be minimized or avoided if 
possible, because such steps require additional reagents and can generate waste. 
9. Catalysis. Catalytic reagents (as selective as possible) are superior to stoichiometric reagents. 
10. Design for degradation. Chemical products should be designed so that at the end of their function 
they break down into innocuous degradation products and do not persist in the environment. 
11. Real-time analysis for pollution prevention. Analytical methodologies need to be further developed 
to allow for real-time, in-process monitoring and control prior to the formation of hazardous 
substances. 
12. Inherently safer chemistry for accident prevention. Substances and the form of a substance used in 
a chemical process should be chosen to minimize the potential for chemical accidents, including 
releases, explosions, and fires. 
Source: American Chemical Society 2017; original source cited as Anastas & Warner, 1998, p. 30 
 
These principles are a summary and can be ‘drilled down’ for greater detail on the society’s 
site. Their adoption followed several major chemical disasters and the resultant introduction 
of the US Pollution Prevent Act of 1990. Europe and the OECD were involved in 
complementary initiatives during the same era (ACS 2017). If producers and regulators 
implemented such principles, it would mark a big step towards a sustainable chemical 
industry. 
  
Weaknesses 
On balance then, there are several weaknesses evident in the governance of glyphosate, all of 
which militate against sustainability. They also tend to undermine the credibility of the wider 
chemical industry, as do the dangers of substances including persistent organic pollutants 
(POPs) such as DDT, dieldrin and dioxins that are banned in many jurisdictions (Ritter et al 
1997).  
 
First, the military-industrial relationship involved in its development undermines public 
confidence because it is associated with secrecy, destruction and the use of force. Also US 
multinationals such as Monsanto have opposed unfavourable research and regulation 
concerning the herbicide. Monsanto has been particularly aggressive in attacking adverse 
findings and even pays academic toxicologists to publically support its cause. While its human 
toxicology nevertheless still appears relatively benign, evidence for glyphosate’s effects on 
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other life forms, especially aquatic animals, appears increasingly less favourable. Further, a 
technical approach to its control has resulted in acceptance of research based on an 
unjustified adherence to instructions on the label. In any case, its instructions are 
contradictory in relation to its use around water.  There is thus a participation deficit in its 
governance. 
 
The continuing controversy over glyphosate and its increasing use world-wide are linked 
issues. Much of the research that supports it is secret, and mostly focuses on the active 
ingredient rather than its hundreds of commercial formulations. Those commercial 
applications vary in mixtures with other chemicals, and many such combinations remain 
untested. Its transparency is lacking. 
 
Affecting both participation and transparency, with the exception of the SAICM, the breadth 
of stakeholder involvement in its governance is narrow, which must weaken both 
understanding and acceptance of the science involved. As with other chemicals, this can be 
exacerbated by the silo-like technical expertise about the substance.  
 
There is no single program, process or institution that has global carriage of its regulation.  
Globally, its sustainability risks are dealt with through voluntarist strategies at state level, 
together with regulation in industrial countries. While there are relationships between them, 
leading regulators as in the US, the EU and China take different positions on the substance and 
its toxicity. While some of this may be due to cultural and economic factors, there is indirect 
evidence that the rapport between industry and government may be rather too cosy in the US 
and China. And while the scope of both the WHO and FAO is global, both are focused on 
human health rather than biodiversity. They also act to limit tighter safety standards in the 
cause of free trade in food. Despite claims of higher yield and less pesticide use through 
linking glyphosate with genetically modified crops, evidence is to the contrary (Hakim 2016). 
Sustainability is better where there is less glyphosate and no genetic modification. This issue is 
central yet still to be addressed by many regulators. Regulation of technologies in this industry 
is a patchwork rather than a seamless coherent fabric. The problem of how all these measures 
can be integrated remains largely unsolved. At this level there is an absence of authority and 
thus a lack of accountability. 
 
An internationally consistent glyphosate regulation would support better governance. A 
recent letter to stakeholders from the EPA director of pesticide programs points to a new 
‘twenty-first century approach’ to pesticide testing and assessment (Housenger 2016), based 
on digital technologies. It is aimed at faster evaluations of more pesticides, using fewer 
research animals with lower costs. The approach emphasises international cooperation on 
data sets that relies more on models of established toxicity relationships rather than further 
direct testing. As such it promises a more coherent international approach to regulation — 
one that relies more on data analysis for risk assessment. Developing this sort of approach is 
discussed further at chapter 13.  
 
However, glyphosate governance now faces another challenge. The US$66 billion takeover of 
Monsanto by Bayer announced in September 2016 (Roumeliotis & Burger 2016) will be the 
largest ever by a German company and create a globally dominant chemical and seed 
conglomerate across agriculture as well as pharmaceuticals. Governance must now grapple 
with the immense leverage of a global enterprise that stands astride the traditional twin 
centers of the world chemical industry, in both Germany and the US. Integrity is further 
threatened. 
 
  175 
Yet the October 2016 finding of the international Monsanto Tribunal indicates that the law 
can be used against any unsustainability threat posed by glyphosate as much as it has been to 
negate adverse findings. Five judges meeting in The Hague using the legal principles of the 
International Criminal Court, brought down a verdict that Monsanto is guilty of crimes against 
the planet and humanity due to the effects of glyphosate and genetically modified crops on 
the ecosystem. While ecocide is yet to be established as an international crime,220 and 
Monsanto denounced the tribunal as a “kangaroo court”, the presiding judge said that civil 
society could help that development in international law (Eradicating Ecocide 2016). 
 
Glyphosate is an example of a market-led approach to governance in which the state is 
supportive of private development and market access through trade; its support strengthened 
in this case by strong military links to herbicide and nuclear weapons development. While not 
all pose the same challenges, its governance issues can apply to other chemical products. 
These issues include association with the military, commercialisation secrecy, incoherent 
global regulation, litigation that menaces dissenting research, and the political leverage of big 
corporate producers. Against the TAPIC governance criteria, transparency, accountability and 
participation are all sub-optimal due to secrecy and regulatory capture. Integrity is 
jeopardised by corporate influence. Capacity is sapped by incoherent standards, different 
institutional focus and lack of stakeholder engagement These are summarised in figure 33 
below:  
 
Figure 33: Glyphosate and other market-led chemical technology governance across TAPIC criteria 
Transparency Accountability Participation Integrity Capacity 
Low transparency 
due to corporate 
secrecy, patent 
protection, and 
relationship with 
military-industrial 
complex. 
Low 
accountability 
due to regulatory 
capture and 
capacity of 
Monsanto to 
influence science, 
media and 
through political 
connections. 
Narrow 
participation due 
to exclusive rights 
of corporations to 
undertake R&D 
without wider 
scrutiny by 
scientific bodies 
and civil society. 
Low integrity as 
considerable 
evidence 
Monsanto is using 
its influence to 
steer scientific, 
public and 
political opinion 
in its favour. 
Mission clarity 
divided between 
global 
institutions. 
Weak capacity of 
external agents to 
bring Monsanto 
to account due to 
lack of rights and 
resources. 
Political capacity 
to engage 
stakeholders in 
policy discussion 
notably absent. 
Standards not 
coherent. 
Different 
institutional 
focus.  
 
Counterweights that favour sustainability include the creation of legal categories that would 
thwart environmental damage and the use of digital technologies to speed and make more 
coherent testing through data analysis.  
 
Finally, irrespective of whether it is possible to find Paracelsus’ dosage ‘sweet spot’, 
glyphosate’s sales success as a weedkiller points to the return of mechanical methods due to 
the problem of evolved resistance as outlined by Professor Duke above. Robotics look to be 
one precision alternative that has no harmful environmental effects and thus a sustainability 
advantage. This is further discussed in chapter 11.  
  
                                                 
220 Ecocide is nevertheless a crime in ten national jurisdictions, including Vietnam and the Ukraine. 
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Chapter 10. Case study: Nuclear-electric power  
 
Human civilisation can flourish for centuries and millennia on energy delivered from a closed 
uranium or thorium fuel cycle, or from hydrogen-deuterium fusion  
— Asafu-Adjaye et al 2015, An Ecomodernist Manifesto, p. 10. 
 
Generating electricity involves technologies that form the key platform of modernity, and 
which are linked to societal affluence (Garrett 2014). They combine significant benefits with 
big risks. The energy sector generates about two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions 
(IEA 2013, p. 15), sourced mainly from fossil fuels. And about 41 per cent of the energy 
sector’s emissions come from electrical power generation (Ibid, p. 27). While greenhouse gas 
emissions are by no means the only issue in electricity generation, they are the major cause of 
climate change. Yet, despite the 2015 Paris climate agreement that limits emissions, there 
remains a political-technological divide between those who are reluctant to replace fossil-
fuelled electricity generation and others who want electricity generation from renewable 
sources progressed urgently. Both views might rely on Margaret Thatcher’s famous dictum: 
There is no alternative (TINA).  
 
One group argues that only coal-fired plants can provide viable base load power, while the 
other says that only renewables will prevent the overheating of the biosphere. But contrary to 
Thatcher’s dictum, there is an alternative to these extremes. It is neither fossil-fuelled, nor 
does it use renewable energy. It provides continuous base-load power and it emits no 
greenhouse gases during operation. As do fossil-fuelled power plants, it uses turbines spun by 
steam pressure to turn the electric generators. The key difference is that the heat is supplied 
not by coal but by nuclear fission.221 
 
Nuclear-electric power is favoured by ‘ecomodernists’ (Asafu-Adjaye et al 2015), who have 
been described as the environmental ‘centre-left’ of the political spectrum (Lynas 2015). They 
believe that decoupling production from nature using energy-dense technologies will benefit 
humanity, while at the same time leaving nature more space and less interference. 
Ecomodernists argue that nuclear power has a demonstrated potential “to reduce human 
demands on the environment, allowing more room for non-human species” (Asafu-Adjaye et 
al 2015, p. 18), and that nuclear fission is “the only present-day zero-carbon technology with 
the demonstrated ability to meet most, if not all, of the energy demands of a modern 
economy” (Ibid, p. 23). But due to social, economic and institutional “challenges”, large scale 
deployment of the technology is unlikely in the shorter term. New generation fission and 
fusion technologies are, however, viable in the longer term, according to the ‘Ecomodernist 
Manifesto’ (Ibid). 
 
Many of these “challenges” to nuclear power arise from major accidents that involve 
contamination of large areas and extensive publicity about nuclear catastrophe. The downside 
also concerns the proliferation of nuclear weapons material, the high cost of the power plants 
including construction, operation and decommissioning, the risk of nuclear terrorism and the 
difficulty of radioactive waste disposal. Further, nuclear plants need long lead times for 
planning and construction. The inevitability of accidents means that the electricity generated 
cannot always be relied on as other nuclear plants in the same grid are shut down when 
catastrophes occur, as happened in Japan after Fukushima in 2011. Given these challenges it is 
unsurprising that the nuclear industry has struggled to present itself as the answer to future 
                                                 
221 Nuclear fission was discovered in 1938 by Otto Hahn, who was later awarded the Nobel prize in 
chemistry. 
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energy needs, despite millions of dollars spent on major public relations efforts (Farsetta 
2007).  
 
Nothing exists except atoms and empty space; everything else is opinion - Democritus c.480 BC 
 
Background 
While the ancient Greek, Democritus, had postulated the existence of fundamental particles 
or atoms, it was only at the end of the nineteenth century that radioactive substances were 
discovered,222 and in the early 1930s Rutherford at Cambridge found that splitting lithium 
atoms released vast amounts of energy. The first self-sustaining atomic pile, which created 
heat in a controlled way, was built in Chicago in 1941. The first (experimental) reactor 
producing electricity was built in 1951, also in the US (USDoE 1994, p. 8), and the first 
commercial nuclear power plant was opened at Windscale in the UK in 1956. In the US, the 
1957 Price-Anderson Act223 limited the liability of firms for nuclear accidents and helped them 
secure capital with federal loan guarantees, such that more than 100 nuclear plants were built 
by the early 1970s (Jenkins et al 2010, p. 26). Construction of nuclear electric plants elsewhere 
continued in a stuttering way until by 2016 there were 449 plants in operation in the world, 60 
reactors under construction, two in long-term shutdown and over thirty permanently closed 
(IAEA PRIS 2016). All use uranium as a fuel. Apart from the four major incidents that received 
extensive publicity,224 Windscale (UK 1957), Three Mile Island (USA 1979), Chernobyl (Ukraine 
1986), and Fukushima (Japan 2011), there were about 100 “significant accidents”225 at nuclear 
power plants between 1952 and 2009, involving more than US$20 billion in damages 
(Sovacool 2010). 
 
Connections 
There are people connections between the regulation of pesticides and the generation of 
nuclear power. In the US, part of the nuclear-electric public relations effort has involved 
setting up industry funded pro-nuclear front groups. People with ‘green’ associations are 
highly valued recruits. As a result, former EPA chiefs, Christine Whitman and Carol Browner 
have taken prominent positions with pro-nuclear organisations since they left the Agency. 
Whitman is now co-chair of the ‘Clean and Safe Energy Coalition’ (CASEnergy), which is funded 
by the industry Nuclear Energy Institute (Farsetta 2007). Browner is a leader of the advocacy 
group ‘Nuclear Matters’. Another former EPA chief, William Reilly, is also a prominent 
campaigner (Nuclear Matters 2014; Manjunatha 2016). In these cases, two were appointed to 
the EPA by Republican presidents, one by a Democrat,226 so it is a bipartisan phenomenon that 
evidences close ties between government regulators and the nuclear power industry in the 
US.  
 
Also, both herbicides and nuclear power grew from military applications fostered by 
government, especially in the US and UK. Nuclear military applications were also developed in 
France from 1945 and its first nuclear electric plant opened in 1962. In 2016 France had the 
                                                 
222 By Henri Becquerel (France) in 1896. The becquerel (Bq) is now the SI unit of radioactivity, defined as 
the number of radioactive transformations per second. When used to measure activity in soil, food, and 
water, it is typically expressed as Bq/kg or Bq/m3. 
223 The Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act has been amended several times and applies at 
least until 2023. 
224 The Kyshtym (Russia 1957) disaster was also a major incident but it was not a nuclear-electric plant 
and there was little publicity due to the Cold War. 
225 Incidents resulting in loss of human life or more than US$50,000 of damage, based on US mandatory 
reporting criteria. 
226 Whitman was appointed by Bush the elder, Reilly by Bush the younger and Browner by Clinton. 
  178 
highest proportion of electricity generated from nuclear power of any country – around 75 per 
cent. Due to the 1973 oil crisis when much of the country’s electricity was generated from 
imported oil, the ‘Messner Plan’ was implemented aiming to produce all France’s electricity 
from nuclear power on the popular rationale of: "no oil, no gas, no coal, no choice" (Palfreman 
1997). Despite major accidents elsewhere, nuclear power remains popular in France for 
several reasons: a relatively good safety record, lack of alternatives, a national regard for elite 
technocrats, strong government ownership, and a low retail price of electricity (Ibid). These 
factors have also made nuclear-electric power an important export industry, as discussed in 
chapter 8 above.   
 
Dosage is yet another nexus. Both the nuclear and pesticide industries are critically concerned 
with the issue of ‘safe dose’ for risk estimates. The nuclear risk profile has relatively low 
probability of happening combined with high impact should an accident occur, while pesticide 
contamination may be more likely but with lower impact. A common assumption of nuclear 
radiation risk is that no dosage is safe and there is a linear relationship between exposure and 
harm (IAEA 2011). Exposure at significantly more than the level of natural background 
radiation is therefore cautionary. Figure 34 below lists different radiation exposures, 
measured in millisieverts (mSv),227 that relate to human biological impact (Chandler 2011). It 
shows that the recommended limit for workers exposed to nuclear radiation is 20 millisieverts 
per year against typical natural radiation of 2 millisieverts per year – a tenfold difference. 
 
Figure 34. Radiation exposure comparisons  
2 mSv/year Typical background radiation experienced by everyone  
1.5 to 2.0 mSv/year Average extra dose to Australian uranium miners, and medical.  
2.4 mSv/year Average extra dose to US nuclear industry employees.  
up to 5 mSv/year Typical incremental dose for aircrew in middle latitudes.  
9 mSv/year Exposure by airline crew flying the New York - Tokyo polar route.  
10 mSv/year Maximum dose to Australian uranium miners.  
20 mSv/year Current average limit for nuclear industry employees and uranium miners.  
50 mSv/year Former routine limit for nuclear industry employees.  
100 mSv/year Lowest level at which increase in cancer is clearly evident.  
250 mSv Limit for emergency workers at Fukushima Japan, 2011. 
350 mSv/lifetime Criterion for relocating people after Chernobyl accident.  
500 mSv Symptoms of radiation poisoning become evident. 
1,000 mSv/cumulative228 Probably cause fatal cancer in five of every 100 people exposed to it  
1,000 mSv/single dose Radiation sickness (nausea and decreased white blood cell count).  
5,000 mSv/single dose Death for c. half those exposed within a month (similar to Hiroshima 1945).  
10,000 mSv/single dose Fatal within a few weeks. 
Sources: World Nuclear Association, 2004; Chandler 2011. 
 
                                                 
227 This is essentially a measure of the amount of potential damage to the body from a given amount of 
radiation. 
228 The UNSCEAR (1994, p. 3) report to the General Assembly establishes 5 per cent fatal cancer rate for 
each Sievert (1000 mSv) of exposure. 
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The increased dosage limit (250mSv) for emergency workers at Fukushima in 2011 in the table 
above is an example of the regulatory ‘bracket creep’ that has also occurred with glyphosate 
tolerances. Although it is a total rather than a rate of dosage, it suggests that regulations were 
adjusted to accommodate hazards, instead of measures developed to avert them. This 
compares with the following dosage limits (above background levels) according to three 
international organisations (figure 35), which are consistent, and considerably lower than 
dosages experienced at both Chernobyl and Fukushima: 
 
Figure 35. Radiation dosage limits above background levels by international organisation  
 2016    IAEA   ICRP229 EU 
General public   ≤1 mSv/year    ≤1 mSv/year   ≤1 mSv/year 
Licensed workers  
over 18 yrs  
≤ 20 mSv/year ≤20 mSv/year  ≤ 100 mSv over 5  
consecutive years 
Workers 16-18 years < 6 mSv/year < 6 mSv/year < 6 mSv/year 
Source: IAEA 2011 
 
Especially given that young people are particularly susceptible to radiation, the employment 
of 16 year olds at nuclear plants is a probable breach of ILO Conventions on child labour 
including C138, article 3.1: “The minimum age for admission to any type of employment or 
work which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out is likely to jeopardise 
the health, safety or morals of young persons shall not be less than 18 years” and C182, article 
3d, which prohibits “work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is 
likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children”. 
 
Further, these kinds of tables can mislead. It is not immediately obvious that the rate of 
exposure is as important as the total amount. Further, there is a difference between the 
external exposures reflected in most of these figures and the internal exposures that result 
from longer term inhalation, absorption and ingestion of radioactive substances due to 
contamination by fallout. In contaminated areas those high in the food chain are at greater 
risk because contamination is accumulated through diet. These internal exposures produce 
cumulative genetic damage leading to cancers  later and separate from the effects of the 
external exposures described in most of the dosage limits above (Caldicott 2011). Along this 
fault line, a typical pro-nuclear argument is that there were no deaths directly due to radiation 
exposure at Fukushima. The contrary view is that there will be many indirect deaths due to 
fallout and ingestion of contaminated food over an area shaped by the prevailing winds 
originating from the disaster site. There will also be many cancers, especially of the thyroid, 
that may not register as fatalities (Tsuda et al 2016) 230 and to which children are particularly 
susceptible (WHO 2016). 
 
Regulation 
Regulations about relatively safe exposure levels can also be confusing and the issue is 
contested. For example, current standards are based on the conservative assumption that risk 
is directly proportional to the dose, called the 'linear no-threshold (LNT) hypothesis', although 
other bases are proposed. These other (higher) bases, include the ‘as low as reasonably 
achievable’ (ALARA),231 the ‘as high as naturally existent’ (AHANE), and ‘as high as relatively 
safe’ (AHARS)  which is about 1000mSv per year. All are mentioned as possible approaches to 
                                                 
229 ICRP: International Commission on Radiological Protection, an international NGO. 
230 Thyroid cancers are due to the ingestion and concentration of radioactive Iodine. Even if successfully 
operated upon they often lead to significantly reduced quality of life. 
231 Taking social and economic factors into account. 
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the issue of limits by the industry-based World Nuclear Association,232 which argues that there 
is probably a threshold below which there is no risk and that exposure to radiation is much 
less harmful than is usually assumed (WNA 2016).  
 
Like Gaul the area of nuclear technology is divided into three parts: a zone of non-
patentability, a zone of government patents, and a zone of private patent rights  
 Riesenfeld 1958, p. 51).  
 
Only some nuclear technologies may be patented. The 1954 Atomic Energy Act is the seminal 
US legislation regulating nuclear energy, which has been supplemented several times due to 
treaty obligations, but remains largely intact. It followed an earlier 1946 law that was primarily 
to ensure government control over its military applications. By contrast, a central purpose of 
the 1954 Act is “to make available to cooperating nations the benefits of peaceful applications 
of atomic energy as widely as expanding technology and considerations of the common 
defence and security will permit” (s.3e). Following considerable political pressure and much 
amendment regarding patent rights (Riesenfeld 1956), the Act excludes patent rights for 
inventions that can be used solely in atomic weapons (USPTO 2016), but provides for patents 
in non-military applications such as electricity generation. There is also an ‘intermediate zone’ 
whereby the patent office must report nuclear inventions (to the Department of Energy) and 
the government may subsume patent rights with appropriate compensation,233 irrespective of 
their military or non-military application. As such it is an attempt to balance the need for 
security in military matters against commercial incentives for innovation.  
 
The Act also establishes the Atomic Energy Commission, and asserts a licensing requirement 
for all activities concerning nuclear material (s.101). However it mentions nuclear safety only 
fleetingly  but twice in its 276 pages  in relation to cooperation with the states on a federal 
radiation council (s. 274) and in relation to standards for uranium mill tailings (s. 275).  
 
As to international regulators, the independent International Commission on Radiological 
Protection (ICRP)234 was formed in 1928 to provide scientific advice on the effects of all forms 
of radiation, well before nuclear power plants were conceived. This NGO has its secretariat in 
Ottawa, Canada, and is accredited with several UN agencies including the WHO, FAO and the 
ILO, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Its recommendations on policy 
and standards are widely followed by national health authorities.  
 
The IAEA is a semi-independent UN body with statutory responsibilities for nuclear safety that 
develops non-binding standards235 based on ICRP recommendations. Following Eisenhower’s 
1953 “Atoms for Peace” speech to the UN General Assembly and the expediting 1954 US 
Atomic Energy Act, the IAEA was set up in Vienna in 1957 to “to accelerate and enlarge the 
contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity through the world” [Article II] 
as well as, in consultation with other agencies, “to establish or adopt…standards of safety for 
protection of health and minimisation of danger to life and property” [Article III A.6]. The IAEA 
                                                 
232 The World Nuclear Association represents industry from all segments of the nuclear fuel cycle 
including uranium mining, plant construction, transport, plant operation and nuclear waste disposal.  
233 Compensation may be additional to patent rights and is determined by the AEC patent 
compensation board (Boskey 1956, p. 119) 
234 The Swede, Rolf Sievert, was the first president of the Association and is commemorated in the unit 
of ionising radiation that bears his name. 
235 Although any state that accepts help from the IAEA must also accept its safety standards. 
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is also responsible for measures to contain the spread of nuclear weapons [Article III A.5], a 
task at which it has not been entirely successful.236 
 
The UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), set up in 1955, is 
an authoritative source of information specifically on the effects of the ionising radiation that 
results from nuclear materials (as distinct from the wider radiation concerns of the ICRP), 
based on assessments of the scientific literature. It provides appraisals to both the ICRP and 
the IAEA. National governments set radiation protection standards generally in line with ICRP 
recommendations, keeping exposure as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).  
 
Also based on ICRP recommendations, the European Commission (EC) develops binding 
directives that its member states must transpose into national law. The OECD Nuclear Energy 
Agency (NEA) investigates emerging issues in radiological protection when invited by member 
countries. It also tests draft recommendations of the ICRP before they are finalised (Lazo 
2009). 
 
It is in this global regulation of nuclear power that there is an intriguing asymmetry involving 
the IAEA and the WHO. The IAEA was primarily created to promote non-military nuclear 
energy. Its regulation of that energy, however, is a secondary function that involves 
consultation with other agencies and member states. Yet that consultation works both ways 
and the agency’s overriding promotional objective tends to overshadow its relationships. For 
example, before the IAEA was established, the WHO issued strong public warnings about the 
health risks of the nuclear industry, as in 1956 when it said “the health of future generations is 
threatened by increasing development of the atomic industry and sources of radiation". 
However, in 1959, two years after the IAEA was established, the WHO became muted due to a 
formal pact with the IAEA that required them to consult on relevant activities “with a view to 
adjusting the matter by mutual agreement" (clause 12.40, cited in Caldicott 2011). Current 
WHO statements consist of factual information on the health effects of radiation rather than 
dire warnings of nuclear threats to posterity (WHO 2016). 
 
This clubby multi-agency arrangement of dispersed responsibility began to appear lax when 
the size of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster became apparent. In response, the IAEA facilitated a 
binding Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), which all countries with nuclear power plants 
(except Iran) agreed to  albeit a full eight years after the disaster, in 1994. The CNS commits 
countries (and the EU) to specific nuclear safety measures that include licensing (article 7) 
principles of oversight (article 8) and systematic safety assessment (article 14), although not to 
any technical benchmarks, which remain voluntary. Every three years under the Convention 
there is a peer-review system of country reports on the management of nuclear safety (article 
5) aimed at identifying good practice as well as flaws in national supervision.  
 
However the Convention itself proved inadequate when Japan reported in 2010 that it was in 
compliance, whereas in fact it was not  especially concerning regulatory independence 
(article 8.2) and safe siting of nuclear power plants (article 17). The Fukushima disaster 
occurred the following year, exposing “certain weaknesses in Japan’s regulatory framework” 
(Dahl 2015). According to the IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano – himself Japanese – 
“responsibilities were divided among a number of bodies and it was not always clear where 
authority lay”. Underlying this,  
 
                                                 
236 Given that there are nine nuclear weapons states possessing a total of more than 15,000 nuclear 
warheads, according to the Arms Control Association (2016). 
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a major factor that contributed to the emergency was a widespread assumption in 
Japan that its nuclear power plants were so safe that an accident of such a magnitude 
was simply unthinkable. This assumption was accepted by nuclear plant operators and 
was not challenged by regulators or by the government (Ibid).  
 
Russia, Switzerland and the IAEA itself then proposed that IAEA safety standards and peer 
reviews be compulsory. The proposition failed. Switzerland and the EU then further proposed 
that the CNS include compulsory safety targets for all reactors, but this was again opposed by 
countries such as the US, India and China that feared extra costs and domestic interference. It 
is probable that the US especially was wary of cost implications since US reactors vie in 
intensely competitive electricity markets, whereas European reactors tend to operate with 
more government control, in more regulated electricity monopolies where costs are less 
critical (Hibbs 2016). 
 
Beyond these inadequate governance arrangements, in response to Chernobyl the industry 
itself formed a non-profit association that focused uniquely on safety rather than the 
promotion of nuclear electric power. The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) 
was formed in 1989 and has headquarters in London, UK. It represents almost all operators of 
individual nuclear power plants, undertakes external peer reviews and provides operational 
and technical support and professional development. Immediately after Fukushima WANO 
convened a commission to report on needed changes to the organisation. The five 
recommendations were:  
1. To extend the scope of WANO to include design and accident management 
2. To set up an event response strategy  
3. To increase WANO’s credibility through stronger internal control 
4. To increase WANO’s transparency by making WANO regular reports accessible to 
the public 
5. To increase internal consistency between its four regional centres (Chudakov 2014). 
In effect, these measures accept that nuclear power plant accidents are inevitable. Beyond 
maximising safety through prevention, they recognise that there must be an effective 
response when accidents occur. In respect of the transparency recommendation #4, however, 
as of mid 2017 very few reports were available to the public on the WANO website, apart 
from some brochures on global performance indicators and a list of safety measures. Detailed 
reports appear to be restricted to members.  
 
Human mortality 
Despite the setbacks due to nuclear accidents, pro-nuclear public relations agents237 and 
academic research have both tackled the nuclear power safety issue directly. Articles 
comparing nuclear mortality with other means of electricity generation are becoming more 
common. For example, the following table (figure 36) was published in the influential US 
Forbes business magazine in an article arguing that nuclear is the least harmful form of 
electricity generation to humans. The piece has since prompted hundreds of comments over a 
period of four years.  
  
                                                 
237 According to the European energy consultant, Mycle Schneider, “the international nuclear lobby has 
pursued a ten-year long massive propaganda strategy aimed at convincing decision-makers that atomic 
technology has a bright future as a low-carbon option” (Schneider 2011). 
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Figure 36. Human mortality rate per energy source 
Energy source   Deaths per trillion kWh Per cent energy or electricity 
Coal – global  100,000     50% of global electricity 
Coal – China                          170,000    75% of China’s electricity 
Coal – US                                10,000    44% of US electricity 
Oil                                                36,000 36% of energy, 8% of electricity 
Natural Gas                                 4,000     20% of global electricity 
Biofuel/Biomass                     24,000     21% of global energy 
Solar (rooftop)                               440 <1% of global electricity 
Wind                                                  150     ~1% of global electricity 
Hydro – global 1,400     15% of global electricity 
Nuclear – global  90     17%  of global electricity with Chernobyl and Fukushima 
Hydro – US                                    0.01     7% of U.S. electricity 
Nuclear – US 0.01     19% of U.S. electricity 
Source: Conca 2012 
 
While the table appears persuasive, alas the figures do not add up: all the ‘global’ percentages 
for each electricity source total just under 104 per cent. Assuming that the figure for oil 
generated electricity is also global and that biomass accounts for some electricity generation, 
total global electricity is more than 112 per cent. Moreover, the figures are not sourced, nor is 
the year given, which cast further doubt their validity.238  
 
By contrast, the International Energy Agency (IEA) provides the following figures for 2014 that 
do add to 100 per cent and are probably more reliable (IEA 2016, p.3): 
 
In 2014, 66.7% of world electricity production was from fossil fuel generating plants. 
Hydro electric plants provided 16.4%, nuclear plants 10.6%, biofuels and waste 2.1%, 
and geothermal, solar, wind and other sources made up the remaining 4.2%.  
 
These are considerably different from the figures in Forbes, especially for nuclear at 10.6 per 
cent compared with Conca’s 17 per cent, and fossil fuels at 66.7 per cent compared with 
Conca’s 78 per cent. Such divergence in basic figures suggests that, as with glyphosate, 
nuclear-electric technology is a crucible of controversy. In fact, the conflict over nuclear power 
has been described as having “an intensity unprecedented in the history of technological 
controversies” (Kitschelt 1986, p. 57), visible in mass demonstrations in many countries, 
especially those following the four major and most public nuclear accidents.  
 
A more rigorous study, still favourable to nuclear power, came from NASA’s Goddard centre. 
According to the study, nuclear power has saved millions of lives: 
 
nuclear power prevented an average of over 1.8 million net deaths worldwide 
between 1971-2009 [over 47,000 per year] …This amounts to at least hundreds and 
more likely thousands of times more deaths than it caused. An average of 76,000 
deaths per year were avoided annually between 2000-2009…with a range of 19,000-
300,000 per year (Kharecha & Hansen 2013, para 4).  
 
                                                 
238 I put this to Dr Conca in September 2016 on the article’s comments site. His immediate published 
response ignored the points made: “Sorry, that was four years ago and those numbers have changed 
dramatically since. Will go back and fix when I get a chance”. 
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Dr Kharecha confirms that the higher rate of avoided deaths in later periods is attributed 
simply because there were more nuclear plants then operating.239 But accepting that these 
estimates are valid, the logic is constrained. These numbers are based on estimated deaths 
mainly from the inhalation of particulates from fossil-fuelled plants. The scenarios in the 
article assume that “nuclear energy is cancelled and replaced entirely by energy from either 
coal or natural gas” (Ibid). Yet this does not have to be the case. Renewable and distributed 
sources can also substitute for nuclear; they are much more quickly constructed than nuclear 
plants and have more public acceptance. In fact, the Lancet article on which Kharecha & 
Hansen rely for their estimates, indicates that a decision to replace current nuclear power 
plants: 
 
would be welcome in health terms if the nuclear plants were replaced by capacity in 
renewable production additional to the level of renewable production that would 
otherwise occur (Markandya & Wilkinson 2007, p. 988). 
 
Also, the wide range of ‘deaths avoided’ in the study — between 19,000 and 300,000 per year 
—indicates uncertainty about the true figure. That figure must be high as there are seven 
million early deaths each year from all sources of air pollution (WHO 2014b), many of which 
must be from coal and gas-fired electricity, especially in China and India.240 But on the nuclear 
‘deaths caused’ side of the ledger, estimates also vary widely. For example, the Belarussian 
scientist Malko’s 2006 study on Chernobyl estimated more than 90,000 excess cancer deaths, 
and his later study showed more than 115,000. This contrasts with a WHO prediction of 9,000 
additional deaths due to Chernobyl (Dawe et al 2016, p. 25). Peplow (2011) reporting in 
Nature says study estimates “range from a few thousand to hundreds of thousands” of deaths 
due to the disaster. Further, the issue of contamination continues over many decades: Cesium 
137, which forms much of the radioactive fallout from both Chernobyl and Fukushima has a 
half-life of 30 years (Schneider 2011). 
 
In China, the Fukushima effect was more economic than physical, probably because the 
prevailing winds are westerly, blowing fallout across the Pacific rather than towards the Asian 
continent. Land prices within 40 kilometres of a nuclear power plant in China fell by about 18 
per cent a month after the disaster, eventually returning to normal only years afterwards (Zhu 
et al 2016). China’s State Council did suspend nuclear plant development (Schneider 2011), 
but construction has since resumed. 
 
Comparisons 
Apart from these accident risks, the emissions and costs of nuclear power can be compared 
with other sources of electricity, key factors in any political consideration. Figure 37 below 
shows emissions and costs from existing and possible future sources, based on IPCC data. 
Calculations are for the life cycle of each source, including materials, construction, and 
ultimate remediation.241 Nuclear emissions and costs include the mining, processing and 
transport of uranium, construction of reactors and insurance costs against the risks of 
disaster. Hydro-electric generation includes the emissions and running costs of the 
construction machinery used, as well as for the dams and turbines. Social and direct 
environmental costs such as the loss of habitat due to dams and coal mines are not included. 
Notably, the data242 assume there is a distribution grid, which skews cost advantage away 
                                                 
239 Personal email of 2 September 2016. 
240 As well as to other sources such as fuel stoves, steel production and transport, for example. 
241 The only significant remediation cost is for nuclear; others are assumed to be negligible. 
242 The data are the “levelised cost of electricity” assuming 10 per cent “weighted average capital cost” 
(WACC) and high “full load hours” (FLH) of production. Figures for 5 per cent WACC and low FLH are 
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from rooftop solar in developing countries, where nuclear and all other forms of generation 
would require a grid to be built.  
 
Figure 37. Total greenhouse gas emissions plus total cost of electricity by source. Zero carbon 
price. CCS: carbon capture and storage (not yet commercial.243) Emissions: kgCO2eq/mWh. Cost: 
US$2010/mWh.   
 
Source: Based on data in IPCC 2014c, pp. 1333-1335. 
 
If cost were the only consideration, coal, biomass-coal, gas, geothermal, onshore wind and 
hydro are all more viable than nuclear. However, when emissions and cost are combined as in 
this comparison, nuclear is the third most viable form of generation, after hydro and onshore 
wind. When carbon pricing is included, nuclear remains the third most viable against these 
two combined criteria as the advantage of all non-fossil-fuelled sources is considerably 
increased.    
 
The data show that the range of costs (from 35 to 220 USD/mWh) is much narrower than the 
range of emissions (from 11 to 820 kgCO2/mWh). Whilst it has been argued to the contrary, 
the cost of fossil fuels is unlikely to rise much in the medium term. Supplies are not yet at the 
point of exhaustion due to new extraction methods and there are still considerable reserves 
(Helm 2013). Yet largely due to economies of scale in manufacturing, the cost of solar photo-
voltaic has been continually falling in real terms. Increasingly, renewable sources (that use 
free fuel) are among the cheapest and becoming cheaper, rivalling the cost-emissions 
advantage of nuclear. It is also a considerable disadvantage that nuclear has very high upfront 
costs as well as long lead times (Findlay 2010). 
 
However, these two categories are necessary but not sufficient to determine a viable energy 
policy and the place of nuclear within it. Not only is energy desirably clean and cheap, it is also 
                                                                                                                                              
also available, but not used here for the sake of simplicity and because some data appear to be mis-
labelled in the IFCC report. 
243 Although according to Service (2017) it is close to being so in Texas, US. 
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
Hydro
Onshore wind
Nuclear
Geothermal
Ocean  - tidal and wave
Offshore wind
Solar photo-voltaic: utility scale
Concentrated solar
Solar photo-voltaic: rooftop
CCS – gas – combined cycle
CCS – coal – oxyfuel
CCS – coal – integrated gasifier combined …
CCS – pulverised coal 
Dedicated biomass
Combined cycle gas
Biomass, co-firing with coal
Pulverized coal
emissions
cost
  186 
an advantage that it is continuous, whether provided directly or as a result of storage, and 
desirably inexhaustible. There are also locational factors: it is obviously not possible to locate 
offshore wind farms in landlocked countries, for example. Nor is hydro power feasible without 
rivers. Coal and nuclear power stations have locational problems associated with pollution and 
safety, and nuclear carries additional risks of major catastrophe, nuclear proliferation and 
waste disposal.  
 
The prolific energy policy analyst, Benjamin Sovacool (2010) judges nuclear and renewable 
technologies against six criteria: cost, fuel availability, land degradation, water use, safety and 
security, as well as ‘climate change’  the equivalent of greenhouse gas ‘emissions’. Writing 
before Fukushima, Sovacool finds that for nuclear, the costs of construction, fuel, and 
decommissioning will probably increase. Further, nuclear reactors are prone to accidents and 
failures, imminent shortages of quality uranium ore, the degradation of cooling water and the 
issue of nuclear waste storage. Writing after Fukushima, Tickell (2012) is even more critical. He 
points out that in a world that relied on nuclear energy:  
 
Serious accidents, such as those at Windscale,244 Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and 
Fukushima – the last of which came very close to making Tokyo uninhabitable for 
decades to come – would become commonplace events. 
 
Disasters 
Another leading energy academic is cited as predicting the total demise of nuclear electricity if 
there is one more major disaster within the next five or ten years (Beale 2016). Yet there 
appears to be a disconnect between this reality and energy policy research, which tends to be 
technical, narrow and masculine. Sovacool’s (2014) meta study of 4,444 full-length articles 
published between 1999 and 2013 showed that the social dimensions of energy use were 
undervalued; studies were biased towards science, engineering and economics over other 
disciplines; there was little interdisciplinary collaboration; and women and minority group 
authors were under-represented. Layperson viewpoints were ignored and quantitative 
research dominated over qualitative (Ibid, p. 530). 
 
These findings resonate particularly for nuclear electricity, because the societal and ecological 
impacts of disaster are its greatest challenge. The sheer scale of disaster most haunts human 
imaginings over both space and time. For example, 100,000 people were evacuated in 1986 
from the Chernobyl exclusion zone, a 2,800 square kilometre area within a 30 kilometre radius 
from the accident site. Later a further 200,000 people were evacuated from the three 
countries most contaminated by radioactive fallout  Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine. Some 
five million people continued to live in these areas that are still contaminated by the accident 
(IAEA 2006 p. v). Release of radioactive particles into the atmosphere from the accident 
continued for ten days, so that different wind directions produced three main plumes over the 
period. As a result, many countries such as Austria, Germany, Switzerland and Greece were 
also affected by fallout, as shown in figure 38 below. In Scandinavia, the native Saami people 
were unable to eat contaminated reindeer meat (Ibid p. 4). In large areas closer to the site 
children drank contaminated milk unaware of the risk of thyroid cancer.  
  
                                                 
244 A three-day fire in 1957 that released radioactive contamination. 
  187 
Figure 38. Europe and USSR: contamination from Chernobyl. Surface density of cesium 137. 
kBq/m2: kiloBecquerels per square metre; Ci/km2: Curies per square kilometre. NPP: nuclear 
power plant. 
 
Source: Steinhauser et al. 2014 
 
While some fallout was relatively short-lived with half lives of only a matter of days, cesium 
137 continues to cause disquiet as it formed the bulk of the fallout due to its 30-year half-life. 
In these contaminated areas, the highest concentrations of cesium 137 are found in woodland 
organisms because it is recycled in forest ecosystems. The level is still above intervention 
limits in many countries and “can be expected to continue for several decades to come” (IAEA 
2006, p. 3). For example, Norway's reindeer remain radioactive as they feed on contaminated 
lichen and mushrooms. Despite another example of bracket creep in which the Norwegian 
food contamination limit is five times the EU limit,245 as recently as 2014 reindeer were found 
still too radioactive to slaughter for food (Taylor 2016). 
 
The Fukushima accident led to more than 150,000 people evacuated from towns within 30 
kilometres of the plant, an area of about 1100 square kilometres, as shown in figure 38 below. 
It had “a massive impact on the atmospheric and natural environment, the economic and 
political situation, and human psychology and health” (Barletta et al 2016). Most evacuees 
remained in temporary accommodation five years after the explosion. Contamination was 
much less than Chernobyl, however, as can be seen by comparing figures 38 and 39.  
 
  
                                                 
245 EU limit is 600 becquerels per kilogram. 
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Figure 39. Honshu: contamination from Fukushima. Surface density of cesium 134 and 137. 
kBq/m2: kiloBecquerels per square metre. FDNPP: Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.   
 
Source: Steinhauser, Brandl & Johnson 2014 
 
This was because much of the Fukushima fallout was swept over the ocean and the volume of 
radioactive particles released was only about a tenth of the Chernobyl explosion (Ibid). Health 
effects were further reduced because Fukushima happened on 11 March, before the main 
agricultural season, and fallout tended to avoid agricultural areas. The Chernobyl accident was 
on 26 April, when the growing season had begun and fallout settled directly on crops and 
pasture (Steinhauser, Brandl & Johnson 2014, s.7). 
 
Different regulators made divergent recommendations and efforts concerning their own 
citizens living in or visiting Japan at the time of the disaster. The US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, for example, advised Americans in the region to evacuate to 80 kilometres from 
the site (Eisler 2012, p.31). So did Sweden. Others, such as South Korea and Germany 
facilitated evacuation from Tokyo and other cities, as did many other countries (Philippine 
Daily Inquirer 2011).246 Although the logistics would have been prodigious, the Japanese 
government also considered such a measure for its own people in Tokyo.  
 
Estimated deaths from Fukushima, like Chernobyl, are inexact. But despite greater population 
density in Japan, far fewer will die due to the lower fallout. One study that used extensive 
modelling suggests radiation exposure will result in an extra 130 (range: 15–1300) deaths from 
cancer and 180 (range: 24–2500) cancer-related morbidities (Ten Hoeve & Jacobson 2012, p. 
                                                 
246 ‘Foreigners Stream out of Tokyo’, 18 March. 
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8743). Others estimate around 1000 fatal cancers due to the disaster, which is within the 
range of the 2012 figures (Beyea et al. 2013; von Hippel 2011). This last figure is also 
reasonably consistent with Malko’s estimates for Chernobyl (90,000-115,000 deaths) that was 
ten times more severe and lasted much longer. Deaths from causes other than radiation due 
to the Fukushima disaster could be up to 600 (Ibid). Non-fatal cancers are ignored in these 
estimates. Even when in future decades the human impact can be better ascertained, it is still 
likely that different methods and researchers will produce different results.  
 
Waste 
Yet while the impact of nuclear disasters may haunt us over decades, the time periods 
involved in nuclear waste disposal are very much greater  on a such a scale that the intervals 
of all other terrestrial technologies are indiscernible:   
 
Since the only way radioactive waste finally becomes harmless is through decay, 
which for high-level wastes can take hundreds of thousands of years, the wastes must 
be stored and finally disposed of in a way that provides adequate protection of the 
public for a very long time247 (USNRC 2016). 
 
The regulation of nuclear waste storage is again nationally determined, hopefully consistent 
with IAEA guidelines. But one overwhelming problem is that as yet there is no permanent 
developed repository for high-level waste  the kind produced by nuclear power plants. At 
present high-level waste is contained on site, usually within the boundaries of nuclear power 
plants in temporary containers. It is universally agreed that ‘deep geological burial’ is the long-
term solution to the problem, yet not one such shaft has been opened since the first nuclear 
power plant began operating in 1956 (Findlay 2010, p. 18), although Finland is preparing a 
such a facility due for commercial use in 2020 (ABC 2016).  
 
Understandably there is extreme political sensitivity about the establishment of a nuclear 
waste dump. Japan once attempted to encourage its more than 3,000 municipalities to 
volunteer a site in 2002. Several years later not one willing candidate had emerged (The Japan 
Times, 2014).248 Regional repository schemes have been proposed, but do not overcome the 
issue of local reluctance. Perhaps only comprehensive national consultations “aimed at 
reaching consensus on a long-term nuclear waste management strategy” as in Sweden and 
Canada may have any glimmer of success (Findlay 2010, p. 18), although a proposed 
referendum in the state of South Australia on the issue appears doomed (Wills 2016). 
Politically it has taken a long time to develop facilities for waste disposal, although nowhere 
near as long as will be needed for the waste to become harmless.   
 
Even twenty years after the event,  
 
a comprehensive program for radioactive waste management has not yet been 
established for further clean up of contaminated areas or temporary radioactive 
waste facilities at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and within the CEZ [Chernobyl 
exclusion zone] (IAEA 2006, p. 159).  
 
It does seem that the effective international regulation of the nuclear power industry is just 
too much of a challenge for current human institutions, many of which have overlapping and 
unenforceable responsibilities, as much as its sustainability founders on the twin issues of 
                                                 
247 The half-life of depleted uranium (U-238) is 4.5 billion years, about the age of the Earth. The half-life 
of the plutonium in Chernobyl’s reactor is 240,000 years.  
248 Editorial, ‘Japan’s nuclear waste problem’, The Japan Times, 21 January 2014. 
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disaster and waste. Even if, despite the doubts of energy analysts (e.g. Brutoco 2014, 
Johnstone et al 2016), newer safer nuclear technologies are developed over the medium term 
as ecomodernists hope, it may be too late for the future of the industry.   
 
This is primarily a state-led example of technology governance, due to its implications for 
national security and evidenced by the heavy involvement of the five veto powers – the US, 
UK, Russia, France and China governments in its development. Despite its major risks 
governance does not seem effective. On the TAPIC measures, the transparency promise of 
WANO appears yet to eventuate. Accountability is largely national and weak at the 
international level, its military origins notable. Participation is narrow and limited to the 
industry. Integrity is moderate and responsibilities are generally well-defined, but is 
undermined by pro-nuclear front groups, especially in the US. Capacity is affected by the 
tension between the different aims of the IAEA and its influence over the WHO. Assessments 
against these criteria are summarised in figure 40 below: 
 
Figure 40. Nuclear power technology state-led governance across TAPIC criteria 
Transparency Accountability Participation Integrity Capacity 
Low due to 
industry and state 
secrecy. Promised 
WANO 
improvement not 
yet evident. 
Industry and 
political fear that 
transparency will 
expose dangerous 
weaknesses. State 
protects industry 
rather than 
enlightens civil 
society. 
Varies according 
to the states 
concerned. 
Military origins. 
Little evidence of 
explanation and 
sanction at 
particular forums. 
IAEA focussed on 
promotion and 
non-proliferation 
rather than 
safety. 
Narrow. Limited 
to industry and 
technical 
representation. 
Minimal other 
stakeholder 
involvement – 
NGOs kept at long 
arms length. 
Moderate. 
Bracket creep in 
exposure 
standards 
evident. Nuclear 
industry front 
groups 
undermine 
integrity, buy 
former EPA staff. 
Otherwise 
responsibilities 
well-defined, but 
enforcement 
lacking. 
Weak and slow to 
react to disaster. 
Nuclear waste 
storage issue still 
unresolved after 
sixty years. Ability 
to engage across 
sectors not 
evident. Problems 
are identified but 
solutions are not. 
Inter-agency 
responsibilities 
detract. 
 
In the meantime, over the last few years the forests of northern Ukraine have become part of 
a valuable export industry. Locals pick thousands of tons of wild berries from the 
contaminated area despite official warnings of danger. The berries are then exported to the 
EU via Poland. Buyers use Geiger counters to check radioactivity levels, not to reject ‘hot’ 
berries, but rather to pay lower prices for them. They then mix contamination levels so that 
each quantity is below the generous post-Chernobyl EU limit of 600 becquerels per kilogram. 
The berries are marketed in Europe as ‘organic’, which they are. In this way, the hazards of 
ingesting nuclear fallout are shared throughout Europe, rather than in just the areas 
contaminated (Brown & Martynyuk 2016). 
 
Visiting Chernobyl and its dormitory town, Pripyat, thirty years after the nuclear accident – 
safely by Google Earth and YouTube drone — two images stand out. One is the rapid re-
vegetation of what was once a town of 50,000 people. The other is the remains of a 
playground where stands a rusting Ferris wheel; yellow gondolas, still and silent in an eerie 
landscape, long abandoned by workers and their children. 
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Chapter 11. Case study: Robotics and artificial intelligence  
 
We share the infosphere with digital technologies. These are ordinary artefacts that 
outperform us in ever more tasks, despite being no cleverer than a toaster 
 – Luciano Floridi 2016.  
 
Perhaps our two-faced dance partner is a robot. Robotics is concerned with connecting 
perception and action. Robots are essentially hardware and are not necessarily intelligent, 
although they are certainly artificial. Artificial intelligence, on the other hand, is software. It is 
concerned with the acquisition, representation and use of knowledge (Brady 1984). The 
combination of both has been the source of human hopes and fears for a long time. 
 
There were about one and a half million slaves in ancient Italy out of a total population of six 
million during the lifetime of Augustus in the first century BC (Scheidel 2007, pp. 5-6). The 
benefits of slave ownership must have been highly valued in an era when human muscle and 
intelligence were little augmented by energy-exploiting machines. Nevertheless, the rewards 
of slave ownership were offset by risk. The many slave rebellions of earlier times include the 
three Servile Wars of the first and second centuries BC,249 the Zanj revolt led by Ali bin 
Muhammad (869-884 AD) in the Middle East, and the creation of the Haitian state (1791-
1803) led by Toussaint Louverture. Because masters feared their slaves, retribution was 
ruthless and bitter. Crucifixion was a common punishment for insurrection.250 Likewise, there 
is contemporary unease as robots become more numerous and more intelligent   and 
therefore more threatening. 
 
Still, the combination of strength and intellect in human slave form is as yet unrivalled in 
modern times. Certainly machines now multiply human muscle by many orders of magnitude. 
And computer programs exceed the human mind in myriad different  albeit singular  ways. 
But the computer that can land an aircraft is yet incapable of playing naughts and crosses or 
telling the difference between a dog and a parrot. Neither machine nor program is human-like 
and, despite hopes and fears to the contrary, may well never be. 
 
Links 
The development of modern robotics and nuclear energy are directly linked. Robotic limbs 
were first constructed for the manipulation of radioactive material during the 1940s as part of 
the Manhattan atomic bomb project. As with herbicides, nuclear power and robotics, the 
origins of artificial intelligence also lie with the military during the Second World War when 
early computers were constructed and used for code breaking. Alan Turing, discussed earlier, 
proposed a chess-playing program in 1941 at Bletchley Park, in a further step in the direction 
of artificial intelligence. A decade later he remained optimistic about its prospects: “It seems 
probable that once the machine thinking method had started, it would not take long to 
outstrip our feeble powers” (Turing, 1951, p. 475). 
 
The word ‘robot’ is from the Czech ‘robota’ for ‘slave’ or ‘serf’ and was first used in a 1920 
play ‘R.U.R’ (Rossum’s Universal Robots) by the Czech satirist Karel Čapek. The play was an 
immediate hit in Prague, was translated into many languages and reached New York in 1922 
(IFR 2012, p. 12). Čapek portrayed robots as intelligent androids that enabled cheap labour 
                                                 
249 The third Servile War (73-71 BC) was famously led by Spartacus.  
250 For example, six thousand rebel slaves were crucified along the main roads leading into Rome after 
the third Servile War. 
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and higher profit.251 In the play, human civilisation becomes a type of ‘Sodom’ as people  
pursue gross pleasure, so easily are human desires fulfilled by robots. One particularly 
intelligent robot, Radius, wants not just his freedom, but also demands to command as 
humans do. Other robots similarly grow resentful of their lot. Ultimately a world-wide robot 
uprising ensues, echoing the slave revolts of earlier times. Pamphlets announce its objectives: 
 
Robots of the world, we enjoin you to exterminate mankind. Don't spare the men. 
Don't spare the women. Retain all factories, railway lines, machines and equipment, 
mines and raw materials. All else should be destroyed. Then return to work, it is 
imperative that work continue (Čapek 2006, p. 44).  
 
Only one human is left, Alquist, like Daedelus of ancient legend not a scientist but an artisan. 
Alquist helps robots to reproduce themselves and witnesses an emergent robot Adam and Eve 
(Ibid, pp. 64-76).  
 
Commercialisation 
Despite this caution, the commercialisation of robotics was inspired by the fictional science of 
Isaac Asimov, who began writing short stories about robots in the late 1930s. But unlike 
Čapek’s unruly slaves, and unlike every significant robot narrative that came before (Golem,252 
Frankenstein’s Monster) Asimov’s creatures are benign. His robots are wholly electro-
mechanical, so that they can be programmed to protect humanity; they can be made safe. 
However, in line with fear of slaves, most earlier fictional robots were partly organic and fell 
prey to the ‘rogue robot plot’ in which they ultimately turn on their human creators (Pez 2016, 
part 1). As mentioned in chapter 6, Asimov developed his ‘laws of robotics’ that, in a cascade 
of priorities, purportedly ensure that robots cannot harm humans. In summary, these are: (0) 
protect humanity (1) protect individual humans (2) obey human orders, and, of lowest priority 
(3) protect oneself.253 Indeed, in the final book of his Foundation series, Foundation and Earth, 
Asimov reveals that one advanced robot, R. Daneel Olivaw, in his final resting place on the 
moon that still orbits a radioactive Earth, has been working to protect humanity throughout 
the galaxy over a future twenty thousand years (Asimov 1987, pp. 491-493). 
 
Asimov fans, Joe Engelberger and George Devol, founded the company Unimation254 in the US 
in 1956, the first to manufacture robots commercially. Engelberger was a physicist who 
designed control systems for the new technologies of nuclear power plants and jet engines. 
Devol was an inventor who patented an invention called a ‘programmed article transfer’,255 
from which they together developed the first industrial robot arm, called the Unimate. The 
device was later licensed around the world to enable the development of other industrial 
robots (IFR 2012, p. 2). Industrial robots used in manufacturing now come in many forms, but 
are generally designed to perform repetitive and dangerous functions such as spot welding, 
spray painting and stock transfer. These machines are subject to safety regulation and their 
numbers are increasing rapidly, although still miniscule compared to the human workforce. In 
2016 the International Federation of Robotics estimated that there would be 2.6 million 
industrial robots by 2019  an increase of a million in only four years (IFR 2016)  mostly in the 
US, Germany, China, Japan and South Korea. There are also already several million small 
                                                 
251 “on the wall stage right are printed posters: ‘The Cheapest Workforce You Can Get: Rossum's 
Robots’"  R.U.R (Čapek 2006, p. 3).  
252 The ‘Golem’ legend about the creation of a literally obedient giant designed to protect Jews may 
only be a few centuries old, but was centred in Prague, consistent with the robots of Čapek. 
253 Originally only the latter three. The ‘zeroth law’ was added during the ‘Foundation’ series. 
254 Based on the words ‘universal’ and ‘animation’.  
255 US patent no. 2,988,237 filed 1954, granted 1961.  
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autonomous domestic robots that perform such tasks as vacuum cleaning, floor washing and 
pet impersonation, plus several thousand ‘carebots’ (Muoio 2015) that mimic some human 
expressions or provide other functions useful in health and aged care. Military robots, 
including drones and bomb disposal units, tend to operate under direct human control, 
whereas experimental agbots and environmental pest destroyers usually operate 
autonomously. 
 
Artificial intelligence 
While the term ‘artificial intelligence’ is often used as if its meaning is self-evident, it remains a 
source of confusion and controversy (Lewis-Kraus 2016). Insofar as it is the software that 
acquires data and applies knowledge, artificial intelligence is independent of physical form 
and function, although it may enable particular functions. So far, it is not at all similar to 
human or biological intelligence. Neither is it conscious. Nevertheless, forms of artificial 
intelligence can already do many things better than any human can and their variety is 
astonishing. Johnson (2016) argues that artificial intelligence is the most powerful technology 
that human intelligence has yet developed. The philosopher, Timothy Morton says that we are 
already controlled by a primitive form of artificial intelligence  industrial capitalism (cited in 
Blasdel 2017)  which is pause for thought.  
 
As mentioned in chapter 6, ‘machine learning’ is a common form of artificial intelligence (AI) 
that is dumb, but has yet triumphed over more sophisticated intelligence through the use of 
prodigious amounts of data. And such available data are ever increasing, making machine 
learning AI potentially more and more capable. Such AI can instantly translate from one 
language to another, it can help make better medical diagnoses and it can facilitate intensive 
agriculture, for example. It can increasingly reliably recognise individual human faces and 
drive cars. But it can also optimise bio-weapons and create financial system meltdown 
(Kaspersen 2016). 
 
Figure 41 below depicts the relationship between AI and machine learning, and to other forms 
of data analytics. Machine learning is a form of AI. Except for databases, both overlap to some 
extent with all other forms of data analysis, such as pattern recognition, data mining and 
computational neuroscience. The diagram also suggests just how complicated and uncertain is 
the association between these inter-related fields.  
 
Figure 41. Relationship between artificial intelligence and forms of data analytics.  
 
Source: Hall 2014  
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There is an important further distinction within AI itself: there is narrow task-based AI, such as 
translation software, which is different from the concept of a much wider human-like artificial 
general intelligence (AGI), such as Clarke and Kubrick’s Hal 9000 in 2001 A Space Odyssey 
(which incidentally illustrates conflict between Asimov’s zeroth and first laws). The former 
tends to be regarded simply as a remarkably useful tool, whereas the latter tends to evoke 
fear that it may eventually rebel and control or destroy humanity.  
 
Dave: Open the pod bay doors, Hal. 
Hal:   I’m sorry Dave. I’m afraid I can’t do that…This mission is too important for me to allow 
you to jeopardise it.                                                    Clarke-Kubrick 1968, 2001 A Space Odyssey 
 
Narrow AI has been successful. Wider AGI, however, has failed to develop over the past 
several decades of research. While there is considerable disagreement, some experts predict 
that AGI might be achieved by 2050, others say earlier, or ‘never’. Still others warn we should 
not be complacent just because it seems far away (Häggström 2016, pp. 106-107). Once AGI 
exceeds human capacity, there is a speculative ‘singularity’, the point at which AGI can create 
even more intelligent AGI indefinitely, rendering humanity obsolete, or subservient to the 
whims of our super-intelligent progeny. The seminal formulation of this concept by I. J. Good 
(1966),256 however, went beyond ‘singularity’ to an ‘intelligence explosion’:  
 
Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the 
intellectual activities of any man however clever.  Since the design of machines is one 
of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better 
machines; there would then unquestionably be an “intelligence explosion,” and the 
intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is 
the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile 
enough to tell us how to keep it under control (Good 1966, p. 33). 
 
Intriguingly, this idea has been compared with Fermi’s257 first self-sustaining nuclear pile in 
Chicago in 1942. The addition of the final layer of uranium bricks (layer 58) brought the 
number of neutrons emitted within the pile to a level that then was more than self-sustaining. 
The reaction increased so rapidly that it had to be shut down after 28 minutes. If not, much of 
the University would have been destroyed along with Fermi himself. A similar AI scenario  
without the shutdown  has been termed ‘AI-go-FOOM’ (Yudkowsky 2013, p. 6).  
 
Yet the intelligence ‘return on cognitive investment’ may be unlike a nuclear chain reaction. 
The advances made by an artificial ultra intelligence might simply be linear – double the time, 
double the intelligence  rather than exponential or greater. Or again, advanced AGI might 
suffer from diminishing returns once easily accessed information systems have been exploited 
(Ibid, pp. 18-20). The intelligence explosion that Good envisaged might well never happen. 
 
Certainly current AGI is neither very intelligent or self-aware. Recent Turing tests that ask an 
observer to tell the difference between human and computer responses have swiftly 
identified the non-human by asking questions like How do you put on a boot? While the 
human respondent talks about undoing bootlaces and holding back the tongue, the AGI asks 
                                                 
256 UK mathematician, Irving John Good, (formerly Isadore Jacob Gudak), articulated this in his paper 
‘Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine’. Good worked with Turing on early 
computer design (Yudkowsky 2013, p. 1), and advised Stanley Kubrick on 2001 A Space Odyssey. 
257 Enrico Fermi (1901-1954), the Manhattan project physicist.  
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What is a boot? Others have put forward claims that the test has been passed, but the 
evidence is dubious, based on contorted rules and results (Masnick 2014). In contemporary 
science fiction, a future involving a spaceship’s artificial intelligence system that is 
downloaded into an android body is explored. The original ship-wide system has eyes and ears 
everywhere, and can access knowledge instantly. The android body is, however, isolating, 
constricting and has to rely on its own memory for knowledge (Chambers 2016). In this 
imagining, it is simply assumed that self-awareness is viable. The spaceship AGI is self-aware 
as is its android download.  
 
Yet in present reality, while ‘chatbots’ like China’s Xiaoice (Wang 2016) and assistants like 
Google’s Siri, might appear to be self-aware, their appearance is deceiving. Their responses 
are based on the assimilation of millions of examples of appropriate conversations through 
machine learning.  It may well be that human-like AGI has been elusive because it attempts to 
just use symbols to represent an objective world. By contrast, human intelligence “thinks with 
our whole body, not just the brain”, in a world that has been revealed to us through our 
senses over each lifetime. Humans thus embrace rich models of reality and can predict 
outcomes from few examples, unlike present AGI, which needs to be shown again and again 
(Wilson 1998, p. 135; Medlock 2017).  
 
But since the era of Turing, Good and Clarke, and despite slow progress in achieving human-
like AGI, the issue of how to control it, should it ultimately emerge, has become more pointed. 
Stephen Hawking, Bill Gates and Elon Musk are famously among those who have expressed 
wariness of its potential. Hawking et al (2014), for example deplore the serious lack of 
research into AI given that “we are facing potentially the best or worst thing ever to happen to 
humanity” involving possible “incalculable benefits and risks”. This view is more negative than 
Good’s sentiments. While he did proviso machine docility, the opening sentence of his paper 
is “The survival of man depends on the construction of an ultraintelligent machine” (Good 
1966, p. 31), as if he was anticipating some artificial deity that will save humanity from 
disaster. The structure of his AGI is based on the form of the human brain, so that this God 
would be made in man’s image. Hawking and his colleagues are from this less optimistic age, 
when the artificial intelligence explosion appears closer, but also dangerous and possibly 
malevolent. 258   
 
There is at least one further important matter. As part of a future that is as yet unevenly 
distributed, our young are beginning to grow up with artificial intelligence. By this it is meant 
that our children are interacting with forms of AI on a day-to-day familiar basis, such that they 
tend to regard its expression and forms as parts of normal everyday life, unremarkable, 
ordinary, even in a sense, natural. The Amazon AI Alexa’s growing relationship with a three-
year old human, Grace, is related by Grace’s mother, Rachel Botsman: 
 
With some trepidation, I watched my daughter gaily hand her decisions over. “Alexa, 
what should I do today?” Grace asked in her singsong voice on Day 3. It wasn’t long 
before she was trusting her with the big choices. “Alexa, what should I wear today? 
My pink or my sparkly dress?” (Botsman 2017). 
 
It seems that Alexa, represented by a cylindrical microphone on a kitchen bench, is more 
capable than its Wang or Google equivalent. It can not only intelligibly answer a wide range of 
questions that a three-year-old might ask, it can play music, predict the weather and most 
                                                 
258 “little serious research is devoted to these issues outside small non-profit institutes such as the 
Cambridge Center for Existential Risk, the Future of Humanity Institute, the Machine Intelligence 
Research Institute, and the Future of Life Institute” (Hawking et al 2014). 
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importantly it can both recommend and decide. If Grace wants blueberries it will order them. 
If Grace wants clothing advice it recommends and may buy favoured items, from Amazon. 
While it has useful and amusing functions, it is insidious. Its algorithms are designed to 
engender trust  and to sell stuff. While this particular Alexa was consigned to the closet, the 
issue for our children who will grow up surrounded by different forms of AI will be how to 
maintain a wariness of its ultimate purpose. But if ‘selling stuff’ can be designed into AI as its 
ultimate purpose, then so can other motivations: the ethical and the sustainable for example.  
 
Sustainability benefits 
The ‘incalculable benefits’ of a super intelligence might include solutions for clean energy, the 
maintenance of Earth systems, the elimination of disease and the end of the era of 
extinctions. But in the meantime, a combination of contemporary artificial intelligence with 
robotics also augers potentially significant advances for sustainability. While they are separate 
fields, the two technologies overlap in intelligent robots that can acquire and assess new 
information and act on it independently. For example, a promise for sustainability is illustrated 
with robots under development at the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) in 
Australia. These robots can identify and precisely eliminate different types of weeds in 
agriculture  chemically, mechanically and by zapping them with microwaves  ways much 
more targeted than the typical blunderbuss spraying of herbicides. A similar system has been 
developed by the German multinational, Robert Bosch, since 2014. This particular mobile 
‘agbot’, first identifies all desirable plants on a geo-spatial grid. As it autonomously patrols 
each field, it detects plants that depart from this pattern and eliminates them mechanically – 
in a return to the pre-chemical method, albeit updated (Albert 2016; Van Woensel & 
McCormack 2016). Abundant Robotics’ (US) robot visually recognises apples on the branch 
that are ready for harvest and picks one apple a second using a vacuum grasp. Blue River’s 
(US) robot uses computer vision and machine learning to identify plants in need of chemical 
treatment, weeding or thinning. The company claims this can reduce the amount of chemicals 
used in agriculture by 90 per cent (Burwood-Taylor 2017). Marine sustainability is enhanced 
by a submersible robot shaped like a torpedo with a single extensible arm, which 
independently identifies and injects acids into crown of thorn starfish that threaten Australia’s 
Great  Barrier Reef.259   
 
As illustrated by these examples, many technologies now depend on a world increasingly 
enveloped by devices, sensors, applications and data, which has resulted in an IT-friendly 
environment (Floridi 2016). Even if a super-intelligence does not eventuate, machine learning 
that combines algorithms, memory and vast datasets offers increasingly reliable predictions of 
weather, sea states and environmental change, as well as how they can be managed. With or 
without robotics, self-awareness or general intelligence, machine learning is already 
applicable to many sustainability issues and their potential resolution. For example, the 
several climate models used by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change are 
tracked and constantly improved by machine learning that compares predictions to results. 
The technique derives patterns that can also apply to the past by filling in gaps when data 
were scarce (Deaton 2014).260 
 
On the other hand, the co-founder of Google, Sergey Brin, speaking at the World Economic 
Forum appears uninspiring about the possibilities of machine learning and AI. Although 
enthusiastic, the examples he cites are mundane: AI “touches every single one of our main 
projects, ranging from search to photos to ads … everything we do” (Chainey 2017). Its 
                                                 
259 Personal discussion with Professor Tristan Perez at QUT Brisbane, Australia on 23 September 2016. 
260 The technique is known as ‘sparse matrix completion’. 
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application to sustainability appears to be low on Google’s agenda. Paying academics for 
favourable research appears to be a higher priority (Bridge, Whipple and Moody 2017).261 
 
Oversight 
Little has been done to oversee such technologies.  Much of that which is positive appears due 
to serendipity rather than intent. As recently as 2016, the UK Parliamentary committee on 
robotics and AI commented without any apparent urgency that:  
 
There has been some discussion about who should be involved in identifying, and 
establishing, suitable governance frameworks for robotics and AI. Kate Crawford from 
Microsoft has argued that ‘like all technologies before it, artificial intelligence will 
reflect the values of its creators. So inclusivity matters—from who designs it to who 
sits on the company boards and which ethical perspectives are included’262 (UK House 
of Commons 2016, para. 66). 
 
The committee went on to recommend the establishment of a permanent committee on 
these matters to be operated from the Alan Turing Centre. The European Union appears to be 
in a similar frame of mind. The author of a 2016 EU report on robotics and AI talks of a 
framework for current robots and those available over “the next ten to fifteen years” (Hern 
2017), but fittingly is also concerned with international regulation:  
 
In view of the development of robotics and AI all over the world, consideration should 
be given and initiatives taken to amend existing relevant international agreements 
when needed or to draft new instruments with the objective of introducing specific 
references to robotics and AI. International cooperation in this field is very much 
desirable (Delvaux 2016, p. 22). 
 
Like the UK, the EU report proposes the establishment of a European agency on the issue 
(Ibid, p. 7). The report is also concerned that Asimov’s laws should be incorporated into a code 
of ethics for robot and AI designers, and that smart robots should become registered legal 
entities subject to relevant law.  
 
In the US, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in the Obama 
administration held a series of workshops on the “benefits and risks of artificial intelligence”, 
and released a summary report, ‘Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence’ (Bensinger 
2016). However, as of January the following year (2017), the new White House website was 
silent on the issue. The Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI),263 
research group worked with the Obama White House on the workshops and the report. But 
the sort of intelligence explosion that Good (and Hollywood)264 envisage has received a luke-
warm reception at such levels, including by former President Obama. Still, the report does 
point to three main ways that AGI might be developed: (1) by gradually broadening the scope 
of narrow AI systems to cover a wider range of less structured tasks, (2) by progressive 
unification of existing methods to address more applications that previously required multiple 
methods, and (3) by solving specific technical challenges that open up new ways forward, such 
as ‘transfer learning’, which would create a machine learning algorithm that can be applied to 
a range of new applications (Ibid).  
                                                 
261 The Times, UK says Google funded 329 research papers of into public policies since 2005. 
262 Originally published in the New York Times as ‘Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem’, by Kate 
Crawford 25 June, 2016 
263 formerly the American AAAI. 
264 As in the 2014 movie, ‘Transcendence’. 
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We should be very careful about artificial intelligence. If I were to guess what our biggest 
existential threat is, it’s probably that…Increasingly, scientists think there should be some 
regulatory oversight maybe at the national and international level, just to make sure that we 
don’t do something very foolish                                                  – Elon Musk, cited in Floridi 2016. 
 
 
Major US Silicon Valley firms Google, Facebook, Amazon, IBM and Microsoft265 have recently 
formed a partnership to consider such matters as the ethics and trustworthiness of AI. Such 
considerations were also supposed to be on the main agenda for an ethics board to be 
created when Google bought out the UK-based AlphaGo-winning DeepMind in 2014. However, 
if the board has even met, it has yet to make its views public, preferring its deliberations to be 
‘internal’ (Hern 2016; Hern 2017b). 
 
 
This relaxed attitude can be traced back to a meta-study which analysed statements about AGI 
and assessed predictions as to when AGI will be achieved, up to the end of this century.266 It 
found “no  evidence  that  expert  predictions  differ  from  those  of  non-experts” and that  
“timeline predictions are likely unreliable” because they were dependent on when they were 
made (Armstrong et al 2014, p. 12). The key political issue of robotics and AI is not ‘singularity’ 
but rather the replacement of human workers by automation and its effects on society. The 
OECD, for example, has a blog called Robotenomics that concentrates on this question. So did 
Čapek nearly a century ago: 
 
Domin: In ten years' time Rossum's Universal Robots will be making so much wheat, 
so much material, so much of everything that nothing will cost anything. Everyone will 
be able to just take as much as he needs. Nobody will live in poverty. They won't have 
jobs, that's true, but that's because there won't be any jobs to do. Everything will be 
done by living machines. People will do only the things they want to do, they can live 
their lives just so that they can make themselves perfect (Čapek 2006 [1921], p. 19).  
 
AI singularity may or may not turn out to be the more important political question, but is a risk 
that is not yet addressed through governance. Despite its military origins, robotics and 
artificial intelligence has since developed as a market-led technology. Unlike glyphosate and 
the chemical technologies developed by large MNCs, as shown in figure 42 below, it appears 
to be more transparent and participatory.  
  
                                                 
265 Apple since joined in 2017. 
266 The authors cite an exhaustive search of the online literature by Wang & Potter which assembled a 
database of 257 AI predictions from 1950-2012. Of these, 95 contained predictions giving timelines for 
AI development. 
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Figure 42. Robotics and artificial intelligence market-led governance across TAPIC criteria 
Transparency Accountability Participation Integrity Capacity 
Limited. Tends to 
be limited by 
commercial 
considerations 
over data 
ownership and 
innovation, as 
well as by speed 
of change. AI 
ethics boards yet 
to report. 
Weak. Little 
accountability 
evident – no 
direct 
mechanisms, 
codes of conduct 
or regulation. 
Robots subject to 
safety rules only. 
AGI governance 
still at think-tank 
stage. 
Moderate. 
Epistemic 
communities are 
involved in 
research as are 
major 
corporations like 
Google and 
Microsoft and 
Robert Bosch. 
However affected 
groups tend to be 
viewed as 
consumers rather 
than participants. 
Low. Ethics in 
Silicon Valley are 
questionable, 
especially in some 
human resources 
and commercial 
practices. Corrupt 
commercial 
practices have 
been checked by 
EU, but mission 
clarity is lacking. 
AI ethics boards 
yet to meet. 
Potentially high as 
stakeholders tend 
to be well-
educated and 
well-informed, 
but not yet 
obvious as 
problem 
identification and 
solution 
formulation is at 
early stage. 
 
However, it is not especially accountable as such mechanisms are underdeveloped, despite a 
potentially strong policy capacity. Its present main weakness is clearly integrity. As well as the 
lack of diversity in its recruitment leading to cases of harassment (such as Uber in 2017), 
Silicon Valley company ethics are known for its dearth, probably related to limited 
accountability.  Nevertheless, the EU has recently imposed record fines on such companies 
due to unethical practices (Cox 2017). 
 
Apart from its effects on humanity, outside of fiction there is almost no discussion of the 
ethics of creating a super-intelligent being from the point of view of the being itself, yet this is 
of great importance. Is it ethical to create such an intelligence but at the same time restrict its 
freedoms through some variant of Asimov’s laws, for example? By contrast, humanity has 
laws, but also the freedom to break those laws irrespective of consequence (Camus 2011 
[1942]), while an AGI would have no such freedom. It would be bound by the laws integrated 
with its existence. Discussions are almost entirely anthropocentric, typically ‘what would be 
the impact of a super-intelligence on human society?’, instead of ‘what would be the effect of 
humanity on super-intelligence?’, let alone ‘what would be the effect of a super-intelligence 
on the biosphere?’.  
 
At least the issue of AI’s contribution to sustainability is beginning to be addressed by some 
such as the Oxford ethicist, Luciano Floridi, who believes that “we should make AI 
environment-friendly” and as smart as possible so as to “tackle the concrete evils oppressing 
humanity and our planet”. In this he is clear about our responsibility: 
 
We are and shall remain, for any foreseeable future, the problem, not our technology. 
Churchill said that ‘we shape our buildings and afterwards our buildings shape us’. 
This applies to the infosphere and its smart technologies as well (Floridi 2016).  
 
It also applies to technology more generally. If we are to become sustainable, humanity must 
consciously shape the technologies we create. That relationship has yet to be achieved.  
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Even the sustainability bond between robotics and nuclear power is fragile, at least at 
Fukushima where the clean up will take several decades:  
 
As the 60cm-long Toshiba robot, equipped with a pair of cameras and sensors to 
gauge radiation levels was left to its fate last month, the plant’s operator, Tokyo 
Electric Power (Tepco), attempted to play down the failure of yet another 
reconnaissance mission to determine the exact location and condition of the melted 
fuel (McCurry 2017). 
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Chapter 12. Case study summary 
 
The future, like everything else, is no longer what it used to be  Paul Valéry. 
 
These case studies illustrate several concerns about our connection with technology. One 
underlying concern is the fear that lurks within our relationships. We fear a slow poisoning or 
starvation that herbicides might unleash. There may be yet unseen effects on other life forms. 
We dread the risk of nuclear disaster that would threaten health over generations. We are 
afraid our robots could rise against us as slaves did in the past. Still we gamble on those risks. 
Humanity has woven systems that lock in blanket herbicide use. We have resumed building 
nuclear power stations and we accept unhindered development of robots and artificial 
intelligence. How we manage such risks is a matter of governance. 
 
Fiction 
These examples also show that inspiration to conceive new technologies has come from 
literature, especially from the science fiction that underlies robotics and AI; the future exerts a 
pull on the present. It is also in fiction that the conundrums of technological ethics and 
governance have been debated well in advance of reality: the ethics and control of artificial 
beings is a trope of science fiction (e.g. Asimov 1987). Kubrick’s movie Dr Strangelove (1964) 
highlighted absurd weaknesses in the governance of nuclear weapons systems. Neville Shute’s 
1957 novel On the Beach267 made stark its humanity-ending results. Pfister’s movie 
Transcendence (2014) portrayed the dystopian results of AI singularity. Such fiction is more 
than entertainment. Its explorations can inform how technology might be controlled. 
 
Science 
The case studies indicate that scientists differ in interpreting results. Scientists are part of the 
cultural and political fabric of paradigm and influence. And while many depend for their 
income on industry and industry depends on profit, reputation amongst scientists themselves 
depends on peer approval; so is dissent confined. As Michael Polanyi (1962, p. 5) points out, 
the elements of scientific merit are in a sort of creative tension: originality, which promotes 
dissent is esteemed as much as plausibility and scientific value, both of which promote 
conformity. His ‘republic of scientists’ may resemble aspects of a body politic, but scientists 
are neither politicians nor (often) regulators.  
 
Politics 
The intersection of science and politics is critical to the governance of technology. But while 
the views of scientists are essential in assessing that direction, there are other interests that 
need to be heard from if technology is to be governed in the interests of sustainability. There 
is support from organised religion, for example, personified by Pope Francis, who, contrary to 
some reports, may not have said that “capitalism is the dung of the devil”,268 but who 
nevertheless counsels for sharing our common home and against the love of money. 
 
Against the TAPIC criteria, there are substantial areas of concern: 
 
                                                 
267 On the Beach was made into a United Artists film of the same name in 1959, directed by Stanley 
Kramer. 
268 This is a disputed quotation. It was not in Laudato si’, but rather a speech in Bolivia where Francis 
was referring to the pursuit of money rather than capitalism, and was citing a fourth century saint, Basil 
of Caesera (Plis 2015). Other sources fail to substantiate the claim despite headlines consistent with it 
(e.g. Reuters 10 July 2015). 
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Transparency 
Industry is typically in advance of government when deploying technologies, including those 
that affect sustainability; regulation follows commercialisation. Nevertheless, in a competitive 
corporate environment consumer and political pressures are magnified through social media 
enabled by the Internet. This can prompt sustainability considerations by firms before 
government is aware. Yet corporate deliberations are not always open to public scrutiny. As 
shown with glyphosate, secrecy based on outdated patent rights has rendered many industry 
studies opaque. The nuclear club relies more on public relations (PR) than transparency. With 
artificial intelligence, ethics committees tend to be ‘internal’; so far not for public debate. It is 
left to individual outliers like Hawking and Musk to warn of danger. Others point out that 
human stupidity, rather than artificial intelligence, remains the greatest risk (Cave 2017). 
Governments move slowly as if regulation might disturb the mystical process of innovation.  
 
Accountability 
The military is intimately involved in the development of modern technologies and its 
influence is striking. Corporate industry became involved in the commercialisation of many 
such technologies only after the Second World War. Post-colonial conflict in both Africa and 
Asia further sped the demand for herbicides, while nuclear and robotic technologies were 
spurred on during the Cold War. Today robot drones kill on one continent while controlled 
from another. There is the prospect of autonomous robotic soldiers. Artificial intelligence 
guides weapons systems as well as enabling driverless cars. The military, as Eisenhower 
warned, is both economically and politically powerful, especially in the US and China. The 
central issue to the governance of technologies it spawns is that the military is intrinsically 
secretive and, at least technologically, arguably beyond democratic control. In the commercial 
arena, there is as yet no accountability for the effects of robotics and AI. There is political 
concern, but only for the job loss effects of automation. For nuclear risks, the IAEA is more 
concerned with proliferation than safety, and the industry body appears ineffective. 
 
Participation 
One of the most important findings from the case studies is that governing technologies often 
involves few people, who tend to share a common view of risk and reality. Because 
technology clubs are exclusive, not inclusive, this results in a skewed set of priorities. 
Disciplines are narrow and secluded. Technical knowledge is often isolated from real world 
experience of its effects. Political connection trumps technical knowledge. Governing 
technologies for sustainability thus defers to a passive attitude of technological inevitability. 
With chemicals such as glyphosate, participation tends to be limited to scientists rather than 
end-users and consumers. Nuclear power risks are monitored in exclusive technocratic 
enclaves that have proven inadequate and remain ineffective, including the industry body. 
The highly technical nature of AI daunts the participation of non-experts despite its potential 
impact on the future, and ICT corporations tend to view stakeholders as consumers. 
 
Integrity 
As Milton Friedman observed (1982, p. 128), regulatory agencies tend to be captured by 
producers, which appears to be true of the relationship between the EPA and Monsanto, for 
example, and will be made more likely at global level as the Bayer-Monsanto takeover 
proceeds. There is also evidence that academics are paid for favourable research by major 
firms in at least two sectors. The nuclear industry is affected as much by economics as it is by 
safety and sustainability. Evidence of pro-nuclear front groups rewarding former EPA chiefs is 
also concerning for the integrity of its governance. Robotics and artificial intelligence 
developments are without any real oversight, which proceeds with a lethargy that contrasts 
starkly with the speed of industry innovation. The integrity of public organisations involved in 
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regulating its development has not emerged as an issue because there is essentially no such 
regulation, although the EU has been active in the wider ICT industry. Ethical think tanks are at 
best, nascent. Yet this criterion is where the need for mission clarity is defined. This is where 
leadership and initiative converge. There appears to be a profound lack of the sort of ethical 
leadership that defines technology governance as primarily aiming for sustainability. 
 
Capacity 
At the global level, technological governance remains disjointed, with different approaches 
between institutions and inconsistent rule-making. The chemical industry is fraught with legal 
and PR battles. Nuclear regulation focused more on non-proliferation than safety, until the 
industry itself was forced to act after Chernobyl  albeit with the lethargy of the incapacitated. 
Nuclear waste storage remains a major problem; no state is prepared to suffer the ignominy 
of becoming an international nuclear waste dump and there is neither capacity nor authority 
to determine otherwise. While corporate interests exert less leverage on regulatory standards 
at global level than at national level, this may be challenged by the impending Bayer chemical 
takeover of Monsanto. On the other hand, potential policy capacity in robotics and AI 
governance is high, as stakeholders tend to be well-educated and it applies across many fields. 
The following figure 43 summarises the case study findings against the TAPIC criteria: 
 
Figure 43. Governance strengths and weaknesses of case studies against TAPIC criteria: summary 
Paradigm  Transparency Accountability Participation Integrity  Capacity 
State-led. 
Nuclear 
electricity 
 
Low  state 
and industry 
secrecy due to 
fear of risk 
exposure.  
Variable  
military 
origins, little 
evidence of 
sanction. IAEA 
not focussed 
on safety. 
Narrow  
limited to 
industry and 
technical 
representation. 
Moderate  
bracket creep, 
industry front 
groups. Duties 
well-defined, 
but 
enforcement 
lacking. 
Weak  slow, 
waste storage 
unresolved, 
engagement 
poor, inter-
agency duties 
detract. 
Market-led. 
Chemicals 
(glyphosate) 
 
Low  
corporate 
secrecy, 
patents,  
military origins. 
Low  military  
origins, 
regulatory 
capture, 
Monsanto 
adverse 
influence.  
Narrow  
rights to R&D 
are without 
wider scrutiny. 
Low  
Monsanto 
influences 
science and 
politics. Global 
institutions 
divided. 
Weak  lack 
resources. 
Stakeholder 
engagement 
absent. 
Standards not 
coherent.  
Market-led 
Robotics and 
artificial 
intelligence 
 
Limited – due 
to data 
ownership, 
innovation, 
speed of 
change. Ethics 
boards yet to 
report. 
Low – military 
origins, no 
mechanisms, 
codes or 
regulation, 
except robot 
safety rules. 
AGI at think-
tank stage. 
Moderate – 
epistemic and 
corporate 
involvement in 
research, but 
groups seen as 
consumers, not 
participants. 
Low – ethics 
questionable, 
Corrupt 
practices in 
EU, mission 
clarity lacking. 
Ethics boards 
not yet met. 
Academics 
paid for 
favourable 
research. 
Potentially 
high –
stakeholders 
well-educated, 
but problem 
identification 
and solution 
formulation at 
early stage. 
 
Overall, the case studies indicate that there are significant deficiencies in the governance of 
representative technologies, irrespective of mode. Both state and market-led approaches are 
wanting against most criteria, which allows the ‘dark side’ of Janus to present itself should 
sustainability be strongly pursued. This dark side emerges primarily because stakeholders are 
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neither engaged nor informed and therefore cannot have any part in determining or owning 
the decisions and impacts of these powerful technologies. Instead, however well-meaning, 
participants are few, technocratic and cloistered, bound by commercial and legal constraint as 
well as a culture of secrecy and self-reference. At worst, there is regulatory capture due to the 
political strength of corporations, or else concealment of major risks.   
 
If better technology governance is to be effected in the pursuit of sustainability, then a system 
that relies on participation and engagement is indicated. A form of network governance that 
may be viable is outlined in the following chapter, along with other alternative measures that 
would support its operation and strengthen its results.  
 
 “The shift from government to governance spells a change in decision making and numerous 
opportunities for the pursuit of sustainability”                   Kemp, Parto & Gibson 2005, p. 18.  
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Chapter 13. Alternative visions 
 
And yet as has been said about Wagner’s music, the situation may not be as bad as it sounds 
 – John Ruggie 2014, p. 6.   
 
This chapter first outlines the current state of technology and sustainability, then highlights how 
its deficiencies might be overcome, with particular reference to the form of its governance. This 
includes implied legal and financial reforms as well as considerations of structure, institution and 
values. 
 
On the American Samoa island of Ta‘ū, where the anthropologist Margaret Mead once based her 
research, all electricity is produced from an array of solar panels combined with sixty Tesla 
powerpacks, plus a microgrid for distribution. 269 The system can power the entire island for three 
days without sunlight and recharges within seven hours (Etherington 2016).  
 
Within the Ukraine’s Chernobyl exclusion zone, two Chinese companies are building a solar farm 
that will produce a gigawatt270 of electricity. The site has been made more secure by placing a 
giant steel lid over the meltdown site, land is cheap and grid infrastructure is already in place 
(Cooke 2017).  
 
Apart from these two particular applications, some other sustainable technologies are already 
widespread. They include energy generation systems such as hydro, tidal and wind, as well as 
illumination by light-emitting diodes (LEDs). Electric transport can be sustainable depending on 
energy source. There are now many low-energy homes independent of the grid. Apart from these 
examples, however, few sustainable technologies are fully developed. Certainly there are 
promising advances such as ‘scrubbing towers’ that remove pollutants from the air, bladeless 
wind generators, and nanotube filters that remove heavy metal contaminants from water (Wang 
2016). There are phyto-remediation methods that use plants to remove soil contamination (Lasat 
2000), techniques that promise to restore entire marine ecosystems using artificial reefs and 
oyster spats (Grovenor 2016) as well as metal-organic machines that harvest fresh water from the 
air (Kim et al 2017). But these are only technical advances, yet to be commercially rolled out. 
 
Figure 44. Ten most important technologies of the fourth industrial revolution 
 Advanced materials  
 Cloud technology, including big data  
 Autonomous vehicles, including drones  
 Synthetic biology  
 Virtual and augmented reality  
 Artificial intelligence  
 Robots  
 Blockchain 
 3D printing 
 Internet of things  
Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers 2017, report for the Word Economic Forum 
 
                                                 
269 Notably, the USEPA funded the project with the US Department of the Interior and the American 
Samoa Economic Development Authority.  
270 One billion (109) watts, enough to power about 700,000 homes.  
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In more general terms, business interests involved with the World Economic Forum have 
identified the top ten ‘fourth industrial revolution’ (4IR) technologies271 for the Earth as in figure 
44 above. While these technologies may not automatically contribute to sustainability, they 
are all light-footed and indicate promising trends. Importantly, most are Internet dependent. 
All have a digital base:  
 
Meanwhile business as usual  strip mining, fracking, drilling, trawling, land clearing, broad acre 
monoculture, fossil-fuelled and polluting technologies  continue as typical, conventional and 
unremarkable. And some emerging technologies pose “major risk of global catastrophe” 
(Beckstead et al 2014, p. 6), let alone jeopardise sustainability. Synthetic biology might result 
in pandemics. Geoengineering risks drought and acid rain (Ibid, p. 3). Advanced artificial 
intelligence demands protection from malevolence lest it spells the end of the human race 
(Hawking 2014). Insidiously, the ‘smart’ mobile technologies that direct advertising based on 
past taste and location (Glavas & Letheren 2016) reduce people to neoliberal consumers 
(Monbiot 2016), who are force-fed promotions to increase consumption, as geese are 
engorged to produce foie gras. Other emerging technologies such as data mining, low 
intensity nuclear, nuclear fusion, vehicular hydrogen, magnetic-levitation trains and microbial 
biofuels can be associated both positively and negatively with sustainability.  
 
This blotched pattern of mixed hope and despair results from the current fragmented governance 
of technology. These are isolated attempts to control a set of entities that are largely self-
propelled, yet directionless, buffeted by forces economic, political and legal. While sustainability 
of and through both new and conventional technologies scaled to the global level demands 
conscious oversight and regulation, instead there is only passive acceptance apparent in many 
areas.  
 
With few exceptions, governance of important technologies lacks in many of the TAPIC elements. 
Where it exists, governance tends to be secretive and opaque. It is not really accountable, except 
to states that may be unduly influenced by corporate pressures, or constricted by the military 
relationship. With the notable exception of the SDGs, participation tends to be narrow outside of 
the technocratic enclaves that are required by treaty. It is evident from the case studies that 
important technologies are developed and managed in secretive, technocratic bartizans that 
are reluctant to respond to criticism, except when corporate interests are threatened. 
Integrity is especially constrained by regulatory capture, and capacity is limited by lack of 
collaboration, as well as the difficulties of combining political acumen with technical literacy.  
 
Measures that would advance technology governance to benefit sustainability are significant 
challenges. They involve legal and financial reforms, structural and institutional change, a re-
emphasis of values and different political priorities that centre on integrity. 
 
Legal reforms 
Governance arrangements are undermined by the law, which has failed to protect where 
technology impacts. Nevertheless, the law is a means to prise open opaque practices and shed 
light on the unsustainable. Technology may be able to be restrained by a legal framework that 
sets boundaries to protect the environment as Pope Francis suggests (2015, p. 39). Within 
that, specific legal reforms that would underpin technological sustainability include a 
recognition of non-human rights. They also include establishing the international crime of 
ecocide, revising laws concerning corporate involvement in politics and changes to patent law. 
                                                 
271 The term ‘4IR’ was made popular especially in business circles by Klaus Schwab of the World 
Economic Forum in an article first published in Foreign Affairs 2015 (Schwab 2016). 
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While the concept of human rights was progressively translated into law during the twentieth 
century, non-human rights have advanced a little in the twenty-first. A Spanish town recently 
gave civic rights to cats and dogs, and a US court ruled that chimpanzees in a research 
laboratory are ‘legal persons’ (Dawber 2015).272 Francis Fukuyama, in considering a 
‘superuniversalisation’ of rights, concluded that there is no essential difference between the 
rights of humans and other animals (Dresner 2008, pp. 155-156). Recent New Zealand law 
recognises an entire river as a living entity with the rights of a person (Roy 2017). The 
proposed crime of ecocide would regard the destruction of ecosystems as punishable in an 
international court. In the 2016 ‘shadow’ ecocide case against Monsanto, however, the 
putative crime remains anthropocentric; the ecosystem damage must in some way directly 
harm humans.273 Yet as Polly Higgins (2017) points out, since the Paris Agreement, the mens 
rea (‘guilty mind’) in ecocide now exists as a recklessness in disregarding available 
information. Decision-makers cannot claim ignorance of the harm from dangerous industrial 
technologies, at least as far as greenhouse gas emissions are concerned.  
 
But, as is typical of concepts touched by sustainability, there is a paradox. The dirtiest 
companies tend to spend a great deal on politics if they are not to be regulated out of 
existence, so politics tends to be dominated by companies associated with unsustainable 
technologies (Monbiot 2017). ExxonMobil is one example.274 There is strong evidence that the 
Koch brothers’ oil interests led to the Republican repudiation of climate science (Davenport & 
Lipton 2017). But while corporate influence on politics varies according to individual states, 
sway mounts as international corporate mergers progress and companies dwarf many 
countries. Laws that prevent such mergers, and which restrict corporate donations to political 
parties would tend to avert Monbiot’s paradox and enable politics to better represent the 
public interest, especially in favour of sustainable technologies. 
 
Further, as discussed in chapter 8, it would be prudent to amend patent regulations to 
encourage genuine progress rather than trivial innovation, and to discourage patents as a lure 
for corporate takeover. This would provide for a primary indication of the invention’s impact 
on sustainability rather than just its novelty and ‘useful purpose’ as it is now. To advance 
sustainable innovation, patent governance could be tailored to each industry sector. The 
information technology sector that can make developments quickly, may well benefit from 
short patent protection; greater openness may encourage collaboration (Bostrom 2016, p. 
19). Whereas the pharmaceutical sector may need longer protection because developments 
take much time and can be easily copied. While the radical proposal  to abolish patents 
altogether and rely on first mover advantage  might benefit innovation, it would do nothing 
to encourage sustainable technologies. As a register of inventions, patents are a potentially 
rich source of data that may be trawled by artificial intelligences looking for more sustainable 
technologies than those presently developed.  
 
Financial restructuring 
Technology governance is hampered by the influence of the military and the fossil fuel industries. 
The case studies imply that it would benefit transparency and accountability if the military were 
restrained and re-oriented. This indicates financial restraint so that military technologies are 
properly scrutinised rather than authorised under pressure of a competitive arms contest. It 
also implies a re-orientation from the technologies of destruction to the technologies of 
peace-keeping, development aid delivery, and emergency services. New Zealand’s approach 
                                                 
272 This decision was since overturned on appeal (Kyriakakis 2015). 
273 Personal conversation with court advocate, Dr Gwynn MacCarrick, 3 February 2017. 
274 ExxonMobile’s former CEO, Rex Tillerson, was confirmed as US Secretary of State in 2017. 
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to its air force is an example here. It has no expensive combat aircraft;275 instead patrol 
helicopters together with long range transport and rescue craft are consistent with its mission, 
enabling operations over large areas of the Pacific. While achieving such re-orientation would 
be enormously difficult and require great political skill, it would be helped by the practical 
necessity of dealing with the disasters brought about by climate change. As floods and 
tempests intensify, the military is the logical organisation to deal with their effects. Missiles, 
bombs and combat aircraft have little value in disaster relief. Desalination units, emergency 
shelter and safe transport are in demand. Further, the dynamics of reorientation would favour 
producers of rescue equipment and so reduce the influence of the weapons producers in the 
military-industrial complex.  
 
Apart from legal restraint, encouraging the ‘divestment’ movement would also tend to reduce 
the influence of fossil fuel corporations and enable integrity in governance. Originally based in 
Western universities, the movement uses social media and direct protest to persuade 
investment funds to put their money elsewhere. While still more a trickle than a tsunami, 
funds that have pledged divestment include the Lutheran World Federation and the World 
Council of Churches,276 the world’s largest single pool of investment capital, Norway’s 
sovereign wealth fund, as well as Stanford University and AXA, the world’s largest insurance 
company. Ultimately the aim is to damage the reputation of fossil fuel companies as tobacco 
companies and apartheid were affected in times past (Gunther 2015). In any case, there 
already appears to be over-investment in extraction. According to the International Energy 
Agency (2014, p. 43), much investment in fossil fuels will be “stranded” if stronger measures 
are taken against emissions. Therefore, a rational investment strategy would fund 
technologies that increase sustainability, and so reduce the need for hard regulatory measures 
to govern the technologies that do not.  
 
Structural and institutional change 
As to the structure of governance, some believe that stronger, more globally centralised 
government is ultimately the only answer to sustainability (Heilbroner 1974, p. 175). Others, wary 
of government’s cumbersome tendencies, assert market forces and innovation as leading to a 
sustainable future based on renewable energy technologies (Lovins 2011). Still others believe this 
is implausible because corporations are ultimately focused on profit, not sustainability (Reich 
2007, p. 170). Or because adversarial liberal democracies, based on individual self-interest, are 
inherently unsustainable (Gale 2014). In framing the issue as a conflict between democracy and 
the environment, Mathews (1991) doubts that either can be sacrificed for the other. 
 
Beyond authoritarian centralism or corporate laissez-faire, a third option involves enlarged and 
localised ‘strong’ democracies (Orr 2013, Klein 2014) encompassing de-privatisation, similar to 
the socialism espoused by US Senator Bernie Sanders during the 2016 presidential election and 
including spreading economic assets throughout society. Allan Patience (2017) argues that after 
the present evident failure of neoliberal capitalism, better governance would consist of an 
enlivened international civil society, new forms of direct democratic governance, and state re-
regulation of economies in the interests of society rather than elites. There are cautions about 
throwing out the baby with the bathwater, however: “the administrative state isn’t optional in 
our complex society. It’s indispensable” (Bazelon & Posner 2017). But given the ever-increasing 
scope and size of transnational corporations, inter-government and global institutions are 
indicated to set standards and manage the transitions to new technologies (Adams 2006, p. 15; 
Sajeva, Sahota & Lemon 2015, p. 65). Some such institutions exist, but lack coordinated 
placement within a governance structure. 
                                                 
275 One FA-18E/F Hornet has a 2016 price of approximately US$100 million, for example (Wiki 2017). 
276 http://gofossilfree.org/lutheran-world-federation-divests/ 
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Much of the focus for epistemic communities is already on international cooperation, but for 
technological sustainability such is the speed of change and mounting risk, wider global 
networks involving all stakeholders are indicated. “Despite the veneer of objectivity and value 
neutrality achieved by pointing to the input of scientists, policy choices remain highly political” 
(Haas 1992, p. 11). As the case studies show, scientists often differ in interpreting results and 
are cloistered in narrow disciplines. Consistent with Berg’s observation about increasing 
corporate dominance, the governance of emerging technologies would be facilitated if 
connection with other stakeholders is made early.  
 
The dynamic nature of technology demands an agile, adaptive form of governance.  
Traditional ‘predict and control’ regimes are centralised, hierarchical with narrow 
participation. Whereas adaptive regimes are polycentric, horizontal approaches with broad 
stakeholder input. In this area, centralised regimes tend to involve only quantifiable 
environmental measurement that can be determined easily. By contrast, decentralised 
governance tends to use both qualitative and quantitative indicators over whole ecosystems 
that are changing rapidly due to human influence (Pahl-Wostl 2007, p. 55). This sort of 
adaptive management is also a systematic process for continuous improvement of policies 
and practices by learning from strategic outcomes (Ibid, p. 51).  
 
Polycentric, collaborative governance systems that include the general public in decision-
making can not only enhance the knowledge base of decisions, but also support 
implementation through ownership (Lang et al 2012, Newig et al 2016, p. 343). Just as Ostrom 
(2009) advised that the management of common resources is best “drawing on the strengths 
of many different institutions working together” and “co-operating at multiple scales” 
(Meinzen-Dick 2012), the management of technology in all its complexity is similarly 
mandated: technology is a fundamental resource and has many owners. Polycentric systems 
also have advantages over monocentric designs because numerous points of intersection help 
form resilient networks that can develop and maintain capability despite the ineptitude of one 
or two. Such network governance systems have reserves of expertise that help overcome 
inadequacies of particular components. 
 
If technologies are to be effectively governed, then their risks must be made visible. This is 
challenging due to the variety of technologies involved and the temptation to use further 
high-risk technologies to solve the original problem (Adam, Beck & Loon 2000; Harari 2017). 
Technological risk assessment therefore implies a mix of approaches, including a top-down 
oversight that identifies major risks (high impact combined with high likelihood) and their 
mitigation, as well as inputs from experts and stakeholders in different particular fields.  
 
There are already academic institutions that attempt to assess major risk, such as the 
University of Cambridge’s Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER) as well as the Future 
of Humanity Institute (FHI) at Oxford which look at threats to the very existence of our 
species, especially including the hazards of “advanced forms of biotechnology, molecular 
nanotechnology, and machine intelligence” (Bostrom 2013, p. 16). The Club of Rome 
continues its concern with the future of humanity, including attention to the technological 
risks that Peccei had urged.277 The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) that provided 
the original ‘Limits to Growth’ report for the Club is central to both sustainability and 
technology. The Stockholm Resilience Centre studies the risks of crossing the planetary 
                                                 
277 But more on risks of unsustainable consumption and alternative economics. Its 2017 website lists 
the Reclaim Economics program, stating that “the current economic system is failing humanity and the 
planet at almost every level”. 
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boundaries, and also seeks to identify technologies that advance sustainability by reducing 
those risks.  
 
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in Chicago publishes the ‘Doomsday Clock’,278 which 
originally indicated the likelihood of nuclear conflict. It now includes other technology-related 
threats, such as climate change, biological weapons and ‘cyberthreats’. The Bulletin suggests 
that open-source monitoring could be used to help supervise the waning Biological Weapons 
Convention, which lacks an effective inspections system (Jeremias & Himmel 2016). A like 
principle could apply to the monitoring of all high risk technologies. Whistleblowers can help 
police mundane technologies too, as in the recent US$40 million case of illegal discharge from 
cruise liners (Clatworthy & Horne 2017). 
 
Meanwhile, geoengineering looks increasingly real. A Harvard team has proposed to spray 
aerosols into the stratosphere in 2018, despite a moratorium on the practice adopted by the 
UN Convention on Biological Diversity, which the US has not ratified (Neslen 2017). At the 
same time, the non-profit Carnegie Council is pursuing an initiative that aims to shift the 
debate on geoengineering governance “from academia to the intergovernmental policy 
space”. The initiative involves constructing global networks on the issue from a wide range of 
stakeholders and governments (Carnegie Council 2017, p. 3). This sort of risk demands serious 
attention, but other issues of technology governance might benefit from a similar network. 
 
The evermore complex risk society implies that science must be ‘de-monopolised’ away from 
narrow groups of experts, because those who may suffer the effects of decisions should be 
able to contribute to them (Bäckstrand 2003, pp 32-33). Encouraging linkages between the 
organisations concerned with technological risk cited above, with civil society, international 
institutions, the media  and directly to interested individuals  would help enable such 
contributions to be made.  
 
Many organisations deal with particular technologies at and above the level of nation states, 
but none directly concern technology and sustainability together. Many others involve the 
more general ‘sustainable development’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘biosphere impacts’. There are 
also proposals for new bodies that relate to other aspects of technologies and their impacts. 
One suggestion is for institutions to “manage the technological transition” to the new 
economy of reuse, recycle and new energy (Adams 2006, p. 15). Another is for a “global 
referee” to ensure that planetary boundaries are respected (Steffen, Rockström & Costanza 
2011, p. 65).  
 
However, it seems that there is as yet no institution to oversee technologies as they affect 
sustainability in general. If established, such an institution would function as the global focal 
point for the governance of technologies in the quest for sustainability. It would coordinate 
research and promote links between nodal points in a networked governance system, 
including the academic bodies mentioned above, other relevant research institutions, industry 
bodies, think tanks, NGOs and regulatory agencies. It would produce reports on established 
and emerging technologies and their effects on sustainability. It would organise conferences 
to determine priority areas, and it would encourage evaluations of technology systems and 
their governance. Desirably, ordinary people would be empowered to engage online, 
especially including those who might identify applications of unsustainable technologies. 
Conversely, such an institution would help illuminate more of those jewels of sustainability 
and encourage their adoption more widely.  
                                                 
278 The Doomsday Clock was created in 1947 by former Manhattan Project researchers. It showed three 
minutes to midnight as at March 2017. 
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Values 
In the name of profit, capitalism drives efficiency to reduce production costs. But efficiency 
improvements by themselves, can be counter-productive, as the Jevons paradox 
demonstrates. It has been argued that rather what is needed is: 
 
a conscious effort to direct technological innovation toward the achievement of 
clearly defined societal goals that reflect shared values…Unless we undertake this 
critical challenge, technological innovation and efficiency improvements will continue 
to promote unsustainable growth which will inexorably lead to environmental and 
societal collapse (Huesemann & Huesemann 2011, p. 116). 
 
Even if this prediction is exaggerated, there is a mass of evidence that neoliberal capitalism is 
at best inadequate in fostering sustainable technology, because its only value is profit. But as 
Fukuyama and Thatcher might concur,279 capitalism will nevertheless be part of technology’s 
future, just not as neoliberal discourse suggests, “that no other part need be played” 
(Albertson 2014).  
 
Further, there are tendencies for values to be downgraded. An early landmark paper in the 
field of conservation biology advanced ‘core values’280 that were centred on the intrinsic value 
of biodiversity and ecological complexity, irrespective of human considerations (Soulé 1985, p. 
964). By contrast, a more recent article in the same journal suggests that these values are no 
longer appropriate because the global context has since profoundly changed. Human 
dominance of the biosphere is pervasive, while at the same time nature has shown surprising 
resilience. Instead of values, more “practical statements” about what should be done are 
proposed. These involve recognition of human-altered ecosystems and working with 
corporations to maximise both conservation and economic objectives (Kareiva & Marvier 
2012, pp. 965-967). This exposes a fault line in sustainability thinking. The former position may 
be too restrictive, whereas the latter licenses still more human interference in natural systems 
that are already precarious.  
 
It has been suggested that it is time for “a presidential technoethics commission”, just as 
earlier US bioethics commissions281 laid down guidelines for stem cell research. The 
technoethics commission call is due to an increasingly pervasive information technology, 
which now routinely records and sells personal details, preferences and consumer actions via 
social media (Rockmore 2016), thus threatening all values that are not commercial. 
Sustainability logically outranks values of commerce and exchange.  
 
Political priorities 
The related issue of data ownership and control is probably still more substantial. As data has 
become a ubiquitous commodity, corporate control over it threatens sustainability through 
the exclusion of other interests. As a ‘non-rival good’, data are virtually immortal and may be 
consumed indefinitely. While it may be used commercially, it is also integral to scientific and 
social research. And because data mining for research opens vivid new vistas of sustainability 
assessment, Donella Meadows’ (2008) ‘dancing with Earth systems’ becomes possible  but 
only if data are freely available for examination and study. This does not contradict the right of 
entrepreneurs to put a value on the information they create from data for commercial 
purposes. But the quest for sustainability will be impeded if researchers are denied access to 
the fundamental records available on which to build information and knowledge.  
                                                 
279 They share the view that ‘there is no alternative’. 
280 These values are consistent with the philosophy of ‘deep ecology’ (Naess 1973). 
281 Such as the US National Bioethics Advisory Commission 1999. 
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Environmentalism’s traditional capacity to speak like the prophet Jeremiah, promising hell to 
come, does not promote creative thinking and openness to change  William Adams (IUCN) 2006, 
p. 15.  
 
Persuasive rhetoric is important to political outcomes (Hume 2009, p. 6), and as Adams points 
out, the language of Jeremiah is unproductive. Sustainability values are underpinned by 
narrative; they are not intrinsic to the technology Janus, which is values-blind. The gulf 
between the sciences and the arts lamented by C P Snow (1959) has probably widened due to 
the fractal concerns of both systems, as well as to the cumulative technological complexity 
since his time. This accelerating ‘techne’, however, has not been matched by a logos or 
‘persuasive discourse’ (Kemple 2017) that would set technology within a purposeful ethic. If 
biodiversity and sustainability have intrinsic value, then technologies that minimise the human 
footprint are most ethical. A rhetoric that invokes technology to bridge the gap between 
science and the arts may make use of both spheres. Such a narrative could involve an ethic of 
preventing the entropic juggernaut from taking nature with us into terminal decline, instead 
to use technologies that enhance life in all its forms. Or it could describe how brute machines 
that once underpinned industrial-scale devastation are replaced by agile technologies that 
measure, visualise and diagnose ways to repair the damage that has led us to the brink. 
 
Bearing in mind that the pursuit of sustainability depends on a global community linked 
through Internet-based technologies (Dresner 2008, p. 179; Gore 2014), such inclusion is now 
technically feasible online,282 whether direct or via the social media. Input may be invited from 
everyone who has interests or concerns. Thus governance may be refreshed by democracy. It 
may also be refreshed by gender inclusion. The Silicon Valley ‘alien overlords’ are largely men, 
as elsewhere such as the UK (Hicks 2017). It is probable that women have some different 
perspectives and priorities. 
 
The planetary boundaries (Steffen, Rockström & Costanza 2011; Steffen et al 2015) indicate 
where technologies are most critical in the quest for sustainability. Although questioned as to 
their scale (Nordhaus, Shellenberger & Blomqvist 2012), they are extensively cited and 
recognised by major global organisations.283 These boundaries therefore indicate priorities for 
technological governance. Ozone destroying technologies have been checked by the Montreal 
protocol, but disruption of the nitrogen and phosphorous cycles is at critical levels, as are 
extinctions and biodiversity impacted by chemical pollutants, land-clearing and hunting 
technologies. The Earth’s capacity to assimilate ‘novel entities’ such as heavy metals, nuclear 
waste, plastics and other chemicals is not yet quantified, but of considerable concern. The 
effects of greenhouse gas and particulate emissions are also critical. Beyond these indications, 
there are the emerging technologies that threaten to get out of hand, such as artificial general 
intelligence and forms of geoengineering, which demand sustainability risk assessment. These 
issues are more than just prosaic ‘environmental concerns’. Contrary to Fukuyama’s view, 
their governance will also require daring, courage, imagination, and idealism: 
 
The end of history will be a very sad time… daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be 
replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental 
concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands  
 Francis Fukuyama 1989, p. 25 
 
                                                 
282 The Online Direct Democracy Party in Australia, for example, offers such a citizen direct-vote policy.   
283 Such as the UN High Level Panel on Global Sustainability (2012), Oxfam, the World Wildlife Fund and 
the UN Environment Program. 
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Chapter 14. Conclusion: the owl of Minerva 
 
Only in the maturity of reality does the ideal appear as counterpart to the real, apprehends the 
real world in its substance, and shapes it into an intellectual kingdom. The owl of Minerva 
takes flight only when the shades of night are gathering          Georg Hegel 2001 [1820], p. 20. 
 
That wisdom’s companion is a natural creature, of strength and beauty, that oversees the 
world from aloft before swooping down in shadow upon its quarry, fits this finale.  
 
Dusk is falling over the industrial age of fossil fuels and the ‘limitless frontier’. It gathers over 
neoliberal market supremacy, which has failed to answer humanity’s greatest problem. At the 
end of this era the planet-changing power of our technological tigers is apparent. After two 
centuries of technological outburst, we have reached a point where its pattern is clear. Just as 
modern capitalism cannot control itself, it cannot control the technologies from which it 
profits; the exponential growth it provokes inevitably leads to material entropy. Unrestrained, 
it is antipathetic to the planet and to humanity.  
 
Capitalism’s handmaiden, innovation, concerns the diffusion of novel technologies. But unlike 
the owl, innovation does not inevitably augment wisdom. It is blind to the benefit or harm 
that such dispersal might bring. Rather, innovation worships at the value-free “altar of 
change” (Vinsel & Russell 2016). As another Russell (1946) said, it is a kind of madness.  
 
Much concern with technology centers on energy and how its emissions lead to global 
warming and to a cascade of detrimental effects. Geoengineering responses such as 
atmospheric aerosol spraying, or seeding of the seas with iron, may evoke unforeseen results. 
Nuclear technologies risk meltdown and spawn the conundrum of waste that cannot be 
assimilated. Chemical technologies still pollute the waterways despite knowledge of 
sustainable alternatives. Mining and smelting technologies are not sustainable yet could be 
much contained and improved. There is risk of pandemic from genetic experimentation. And 
there is the ‘existential threat’ of artificial intelligence that uncritically but inexorably follows 
instructions embedded in its algorithms, written by our alien overlords.   
 
All life is counter-entropic within itself (Schrödinger 1944; Lovelock 1979). The external 
entropy it necessarily creates can only be offset by incoming energy. The Earth is literally a 
solar-powered life-support system  for humans and for myriad, but dwindling numbers of 
other species. That life support system is malfunctioning mainly due to the impact of human 
technologies. Unless our future is to be degraded and inert, as our sibling moon reminds us of 
such a fate, our technologies must support life. The imperative is to treat ‘our common home’ 
as if we intend to stay  and as if we want other species to stay with us. Technologies that 
frustrate that imperative must be reined in; technologies that advance it must be encouraged.  
 
This dissertation has approached the conundrum of sustainability by assessing how it is 
conceived and the contribution of its classic components to human impact upon this planet. 
While the rate of population increase is at last slowing, such is its momentum that our 
numbers will probably continue to swell until the end of the century. Rising affluence and 
consumption, especially of food and energy in the East and South, will place additional strains 
on primary and extractive industries and demand better ways to fuel and transport within and 
between settlements. Neither population nor affluence can be braked through policy leverage 
in the medium term; such methods are simply unpalatable or have unacceptable 
consequences for those who already have little. In the West, the rising inequality that is 
intrinsic to capitalism fragments political coherence.  
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The assertion that technology offers our best chance in the pursuit of sustainability is highly 
contested. The case studies illustrate major concerns with how it is developed and deployed. 
Yet if not technology, then what? It is technology that has defined our civilisation. It is evolving 
rapidly. While it has wrought great harm, it has also brought great benefit. Our relationship 
with technology has always been interwoven with our historical economic systems; much has 
centered on the relative price of labour, on slavery, and on the development of labour-saving 
devices in the West. But the most powerful force in technological development over the 
period of the Industrial Revolution has been capitalism, often linked with the concerns of the 
military. Even the present key technology platform, the Internet, has military origins. These 
two forces are exceptionally difficult to control. Neither recognises limits or end points. Both 
amplify rivalry, whether of the individual or the nation state. Both are based on continuous 
development. 
 
The direction of that development may nevertheless be channelled. Now that it is the entire 
planet that is affected in this Anthropocene, how technologies are governed, demands a 
global approach. At the same time, such is the diversity and rapid development of new 
technologies in this digital era, that agility is essential to any form of effective governance. 
There is no world government, but a world government in an institutional sense may not be 
warranted  at least as far as reasserting direction and control over technology is concerned  
as it would be clumsy. Agility may be attained through a network system that links existing 
and new stakeholders in a mesh large enough to encompass major global issues, yet fine 
enough to be sensitive to particular emerging developments and impacts. 
 
In deference to Snow, Pirsig and McLuhan, the need to bridge the quantitative and the 
qualitative in resolving this conundrum is apparent. Scientists, engineers and technocrats are 
essential to any move to bend technology in the direction of sustainability. Philosophers, 
writers, economists and politicians are needed to reform the economic system and the 
military towards a capacity to accept and benefit from it. Politically, it is well past time to 
assert leadership over technology, over the economic system and over the military so that the 
fine arts, love, and capital accumulation are, in the longer term, not for nought and for 
nothing, but rather for all and everything in the present and the future. 
 
Means of effecting such a future have been discussed in the light of the case study 
assessments. In summary, they include the following: 
 
Legislative measures that would favour technological sustainability include the establishment 
of non-human rights and the crime of ecocide, limiting corporate influence over 
representational politics and amending patent law to support genuine progress. Financial 
measures include restricting investment in unsustainable technologies and promoting re-
investment in sustainable alternatives. Re-nationalisation of electricity grids and public 
transport are alternatives to neoliberal market failures in these sectors if sustainability is to be 
a priority.  
 
There is a need for technological threat identification, which links existing institutions and 
facilitates input from a wide range of stakeholders, including support for whistleblowers. As a 
source of destructive technologies, the military attracts special scrutiny. To the extent that the 
military can be re-oriented to non-violent roles, there would tend to be a rebalance towards 
more sustainable technologies, and perhaps towards a peace during which such organisations 
might redirect their attention.  
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The tension between values involving technology and nature concerns nature’s intrinsic value 
as against the practical value of working within altered ecosystems in conjunction with 
corporate interests. Technoethics commissions may be useful, but the need to regulate data 
that simultaneously rewards openness, preserves privacy and enables its analysis is more 
pressing. Sustainability and technology demand an underpinning narrative; one that is both 
practical and aspirational; as with Dryzek’s reformist environmental discourses, both prosaic 
and imaginative, or as with Steffen’s greens and greys, more bright green (innovation and 
regulation) than the alternatives.  
 
Elements of an effective governance system include transparency involving usable and 
accessible information, inclusive participation, integrity fortified by a clear sense of mission 
and a policy capacity drawn from polycentric networks and the encouragement of public 
input. Such a system would first relate to technologies that affect the Earth system 
boundaries. A global institution designed as a central focus of governance for technological 
sustainability would especially encourage network linkages between existing institutions and 
illuminate areas where progress has been realised. Accountability is ultimately to all of us; its 
sanction is the quality of our existence. 
 
The governance of technologies for sustainability must itself rely on technologies available for 
data, information and knowledge, as well as for communication. These technologies are easy 
to identify and access is at issue. But for wisdom, there is no such technology; ultimately 
wisdom depends on human judgement. As technological complexity increases, expertise must 
narrow. Judgement of technological quality then is a series of human overlaps. These 
connections can be made across and between disciplines, and also across experiences. Neither 
the blind wisdom of the market nor the omniscience of a central authority can be assumed. To 
govern technology for sustainability, we must “reach beyond the powers of commerce and 
command” (Kemp, Parto & Gibson 2005, p. 26) to a shared responsibility that encompasses 
the Earth. 
 
One key challenge between technology and sustainability is on the one hand against the 
attitude that our predicament is inevitable and that any effort can only make things worse. It 
is on the other hand against the promise that technology will solve all problems (Buckup 
2016). In either discourse we become passive subjects in a world of increasing uncertainty, 
whereas awareness, thought and participation is critical if our species is to have a future. 
 
Driven only by national rivalry or by the quest for profit, technology has defined the last two 
hundred years of human civilisation  at its most triumphant and at its most demeaning. At 
this gathering of the dusk, unless the quest for sustainability overrides other considerations of 
technology’s governance, a long night looms ahead. 
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